Consider what Aristotle says in Book X of the Ethics about how contemplation is highest form of life in that it is most divine.

Then consider his conception of form → intelligibility → divinity. All things, in tending toward their own actualization, their own fulfilment, are tending toward divinity, realizing form in their own greater and lesser ways. The form in anything is “divine and good and desirable” (Phys.Α.9, 192a17). The form which is the reality of anything is its limited, imperfect share of what the Unmoved Mover is purely and perfectly, that is, idea.

Form or primary substance at its highest-level actuality simply is God. And the desire which God inspires is none other than the desire of each organism to realize its form. Each natural organism has within it a desire to do those things necessary to realizing and maintaining its form. This desire is part of the organism’s form or nature itself: form is a force in the organism for the realization and maintenance of form… From a meta- physical perspective, one can see that in trying to realize its form, the organism is doing all that it can do to become intelligible.It is also doing the best job it can do it imitate God’s thought—and thus to imitate God himself”

-Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand

Your problem seems to come up because you are thinking of the good as defined primarily in terms of an organisms' form. This is correct, but then we have to ask "from whence and why this form? You seem to be presupposing a sort of indeterminacy lies prior to form. The form of an organisms just is what it is.

It might be helpful to consider why Aristotle's mentor Plato thought the divine could be neither hostile nor indifferent to what is other to it. Indeed, on Plato's account the Demiurge creates out of love and a desire to share its own self-determination and reality with an 'other,' to "give birth in beauty."

If the divine is hostile to what lies outside of it then it will be determined by those things; it will exist in response to them. But if the divine is determined by that which lies without, then it is not fully self-determining and thus not fully real as itself. Likewise, if the divine is merely indifferent to that which lies outside of it, the divine is nonetheless still defined by "what it is not." It is only in love, in a transcedent identification of the self with what is other, that the divine can be fully determined by what lies within the ambit of its identity and self, as opposed to being defined by and in terms of the other.

This is of course Plato's view, laid out most clearly in the Timaeus, but I don't think Aristotle rejects this part of Plato.

But Aristotle’s divinity is not only intelligible content or form but also thought itself, the act-of-intellection. Here we find, perhaps more explicitly although with less graphic imagery, the togetherness or coinciding of thought and being that we discovered in Plato. “Thought thinks itself by participation in the intelligible; for it becomes intelligible in touching and thinking, so that intellect and the intelligible are the same; for intellect is what is receptive of the intelligible, that is, of reality [τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας]. And it is in act possessing." Met. Λ.7, 1072b20–23).

Richard Perl - Thinking Being

In Metaphysics XII Aristotle expands a bit more on the relationship between the human good and the divine.

The First Principle upon which depend the sensible universe and the world of nature.And its life is like the best which we temporarily enjoy. It must be in that state always (which for us is impossible), since its actuality is also pleasure.54(And for this reason waking, sensation and thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of them.) Now thinking in itself is concerned with that which is in itself best, and thinking in the highest sense with that which is in the highest sense best...

Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought, and its active contemplation is that which is most pleasant and best.If, then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvellous; and if it is greater, this is still more marvellous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is.

All goodness for organisms is filtered through their forms, but the forms themselves are not ordered to nothing at all, but to being itself. This is why Aristotle is often seen as presenting the germ of what would become the Doctrine of Transcendentals, the convertibility of Unity, Truth, Goodness, and sometimes Beauty, with Being.

The life of contemplation described in Book X of the Ethics is not good only in virtue of an arbitrary essence that man happens to have. It will be the highest good for all rational creatures in so much as they are rational.

what about a devil species? — Bob Ross

Aristotle's ethics is about the human good, not some imagined devil species.

Very true. Man is the rational animal though and presumably "demon men" would be rational as well, so it's hard to see how they could have entirely different in terms of what springs from rationality and how this orients the person.

