Continuing my previous post:

Its form is what it is to be what it is. What differentiates it from other things or kinds.

Aristotle points out that there are various meanings of good. The NE begins by saying that all things aim at some good. A "devil species" is bad, no matter how good it is at being bad. In fact, the better it is at being bad, the less good is.

The good of a thing cannot be determined apart from what it is to be that thing, apart from its telos. In his translation of the Metaphysics Joe Sachs points out:

Aristotle does not say that animals, plants, and the cosmos have purposes but that the are purposes, ends-in-themselves ... Aristotle's "teleology" is nothing but his claim that all natural beings are self-maintaining wholes.

We are back again to the absurd notion that a natural thing's telos, its place is the cosmos is to harm other species. Such a cosmos would not be a well-ordered whole.

The form of a thing is its nature ... — Bob Ross

A things form is inherent to it. It is the being at work (energeia) of a thing If it was not continually being at work staying the same (entelecheia) from its beginning it would cease to be.

It's nature is not separate from nature. It is a part of not apart from nature. To understand the nature of a thing is to understand its place and activity within nature.

Form (eidos) and nature (phusis) are not two terms with the same meaning. In Book V, chapter IV, of the Metaphysics he says:

In one sense, nature means the coming into being of things that are born.

Nature encompasses both form (eidos) and matter (hule).

(i.e., its essence — Bob Ross

'Essence' is an English translation of the Latin 'essentia'. A term coined by Cicero to translate 'ousia'. Literally it is the “the what it was to be” of a thing. Ousia refers to some specific being. Aristotle or Bob Ross.

In short, to realize one's nature is not to realize one's form of being.

A "devil species" is bad, no matter how good it is at being bad. In fact, the better it is at being bad, the less good is.

The good of a thing cannot be determined apart from what it is to be that thing, apart from its telos
…
We are back again to the absurd notion that a natural thing's telos, its place is the cosmos is to harm other species. Such a cosmos would not be a well-ordered whole.

Whether or not such a species would fit well into the “ordered whole” of nature is irrelevant: if the good of a thing is relative to its telos such that it is good equally to how well it fulfills it, then it plainly follows that a species which has a telos which involves torturing other species is, in fact, good IFF it is excellent, apart from other things, at torturing other species. You are accepting Aristotle’s concept of ‘goodness’ (as underlined) and then turning around and irrelevantly commenting that it is absurd for such a species to exist as a coherent member of nature—that doesn’t address the hypothetical I have presented. You would have to demonstrate how the hypothetical (stated above) is inconsistent or incoherent with Aristotle’s concept of ‘good’. I understand the point is that Aristotle thinks that the telos of each species is well-ordered, but I think it doesn’t help his case because of how he defined goodness.

Aristotle points out that there are various meanings of good. The NE begins by saying that all things aim at some good.

The devil species would be aiming at a perceived good: their well-being.

Form (eidos) and nature (phusis) are not two terms with the same meaning. In Book V, chapter IV, of the Metaphysics he says:
In one sense, nature means the coming into being of things that are born.

Nature encompasses both form (eidos) and matter (hule).

Form is the idea of the essence of a thing; and the nature (in the relevant sense from the many definitions Aristotle gives of ‘nature’) of a thing is “the intrinsic source of the primary process of each growing thing just qua the growing thing that it is” (Metaphysics, Book Delta, IV, p. 118). Form and essence are one: the form of a human being is the essence of a human being.

Likewise, like I stated before, the form, or essence, of a human being includes things which a human being may not have actualized (yet or ever); e.g., the form of a human being includes ‘having two arms’, but not all human beings have two arms. If I take your argument seriously (that a human being’s form is fully realized immediately), then a human being with one arm is not a human being (which is implausible); or, if I don’t, then it follows that the form of a human being is not fully realized in a human being per se.

'Essence' is an English translation of the Latin 'essentia'. A term coined by Cicero to translate 'ousia'. Literally it is the “the what it was to be” of a thing.
…
Its form is what it is to be what it is.

You are just going around in circles, trying to distinguish these terms when they are clearly the same. You literally circled back around to saying that a ‘form’ and ‘essence’ are the same thing without realizing it.

