• apokrisis
    7.3k
    None of which is to deny the physics of colour. The scientistic view that "there is no colour in the world" is inept, failing to recognise that humans create and maintain a shared world of language and belief.Banno

    Somehow the neurobiology of perception has gone missing here. And some might think that the most salient part of the story. Curious.
  • apokrisis
    7.3k
    One has to wonder what the 8% of “colour blind” males make of this debate. Are they missing out on the glory of the red or green frequencies? Does it seem odd that red and green might just be about shared habits of speech? What can it mean that they can’t seem to see much of a difference between red and browny yellow or green and beige?

    A philosophical discussion of colour perception - or better yet, hue discrimination - ought to start with a better understanding of the neurobiology involved. And the ecological relevance. Why hue discrimination even matters in an organism’s construction of its world, it’s Umwelt.
  • apokrisis
    7.3k
    The science exists - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4987397/

    The ecological question of whether it is better to be a dichromat or trichromat is a tricky balance. It is easy to delete or add a cone. And across the primate world, there is a shuttling back and forth that appears to boil down to a tale of small comparative advantages.

    Perhaps you forage for food that it helps to spot from a distance, then more cones of the same type would help with the computational acuity. Or perhaps you forage for small berries that demand close work with nimble fingers. Then the extra colour pop of the trichromat is favoured as the option which provides more calories for less effort.

    So questions about perception are best first addressed in ecological terms. What is a “mind” even for?

    If there is anything “philosophical” left unaddressed after that, at least the discussion will be usefully focused. And not another re-run of idealism vs realism.
  • jorndoe
    3.6k
    Imagine we discover an unknown tribe of humans from some remote island. [...]Richard B

    Real-life example: Marie Curie might have lived longer if she could have visualized radiation with a cloud chamber or sonified radiation with a Geiger counter. Instead, it was her later radiation sickness symptoms that gave her the otherwise absent, delayed sensing of the radiation. :/

    The mental phenomena is not the cause of us seeing the colors of the fruit, the cause is the addition of the contact lenses.Richard B

    Hmm... So, there's the experience (the perception, qualia), the perceived (the fruit), and whatever is involved in the interaction (including the contact lenses). Could "mental phenomena" and "seeing the colors" be deflated, so they're the same thing? Or, well, for the mental phenomena to occur in this case, we'd first have to see with our eyes, right?

    Could we say that the rose and the car have the property of being red since they can elicit/cause that (format of) experience/perception to most onlookers under common circumstances?

    The experience/perception isn't "in the" rose, it's part of the onlooker when occurring. And the rose isn't part of (or "in") the onlooker. What "red" are we talking about anyway? :)
  • AmadeusD
    2.4k
    have the property of being red since they can elicit/cause that (format of) experience/perception to most onlookers under common circumstances?jorndoe

    "direction of best fit" as it goes... More than likely, something like this.
  • Michael
    15.1k
    The colours in the photograph are susceptible to blend and interfere with changing light conditions on different screens and environments where the photo is displayed. Basically we don't just see the colours of the dress, but a blend of its colours with the colours from different environments or screens, and that's why different observers tend to see different colours.jkop

    We look at the same distal object (the pixels on the screen), our eyes react to the same proximal stimulus (the light), and yet we see different colours. Therefore, the noun "colours" in the preceding sentence is not referring to some property of the distal object or some property of the proximal stimulus; it is referring to the type of mental percepts that differ between individuals.

    And the way we're using the noun "colours" in that initial sentence is the ordinary use of the word.

    That's plainly false. Red paint really reflects wavelengths of 700 nm, and to experience it as red is to have a veridical experience of it (unlike experiencing 700 nm as gray (if colorblind) or as any colour, sound, smell etc. (if hallucinating).jkop

    You're putting the cart before the horse. Light with a wavelength of 700nm ordinarily causes red colour percepts in most humans, and so we use the adjective "red" to describe objects which reflect light with a wavelength of 700nm.

    But as a noun, the word "red" ordinarily refers to that type of percept.

