You are not responsible for morality, it is your choice, but being immoral has repercussions. If we're judging by amount alone, then it's always moral to save the majority; if you decide not to save the majority, then the environment you face after will criticize that, especially if there is no better reason. You will face the repercussions of your decision.

I am going to come back and make a full response when I have more time

No worries at all.

According to what you say here the driver should be convicted for murder, no? You seem to think he murdered the pedestrian on the shoulder.

Correct. I am assuming you disagree: the fact they are swerving to avoid other people, although they are still intending to run over other people to save them, seems to be the relevant difference for you that makes it (presumably) morally omissible.

Killing one person to save the five is what enables the person to save the five. Without being able to kill the one person, they cannot save the five. — Bob Ross

You are saying two different things here. Let's take them separately:

"Killing one person to save the five is what enables the person to save the five. "
This is false. Suppose at the last minute the 1 person rolls off the track and saves himself. The operator has still managed to save the other five, and that is because it was using the lever that enabled him to save them, not the presence of the other 1 person. The means is the same whether the 1 person is killed or manages to save himself.

"Without being able to kill the one person, they cannot save the five."
If you mean that they would be unable to save the 5 if they lacked the ability to kill the 1, that is true. But this is not because the 1 is the means of killing the 5, it is because to be able to kill the 1 person they need to be able to switch the train, and it is this switching that is the means of saving the 5, not the killing of the 1.

I think what is preventing you grasping the obvious fact that killing the 1 person is not the means of saving the 5 is your belief that intention to kill innocent people is enough to convict someone of moral guilt. Even if there were such a thing as moral guilt (which there is not, because as I have said, there is no such thing as moral responsibility), this would not be the case, because, as in the trolley case, an agent may be in a situation where they cannot avoid killing innocent people. If they did not choose to be in such a situation, then no blame can attach to them for being in that situation, and consequently no blame can attach to them for then intentionally killing some of these people, as long as they intend to kill as few as the situation allows.

To be completely honest, I think your line of reasoning entails that one should pull the lever. — Bob Ross

Yes - I’ve changed my mind regarding the trolley case. I now hold that pulling the lever is permissible if the conditions of double effect are being adhered to.

The reason I am wary of the trolley case is because when a modern mind asks if it is permissible to pull the lever, they are almost certainly asking whether it is permissible to do evil that good may came; they are almost certainly attempting to justify consequentialism. So in this sense I think @Fire Ologist is correct when he says that the problem unduly prescinds from questions of intention. Only if one is not intending to kill the person (and one is not willing their death as a means to the end) can one pull the lever.

Correct. I am assuming you disagree: the fact they are swerving to avoid other people, although they are still intending to run over other people to save them, seems to be the relevant difference for you that makes it (presumably) morally omissible. — Bob Ross

Okay.

Yes, if by “he cannot avoid causing deaths” you mean his actions. If he has to either (1) kill 2 innocent people or (2) 4 innocent people; then I agree he should go with 1. But that is not the situation the pilot is in in your hypothetical. — Bob Ross

It seems like he is in that hypothetical. You are positing a significant difference between steering away from a large group of people and killing others as a side-effect, and ceasing to the fly the plane and killing others as a side-effect. When the pilot decides to cease flying the plane he knows the death of innocents will result, and therefore on your definition the advice you give is also intentional killing (i.e. the advice to cease flying the plane).

I guess. I would say that the duty to fly the aircraft safely is a duty which does not obligate one to commit anything immoral for its own sake; whereas it seems like you may think that it might. — Bob Ross

This is instructive because you speak about "committing an immoral act for its own sake." This is obviously not what is happening any any of the scenarios. Not even someone who does evil for the sake of a good end is committing immorality for its own sake. :chin:

How? Both situations have a person who knows they have to sacrifice someone to save someone else, and they act upon it. To me that is a sufficient condition to say they intended to do it. — Bob Ross

They don't intend to do it in different ways? Again, on your principles to cease flying the plane is to intentionally kill.

Much of this comes back to the first sentence of Aquinas' response:

I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. . . — Aquinas, ST II-II.64.7: Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

You are denying this principle insofar as you are saying that everything which is foreseen is intended. Or more precisely, every effect which is foreseen to be necessary is intended.