Whether or not such a species would fit well into the “ordered whole” of nature is irrelevant — Bob Ross

Mistake the part for the whole. You insist that:

Since Aristotle is attaching the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing relative to its nature, — Bob Ross

but claim that nature, which is the source of species, is irrelevant? You are now reading the Metaphysics and claim to understand Aristotle's points but fail to understand a fundamental point: it is an inquiry into the arche, the source or beginning of things. The question of the goodness of a species cannot abstracted from the question of the goodness of the whole of which it is a part.

You are accepting Aristotle’s concept of ‘goodness’ (as underlined) and then turning around and irrelevantly commenting that it is absurd for such a species to exist as a coherent member of nature—that doesn’t address the hypothetical I have presented. — Bob Ross

The hypothetical you present is incompatible with Aristotle. That is not an irrelevancy. Aristotle was a pretty smart guy. Do you really think that he would not have seen what you see so plainly? It is not that Aristotle failed to consider this hypothetical, it is that such a creature has not place in his understanding of the world.

You would have to demonstrate how the hypothetical (stated above) is inconsistent or incoherent with Aristotle’s concept of ‘good’. — Bob Ross

I have already done that.

I understand the point is that Aristotle thinks that the telos of each species is well-ordered, but I think it doesn’t help his case because of how he defined goodness. — Bob Ross

It is not that the telos of each species is well-ordered, it is that the whole, of which each species is a part is well-ordered. Once again:

Aristotle points out that there are various meanings of good. — Fooloso4

To take one meaning as is it applies to all or the whole leads to your confusion.

quote="Bob Ross;921928"]

Form is the idea of the essence of a thing

If by idea you mean a concept then that is wrong.

the form of a human being is the essence of a human being. — Bob Ross

No. A human being is not a disembodied entity.

If I take your argument seriously (that a human being’s form is fully realized immediately) ... — Bob Ross

The species form "human being" is why the offspring of human beings are human beings, whether they have one arm or two.

You are just going around in circles, trying to distinguish these terms when they are clearly the same. — Bob Ross

Aristotle distinguishes these terms. Aristotle comes to us through Latinized translation. Because of this the meaning of the Greek terms is obscured. See the section Translating Aristotle from the IEP article on Aristotle's Metaphysics and Selections from Joe Sachs's Introduction
to His Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, here

You are sidestepping the hypothetical. It is akin to if I asked you "if you had $1,000,000,000,000,000, then what would you buy?" and your response was "that's not actually possible, given how the economy as a whole works.". That's not an answer. I statement was "IF something is 'good' IFF it fulfills its nature and a species exists which has in its nature the need to torture other species, then a member of that species is 'good' IFF it is, among other things, properly torturing other species": to contend with this hypothetical, you will have to point out which antecedent is false and why.

You are sidestepping the hypothetical. It is akin to if I asked you "if you had $1,000,000,000,000,000, then what would you buy?" — Bob Ross

You are sidestepping Aristotle! It has become increasingly apparent that for you Aristotle is irrelevant. This thread is not a "rejoinder to Aristotelian ethics".

So we can further the discussion, please point out what is wrong with this claim within the context of Aristotelianism:

P1: If something is 'good' IFF it fulfills its nature and a species exists which has in its nature the need to torture other species, then a member of that species is 'good' IFF it is, among other things, properly torturing other species.

P2: Something is 'good' IFF it fulfills its nature and a species exists which has in its nature the need to torture other species.

C: A member of that species is 'good' IFF it is, among other things, properly torturing other species.

For intents and purposes, assume there exists such a species; even if it immediately goes extinct for whatever reason. If we can find common ground on the 'good' of this species, then we can move on to how well they would fit into the ecosystem of nature.

Suppose someone invents a knife. As a knife it fulfills its function - to cut. As such you might say it is a good knife. It is so "good', in fact, that it can cut through anything, and does. It cuts right through the cutting board, the table, and everything else it comes near, leaving behind a path of death and destruction. Having witnessed this from what is at the moment, a safe distance, would you still say it is a good knife? Now before answering too quickly, consider the other attributes of a good knife, most importantly, how well it handles. This knife literally cannot be handled. It would cut off your hand.

