Nothing he says aligns with the mistake your entire philosophical edifice, informed stance, rests its laurels upon. See the top of this post. — creativesoul
My "stance" is repeating what the scientists have said: — Michael
Newton: "For the Rays to speak properly are not coloured. In them there is nothing else than a certain Power and Disposition to stir up a Sensation of this or that Colour."
Kim et al: "Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus."
Palmer: "Color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights."
Maxwell: "Color is a sensation." — Michael
Newton: "For the Rays to speak properly are not coloured. In them there is nothing else than a certain Power and Disposition to stir up a Sensation of this or that Colour." — Michael
Searle presents the example of the color red: for an object to be red, it must be capable of causing subjective experiences of red. At the same time, a person with spectrum inversion might see this object as green, and so unless there is one objectively correct way of seeing (which is largely in doubt), then the object is also green in the sense that it is capable, in certain cases, of causing a perceiver to experience a green object.
This seems to be arguing that colours are mental phenomena and that the predicate "is red" is used to describe objects which cause red mental phenomena. — Michael
On this view you're advocating for, you're clearly stating that there is no difference between seeing, hallucinating, and dreaming.
— creativesoul
I didn’t say that. — Michael
What's the difference between seeing red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur?
— creativesoul
Nothing. — Michael
And what's the difference between hallucinating red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur?
Or between dreaming red and the mental percept that 620-750nm light ordinarily causes to occur?
— creativesoul
Nothing. — Michael
And Lastly, from Seeing Things as They Are by John Searle:
"Question 2 How does the account deal with color constancy and size constancy? I will consider these in order. Imagine that a shadow falls over a portion of the red ball so that part of it is in shadow and part not. Did the part in shadow change its color? Well, obviously not, and it is obviously not seen as having changed its color. All the same, there is a difference in the subjective visual field. The subjective basic perceptual properties have changed. The proof is that if I were drawing a picture of what I now see, I would have to include a darker portion of the part in shadow, even though I know that there has been no change in its actual color. It is extremely misleading to describe this phenomenon as "color constancy", because of course the experienced color is precisely not constant. It is because of my high-level Background capacities that I am able to see it as having the same color even though at the lower level I see it as having in part changed its color. I want to emphasize this point. At the basic level, the color is precisely not constant, neither subjectively nor objectively. It changes. It is just at the higher level that I know, because of my Background abilities, that it still keeps the same color." — Richard B
It's odd that Michael sees Searle as a friend, when Searle has spent so much effort in showing the intentional character of perception.
Searle eviscerates the Bad Argument - "that the existence of hallucinations and other arguments show you never see the real world, you just see your own sense data" - which looks to be the very case that @Michael is attempting to make, that we never see red, only ever percepts-of-red. — Banno
So now provide the link to the study in which some neurobiologist looked at someone's mental phenomenon while the subject was looking at a ripe tomato as observed red mental phenomenon.And hallucinations are what? A type of mental phenomenon, not a mind-independent property of tomatoes. Therefore colours are a type of mental phenomenon, not a mind-independent property of tomatoes. — Michael
The percept of the ball changed, but its color stayed the same. — Leontiskos
What makes causality and determinism necessarily materialistic? My thoughts naturally lead to other thoughts. Certain experiences are prerequisites for certain thoughts. It seems to me that my thoughts can "bump into" other thoughts and create novel thoughts. New thoughts are an amalgam of prior thoughts and experiences. It seems to me that causality and determinism could be just as immaterial as material.The next step, I believe, after freeing oneself from naive realism, is to free oneself from materialism altogether, and understand that the so-called "effects of the stone upon himself" are not properly called "effects" at all. The percept is a freely constructed creation of the living being, rather than the effects of a causal chain. This understanding enables the reality of the concept of free will. The living being's motivational aspects, which are very much involved in all neurological activity, and appear to allow the being to act with a view toward the future, (understood in its most simple form as the will to survive), cannot be understood as the product of causal chains. This is what science reveals to us, through its inability to understand such aspects in determinist terms. — Metaphysician Undercover
The only thing that is relevant is that the visual quality that we naively think of as being a mind-independent property of a tomato's surface is in fact a mental phenomenon either reducible to or caused by neural activity in the brain, usually in response to optical stimulation by light. — Michael
What makes causality and determinism necessarily materialistic? My thoughts naturally lead to other thoughts. Certain experiences are prerequisites for certain thoughts. It seems to me that my thoughts can "bump into" other thoughts and create novel thoughts. New thoughts are an amalgam of prior thoughts and experiences. It seems to me that causality and determinism could be just as immaterial as material. — Harry Hindu
What if I said that the tomato appears ripe? Do we really need to make it clear whether we are talking about the appearance or the tomato when talking about the tomato to others?I said that the tomato does not have the property that it appears to have. The property that it appears to have is in fact a subjective quality, and so is a percept, not a mind-independent property of material surfaces. — Michael
No, the change is the shadow falling over a part of the red ball, making that part look dark red. That's what there is to see. — jkop
I don't understand why we would need to escape determinism, or why free will is necessary. — Harry Hindu
In a deterministic universe, we all do what we naturally do. All acts feel natural and intended. — Harry Hindu
No, the change is the shadow falling over a part of the red ball, making that part look dark red. That's what there is to see. — jkop
I don't have a copy of Searle, but according to this:
Searle presents the example of the color red: for an object to be red, it must be capable of causing subjective experiences of red. At the same time, a person with spectrum inversion might see this object as green, and so unless there is one objectively correct way of seeing (which is largely in doubt), then the object is also green in the sense that it is capable, in certain cases, of causing a perceiver to experience a green object.
This seems to be arguing that colours are mental phenomena and that the predicate "is red" is used to describe objects which cause red mental phenomena. — Michael
(The Bad Argument Searle refers to is any argument that attempts to treat the perceptual experience as an actual or possible object of experience.) — Richard B
However the light source being reflected off of the tomato and into the eyes is no less a relevant part of the scientifc understanding of what is happening. — wonderer1
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