To put it another way, if I imagine a world full of beings who do not dream, hallucinate, etc, I do not need to posit mental phenomena for these being. — Richard B

Like a world of inorganic matter? Sure. What’s the relevance?

The relevance is that many human beings do not report dreams, hallucinate, etc, so are we compelled to say they have no mental phenomena. Mental phenomena seems to be contingent on whether a human being reports experiences that do not occur (dreams/hallucinations), or problem with discernment of colors compared to normal performance. But, I have the impression that you believe that all human beings have mental phenomena, regardless if they have dreams or not, hallucinations or not, etc

But, I have the impression that you believe that all human beings have mental phenomena, regardless if they have dreams or not, hallucinations or not, etc — Richard B

Yes. Mental phenomena are either reducible to brain activity or are caused by brain activity. We dream/hallucinate/see (in colour) when the visual cortex is active. I see no reason to believe that dreaming and hallucinating involve mental phenomena but that ordinary waking experiences do not - that would seem like special pleading. Their only relevant difference is their cause.

Even if one wants to claim that colours are also a property of distal objects one cannot deny that colours are a property of mental phenomena, else one cannot make sense of dreaming and hallucinating in colour.

But then I deny that colours are properties of distal objects on the grounds that a) such things are unnecessary, given that colours as mental phenomena is sufficient, and that b) things like the Standard Model do not describe colours; they only describe various arrangements of atoms with a surface layer of electrons that reflect light at certain wavelengths.

And then the same principle for things like smells and tastes.

People can disagree about size and motion as well, and they can also experience these due to simulation of the brain. Are extension in space, motion, speed, etc. all also not properties of distal objects?

Likewise, the "mind independent" existence of any discrete objects seems like it can be called into question based on the same sort of reasoning employed to demote the reality of color. But if discrete objects "don't really exist" "out there" then it's hard to see how one can say anything true about anything. Or at the very least, anything true about anything other than "mere experience" (as opposed to that lofty goal of knowledge of "things-in-themselves.")

IMO, this is just abstraction run amok. Nothing we are aware of exists mind independently. No one can point to anything that is actually mind independent, on pain of such an entity losing its mind independence. I see no good reason to see thing's relationships with minds as somehow "less real," than any of their other relations. "Looking red to people," is a real relationship things have.

Rather, the move to positing all sorts of thing as somehow illusory seems to me to just be an elaborate coping mechanism for dealing with the fact that minds don't sit well in mechanistic accounts of nature — hence the demotion to "less real."

I haven't said anything about illusions or being "less real". I'm just saying that it's wrong to claim that colours are mind-independent properties of distal objects, just as it would be wrong to claim that smells and tastes and pain and being funny are mind-independent properties of distal objects.

All these things are real; it's just that they're not located where conscious experience isn't – and conscious experience does not extend beyond the brain.

Does claiming that pain only exists in the head entail that distal objects "don't really exist"? If not, then why would claiming that colour only exists in the head entail this?

Do you at the very least accept that colour percepts exist (e.g. when dreaming and hallucinating), and that these percepts are at least correlated to certain neural activity in the visual cortex?

But are extension in space and motion likewise not in external objects? Seems like you could make the same sort of case there.

Same for anything "being a tree" or "being a rock." I don't see how the examples that are supposed to show that color is only "in brains" doesn't equally apply to anything being any sort of discrete object at all. That is, things are only cats, rocks, planets, etc. "inside brains."

I can ask someone to recommend a funny movie, and they can deliver, but I don't think it makes much sense to treat being funny as some mind-independent property of movies. — Michael

Nor does it make sene to say that red is mind- independent. But it also makes no sense, for the reasons given, to say that red is no more than my-perception-of red.

But are extension in space and motion likewise not in external objects? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The Standard Model certainly says so, so I accept that.

But what evidence is there of colours as something other than mental phenomena? We have empirical evidence of an object's surface layer of electrons reflecting certain wavelengths of light, but what of colour?

But it also makes no sense, for the reasons given, to say that red is no more than my-perception-of red. — Banno

I don't think anyone is suggesting that. The second and third paragraphs of the OP make it clear that he isn't saying that colours are just his personal experiences; he's only saying that colours – like smells and tastes and pain – are types of mental phenomena.

But the Standard Model says absolutely nothing about trees, cats, bacteria, etc.

But the Standard Model says absolutely nothing about trees, cats, bacteria, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

English words like "tree" and "cat" and "bacteria" refer to distal objects. English words like "position" and "momentum" refer to a distal object's properties. English words like "red" and "funny" and "sour" do not refer to distal objects or their properties but to the properties of conscious experience.

This is just begging the question lol.

I mean, I could just as well say color words refer to "the colors of objects." And surely my blue car is not located inside my skull.

What draws that line? — Mp202020

Not "what", but "who", surely?

Any color, not matter the shade, how can we know it’s experience is as shared as the cause of its experience? — Mp202020

The experience of your companion doesn't matter, so long as they hand you the red pen. That's why we know about colour blindness - there is a difference that can be examined and explained.

And you can say that words like "pain" and "sour" and "funny" refer to distal objects or their properties, but you'd be wrong.

If colours are only a type of "mental phenomena" (think about that term...), then since your "mental phenomena" are quite distinct from mine, your red is quite different to mine.

Yet you can ask for the red pen and e happy with the result.

Red is therefore not a private experience.