You wish to discuss your species in the context of Aristotelianism but you ignore the context of Aristotelianism in order to discuss your imaginary species. The part, a species, cannot be understood apart from or in abstraction from the whole of which it is a part. The whole is intelligibly prior to the part. This is fundamental to Aristotle's Metaphysics, to the problem of what is first, to the problem of first philosophy.

Your hypothetical does not take into account the way Aristotle views human life in relation to the life of other animals. An excellent overview of this is given by Edward Clayton:

First, Aristotle claims that it is not correct from a biological point of view to divide animals into the categories of "tame" and " wild " as some before him have done:

"For in a manner of speaking everything that is tame is also wild, e.g. human beings, horses, cattle . . . ." [PA 643b4]

For each of these kinds of animal, some members are tame while others are wild and even those that are tame do not start out that way. Unless they are tamed by human beings, all animals remain in their wild condition—and even human beings are born wild. In a surprisingly little noticed passage in the History of Animals, Aristotle says that:

" in children, though one can see as it were traces and seeds of the dispositions that they will have later, yet their soul at this period has practically no difference from that of wild animals. " [HA 588a-588]

Of course it is education that will shape those beginning dispositions and provide the char-
acter and characteristics that children will have later in life, and Aristotle believes that it is the job of politics and the city through laws and training to provide that education. — Aesop, Aristotle, and Animals: The Role of Fables in Human Life, Edward Clayton

The need for nurture to become what is our 'special' nature is integral to our place between the beast and the divine. We need each other to become who we are. The hypothetical you propose suggests "natures" can be arbitrarily injected into life forms. Aristotle rejected that possibility in De Anima:

These people, however, merely undertake to say what sort of thing the soul is, but about the sort of body that is receptive of it they determine nothing further, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean stories, for any random soul to be inserted into any random body, whereas it seems that in fact each body has its own special form and shape.96 But what they say is somewhat like saying that the craft of carpentry could be inserted into flutes, whereas in fact the craft must use its instruments, and the soul its body. — Aristotle, De Anima, 407b20, translated by C.D.C. Reeve

How we came into being is inseparable from what you call, "fitting into the ecosystem of nature."

Suppose someone invents a knife.

The problem with your example is that a knife has more than the function of cutting; but let’s hypothesize a new tool which has only the purpose of cutting. You are correct that this tool, let’s call it X, is good in the highest sense IFF it is optimal at cutting, and so an X which could cut through anything whatsoever would, indeed, be the best X.

Now, it does not become a ‘bad’ or lesser ‘good’ X because one cannot grab it; because we stipulated its sole function is cutting. Therefore, this example is not helping demonstrate your point.

A knife would be ‘bad’ if one cannot hold it without getting cut because it is designed to cut a specified thing via a person who wields it with their hands.

However, to be charitable, I think this is really what you are getting at:

The whole is intelligibly prior to the part.

It seems like you are denying that what is good is for a thing to fulfill its nature and instead it is for a thing to fulfill its nature if it is a proper part of the whole.

This doesn’t seem accurate to me; because then a thing could be bad which is fulfilling its nature. For example, imagine a species which is a freak accident and perishes quite abruptly. A member of that species would be good if it is fulfilling its nature, but would not be a fitting member of the whole of Nature. Likewise, for example, a being or tool which cuts through everything would not fit well into the universe (and, in fact, would probably damage a lot of it) but if it did exist then I see no reason to say that it isn’t a good X. See what I mean?

Moreover, the relation of a thing to a bigger whole isn’t necessarily an aspect of its nature: is a part of a rabbit’s nature to get eaten by a fox? No.

The hypothetical you propose suggests "natures" can be arbitrarily injected into life forms. Aristotle rejected that possibility in De Anima:

I wasn’t talking about ‘injecting’ souls into other bodies: I was talking about the essence of a thing. Likewise, just because a thing has an essence at birth it does not follow that they have fully actualized it. So I completely agree that we tend to need other people to help us realize our full potential.

The need for nurture to become what is our 'special' nature is integral to our place between the beast and the divine.

I am assuming you are referring to our ability to sufficiently reason, correct?