What is your analysis of intent? What does it mean to intend something?

I think the difference you are talking about is merely that it seems like the person in the shoulder example is intending to save the pedestrians and the person on the shoulder is just an unfortunate side-effect; whereas the two in the transplant are definitely not a side-effect. — Bob Ross

Right: because in the first case the bad effect is not a means to the good effect, but in the latter case it is. Thus the transplant is not permissible on double effect.

For example, if I see someone in need of water (as perhaps they are thirsty) (let’s call them the first person) and I see someone else with water (let’s call them the second person) and I walk over to the second person and take their water to give it to the first person, then I am intending to take the water from the second person to give it to the first person even if my self-explicated intention is to get the first person water. — Bob Ross

This is another case where the bad effect is a means to the good effect, and is therefore not permissible on double effect. In order to give the first person water I must steal from the second person. Contrariwise, if there were one drink of water and two persons dying of thirst, I could give it to the first person even though I knew that the second person would die of thirst, because the bad effect (of their dying) is not a means to the good effect (of the other person drinking). The bad effect is not necessary in order to bring about the good effect; it is a side effect.

You are saying, by analogy here, that if the person is just intending to help the first person in need, and isn’t executing consciously a plan to take it from the second person, that the taking of the water of the second person is merely a side-effect of the intention. — Bob Ross

In order to give the first person water I must obtain water. In order to obtain water in your scenario it must be stolen from the second person. So what is happening is that I am stealing water in order to obtain water in order to give water to a thirsty person. The bad effect is a means to the good effect, and is therefore impermissible. Without the bad effect there would be no water for the thirsty person; just as without their deaths there would be no organs to transplant.

The difference between the transplant and the shoulder example, is merely that in the former the person is consciously aware that they are using people as a means. The latter example is iffy: someone may realize they have to kill the shoulder person to save the other people and continue anyways (thereby making it a conscious intention of theirs) whereas another person may not realize it and only think to themselves that they are saving the pedestrians. — Bob Ross

Suppose an act has two effects: I press the accelerator and two things happen: my speed accelerates and my fuel is consumed. Do you think Aquinas is right, and it is possible to intend one effect without the other? When I press the accelerator do I intend to accelerate and do I intend to diminish my fuel? And even if so, do I intend them in the same way? Is the word "intend" being used in the same way for both of these effects?

I am seriously struggling to see how the police officer would not communicate in their report, just based off of your statement to them here, that you intended to kill the guy on the shoulder to avoid hitting the two on the median; and this is essential to your argument that you provide a basis against this. — Bob Ross

I brought up murder because it is obvious that this person would not be convicted of murder. They may be convicted of manslaughter, but not murder. At the very least your analysis doesn't sync with our law system. It follows from this that the police officer would not write that I intended to kill the guy on the shoulder. Police officers and judges accept that side effects exist, and that not everything foreseen is intended.

So, this just boils down to the hierarchy of moral values. I think that rights are more fundamental than social duties (like flying airplanes, driving buses, etc.): the latter assumes the duty to protect and are birthed out of the former, so the former must be more fundamental. — Bob Ross

But this doesn't answer the question. If I have a duty to not-kill one person, then why don't I have a double duty to not-kill two persons? At stake are two duties.

It's not clear which answer is right, and yet it is clear that this answer is wrong:



...so it does seem like we can make some progress in our moral reasoning. :grin:

Yes - I’ve changed my mind regarding the trolley case. I now hold that pulling the lever is permissible if the conditions of double effect are being adhered to.

I am glad we can at least agree on the full consequences of your view (:

I think I see a bit of the confusion and mistakes on my end; so let me explicate it more clearly.

I was originally thinking that: if a person knows A is an (reasonable and probable or certain) implication of B and they intend B; then they intend A. This is not true: an intention is a purposeful course of action; and sometimes the purposeful course of action can have consequences which are not in the purposeful plan (of action) one had.

However, I don’t think this changes much in my view at all. Let’s go through an overview of each example we’ve had so far:

1. Standard 1 vs. 5 Trolley Problem: the person who pulls the lever to save the five is purposefully taking a course of action of sacrificing one as a means to save the five. This is immoral.

