The paradox here is that if someone has 'bad faith' how can we tell? This is because the very idea of 'bad faith' is a being-in-itself created by a being-for-itself. What one person may point at as a system of oppression or bad faith may very well be doing so in bad faith.

How can this gap be closed, if at all? — I like sushi

Is it even relevant for people to know or say of others that they are in bad-faith? As you point out, it is an 'internal' concept.

Perhaps the cafe waiter who truly aspires to be the best cafe waiter possible is not in fact in bad faith at all. Sartre's biography of Saint Genet (Jean Genet) would seem to bear out this interpretation. Genet embraced the judgements of society that were heaped upon him (which is what makes him an existential 'saint').

To live in 'bad faith' for Sartre is to live as if you have a predefined human 'essence'/'nature'. — I like sushi

As a metaphor, this is just a fancy way of saying what many others have said. "To thine own self be true." "God will not have his work made manifest by cowards." If taken literally, it's clearly not true. There is a human nature. People are born with instincts, capacities, characteristics, and mental structures. Babies are not blank slates.

An inanimate object is a being-in-itself whereas a human is a being-for-itself (self-creating). — I like sushi

I think the object is still being-for-itself. An object is already quite meaningful: even rocks are more meaningful than being-in-itself. The Being-in-itself/Being-for-itself distinction is the most basic dualism of Sartre's which is offered as a means for resolving various paradoxes, but like all basic distinctions in a philosophy, it's hard to define it explicitly.

A human, I think, is not quite a being-for-itself -- there is no a being-for-itself -- Being-for-itself is a fundamental ontological category. After the distinction between being-in-itself/being-for-itself we can then come to understand that there is an ego, but the objects -- the equipmentality of Heidegger -- are still being-for-itself by my understanding.

The paradox here is that if someone has 'bad faith' how can we tell? — I like sushi

The Hazel Barne's translation has an introductory essay by her in it, and the following paragraph is (part of) her interpretation of Sartre on our relationship to others (and also our self -- think, if we're able to lie to self, which is a kind of Bad Faith, then we must also have this same "gap" you mention not just from our self to Others, but also between our self and our self) (page xxxviii)

Sartre has not
repudiated the Ego; he has only made of it an object of the pre-reflective
consciousness rather than contemporary with it. But it exists just as much
as objects in the world exist. Also Sartre never denies the existence of an
active, organizing (constituante), individual consciousness any more
than does William James, who likewise rejected consciousness as an
cntity. He merely insists that it is essentially a Nothingness which is
individualized by its objects but never wholly determined by past objects
to an extent which would prescribe what it will do with present or
future ones. Consciousness can never blot out the fact that it has been
aware of certain objects (part of which it has unified within the ideal
unity of the Ego); at times it may even let itself be trapped by the Ego
and not actively realize its ability to change its point of view on past
o,bjects. But the possibility is there. When Sartre speaks of inter-subjective
relations, of the phf::nomenon of bad faith, etc. he is referring to
the free conscio'lsness which has been directed toward certain objects,
",:hich usually asserts itself consistently with the general "character" of the
Ego, but which is not forced to do so. In ordinary experience consciousness
for all practical purposes fully asserts itself through the "I", but
anguish occasionally warns us that this familiar "I" is only a screen..
Ncvertheless consciousnesses are particular since they appear at a definite
time and place, thus nihilating Being from a particular point of view.
Sartre has warned us, as we said earlier, that strictly speaking one should
not say "my consciousness" but "consciousness of me." But if I say "consciousness
of me" and if you say "consciousness of me," our consciousnesscs
are as distinct as the Egos of which they are conscious.

Is it even relevant for people to know or say of others that they are in bad-faith? As you point out, it is an 'internal' concept. — Pantagruel

Yes, because if someone is accusing others of oppression they may be doing so in bad faith. This would basically mean that someone sees something they believe is 'oppressive' (which is not) because it suits their worldview to deceive themselves to avoid anguish and discomfort. Given that Sartre points out that the bad faith of people (systemic or otherwise) leads to oppression.

It is an internal concept that is created and propagated by the individual. It passes judgement but can certainly err.