Very true. Man is the rational animal though and presumably "demon men" would be rational as well, so it's hard to see how they could have entirely different in terms of what springs from rationality and how this orients the person. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is the issue of what springs from an evolved nature though. In our case, what we find to be good is substantially a matter of our ancestors having evolved as members of a social species.

We might imagine a devil species which evolved from relatively asocial ancestors. (Though I think the plausibility of human level intelligence evolving in an asocial species is pretty low.) Assuming something like human level intelligence evolved in an asocial species. I would think it quite surprising if such a species had a morality very similar to us.

presumably "demon men" would be rational as well — Count Timothy von Icarus

What do we know of this imagined demon species? Why assume that they are men? Why assume that they are rational? See the following in reply to Bob Ross.

:up:

It's worth noting that Aristotle explicitly rejects Anaximander's theory of natural selection in De Anima, but I don't think that leaves his philosophy rudderless in the face of modern evolutionary theory. A different species would have a different form of life, different needs, etc. However, they would be the same as respects their rational nature (on Aristotle's account of rationality).

Since Aristotle is attaching the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing relative to its nature, wouldn't it follow that a rational species, S, which had a nature completely anti-thetical to justice and altruism be a 'good' S IFF it was unjust and egoistic? — Bob Ross

What is the relation between nature and the nature of a species? Can they be at odds?

There is the issue of what springs from an evolved nature though. In our case, what we find to be good is substantially a matter of our ancestors having evolved as members of a social species.

We might imagine a devil species which evolved from relatively asocial ancestors. (Though I think the plausibility of human level intelligence evolving in an asocial species is pretty low.) Assuming something like human level intelligence evolved in an asocial species. I would think it quite surprising if such a species had a morality very similar to us. — wonderer1

I don't know.. Warfare, torture, tribalism, narcissists, anti-social personalities, all of these things have been advantageous if we were to look at "purely" traits that led to increased survival. This is why I tend to reject naturalistic explanations for any ethical actions. You can argue anything is natural, and you might be right, but informs little on what is ethical other than possibly vague descriptions of mechanisms that might be the physical substrates for which ethical considerations are made.

Good exposition of Aristotle's thoughts; but it doesn't really address the OP: it seems to sidestep it. From what I can gather from your comment, you are not denying that "if a devil species existed and 'good' is defined as ~'excellence at one's nature', then a devil species would be 'good' IFF it is unjust, cruel, etc."; instead, you seem to be saying that God wouldn't allow the devil species to exist. This doesn't contend with the hypothetical, unless I am missing something.

Correct, but that is irrelevant to the OP.

It seems to me that this is an inconsistency in the approach. An evil animal would be an animal that does not follow its nature. Consequently, no animal can be evil (but neither good) by nature but by accident or by a deviation from its nature. As I understand it, to be good or evil cannot be something proper to the nature of a being. To be good or bad is something external in relation to nature.

In effect, imo, Aristotle's teleology is occult, or based on arbitrary post hoc definitions (i.e. final causes aka "essences") which render conclusions inferred from them (e.g. "good" is being/action consistent with final causes) invalid. Unless I've misunderstood the OP, your "problem", therefore, is pseudo, Bob.

↪Fooloso4 Correct, but that is irrelevant to the OP. — Bob Ross

Of course it's relevant! It is not a "glaring issue" that Aristotle is avoiding. The question of the ethics of a species that is by its nature unethical makes no sense. It is asking how something bad is good.

you are not denying that "if a devil species existed and 'good' is defined as ~'excellence at one's nature', then a devil species would be 'good' IFF it is unjust, cruel, etc."; instead, you seem to be saying that God wouldn't allow the devil species to exist. This doesn't contend with the hypothetical, unless I am missing something.

I'm saying that a being oriented towards evil is a contradiction in terms. Evil is a privation. How can a being be oriented fundamentally towards non-being? It would have to be "most what it is" when it is not.


On the evolutionary view, we might also consider how a species could ever evolve that prefers sickness to health? Strife and crisis to homeostasis? Destruction as an end in itself?