2. Same as #1, but amended such that the person deciding to pull the lever (or not) is the operator of the train. The train operator that veers into the other track to save the five at the expense of the one is purposefully taking a course of action that sacrifices the one to save the five. This is immoral. The train operator continuing to steer the train on the tracks that has the five on it is not purposefully running over the five; because they are not purposefully running over the five but, rather, continuing to drive because they cannot sacrifice their passengers (in the event of steering off both tracks unsafely) nor the one on the other track to avoid a bad outcome—their intention is to avoid deaths without committing any immoral acts.

3. The Pilot Example: I would say the same as the train operator example. The pilot is not intentionally killing the group of people by continuing to fly until the plane naturally crashes because their purposeful action is to try to save lives without committing any immoral acts—their intentions does not include killing people but, rather, their purposeful course of action is to avoid doing immoral acts.

4. The Car Example: Ditto.

5. The Water Example: I agree that if one has water and has to choose between quenching the thirst of one person or another and they intend to quench one person’s thirst, then they are not intending to deprive the other of water. This is because their purposeful course of action does not include depriving them of water; whereas in my original example, it did.

This is instructive because you speak about "committing an immoral act for its own sake." This is obviously not what is happening any any of the scenarios. Not even someone who does evil for the sake of a good end is committing immorality for its own sake. :chin:

By “its own sake”, I was referring to the duty to safely fly the plane and not the immoral act.

How? Both situations have a person who knows they have to sacrifice someone to save someone else, and they act upon it. To me that is a sufficient condition to say they intended to do it. — Bob Ross

They don't intend to do it in different ways? Again, on your principles to cease flying the plane is to intentionally kill.

I would say that they don’t intend it in different ways, because both have the purposeful course of action of sacrificing one person for the sake of others.

I would also like to add that sometimes knowledge of B implying A and intending B does implicate one in intending A: the knowledge one has can implicate them in a purposeful course of action that they may not have been sufficiently aware of (self-reflectively). E.g., if I am aware that I am intending to quench the thirst of person A and I know that that requires me to steal the water from person B, then, even if I am not aware that I am intending to, I am thereby intending to steal water from person B when I intend to quench the thirst of person A. The relevant question is the actual and full course of action implied by one’s purposefulness—not what one is aware of as the course of action implied by their purposefulness.

I am seriously struggling to see how the police officer would not communicate in their report, just based off of your statement to them here, that you intended to kill the guy on the shoulder to avoid hitting the two on the median; and this is essential to your argument that you provide a basis against this. — Bob Ross

I brought up murder because it is obvious that this person would not be convicted of murder. They may be convicted of manslaughter, but not murder.

I genuinely believe that the police officer would say you intended to sacrifice the person for the other people; and I am surprised that is controversial to say. If your purposeful course of action is to save the people you are about to run into and you know the only way to do so is to sacrifice someone else, then the full course of action that you are purposefully taking is using one person as a means towards saving the other people. No?

So, this just boils down to the hierarchy of moral values. I think that rights are more fundamental than social duties (like flying airplanes, driving buses, etc.): the latter assumes the duty to protect and are birthed out of the former, so the former must be more fundamental. — Bob Ross

But this doesn't answer the question. If I have a duty to not-kill one person, then why don't I have a double duty to not-kill two persons? At stake are two duties.

What do you mean “double duty”? It doesn’t compound: one has the duty to not kill innocent people intentionally, and that duty applies to any being of a rational kind.

"Killing one person to save the five is what enables the person to save the five. "
This is false. Suppose at the last minute the 1 person rolls off the track and saves himself. The operator has still managed to save the other five, and that is because it was using the lever that enabled him to save them, not the presence of the other 1 person. The means is the same whether the 1 person is killed or manages to save himself.

This is changing the scenario: that’s not a valid option for the person pulling the lever. They either pull the lever, thereby sacrificing one to save five, or they don’t and five people die.

Since they know that pulling the lever necessarily results in killing one person and that this is the only way for them to save the five; then they are intending to sacrifice the one to save the five.

What you are noting is that the mechanism being used to save the five is the lever; which is uncontroversially true.