No, not exactly, because Sartre is saying there is no true self (no 'essence'). We create ourselves.

Babies are not blank slates. — T Clark

We do not have to agree with his propositions to explore the contradictions. He is basically appealing to a form of self-determination (termed as Radical Freedom). He admits that people are born in certain circumstances and situations that make avoiding bad faith more or less as of a struggle.

I think the object is still being-for-itself. An object is already quite meaningful: even rocks are more meaningful than being-in-itself. The Being-in-itself/Being-for-itself distinction is the most basic dualism of Sartre's which is offered as a means for resolving various paradoxes, but like all basic distinctions in a philosophy, it's hard to define it explicitly. — Moliere

He famously stated that "existence precedes essence". As I understand this the very premise Sartre works from is that of atheism. The paperknife is an object created for a purpose, where the purpose is its 'essence'. Humans have no 'essence' because they were not created.

The term object can be attached to a being-for-itself in the realisation of an individual being among other individuals. He terms this as the 'Other'.

He famously stated that "existence precedes essence". As I understand this the very premise Sartre works from is that of atheism. The paperknife is an object created for a purpose, where the purpose is its 'essence'. Humans have no 'essence' because they were not created.

The term object can be attached to a being-for-itself in the realisation of an individual being among other individuals. He terms this as the 'Other'. — I like sushi

The small disagreement I have is I'd sayis that "The paperknife" is more meaningful than "Being-in-itself", at least within my head-cannon right now (I've recently been going back to Sartre)

Yes, Sartre is an atheist. Though I don't think it's a starting premise.

I want to suggest that the free individual could choose to find Hazel Barne's translation online, then discuss it -- Sartre has been coming back to my thoughts a lot recently, and I was very happy to see a thread trying to grapple with him. I've at least read Sartre's introduction and Barne's introduction, with some selections in Being and Nothingness.

I'm excited to see what comes of this.

Try this (page 20-21 in particular):

Existentialism and Humanism

I read page 27, tho I'm not sure what to say in response.

My mistake 20-21

PM'ed my response, and just glad Sartre is coming around as a point of thought on the forums.

Babies are not blank slates.
— T Clark

We do not have to agree with his propositions to explore the contradictions. He is basically appealing to a form of self-determination (termed as Radical Freedom). He admits that people are born in certain circumstances and situations that make avoiding bad faith more or less as of a struggle. — I like sushi

Sure. As I noted, if we don't take his words literally, his philosophy is a lot like many others, including ones I value like Lao Tzu and Emerson.

The question remains how/if the paradoxical position Sartre gives can be overcome? If not that then merely fortified in some way that is productive?

By realizing Sartre is simply wrong. Human beings have an essence, a nature. To ignore this is simply to be ruled by something that lies outside one's grasp of reality, to be determined by ignorance. Our actions do not spring from the aether uncaused, nor do we.

Even if they did, acts determined by nothing but "bare will"—pure potency—would ultimately be arbitrary and random anyhow. I am not sure if any definition of freedom in terms of potency—sans any notion of determinant good towards which rational nature's strive—avoids collapsing into mere arbitrariness.

If you have read Sartre and can explain why in depth I would love to hear it.

An in depth analysis of your understanding of his argumentation against essentialist ideas in the manner he was talking about them would be great?

Our actions do not spring from the aether uncaused, nor do we. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note: I do not believe this is what Sartre was saying. I do not believe he denounces obvious physiological facts or differences (such as sex or the human body in general).

Of course he doesn't, that would be silly. His point is posterior to those things.

The essential thing is contingency. I mean that one cannot define existence as necessity. To exist is simply to be there; those who exist let themselves be encountered, but you can never deduce anything from them. I believe there are people who have understood this. Only they tried to overcome this contingency by inventing a necessary, causal being. But no necessary being can explain existence: contingency is not a delusion, a probability which can be dissipated; it is the absolute, consequently, the perfect free gift. All is free, this park, this city and myself. When you realize that, it turns your heart upside down and everything begins to float...

It's the Good above all that he insists floats totally free. But the Good is presumably that by which we act if we act "for any reason at all."