The problem with your example is that a knife has more than the function of cutting ... — Bob Ross

Now you are catching on! Just as a knife has more than one function, a natural species does as well.

There is a difference between something that is in a species' nature and what that nature is. You misunderstand what he means for the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing to be relative to its nature. What is relative to its nature and what its nature is with regard to its telos is not the same. It is good for birds to fly, but as Icarus learned, not for men to fly. Hubris and violence may be in our species, but that does not mean it is good for us to be hubristic or violent.

Now, it does not become a ‘bad’ or lesser ‘good’ X because one cannot grab it; because we stipulated its sole function is cutting. — Bob Ross

The example is meant to illustrate the problem of postulating an intelligent species with only one function. If intellect is, as Aristotle says in De Anima, the part of the soul by which it knows and understands, then any species that is intelligent must have as part of its nature the capacity to understand. Any species that has a mind, has more than one function. At a minimum, it has the function of thinking, or reasoning. An intelligent species that is not intelligent is a contradiction.

It seems like you are denying that what is good is for a thing to fulfill its nature and instead it is for a thing to fulfill its nature if it is a proper part of the whole. — Bob Ross

That a species is a proper part of the whole is essential for understanding what a species is, that is, for understanding its nature. It is not as if these are two separate things - its nature apart from nature and its nature as part of nature. We can, when discussing such things, make a distinction, but the distinction does not exist in the nature of things.

This doesn’t seem accurate to me; because then a thing could be bad which is fulfilling its nature. — Bob Ross

Right! That is the problem with your devil species. One more once:

It is asking how something bad is good. — Fooloso4

and:

A "devil species" is bad, no matter how good it is at being bad. In fact, the better it is at being bad, the less good is. — Fooloso4

Moreover, the relation of a thing to a bigger whole isn’t necessarily an aspect of its nature: is a part of a rabbit’s nature to get eaten by a fox? — Bob Ross

The whole of nature is not an event in nature. What it is to be a fox or rabbit is not to eat or be eaten by the other. What it means to be your devil species, on the other hand, is as you would have it, to destroy other species. Just as we do not understand foxes and rabbits in terms of eating and being eaten, we cannot understand your devil species in terms solely of destroying and being destroyed.

I wasn’t talking about ‘injecting’ souls into other bodies: I was talking about the essence of a thing. — Bob Ross

How does an essence come into being in the language of Aristotle?

Now you are catching on! Just as a knife has more than one function, a natural species does as well.

I may have been too loose with my terminology: a knife does not have more than one function—it has one function which is comprised of lesser functions which constitute the sole function (e.g., the function of a knife is for people to cut things, and this function requires the lesser function of being ‘grippable’).

I see your point here, which is, notwithstanding the above critique, that the parts are considered relative to the whole; however, we must be careful by disclosing which whole we are considering. E.g., the atom’s function can be considered separately from the function of an organism which is, in part, that atom.

I don’t think this negates the idea of a “devil species”, because I am analyzing the ‘goodness’ of such a species within the context of their species qua whole and not nature qua whole. You have to demonstrate why I should think of it in terms of nature and not the species; as, for me, both are capable of separate analysis since ‘goodness’ is relativistic.

There is a difference between something that is in a species' nature and what that nature is.

I completely agree insofar as what you are trying to convey is correct. I would just describe it differently: I would say that it is not in human nature, in the sense of ‘nature’ qua essence nor Telos, to have, e.g., hubris—that is not in the species’ nature nor a part of what the nature of that species is.

Any species that has a mind, has more than one function. At a minimum, it has the function of thinking, or reasoning. An intelligent species that is not intelligent is a contradiction.

Firstly, how does this negate the ‘devils species’? It seems perfectly capable with their nature to have rational capacities.

Secondly, I was not defining such a species as solely functioning towards rape, torture, etc.; I was saying that such acts are incorporated into their nature such that they flourish by doing so. It is a hypothetical meant to tease out the consistent conclusion of Aristotle’s concept of ‘good’: you are trying to migrate it to actuality or practicality.