"Without being able to kill the one person, they cannot save the five."
If you mean that they would be unable to save the 5 if they lacked the ability to kill the 1, that is true. But this is not because the 1 is the means of killing the 5, it is because to be able to kill the 1 person they need to be able to switch the train, and it is this switching that is the means of saving the 5, not the killing of the 1.

You are confusing using someone as a means towards something, with the means of using them as a means. E.g., the lever is the means to using the one person as a means to avoid the bad outcome [of five dying].

I think I see a bit of the confusion and mistakes on my end; so let me explicate it more clearly. — Bob Ross

Okay.

I was originally thinking that: if a person knows A is an (reasonable and probable or certain) implication of B and they intend B; then they intend A. This is not true: an intention is a purposeful course of action; and sometimes the purposeful course of action can have consequences which are not in the purposeful plan (of action) one had. — Bob Ross

First, I don't know how helpful this is given the fact that "intent" and "purpose" are synonyms. Now you've just said all the same things you were saying before, but with the word "purpose" instead of the word "intent." This is apparently only a superficial shift of which word is being used.

So the principle we now agree on is: <If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q>. (the idea here is that P is clearly intended)

Now I have claimed that Q is intended when it is the means by which P is achieved, or else when it is willed as an end. For example, when I shoot a "bank" shot in basketball (off the backboard) I intend the ball to ricochet off the backboard into the basket. In this case the ball hitting the backboard is Q and the ball going into the basket is P, and the very fact that Q is a means to P shows that I intend the occurrence of Q. For the second example, if I try to hit two birds with one stone, then I am intending both P and Q (hitting bird 1 and hitting bird 2) as ends. Only in these types of cases do I intend Q.

You haven't given any explanation of when Q is intended. You just said, "It's not always intended," and then you went on to give your exact same opinions with the word "purpose" instead of "intent." To take your fourth case:

3. The Pilot Example: I would say the same as the train operator example. The pilot is not intentionally killing the group of people by continuing to fly until the plane naturally crashes because their purposeful action is to try to save lives without committing any immoral acts—their intentions does not include killing people but, rather, their purposeful course of action is to avoid doing immoral acts.

4. The Car Example: Ditto. — Bob Ross

So for the car:

• A: Swerve right
• P: Avoid hitting all four people
• Q: Hit the two people on the right

Remember that we agreed on the principle, <If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q>. You are claiming that although one does not necessarily intend Q, they do intend Q in this case. But why is that? We have agreed that, "Because they know it will happen," is an insufficient answer.

Or the trolley:

1. Standard 1 vs. 5 Trolley Problem: the person who pulls the lever to save the five is purposefully taking a course of action of sacrificing one as a means to save the five. This is immoral. — Bob Ross

• A: Pull lever
• P: The trolley misses the five people
• Q: The trolley hits the one person

Why would one think that the lever-puller is intending or purposing to kill the one person?

5. The Water Example: I agree that if one has water and has to choose between quenching the thirst of one person or another and they intend to quench one person’s thirst, then they are not intending to deprive the other of water. This is because their purposeful course of action does not include depriving them of water; whereas in my original example, it did. — Bob Ross

• A: Give water to the first person
• P: The thirst of the first person is quenched
• Q: The second person is deprived of water

Now how is this any different from the other scenarios? To merely assert that their purpose/intent does not include Q is to beg the question. If I can not-intend this Q, then why can't I not-intend the other Q's?

3. The Pilot Example: I would say the same as the train operator example. The pilot is not intentionally killing the group of people by continuing to fly until the plane naturally crashes because their purposeful action is to try to save lives without committing any immoral acts—their intentions does not include killing people but, rather, their purposeful course of action is to avoid doing immoral acts. — Bob Ross

Here you are actually responding to my counterclaim that if the pilot ceases to fly the plane he intentionally kills:

• A: Cease flying the plane
• P: Avoid actively killing anyone
• Q: People will die

Why isn't the pilot responsible for Q? He knows Q will occur if he stops flying the plane, so on your reasoning it seems that he intends Q.

I think what is happening here is that you are hoping that the deaths that occur via the pilot's omission are better than the deaths that occur via the pilot's commission, even if more people end up dying on the omission. But Q still occurs on the omission, it does not go away.