The closest Aristotle gets to your question is the contrast between vice and being bestial in the Ethics (Book VII IIRC). The bestial man is pretty much a psychopath, what you seem to have in mind. But the bestial man, unlike the man in vice, is incapable of rationality, or is at least a partially rational man beset by beastial urges that deprive him of his rational nature.

We might imagine rational creatures who are more solitary or quarrelsome than man (although man himself is pretty damn quarrelsome lol). But we can't have a creature fully oriented towards non-being as an end, since this would imply it most is when it is not.

Sadism might be another example you have in mind, but the sadist is attracted to causing suffering and destruction because of a sense of power or pleasure(a good), not for its own sake. Even if we suppose a species that acts like many spiders, where females attempt to eat the males that mate with them, it will be the case that this is done for a good (extra calories). Lack of concern for other's good is not being directed towards evil. Beings cannot be oriented towards absence, although they can face competing goods.

I am not sure if a creature whose end is specifically the thwarting of human ends is precluded. But such a thing: a. doesn't exist, b. wouldn't come to exist in the whole order of things.

Of course it's relevant! It is not a "glaring issue" that Aristotle is avoiding. The question of the ethics of a species that is by its nature unethical makes no sense. It is asking how something bad is good. — Fooloso4

:up:

Quite right. From an organic perspective, the only analog to a "devil species" would be "some species that human beings don't like". Which means nothing. Every species is integral to the biosphere in some way. It is a meaningless investigation, either of species or of ethics.

I think this is right idea. Most "vices" only make sense in the context of their being a corresponding virtue associated with them. If prudence is simply not a virtue, then rashness isn't a vice, it just is how you act. E.g., it's not vice for a beetle or a snake to operate purely off instinct and impulse.

Whereas for any rational creature, prudence will always be a benefit.

It seems like Aristotle thinks that the nature of the human species is such that we should care about each other and seek to be just — Bob Ross

Aristotle thought we should care about each other, or seek to be just, in the right way at the right time for the right reasons. This is subtler and more limited than the more general claim you're making. It's also his proposal that we should make a quilt of these virtues with others like self-love, philia of friends; indeed it is virtuous to be 'magnanimous' in the right way etc., and to be angry as appropriate, for example. Eudaimonia is a complex of right behaviours.

It seems as if there is the shadow of the later Christianised Aristotle falling across your thoughts, in the generalised claims about caring and justice, and in the very notion of a 'devil' for instance, and your passing reference to 'God'.

Aristotle was a mentor to Macedonian future kings, most notably Alexander the great. He advocated Alexander's conquests and thought Athenians might in their wars treat other peoples as 'beasts', which has a bit of a devilish air to me.

How can a being be oriented fundamentally towards non-being?

This is a mischaracterization of evil as privation. No one reputable denies that a person can aim at being unjust, cruel, etc. It happens all the time. Now, with what you are noting is:

Sadism might be another example you have in mind, but the sadist is attracted to causing suffering and destruction because of a sense of power or pleasure(a good), not for its own sake

Which is correct insofar as a person cannot aim at what is bad in the sense of it being done for its own sake; however, it is wrong insofar as the “devil species” I outlined is doing bad things for the sake of their own well-being. So they are doing it for the sake of something good, being that it is in accordance with their nature to gain well-being through the suffering of other species, but must aim at bad things to achieve it. So your counter here seems to miss the mark, don’t you think?

My point is that, the “devil species” would be right to commit unjust acts for the sake of their own well-being, since there is nothing about their nature that relates them to doing just acts, and this would be entailed by Aristotle’s view—wouldn’t it?

But such a thing: a. doesn't exist, b. wouldn't come to exist in the whole order of things.

That’s not the point: the point is that a living being having their status of being ‘good’ relative to fulfilling their nature opens up, in principle, the possibility that what is ‘good’ is for a living being to not care at all about other living beings if their nature is such that they gain the deepest sense of happiness from it. Wouldn’t you agree?