That a species is a proper part of the whole is essential for understanding what a species is, that is, for understanding its nature. It is not as if these are two separate things - its nature apart from nature and its nature as part of nature. We can, when discussing such things, make a distinction, but the distinction does not exist in the nature of things.

They are completely separable: I can analyze the function of a liver in isolation to how the body, as a whole, works. Likewise, if I take your argument seriously, then you would have to go further and analyze everything in terms of the largest context—which would be the good of reality (whatever that may be).

What it is to be a fox or rabbit is not to eat or be eaten by the other.

That’s exactly my point: one can determine the nature of a rabbit without understanding nor determining how rabbits relate to the whole of nature—exactly because the relations to other organisms, lives, and environments is not a part of their essence.

CC: @Fooloso4

How does an essence come into being in the language of Aristotle?

Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that an essence, or form, is per se being (as opposed to per accidens being); or, in other words, what-is-was-to-be-that-thing per se with itself, as it applies universally to all cases [of that thing].

The essence comes into being by physical production, and Aristotle gives the example of a man begetting another man. For Aristotle, the forms are not acausal, inert, and atemporal abstract objects but, instead, are manifestations of essences in things in the real world which hold universally insofar as they can be instantiated in different places to imperfect degrees.

Is that your understanding as well?

I am analyzing the ‘goodness’ of such a species within the context of their species qua whole and not nature qua whole. — Bob Ross

Yes, and that is where your analysis fails.

You have to demonstrate why I should think of it in terms of nature and not the species — Bob Ross

I do not think it necessary to demonstrate why a part cannot be adequately understood without regard for the whole of which it is a part. The problem of wholes and parts is fundamental to Aristotle, as it is to much of Greek philosophy. Where in Aristotle does he reject this?

...for me, both are capable of separate analysis since ‘goodness’ is relativistic. — Bob Ross

For you that might be the case, but unless you want to sidestep Aristotle you need to show that for him the good is relative. In the Nicomachean Ethics, which is about the human good, Aristotle says:

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.

A distinction is made between some good, which is relative to some thing, and the good to which all things aim. What the good is to which all things aim is not simply a question about any one thing but all things. It is a question about the whole. This is not relative to any one thing or species.

Firstly, how does this negate the ‘devils species’? — Bob Ross

It does not negate the devil species, it negates your claim that it has only one function.

You said:

The problem with your example is that a knife has more than the function of cutting — Bob Ross

So too your devil species. But why say that it is a problem for the knife example unless you are claiming that the devil species has only one function? There seems to be some things that were n that exchange that are now missing.

It is a hypothetical meant to tease out the consistent conclusion of Aristotle’s concept of ‘good’: you are trying to migrate it to actuality or practicality. — Bob Ross

In that case you have failed. As you said:

I am having a hard time fathoming how Aristotle is avoiding this glaring issue, — Bob Ross

That is not because Aristotle is avoiding it, but because 1) Aristotle is not concerned with fantasy creatures, but with the nature of things as they are, 2) you fail to see why it is incompatible with Aristotle's view of nature, 3) you assume that there is no question of the good for Aristotle, only some good relative to some thing.

They are completely separable: I can analyze the function of a liver in isolation to how the body, as a whole, works. — Bob Ross

They are not completely separable! Livers do not function apart from the body they are in. They are not some separate thing that just so happens to be in a body but have a purpose of their own unrelated to the body.

...if I take your argument seriously, then you would have to go further and analyze everything in terms of the largest context—which would be the good of reality (whatever that may be). — Bob Ross

Right! In the Metaphysics he says:

We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible, without having knowledge of every one of them individually …

(982a)

As far as possible means there is a limit to what we know. We cannot know all things. More specifically, it is the beginning and ends, the arche and telos, of all things that we do not know. With regard to each thing too, however, it requires knowing its arche and telos.

The beginning or source of your devil species is your imagination, but if we are to treat it as if it were a real species without knowing its true origin and end we cannot claim to know its nature. To take its being as its end or purpose is to miss the big picture. The good of an intelligent species is not simply to exist. Its nature as an intelligent being must be taken into consideration. Taking the example of man, his intelligence leads him to the question of his aim. It is not some notion of mindless happiness, but the realization of what is highest in man