    Historically, before we knew what these percepts were, we mistook them for being mind-independent properties of objects. This is the naive realist view. We know better now.
  • Michael
    15.1k
    Six months later, Michale is still here to argue that he is most probably a Boltzmann brainBanno

    I'm not arguing that here. I'm simply responding to the question asking if brains can generate experiences in the vacuum of space. The Boltzmann brain thought experiment shows that such a scenario is both coherent and consistent with current scientific theories.

    When one has an experience, it is an experience of something. When there is no "something", it's an hallucination.Banno

    You seem to be using "experience" to mean "veridical experience". You're welcome to, but that's not what is meant when discussing Boltzmann brains.

    As an example, taken from Wikipedia:

    Experience refers to conscious events in general, more specifically to perceptions, or to the practical knowledge and familiarity that is produced by these processes. Understood as a conscious event in the widest sense, experience involves a subject to which various items are presented. In this sense, seeing a yellow bird on a branch presents the subject with the objects "bird" and "branch", the relation between them and the property "yellow". Unreal items may be included as well, which happens when experiencing hallucinations or dreams.

    When I talk about experience I mean any occurrence of visual or auditory or other percepts, produced by activity in the visual or auditory or other cortexes, regardless of what caused it. The experience is veridical if it is caused by the appropriate external stimulus, a dream if asleep, or an hallucination or illusion otherwise.
  • creativesoul
    11.8k
    Referring to mind-independent objects as having colours is a relic of naive colour realismMichael

    When I look at the photo of the dress and describe its coloursMichael

    :brow:
  • Michael
    15.1k
    Maybe quote the rest of the sentence:

    When I look at the photo of the dress and describe its colours as white and gold, the words “white” and “gold” are referring to colour percepts, not the pixels on the screen emitting certain wavelengths of light

    Do you agree or disagree with this?

    When looking at the photo of the dress, some see white and gold, some black and blue. This is a fact. What are the words "white", "gold", "black", and "blue" referring to in that sentence?

    I say mental percepts.
  • jkop
    822
    So questions about perception are best first addressed in ecological terms. What is a “mind” even for?

    If there is anything “philosophical” left unaddressed after that, at least the discussion will be usefully focused. And not another re-run of idealism vs realism.
    apokrisis

    Did for example JJ Gibson's research get rid of the metaphysical, epistemological and semantic issues? It seems fairly clear, I think, that these issues are inextricably connected. Hence the reruns of idealism vs realism etc.

    We look at the same distal object (the pixels on the screen), our eyes react to the same proximal stimulus (the light), and yet we see different colours.Michael

    No, you fail to distinguish the pixels of the image and the conditions of observation such as the pixels of different screens on which the image is displayed. Two observers looking at the same photo but on different screens see different colours (that's why screens need to be calibrated).

    Also when different observers in the same room see the photo on the same screen they may discover that they identify different colours depending on whether their eyes have been exposed to the same light conditions prior seeing the photo. It can take around 20 minutes for an aircraft pilot to adjust his or her vision from bright cabin light to the weak light conditions in a cockpit during night flight.

    Since it takes time for the eyes to adjust, different observers can mistake one colour for another, especially bleached, or blended colours under weak light conditions, st dusk or dawn etc that can make it difficult to identify the colour of a pigment or light source.

    Notice that regardless of the colours of the dress in the famous photo, they are kind of bleached or unsaturated, hence particularity susceptible to being influenced by the various conditions under which the photo is observed. It is disingenuous to exploit these selective or manipulated conditions of observation as "arguments" for subjectivism.
  • Michael
    15.1k


    Two people looking at the same photo on the same screen can see different colours. See the dress.

    I see white and gold, my colleague in the same room looking at the same screen sees black and blue.

    The nouns "white", "gold", "black", and "blue" in the preceding sentence are referring to percepts, not mind-independent properties of the screen or the light. This is the ordinary use of such nouns.

    See also variations in colour perception.
  • jkop
    822
    See the dress. ...
    See also variations in colour perception.
    .
    Michael

    Now you ignore my reply and explanation of those variations, how rude :sad:
  • Michael
    15.1k


    Your explanation of what causes variations in colour perception is not relevant to the claim I am making.