I would also like to add that sometimes knowledge of B implying A and intending B does implicate one in intending A... — Bob Ross

I agree, along with Aquinas.

I would say that they don’t intend it in different ways, because both have the purposeful course of action of sacrificing one person for the sake of others. — Bob Ross

Again, this is just an assertion. I could do the same thing if I said regarding case 5, "He intends/purposes to sacrifice the second person for the sake of the first person." This is not to reason or explain; it is merely to assert.

I genuinely believe that the police officer would say you intended to sacrifice the person for the other people; and I am surprised that is controversial to say. If your purposeful course of action is to save the people you are about to run into and you know the only way to do so is to sacrifice someone else, then the full course of action that you are purposefully taking is using one person as a means towards saving the other people. No? — Bob Ross

I suppose we could look up some cases like this to see if they are convicted of murder, if you actually believe they would be so convicted.

Since they know that pulling the lever necessarily results in killing one person and that this is the only way for them to save the five; then they are intending to sacrifice the one to save the five. — Bob Ross

Herg’s point is that the death of the one is not a means to the saving of the five, and we know this because something could happen where the one frees himself from the track and the five would be saved all the same. This is completely different from the transplant case. In that case if the one frees himself and does not die then the five do die. In one case the bad effect is a means, whereas in the other case it is not.

You are confusing using someone as a means towards something, with the means of using them as a means. E.g., the lever is the means to using the one person as a means to avoid the bad outcome [of five dying]. — Bob Ross

This would be true if the second supposed means was, in fact, needed to save the five; but as Leontiskos has pointed out, it isn't:

something could happen where the one frees himself from the track and the five would be saved all the same. — Leontiskos

Since the second supposed means is not needed, it isn't a means at all. You really need to accept this so that this discussion can get somewhere more interesting (e.g. moving on to consider the fundamental dispute between deontologists and consequentialists in the trolley problem, the transplant problem, and. if I may be allowed to widen the scope a little further, the Omelas problem).

I think what is happening here is that you are hoping that the deaths that occur via the pilot's omission are better than the deaths that occur via the pilot's commission, even if more people end up dying on the omission. — Leontiskos

Actually I think Bob is taking the straightforward position that it is always wrong to deliberately kill an innocent person. If I understand him, he regards this as an absolute moral truth, completely non-negotiable, so that 'you must not deliberately kill an innocent person' is a moral imperative that admits of no exceptions, however bad the consequences of obeying it. He will no doubt correct me if I have misunderstood him.

If I have understood him correctly, then I would like to ask him what, in his view, underpins this truth? Does he, for example, think that it is a moral truth because God makes it so?

Actually I think Bob is taking the straightforward position that it is always wrong to deliberately kill an innocent person. — Herg

It seems to me that the question at hand asks what it means to deliberately/intentionally/purposefully kill. Although you and I may disagree on a great deal, we do agree that to pull the lever is not to use the death of the one as a means. My claim is that if his death is not intended as a means and it is not intended as an end, then it is not intended, and he has not been intentionally killed.* Bob Ross has his foot in the door insofar as he has admitted that not every effect of an act is intentional, even if it is known that it will occur.

Good posts, by the way. :up:

* I think it would be helpful for Ross to understand that if the trolley scenario were changed so that instead of one person there were ten people on the second track, then the doctrine of double effect would not permit switching the trolley to the second track, even though doing so is not necessarily to intentionally kill the ten. One cannot intend to kill, but even when one is not intending to kill it does not follow that their act will be moral.

It seems to me that the question at hand asks what it means to deliberately/intentionally/purposefully kill. It seems that although you and I may disagree on a great deal, we do agree that to pull the lever is not to deliberately/intentionally/purposefully kill the single person. — Leontiskos

Certainly 'to deliberately/intentionally/purposefully kill the single person' is not an adequate or accurate description of the operator's intention when he pulls the lever. An adequate and accurate description would be 'to minimise the number of people who are going to be killed'.

However, I'm not sure that this means that I can agree with you that:

to pull the lever is not to deliberately/intentionally/purposefully kill the single person — Leontiskos

because after all, the operator intentionally pulls the lever in the belief that by so doing, he is going to kill the single person. And this surely is the same thing as killing him intentionally.