Anyhow, Alvin Plantinga, who I don't much care for but who is a great logic chopper took up your question in a fairly well received book. His conclusion was pretty much that we cannot tell who is acting in good faith. Good faith doesn't suppose any sort of particular actions, e.g., "don't kill babies for fun." Sartre knows it when he sees it; in the waiter, in the girl on a date, but in these cases he envisages "seeing through their eyes," to a degree.

Human beings have an essence, a nature. To ignore this is simply to be ruled by something that lies outside one's grasp of reality, to be determined by ignorance. Our actions do not spring from the aether uncaused, nor do we. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, what exactly did you mean here then if you know he never suggested we 'spring from the aether' as you put it?

This might help to better outline his distinction :)

In case anyone is confused by what he meant by no nature/essence:

"Furthermore, although it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of condition. It is not by chance that the thinkers of today are so much more ready to speak of the condition than of the nature of man. By his condition they understand, with more or less clarity, all the limitations which a priori define man’s fundamental situation in the universe."

The "facticity" of our being can't spring up uncaused, e.g. our being French, or 22 years old, etc. This would be quite a thing to try to argue. Nor can choices spring up wholly "uncaused," since choices arise in the context of the contents of phenomenal awareness, and to deny that these are "caused" by what lies external to us would essentially be to deny the external world (or any link to it at least). It's purpose and meaning that are springing forth posterior to these—meaning and purpose have no weight save our own embrace of them (at least for the early Sartre; in his late work he backs away from his maximalist positions significantly from what I understand). This is why there is no way to determine good or bad faith "from the outside," because there is no rational nature (scholastic human essence) posterior to our values, purposes, and projects.

I'm sympathetic to parts of the description of bad faith, since it seems to get a core element of reflexive freedom—the idea that we have to be aware of what we are choosing and of our own choosing (and thus our responsibility). I'm also sympathetic to the parts that come down from Kierkegaard, but not necessarily how they get reframed in terms of freedom as a "transcending our material conditions." In Kierkegaard, (as also in Plato, most of the classical tradition, and Hegel) it is our relationship to the infinite (Good) that allows us to transcend the given, i.e., "what we already are."

Personally, I think Kierkegaard represents a degradation of this tradition to some extent, even if his presentation is superior to Hegel's, since the sense in which reason is part of what allows for this sort of transcendence seems to get lost. His focus on the "subjective" always seemed to me to be raising practical/moral reason up over and against theoretical reason. For Kierkegaard, theoretical reason seems at times to become a limit on freedom, e.g. in "Passion and Paradox." In the early Sartre, the infinite Good disappears as the source of transcendence as well (whereas reason's search for Truth is already gone, and Beauty has gone with these). The result is that transcendence seems to emerge from a bare haecceity, essenceless existence, sheer potency. But rather than safeguarding freedom, this would seem to simply collapse value and meaning into what is ultimately arbitrary—it cannot be grounded in a "rational nature" (essence) that seeks some determinate end because freedom is defined in terms of indeterminacy— potency over act.

And this crops up in early attempts to deal with Hegel's Lord-Bondsman dialectic. For Hegel, there is a determinant rational end, Spirit's fulfillment as "the free will that wills itself." Kick this end out and what is left? (Nothing says Hegel in PR §5/§15). The human inheritly demands thymos because...? It can't be because of their (or Spirit's) "rational nature," as in Hegel.

From what I understand it was working over this dialectical, conversations with de Beauvoir (who I think has a much better understanding here and expands the dialectical in useful ways, e.g. gender relations), and a growing recognition of the need for a dimension of social freedom/recognition that moved Sartre away from the early "absolute freedom." I am less familiar with this later stuff, but from what I've read it seems to default on the "existence precedes essence," view (or at least radically alter it), and IIRC he did indeed reject that specific formulation eventually. But I was thinking primarily of that early view with the comments on freedom collapsing into arbitrariness.

