But would it be morally intuitive to say that a social species that maintains their society by torturing another social species as doing something 'good'? That's what is implied by Aristotelian ethics if the social species requires it to fulfill their nature. — Bob Ross
Yes, but whatever we use "to speak of the territory" (including "essences") is not the territory itself.
And yet you begin with his metaphysical terms "purpose" "telos" "final causes" & "essence". :roll:This OP is about Aristotle's Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics; not his Metaphysics, Politics, or Physics. — Bob Ross
No. Maps are used to facilitate taking paths through a simplified abstraction derived from specific types of aspects of a (factual/formal/fictional) territory.A map is something used to know territories themselves, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yet the OP concerns only Aristotle's notion of "essence".The idea of "essence" might be explained quite differently from how Aristotle goes about it ...
And yet you begin with his metaphysical terms "purpose" "telos" "final causes" & "essence". :roll:
Generally, yes. But would it be morally intuitive to say that a social species that maintains their society by torturing another social species as doing something 'good'? That's what is implied by Aristotelian ethics if the social species requires it to fulfill their nature. — Bob Ross
It is a species that, as per its nature, can only achieve a deep and persistent sense of happiness, flourishing, and well-being by committing egregious acts on other species (e.g., torture, abuse, mass genocide, etc.). — Bob Ross
Aristotle is avoiding this glaring issue — Bob Ross
Are you asking if they have the intelligence at par with human beings? Sure. Equal or more. — Bob Ross
torture, abuse, mass genocide — Bob Ross
This is contrary to Aristotle's understanding of nature
you should not be avoiding what he says about nature and telos. for when they are taken into account there is no glaring issue that he is avoiding. For Aristotle the nature and telos of a species is in accord with the whole of nature.
So, what is it that causes this "devil species" to torture, abuse and commit genocide? Do they do these things to their own species, or only to other species? If they do it to other species, what is the explanation for why they do it?
The reason I say it is incoherent is because I can't imagine such a species, more intelligent than we are and in possession of symbolic language, not being bedeviled by ideologies, just as we are, which would mean such aberrant behavior would not be universal among them, just as it is not universal with us
This is contrary to Aristotle's understanding of nature
How so? — Bob Ross
There is no 'the good' in Aristotelian ethics and, consequently, there is no universal good which all species are geared towards. — Bob Ross
("Three Little Words")Aristotle asks about the way the various meanings of the good are organized, but he immediately drops the question, as being more at home in another sort of philosophic inquiry. (1096b, 26-32) It is widely claimed that Aristotle says there is no good itself, or any other form at all of the sort spoken of in Plato's dialogues. This is a misreading of any text of Aristotle to which it is referred. Here in the study of ethics it is a failure to see that the idea of the good is not rejected simply, but only held off as a question that does not arise as first for us. Aristotle praises Plato for understanding that philosophy does not argue from first principles but toward them.(1095a, 31-3)
Perhaps however this question must be dismissed for the present, since a detailed investigation of it belongs more properly to another branch of philosophy. And likewise with the Idea of the Good; for even if the goodness predicated of various in common really is a unity or something existing separately and absolute, it clearly will not be practicable or attainable by man; but the Good which we are now seeking is a good within human reach.
Aristotle thought that what is 'good' is a thing fulfilling its end (i.e., purpose: final cause); and, so, a 'good' human is a human which is properly fulfilling their Telos. It seems like Aristotle thinks that the nature of the human species is such that we should care about each other and seek to be just, but what about a devil species? Since Aristotle is attaching the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing relative to its nature, wouldn't it follow that a rational species, S, which had a nature completely anti-thetical to justice and altruism be a 'good' S IFF it was unjust and egoistic?
I am having a hard time fathoming how Aristotle is avoiding this glaring issue, even after reading his Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics. Does anyone understand how Aristotle avoids or deals with this issue? Does anyone have any solutions to this problem?
At first I thought maybe tying the nature of rationality, in the case of a rational species, would dictate one should be just (to fulfill that nature); but I am failing at coming up with a good argument for that. — Bob Ross
Aristotle was writing about humans. If he had known of a devil species, perhaps he would have written about it. — Leontiskos
Your problem seems to come up because you are thinking of the good as defined primarily in terms of an organisms' form. This is correct, but then we have to ask "from whence and why this form? You seem to be presupposing a sort of indeterminacy lies prior to form. The form of an organisms just is what it is.
The form which is the reality of anything is its limited, imperfect share of what the Unmoved Mover is purely and perfectly, that is, idea.
If the divine is hostile to what lies outside of it then it will be determined by those things; it will exist in response to them.
Likewise, if the divine is merely indifferent to that which lies outside of it, the divine is nonetheless still defined by "what it is not."
All goodness for organisms is filtered through their forms, but the forms themselves are not ordered to nothing at all, but to being itself
I've been reading through Aristotle's "Metaphysics", and I think I understand Aristotle's points enough to start tackling this post you made. — Bob Ross
if what is good is just a thing realizing its form, then there cannot be a further question of “why is it good for a thing to realize its form?”. — Bob Ross
Nothing you said addressed anything I said...at all. — Bob Ross
if what is good is just a thing realizing its form, then there cannot be a further question of “why is it good for a thing to realize its form?”. — Bob Ross
You take what is for Aristotle the question of the Metaphysics, the question of being, and treat it as an answer. Things do not realize their form as if it is something they do not already have, something that they are not already. It's form or eidos is not something that comes after it already is.
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