I don't believe, even if there were such a thing as moral guilt, that this would make him morally guilty, because I believe his moral responsibility would be to minimise the number of people who are going to be killed, and killing the single person intentionally is unavoidable if he is to do this.

CC: @Herg

By “intention”, I just mean a “deliberate” or “purposeful” course of action; and I don’t know how else to explain it than that. An intention is not merely a purpose nor a deliberation: it is a deliberation or purposeful contemplation of a course of action. Perhaps that is just to reiterate what what already there in the term “intention”—but doesn’t it suffice?

I agree that “if I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q even when I know A causes Q” and I agree that “Q is intended when it is a means by which P is achieved. However, here’s what I think you are missing: letting something happen is not the same as doing something: the former is inaction which has its consequences (due to its absence), whereas the latter is action which has its consequences (due to its presence).

I didn’t explicate this very clearly before, because quite frankly I am having to dive in deeper into this (conversing with you) than I have before, but letting an innocent person die is not necessarily immoral; whereas killing an innocent person is. This is the relevant difference in your examples.

To determine whether or not one is killing an innocent person or letting them die, one needs to determine if an action which they committed is responsible for their death—viz., “if action A from P1 results in P2’s death, then P1 killed P2”. This is separate from whether or not a person intentionally kills or lets them die; and what we are discussing is the combination of one killing (i.e., taking action which results in a death) in conjunction with one’s actions being deliberate (or having knowledge which would implicate them).

To allow us to dive into our differences, I am going to pick one of our examples, specifically the car one, and dive deeper into it. If we can make ground on the car one, then we can move on the rest; because they all have the same commonalities vital to our differences.

So for the car:
• A: Swerve right
• P: Avoid hitting all four people
• Q: Hit the two people on the right

Multiple things to note:

1. Q is intended in this case because it is a means towards P. Without hitting the two people, one cannot avoid hitting the four people—that’s exactly what it means to use something as a means (i.e., it is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome). This is no different than the case where one steals the water to quench someone’s thirst.

2. Continuing to drive, thereby hitting the four, does not result in any action from the driver that caused the four to die: they are letting them die—as it is a result of their inaction that causes them to die.

3. Hitting the two people to save the five is an action which results in the deaths of the two; which is thereby an act of killing (as opposed to letting them die).

4. You might say that, in #2, continuing to drive is the act which causes the four people’s death, and so it is not a case of letting them die but, rather, a case of killing them: continuing to do something is NOT an act. If I sit down in a chair, then I have thereby acted in such a way as to sit down in a chair. Every second I am just sitting there is not another action of sitting in the chair—to continue sitting there is not an action: it is inaction. Therefore, to continue to driving, when was driving all the same before, is not itself an action; and so to continue to driving when one cannot avoid hitting four people (because they would be sacrificing other people to save them) is an inaction. On the contrary, swerving to the right is an action which results in the death of two people; and so it is an instance of killing two people, and, separately, was intentional (so it is immoral).

5. It follows from what I have said thus far, that you are right that I intend to let people die by not swerving; but I am not killing them.

6. That the act of swerving is the immediate means of saving the four, it does NOT follow that killing the two people was not a means of saving the four. If the course of action intended requires the sacrificing of an innocent person, even if it be mediated, then the sacrificing of that innocent person is a means towards that course of action (i.e., end). I understand that you are making a (valid) distinction between an effect which is vs. is not necessary ideally to bring about the end; but in the scenarios we are discussing it is necessary for bringing about the end. Saying that technically the same end could have been accomplished differently in a different scenario such that it was without X (where, for example, the two people aren’t on the side of the road) does NOT takeaway from the fact that one cannot in this scenario achieve the end without X.

Here you are actually responding to my counterclaim that if the pilot ceases to fly the plane he intentionally kills:
• A: Cease flying the plane
• P: Avoid actively killing anyone
• Q: People will die

Ceasing to fly the plane would be immoral; because it is an action which results in the deaths of (at least) the passengers. Doing nothing and continuing to fly is an inaction which results in people dying BUT not an immoral act being committed.