    I see white and gold when I look at the photo of the dress. The nouns "white" and "gold" in the preceding sentence do not refer to the screen's "disposition" to emit the wavelengths of light typically associated with white and gold; they refer to the types of mental percepts that I have and that those who see black and blue don't have.
  • Kizzy
    128
    So, yes, apparently brains can generate experiences in the vacuum of space. All that is required is the appropriate neural activity, regardless of what causes and maintains it. — Michael

    When one has an experience, it is an experience of something. When there is no "something", it's an hallucination.
    Banno
    Banno, I think I see what you are saying. :grimace: *inserts Lionino's image of the dur dur dur emoji*

    When one has an experience [lets say me, when I have an experience], it is an experience of "something" [me and who/what/where/when/how?]. When there is no "something" [no me or no ground for experience building or something to get out of "it" (it being the experience?)] I hallucinate when there is nothing to experience?] What if nothing like this has happened to me before, a freak accident or chance in timing,which allowed outcomes to play out that were not expected or anticipated, and that should be able to be explained for what it is by not the one experiencing the chance happening but from someone explaining it in the future for what it was worth then...[imagine telling your grand-kids about your friend getting struck by lightening in the 90's] It can be explained using lang skills in a future time looking back on the past after its been done. Years have passed and the story is recalled again in the present time, which is ancient history by now.... If we have no expectations or visions or ideas in mind, how can use language to describe/to infer any related experience from memory or recollection of thoughts/ideas? We have to picture these ideas in motion, know how they move not just what they are...what about, what WE are?

    What about day-dreaming? Why can't I speak of it?Oh yeah no one is listening. Say this subjective hallucination is explained or described or the person having the hallucinations are observed and as the words are used to talk about what happened in the "daydream" the first time, is it born into the world? Was it being nurtured in the privacy of your mind before you shared the words explaining it? Are the words said with purpose, or are they being stuttered from fear and trembling? Just the sound of the tone, or expression seen on the face, or intensity of the eyes looking towards an objective. How little do we need to express our truth in order to make a mark or lasting IMPRESSION upon others, the world, experience. Are we not making any lasting impression for the self in a separate way, internally? Is this required to reflect on our choices? How did we end up here? Did we lose sight of self and our light or path? Are we being illuminated or doing that for another? Depends.

    Should I try and make any sense of this experience had like no other? How would I know it was like no other if I didnt make sense of it one way or another? I have to then ask myself and answer honestly: Are you where you should be? Does it make sense? How far have we gone and how much have we grown? Agreed upon at large, we standardize objectivity, even as it shifts with time and society. It’s a reflection perhaps, not an illusion.


    Hmm... So, there's the experience (the perception, qualia), the perceived (the fruit), and whatever is involved in the interaction (including the contact lenses). Could "mental phenomena" and "seeing the colors" be deflated, so they're the same thing? Or, well, for the mental phenomena to occur in this case, we'd first have to see with our eyes, right?

    Could we say that the rose and the car have the property of being red since they can elicit/cause that (format of) experience/perception to most onlookers under common circumstances?

    The experience/perception isn't "in the" rose, it's part of the onlooker when occurring. And the rose isn't part of (or "in") the onlooker. What "red" are we talking about anyway? :)
    jorndoe
    This one :point: :flower: the flower and the onlooker are both a part of (or "in") the world, by "being-in-the-world" (see Heidegger, "What is Called Thinking" A Translation of Was Heisst Denken by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray) our experience interacting with flowers in our environment through our bodies sensory organs and/or a shared use of language or gestures that was "taken in" during the experience or interaction. By using both our vision and basic language in a shared world with another, we are asserting and verifying, THAT flower over there is the most vibrant red in the whole garden of roses.

    To the question, "Could "mental phenomena" and "seeing the colors" be deflated, so they're the same thing?" I say yes, but it's one sided and not the initial intention. I believe they can be MISTAKEN or confused into thinking they are seeing/experiencing "the thing" when really its an illusion that the body is distinguishing in the experience of the mental phenomenon to be the same thing without realizing...but that is not the person deciding they want to deflate the two or an observer hoping that one does deflate the two...sometimes one just does that and its linked to their abilities innate / conditioned to them. I think.