I think there are other problems too. The phenomenological experience of volition does not seem to always imply any real choice. Some stroke victims describe experiencing everything they observed appearing voluntary, e.g. the leaves blow across the lawn and they feel like they willed for then to move and made them move. So, to the extent the plausibility of such freedom relies on this sort of fallible presentation of volition to awareness, it seems open to critique.

Moreover, it seems to set freedom against the view of Russell and the other reductionists of Sartre's era (but for the wrong reasons). If freedom in choice is defined in terms of choice springing from potency then determinism still seems to be a threat. (Indeed, the early near Stoic view still seems to require a sort of dualism to maintain in light of the science of cognition). I'd trace the problem here back to Kierkegaard booting theoretical reason from a determinant role in freedom (Nietzsche too). No longer is determinism seen as in a way conducive (or even essential) to freedom, in that it allows theoretical reason to give us a sort of "causal mastery" of the world through techne (e.g. Leibniz's invocation of PSR in defense of free will). Instead we have to keep retreating posterior to the findings of theoretical reason (the sciences) to defend freedom (a freedom which is increasingly contentless).

Well, I've probably gone on too long with not very well organized insomnia thoughts, but perhaps that gives you an idea.

Edit: And I'm aware that later work suggests that oppression might always be a sort of bad faith, but as near as I can tell this is defaulting on the original formulation re essence.

My question was more or less an EVEN IF approach to the whole issue of 'essence'.

Whether we agree or not we can still follow the reasoning and find the paradoxical problem of knowing how to distinguish between a victim of bad faith or someone in bad faith. Clearly to play the victim is bad faith. I am not sure he ever addresses this issue other than to say something along the lines of 'be true to yourself' - as echoes.

Yes indeed. I do think the problem of diagnosing bad faith "from the outside," is related to the fact that no determinant end lies behind action though. Because of this there is no external demarcation accessible to us by which to judge the issue.

I do believe he shifted his philosophy in response to this sort of issue though. I recall reading that his later stuff has it that we can determine bad faith in oppressive actions. Our freedom ultimately entails an interest in others freedom (for broadly Hegelian reasons). I'm not really super familiar with this interpersonal/social turn though. This also helps get away from the idea that the oppressed are involved in a sort of bad faith, which seems a bit off in at least some cases.

The paradox here is that if someone has 'bad faith' how can we tell? — I like sushi

The question remains how/if the paradoxical position Sartre gives can be overcome? If not that then merely fortified in some way that is productive? — I like sushi

I don't really see a paradox. It seems to me that living in good faith is a standard we apply to ourselves, not others, although it might something we take into account. You have a right to expect appropriate behavior from me, but I'm not responsible to you for my inner life. On the other hand, I have known some profoundly false people. That's something to pay attention to when trying to figure out whom to trust.

Furthermore, although it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a human universality of condition. — I like sushi

I disagree with this. The idea of human nature is a central one to my way of thinking about people. Based on reading philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science plus my own experience in life, I see that we are deeply human at a biological, genetic, and neurological level. I say that so you know why I am resistant to any denial of its existence.

It also strikes me as arrogant. We are who we are, but we are also what we are. Sartre's radical freedom feels like Nietzsche's ubermensch. You can take that with a grain of salt, since I have read very little of either man's work.

I'd trace the problem here back to Kierkegaard booting theoretical reason from a determinant role in freedom (Nietzsche too). No longer is determinism seen as in a way conducive (or even essential) to freedom, in that it allows theoretical reason to give us a sort of "causal mastery" of the world through techne (e.g. Leibniz's invocation of PSR in defense of free will). Instead we have to keep retreating posterior to the findings of theoretical reason (the sciences) to defend freedom (a freedom which is increasingly contentless). — Count Timothy von Icarus

You probably have in mind thoughts like these from Nietzsche:

The 'external world' affects us: the effect is telegraphed into our brain, there arranged, given shape and traced back to its cause: then the cause is projected, and only then does the fact enter our consciousness. That is, the world of appearances appears to us as a cause only once 'it' has exerted its effect and the effect has been processed. That is, we are constantly reversing the order of what happens. - While 'I' see, it is already seeing something different.