With respect to point B, Aristotle kind of confusingly defines ‘good’ in a two fold manner: what is done for its own sake (i.e., intrinsic valuebleness), and what is excellence for a particular thing. I couldn’t really decipher which definition he holds, and they are not compatible with each other. When you say it can’t exist in nature, what you are referring to, I would guess, is your example of a being geared towards unhealthiness (decadence); which is besides my point (as I already noted).

I think he definitely keeps definitions entirely too vague; but I don't see anything wrong with the concept of an essence or final causes (telos): do you?

It seems like human beings have an essence insofar as they can be subsumed under one shared concept of 'human being'.

I don't see anything wrong with the concept of an essence or final causes (telos): do you? — Bob Ross

Yes, in this context "telos" is fallaciously anthropomorphic (à la animism). Aristotle mistook – literalized / fetishized / reified – his causal mappings for the territory and called them "essences".

Interesting, but I agree with Fooloso4's post. On the other hand, perhaps BobRoss' problem points that Aristotle's ethics can't be universalised, meaning: what is good for the devil species and for us are contraries, so good becomes an empty term that can refer to anything at all and even to contraries. That would be the case if 'good' here was about the end itself, instead of the act of fulfilment itself — then the term is not empty in light of a devil species.

This is a mischaracterization of evil as privation. No one reputable denies that a person can aim at being unjust, cruel, etc. It happens all the time. Now, with what you are noting is:

Sure, people act devilish. This is different from a species whose telos specifically non-being. Like I said, a species whose end is specifically to thwart human good is perhaps coherent taken alone, although it makes no sense in the natural order of our world. A species whose end is evil tout court doesn't make sense though.

I outlined is doing bad things for the sake of their own well-being.

I don't think this makes sense. How does a species survive if its end is sickness over health? It cannot be fully oriented towards evil. It can be oriented towards goods that conflict with man's.

And for any sort of rational schemer, prudence still seems like a virtue. They won't get far doing evil if they act stupidly. Likewise courage will still be preferable to rashness or cowardice. You can't do your evil if you get yourself caught or are too scared to engage in evil acts. Etc.

My point is that, the “devil species” would be right to commit unjust acts for the sake of their own well-being, since there is nothing about their nature that relates them to doing just acts, and this would be entailed by Aristotle’s view—wouldn’t it?

A tiger is right to attack and eat people. I don't think the idea of a rational creature oriented wholly towards evil works the same way. Tigers' good is indeed fairly opposed to man as one of man's few natural predators. The good of the Bubonic Plague bacteria might be another example.

With respect to point B, Aristotle kind of confusingly defines ‘good’ in a two fold manner: what is done for its own sake (i.e., intrinsic valuebleness), and what is excellence for a particular thing. I couldn’t really decipher which definition he holds, and they are not compatible with each other. When you say it can’t exist in nature, what you are referring to, I would guess, is your example of a being geared towards unhealthiness (decadence); which is besides my point (as I already noted).

Have you read the Metaphysics yet? That's mainly the reason why I don't think this sort of thing is going to make sense from Aristotle's perspective (IIRC Book XII has most of the relevant stuff).

So they are doing it for the sake of something good, being that it is in accordance with their nature to gain well-being through the suffering of other species, but must aim at bad things to achieve it. So your counter here seems to miss the mark, don’t you think? — Bob Ross

You are describing humanity.

Except that on the scale we now inflict suffering, degradation of environments, extinctions of other species and so on is not rational at all, because even from the point of view of a "selfish rationality" what we are doing will not be to our ultimate benefit.

Also, there is really no "selfish rationality" because from a purely rational perspective one's flourishing or suffering are no more or less important than the flourishing or suffering of others.

Yes, in this context "telos" is fallaciously anthropomorphic (à la animism).

It can be; but I think Aristotle is very clear that Telos is just contingent on an agent’s intentions or purposes for things. Wouldn’t you agree that a member of a species gravitates towards fulfilling what it is to be that species?

Aristotle mistook – literalized / fetishized / reified – his causal mappings for the territory and called them "essences".

