Yeah, to some extent the hinge is just the stuff we agree on, but there is an extra step such that the hinge is the stuff about which we cannot sensibly disagree... — Banno
If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon.
Much had to change within the system for it to be certain that someone has been on the moon. This includes having landed on the moon and our being aware of it. If the moon missions had been kept secret we might know that the science had changed enough that it might be possible but there would still be good grounds to doubt that anyone has ever been on the moon
It is not either the fact or the system of grounds underlying the fact — Fooloso4
98…the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.
102. Might I not believe that once, without knowing it, perhaps is a state of unconsciousness, I was taken far away from the earth - that other people even know this, but do not mention it to me? But this would not fit into the rest of my convictions at all. Not that I could describe the system of these convictions. Yet my convictions do form a system, a structure.
105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system.
It's not a good idea to consider hinges to be "outside our epistemological framework", any more than it would be a good idea for a hydrologist not to consider the riverbed. They are rather the foundation on which an "epistemological framework" rests. — Banno
359. But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.
475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination [Raisonnement].
467. I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a
tree", pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: "This
fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy."
It is not one or the other, either the fact "alone" of landing on the moon "or" the system underlying the fact. We would remain doubtful if we were not made aware of the fact and we would remain doubtful if it could not be justified within the system — Fooloso4
As to Moore, it is not his certainty that is at issue, but whether this is an adequate response to the skeptic. Unless someone has a prior commitment to some philosophical position that puts it into doubt, the response to Moore saying "this is my hand" would be to be as certain of it as he is. My dog does not require a system underlying the fact that this is my hand:
359. But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.
That this is a hand is in no need of justification. No need for a system of convictions underlying that fact. — Fooloso4
Moore thinks this sureness is the result of a huge bank of empirical evidence, but Wittgenstein entertains the idea that it’s something else altogether, sometimes described in terms of context and culture, but in §359 of On Certainty described as “something animal.”
Elsewhere, however, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that Moorean propositions are in some way innate to humans as animals. Instead, he repeatedly returns to the idea that these propositions are held fast by the games and activities they are used for—that they are in some way contingently certain, but certain all the same. Wittgenstein writes:
“I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.”(OC §248)
Empirical facts are fluid, they can change their truth value. — Joshs
It is his treatment of his certainty as an empirical fact rather than as a tacit commitment to a set of practices that hold together facts. — Joshs
↪Sam26 Banno
Why do we need to read Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" to get back to conclusions which Kant already implied with his ideas of "synthetic a priori truths"? — schopenhauer1
His having a hand is a commitment to a set of practices? The fact is, he either has a hand or he does not. This may be "fluid" in so far as his hand might be cut off, and then the fact is he doesn't have a hand any longer.
There are practice which involve having or using our hands, but this is not a commitment to a set of practices. The practices follow the fact that we have and use hands. Without hands the set of practices would no longer exist. — Fooloso4
@BannoWe don’t. We need to read On Certainty to reach conclusions that move beyond Kant’s thinking. Synthetic a priori truths begin by splitting off the world in itself from the activity of the subject and then piece them together again. — Joshs
Why do we need to read Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" to get back to conclusions which Kant already implied with his ideas of "synthetic a priori truths"? — schopenhauer1
I'm not sure what conclusions you're referring to. What do you think the conclusions of OC are? — Sam26
Yes but explain what you think Witt is saying and how it connects with Kant, and then I'll respond. I'm not sure we're on the same page. — Sam26
Witt's hinge propositions function the same.. They too are necessary conditions and outside experience.. Their examples might be different, but their functional roles are about the same. They both propose preconditions that are cognitive frameworks for knowledge and experience to take place. — schopenhauer1
I don't see Witt as saying hinges are like Kant's a priori statements, i.e., outside experience. — Sam26
assume this is directed toward me, so I'll respond. We know that much of what Witt was saying was directed at Moore's propositions in his papers Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense, so we're referring to specific propositions that Moore says he knows. Moore believes he has a justification for claiming to know "This is a hand (as he raises it to the audience)." Witt resists this notion, although he starts OC with, "If you do know [my emphasis] that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest (OC 1)." It seems clear to me that when Witt refers to hinge propositions or Moorean propositions he's saying that you don't know what you think you know, viz., Moore's use of the concept know doesn't apply because these statements don't fall within the domain of JTB. We don't normally justify these basic beliefs or Moorean statements. There are of course exceptions to this general rule (generally we don't justify them) and Witt points these out. — Sam26
Well, not only you, and not in response to any particular post. I was just setting out a few thoughts regarding the direction of this thread. There's a slide from "here is a hand" not being known right down to a conclusion that hinges are non-propositional and preverbal. But I don't agree that if you get on one end of the slide, you must get off at the other.I assume this is directed toward me, so I'll respond. — Sam26
Witt's hinge propositions function the same ( as Kant).. They too are necessary conditions and outside experience. Their examples might be different, but their functional roles are about the same. They both propose preconditions that are cognitive frameworks for knowledge and experience to take place — schopenhauer1
... clinging to words, clinging to phrases ...
You can't see the obvious here? You want a debate without words? See ....why cannot there be a robust debate as to whether philosophy of language come prior or after formal epistemology? — schopenhauer1
Or perhaps you are reading Kant into Wittgenstein. I agree here with @Sam26; hinges are not just the now quite problematic notion of synthetic a priori, nor are there clear conclusions in On Certainty. I think you have missed quite a bit of what is going on here.Well, he isn’t saying it’s like Kant, and that’s the problem as it is… — schopenhauer1
You can't see the obvious here? You want a debate without words? — Banno
nor are there clear conclusions in On Certainty. I think you have missed quite a bit of what is going on here. — Banno
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.