What one also learns from Nietzsche is that the external world is not a deterministic mechanism, but continually changes its nature. If we supplement Nietzsche with the phenomenological insight that the intentional act perceives the givenness of what appears to it along dimensions of similarity in relation to what has been seen before, we can give human freedom a teleological, anticipative aspect. But this teleological vector is free in the same way as the ‘external world’ that appears to it. That is, not as theoretical reason but as contextually engaged sense-making.

I disagree with this. The idea of human nature is a central one to my way of thinking about people. Based on reading philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science plus my own experience in life, I see that we are deeply human at a biological, genetic, and neurological level. I say that so you know why I am resistant to any denial of its existence. — T Clark

Those were Sartre's words btw. Forgot to tag.

Will explain later. Time to go to work now :)

It also strikes me as arrogant. We are who we are, but we are also what we are. Sartre's radical freedom feels like Nietzsche's ubermensch. You can take that with a grain of salt, since I have read very little of either man's work. — T Clark

He was undoubtedly influenced quite strongly by both N and H.

Will explain later. Time to go to work now — I like sushi

From my point of view a very important thing to ask is: If we are free, are we condemned to be free? If so, then the act of bad faith is the attempt to free yourself from all responsibility for your life and your being. But A person, following Sartre, acting in bad faith would irremediably be free. Therefore bad faith is pretending that you are not free and that you have no responsibility. So to act in bad faith is to speak dishonesty. Bad faith is in relation to the other: When we act we do not simply affect ourselves, but we affect the other (even ourselves as the other). In this sense we can say that the act of bad faith consists in getting rid of the ethical commitment with respect to the other.

Consequently, bad faith is only recognized by those who act in bad faith. It is a secret, like a testimony. But it has ethical consequences in relation to the other.

So to act in bad faith is to speak dishonesty. — JuanZu

Incorrect. It is self-deception. One cannot always be aware they are acting in 'bad faith'. This misunderstanding might highlight the problem ?

Someone can deceive themselves into thinking they are acting in good faith when they are not - as is commonly done by everyone. We can be 'oppressing' other individuals under the staunch belief that we are acting in good faith rather than 'bad faith'.

It makes perfect sense to be in prone to self-deception that results in believing we are living 'authentically' when we are not.

This is the paradox of the claim of dealing with 'bad faith'. If we cannot truly distinguish between what is or is not an act of 'bad faith' clearly this is highly problematic.

The one bit I didn't say earlier is that Being and Nothingness is a work of ontology, but you're asking -- at least what I'd call -- a question about epistemology.

I'm aware enough about B^N that knowledge somehow connects the Being-for-itself to the Being-in-itself, and that it's a materialist philosophy.

But I'm cautious to put it in terms of epistemology because Sartre's work is much more in the vein of ontology as primary to epistemology, and "ontology" here is defined in the phenomenological tradition.

Heidegger's tradition of phenomenology maybe. Not Husserl's though, and that is why they parted ways (as well as other reasons of course).

Anyway, later ...

Yeh, later. And I'm interested, later, in corrections -- it was a thought I had held onto and felt like I ought share.

In some sense, and maybe this is the analytic side in me, I feel like Sartre is doing description more than "how to know" type stuff. After describing the fundamental ontology -- especially given that egos come after being-in-itself/being-for-itself -- we can some to ask how to know.

Or, in another philosophy you can do the opposite -- it's just I think Sartre is starting on the metaphysics side rather than the epistemology side.

You are right, it is better to talk about self-deception.

However, I think there is a misconception. Bad faith does not refer to the absence of freedom; according to Sartre, you are also free when you act in bad faith. Bad faith, as I understand it, refers to pretending to be a mere object whose actions are determined by your circumstances and not by your freedom.

You cannot self-deceive yourself that you are acting in good faith, because that implies that you know what it is to act in good faith. But no external determination like a knowledge act as an agent of your freedom. Therefore you cannot self-deceive yourself about your own good faith.

The paradox is actually different. It is that when we pretend to be determined by our circumstances, social roles, etc., we are already making use of our freedom precisely in order to pretend. As in the case of the waiter who pretends to be a simple waiter, but the very act of pretending makes it clear that he is not a simple waiter.