Yes, but, then, wouldn’t all of reason, concepts, and the understanding be about the territory? Why can’t we use the map we have to speak of the territory, which could include essences—no?

Sure, people act devilish. This is different from a species whose telos specifically non-being

You are reading the OP too literally: let me clarify. What I meant by “devil species” is what you are calling a “devilish species”. I am talking about a species of which they fulfill their nature necessarily at the expense of other species.

The critique I am making in the OP is an external criticism about how morally counter-intuitive it would be to say that devilish species member is being ‘good’ when they are torturing a human being for their own pleasure. Don’t you agree?

I don't think this makes sense. How does a species survive if its end is sickness over health?

That’s not what is being stipulated in the OP: e.g., it is the “sickeness” of other species for the “health” of the devilish species that I am discussing.

And for any sort of rational schemer, prudence still seems like a virtue. They won't get far doing evil if they act stupidly. Likewise courage will still be preferable to rashness or cowardice. You can't do your evil if you get yourself caught or are too scared to engage in evil acts. Etc.

Agreed. But this by no means entails virtues like kindness, liberality, etc. A devilish species would have no use for those with respect to other life.

A tiger is right to attack and eat people. I don't think the idea of a rational creature oriented wholly towards evil works the same way. Tigers' good is indeed fairly opposed to man as one of man's few natural predators. The good of the Bubonic Plague bacteria might be another example.

Yeah, so this is what I am talking about. You see it as internally coherent with Aristotle’s ethics (and you are right), whereas I agree and merely add that it is morally counter-intuitive to think of the Bubonic Plague as being ‘good’ by fulfilling its nature (of presumably infecting and killing as many people as possible). That seems to scream out: “this ethical theory has problems!”.

Have you read the Metaphysics yet? That's mainly the reason why I don't think this sort of thing is going to make sense from Aristotle's perspective (IIRC Book XII has most of the relevant stuff).

I haven’t, but I will.

I am avoiding using humanity as an example because Aristotle would say our Telos directs us to care about others, but we fall short sometimes.

I am talking about a species of which they fulfill their nature necessarily at the expense of other species. — Bob Ross

You'd have to go awfully far back in time, to find an ancestor of ours that wasn't a member of such a species.

Have you read the Metaphysics yet?
–Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven’t, but I will. — Bob Ross

For f*ck's sake ... :roll:

No. Maybe. Yes, but whatever we use "to speak of the territory" (including "essences") is not the territory itself.

:up:

The noun τέλος, τό (telos) is one of a group of similar words with similar meanings. It can be instructive to give some of them a look.

Verb, τελέω (teleo): complete, accomplish, perform, execute. To make perfect, bring to an end, finish.
Adverb, τελέωσ (teleos): completely, perfectly.
Noun, τέλοσ: an end accomplished, the completion or fulfilment of anything. And like many ancient Greek words it has other meanings, e.g., a body of soldiers, a tax to the city, the rating of a citizen (in Athens) in terms of property, initiation into religious mysteries, generally any religious ceremony, especially marriage. ("Little Liddell" Lexicon, 1977, p. 697).

And obviously Aristotle has his own usage for the word. But it is good to remember that Aristotle's purpose was the combined making sense of the world by giving an account of it. He was not in the magic business. Thus for modern purposes and understanding, DNA would seem to be what drives a living thing to fulfill its telos to be what it is - and this is both simple at first, and then also not-so-simple. But DNA the director. In terms of other things, telos seems to be used to refer to what the goal or purpose is.

Nor is it clear to me whether things have a telos apart from what their specific use is. An example given is that the telos of a blacksmith is to forge a sword, that of a soldier to wield it. But neither of these is the telos of the sword itself.

But the important point, imho, is not to imbue the word with magical or mystical meanings or power or properties, but to think of it instead as an idea-as-tool extant in Aristotle's language and adopted by him to develop and articulate hi ideas.

Social animals care about their own; otherwise, their societies could not last.