    When someone tells you "You have it good," stop for a moment. Think about the deeper meaning behind their statement. Are they being silly, or are we the silly ones? It could be that we both are. And it's possible that personal opinions really come to life in the gray area where joking ends and seriousness begins. Jokes on little lion boy or me?
    Hm, lion...nino...What is that, little lion boy? — Kizzy


    You had to reduplicate the -n- there to make the joke work. But not too far anyway.
    Lionino

    Lionino thinks I am trying to make a joke on his accorded behalf. I was simply showing that I was sounding out and using my language skills/my knowing to determine the meaning. A meaning I can recognize or understand since I know what a "lion" is and that "nino" is spanish for boy. I didnt double up the n to make the joke...you are the joke. I was displaying via screen and typed words how I was breaking down your username to learn what I can and verify my understanding before going to you, the source and person that can share further verifying how FAR out I am...

    So yeah, if you replied to me with an image of a retarded emoji to be funny I want to know who laughed? Does the laughing echo or is the silence deafening? I'm sure it amused a few...

    It only caused this reaction because maybe I also can see myself in the way you might have...Does this truth hurt? Not really, because I have accepted already I am a crazy doof! BUT I am no fool. AND THAT is how I attempt to break down subjectivity, we can get to the bottom of things. If not the bottom, maybe that is important. How close we are to it and if we ought to be there...What colors do you see at rock bottom?Can you go there? What do you know about it? Where are you?
  • jkop
    822
    Your explanation of what causes variations in colour perception is not relevant to the claim I am making.Michael

    The relevant philosophical issue is whether percepts exist, and if there are more plausible explanations of colour. Hence my explanation, yet you show little interest in the philosophy when you repeatedly assert that colour terms refer to percepts. My reference to the SEP article (that you also ignored) is at least descriptive while the article that you refer to unsurprisingly assumes percepts. :roll:
  • Michael
    15.1k
    It's not even a philosophical issue; it's a scientific issue. And the neuroscience shows us that visual percepts exist when there is neural activity in the visual cortex.

    Visual percepts evoked with an intracortical 96-channel microelectrode array inserted in human occipital cortex.
  • jkop
    822
    It's not even a philosophical issue; it's a scientific issue.Michael

    Yeah right :roll:
  • Banno
    24.3k
    You seem to be using "experience" to mean "veridical experience". You're welcome to, but that's not what is meant when discussing Boltzmann brains.Michael
    Perhaps. If you want a word for both experiences and hallucinations you might try "sensation" or "impression". That way we can usefully distinguish between experiencing things in the world and sensations with no such connection. I supose it suits your purpose not to do so.

    The Boltzmann brain thought experiment shows that such a scenario is both coherent and consistent with current scientific theories.Michael
    Then why is it contentious?

    When looking at the photo of the dress, some see white and gold, some black and blue. This is a fact. What are the words "white", "gold", "black", and "blue" referring to in that sentence?

    I say mental percepts.
    Michael
    The presumption is that "gold" is a noun, therefore there must be something for it to refer to. But there are all sorts of nouns that refer to multiple things, or do not refer at all. "Mental percept" here is quite empty - "the thing referred to by a colour word". There are colour words, and colours, because we can use them to pick out to each other different things around us. That sometimes one person sees blue where the other sees gold does not change this.
    The nouns "white" and "gold" in the preceding sentence do not refer to the screen's "disposition" to emit the wavelengths of light typically associated with white and gold...Michael
    Yep.
    ...they refer to the types of mental percepts that I have and that those who see black and blue don't have.Michael
    Nah. When someone says the dress is blue, that is a statement about the dress, not about their mind.
    It's not even a philosophical issue; it's a scientific issue. And the neuroscience shows us that visual percepts exist when there is neural activity in the visual cortex.Michael
    "Visual percepts" is again hollow. It means the patient discerned shapes. "Visual percepts" is hypostatisation.
  • Banno
    24.3k
    Somehow the neurobiology of perception has gone missing here.apokrisis
    I don't think there is any disagreement here concerning the neurobiology of perception. The issue is:
    Does the color “red” exist outside of the subjective mind that conceptually designates the concept of “red?”Mp202020
    That's a question about the way the word "red" is used.
  • apokrisis
    7.3k
    That's a question about the way the word "red" is used.Banno

    So when you get into an argument with a dichromat and start insisting that what they call green is actually beige, does your personal preference for language games trump their neurodiversity?