If colours are only a type of "mental phenomena" (think about that term...), then since your "mental phenomena" are quite distinct from mine, your red is quite different to mine. — Banno

Different token doesn't mean different type. Pain is a mental phenomenon, but presumably the pain I feel when I stub my toe isn't "quite different" to the pain you feel when you stub your toe.

Yet you can ask for the red pen and e happy with the result.

Red is therefore not a private experience. — Banno

As mentioned before, this is a non sequitur.

but presumably the pain I feel when I stub my toe isn't "quite different" to the pain you feel when you stub your toe. — Michael

How could you know that?

As mentioned before, this is a non sequitur. — Michael

yet

... if red refers to the experience, then when you say “red” it refers to your experience, but when I say it it refers to my experience. If we are going to be talking about the same thing then we need something that we both have access to. — Banno

That overwhelmingly folk agree on some things being red and others being not-red shows that red is not a private phenomena. Indeed, the controversy surrounding that dress shows that colour is not private.

How could you know that? — Banno

"presume" doesn't mean "know".

That overwhelmingly folk agree on some things being red and others being not-red shows that red is not a private phenomena. — Banno

No it doesn't.

"presume" doesn't mean "know". — Michael

No. it doesn't. Well done.

No it doesn't. — Michael

Ok. one can lead a donkey to water but not make them drink. I don't know what you must mean by "private', then, but you are not using it the way other folk do. The fact that we distinguish red pens from black pens shows pen colour not to be private.

That overwhelmingly folk agree that stubbing one's toe is painful does not show that pain is not a mental phenomenon.

Pain is a mental phenomenon, despite the overwhelming agreement on which things are painful.

There is simply no connection between your premise and your conclusion.

That overwhelmingly folk agree that stubbing one's toe is painful does not show that pain is not a mental phenomenon. — Michael

So what.

Can you pass me your pain?

There is simply no connection between your premise and your conclusion. — Michael

It appears that you have not understood the argument. Again, the claim is not that there is no mental component in a thing being red, but that there is more to red than mere experience.

Some folk seem to think that things are either mental or they are not mental, with no other option.

But why should this be so? Minds are embedded in the world.

So what. — Banno

So the overwhelming agreement that some X is Y is not proof that Y is not a mental phenomenon.

Whether Y is "red" or "painful", there can be an overwhelming agreement that X is Y even if Y is a mental phenomenon.

Stubbing one's toe is not a "mental phenomena".

I have to say something about that term. A phenomena is something observed. "Mental phenomena" is oxymoronic. One does not usually observe that one is in pain, one just is in pain. Being in pain is not making an observation. One does not observe a pain in one's toe, one has a pain in one's toe. There is a metaphysical slight of hand happening in your language use.

That the overwhelming agreement that some X is Y is not proof that Y is not a mental phenomenon. — Michael

Sure, in your somewhat illicit terms this might be so. What is shown is that being red is not private. That is, that there are red things is a part of our shared world.

Now how do you explain that sharing?

Stubbing one's toe is not a "mental phenomena". — Banno

I didn't say it was.

Sure, in your somewhat illicit terms this might be so. What is shown is that being red is not private. That is, that there are red things is a part of our shared world. — Banno

There's ambiguity here with the English grammar.

The words "coloured" and "painful" are adjectives, the words "colour" and "pain" are nouns, and the word "red" is both an adjective and a noun.

As a noun, the words "colour", "pain", and "red" refer to mental percepts. As an adjective the words "coloured", "painful" and "red" can refer to distal objects, if by such use we mean that the distal objects are causally responsible for these mental percepts.

The existence of mental percepts caused by neural activity in the visual cortex in response to optical stimulation by light is a sufficient and well-supported account of colour (and other visual) experience.

The naive view that either denies the existence of mental percepts or mistakes mental percepts for some mind-independent property is wrong.

Sour is used to refer to lemons, etc. all the time.

As a noun, the words "colour", "pain", and "red" refer to mental percepts. — Michael

There's that verbal sleight of hand again. "Red" is not a mental property, whatever that might be. It's a colour.

You are enabled by the choice of colour in the OP. What if had chosen touch - would you be arguing that being smooth was a mental phenomena?

And for the third or fourth time, I am not denying that there is an aspect of being red that is mind dependent - again using your language. I am pointing out that it is not only mental.

yep.

"Red" is not a mental property, whatever that might be. It's a colour. — Banno

Colours, like smells and tastes and pain, are mental percepts. They are what occur/exist when we dream and hallucinate – and also when having an ordinary waking experience.

What if ↪Mp202020 had chosen touch - would you be arguing that being smooth was a mental phenomena? — Banno

I address this in my distinction between adjectives and nouns in my post above.

I am pointing out that it is not only mental. — Banno

And I am pointing out that it is, just like pain.

Sour is used to refer to lemons, etc. all the time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I address this in my distinction between adjectives and nouns in my post above.

And here we go again.

The berry is red. The berry is rough. The berry is sour.

These involve the berry. They are not purely mental.

Again, if folk agree that the berry is smooth, red and sour, then presumably they agree that there is a berry, and not only a perception-of-berry.

... if "berry" refers to the perception-of-berry, then when you say “berry” it refers to your perception-of-berry, but when I say it it refers to my perception-of-berry. If we are going to be talking about the same thing then we need something that we both have access to.

And here we go again.

The berry is red. The berry is rough. The berry is sour.

These involve the berry. They are not purely mental. — Banno

And again, I addressed this in my distinction between adjectives and nouns above.