    Seems a little unwoke and culturally oppressive for you.
  • Banno
    24.3k
    Whatever, apo.
  • apokrisis
    7.3k
    Sure. Confabulate away. Pretend that colour is covered by "language games" and there is no further mystery to be accounted for. One that deals with the neurobiology rather than the social construction.
  • Lionino
    2.7k
    Seems a little unwoke and culturally oppressive for you.apokrisis

    Nobody here is woke, even if many purport to be. Go to the "Currently Reading" thread. Most names there by far are English. We can't be talking about diverse writers when folks don't even bother to read writers from neighbouring countries.

    Speaking of writers, screw that Argentine Borges and his shameful inferiority complex.
  • creativesoul
    11.8k
    Maybe quote the rest of the sentence:

    When I look at the photo of the dress and describe its colours as white and gold, the words “white” and “gold” are referring to colour percepts, not the pixels on the screen emitting certain wavelengths of light

    Do you agree or disagree with this?
    Michael

    It's not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing. It's a matter of coherency/terminological consistency. As far as I can tell, you're equivocating key terms. "Colours" is one. I was just pointing out the equivocation. The rest of the sentence shows that nicely. You know that too. That's why you corrected it when you added what's below...


    When looking at the photo of the dress, some see white and gold, some black and blue. This is a fact. What are the words "white", "gold", "black", and "blue" referring to in that sentence?

    I say mental percepts.
    Michael

    It's worth noting that that dress 'photo' is a digital image. The same issue does not arise with a hard copy. The words "white and gold" and "blue and black" are referring to both, the light being emitted by the dress and perceived by the viewer. The differences between viewers are attributable to the amount of direct sunlight they(and their eyes) had been exposed to leading up to the viewing of the 'photo'. The colors emitted by surfaces and our eyes are effected/affected by environmental influences such as direct sunlight, shadow, etc. Colours and coloured pigmentation are virtually useless in the deep sea for instance. A bright yellow ball looks very different when viewed in deep water, or in very low light conditions. Everything looks different in those conditions. So, it's clearly not just about what's going on in the brain when we look at distal objects.

    I say claiming that colours are "mental percepts" confines the scope to inside the brain. The dress, ball, and the light they emit/reflect are not. Technically speaking, nor are our eyes. I'm thinking that science also supports the claim that colours are light. I'm doubting that science supports what you're claiming it does.
  • Banno
    24.3k
    I say claiming that colours are "mental percepts" confines the scope to inside the brain.creativesoul
    Yep. Folk assume that colour words must refer, and that there must be a thing to which they refer, then get themselves all befuddled inventing things for them to refer to - "mental percepts" or "frequencies".
  • Moliere
    4.5k
    Nice. I find myself agreeing along with much of that.
  • jorndoe
    3.6k
    This one :point: :flower: the flower and the onlooker are both a part of (or "in") the world, by "being-in-the-world" (see Heidegger, [...]Kizzy

    :up: (no need to invoke the ol' fella' to talk about the world we're all part of, well, unless ...)

    I guess "it's red" or "it has the property of being red" means it reliably can elicit/cause that (format of) experience/perception to most onlookers under common circumstances? That's how we learn that stuff anyway.

    What exactly red is, may be a different question.
  • Kizzy
    128
    I just laughed aloud! :clap: :lol: I was feeling a bit earthy, please pardon my crudeness. Heading over to your thread for a better peek...
  • Banno
    24.3k
    Banno, I think I see what you are saying.Kizzy
    Thanks for the long response, which I will take as you thinking out loud. So many good questions, I'm not going to approach them all. There's a bunch of words relating to these topics. Consider also illusion, delusion, misapprehension, dream, see, perceive, glimpse, notice, and so on. Each with a particular take on what might be happening.
  • Kizzy
    128
    Hey thanks for letting me know, I can do better next time with less!
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