A should be “Continue flying the plane”.

I think what is happening here is that you are hoping that the deaths that occur via the pilot's omission are better than the deaths that occur via the pilot's commission, even if more people end up dying on the omission. But Q still occurs on the omission, it does not go away.

Exactly.

Herg’s point is that the death of the one is not a means to the saving of the five, and we know this because something could happen where the one frees himself from the track and the five would be saved all the same. This is completely different from the transplant case. In that case if the one frees himself and does not die then the five do die. In one case the bad effect is a means, whereas in the other case it is not.

This would be true if the second supposed means was, in fact, needed to save the five; but as Leontiskos has pointed out, it isn't:

See #6.

Actually I think Bob is taking the straightforward position that it is always wrong to deliberately kill an innocent person. If I understand him, he regards this as an absolute moral truth, completely non-negotiable, so that 'you must not deliberately kill an innocent person' is a moral imperative that admits of no exceptions, however bad the consequences of obeying it. He will no doubt correct me if I have misunderstood him.

This is correct insofar as it applies to beings of a rational kind.

If I have understood him correctly, then I would like to ask him what, in his view, underpins this truth? Does he, for example, think that it is a moral truth because God makes it so?

I would say the immediate underpinning is that beings of a rational kind have rights, rights are inherently deontological, and they have the right to not be killed if they are innocent. The ultimate underpinning is that eudamonia (viz., flourishing, well-being, and happiness in the deepest, richest, and most persistent sense) is the highest moral good; and the best way to pragmatically structure society is to give people basic rights to best promote and progress towards a world with the richest and most harmonious sense of eudamonia.

However, I'm not sure that this means that I can agree with you that — Herg

Sure - I edited up that post after I realized this, but it looks like you began replying before my edit went through.

I don't believe, even if there were such a thing as moral guilt, that this would make him morally guilty, because I believe his moral responsibility would be to minimise the number of people who are going to be killed, and killing the single person intentionally is unavoidable if he is to do this. — Herg

Sure, I can see that point of view.

I agree that “if I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q even when I know A causes Q” and I agree that “Q is intended when it is a means by which P is achieved. — Bob Ross

Okay good, but the key thing you need to do is explain the case in which Q is not intended. Are you saying that it is not intended whenever it is not a means to P?

However, here’s what I think you are missing: letting something happen is not the same as doing something: the former is inaction which has its consequences (due to its absence), whereas the latter is action which has its consequences (due to its presence). — Bob Ross

So as I said, "I think what is happening here is that you are hoping that the deaths that occur via the pilot's omission are better than the deaths that occur via the pilot's commission, even if more people end up dying on the omission." What is at stake is a distinction between a commission and an omission.

I didn’t explicate this very clearly before, because quite frankly I am having to dive in deeper into this (conversing with you) than I have before, but letting an innocent person die is not necessarily immoral; whereas killing an innocent person is. This is the relevant difference in your examples. — Bob Ross

Okay, fair enough, and I agree with that, although you would apparently disagree with my opinion that killing a person must necessarily involve an intention to kill them.

To determine whether or not one is killing an innocent person or letting them die, one needs to determine if an action which they committed is responsible for their death—viz., “if action A from P1 results in P2’s death, then P1 killed P2”. This is separate from whether or not a person intentionally kills or lets them die; and what we are discussing is the combination of one killing (i.e., taking action which results in a death) in conjunction with one’s actions being deliberate (or having knowledge which would implicate them). — Bob Ross

This business about judging one's responsibility for an omission vs. a commission comes from my charge that the pilot's omission of ceasing to fly the plane is a culpable omission. I am going to set aside that question for the time being given that it places too many dishes on our plate.

• A: Some action done by P1
• P: Some effect
• Q: P2's death

Did P1 kill P2? Or to be more precise, did P1 intentionally kill P2, or else did P1's action merely cause P2's death? "Kill" is ambiguous as to whether intent is involved. So I propose we avoid the verb "kill" altogether, and talk about murder vs. causing death. "Murder" isn't a perfect word, but it's better than anything else I can think of.

1. Q is intended in this case because it is a means towards P. Without hitting the two people, one cannot avoid hitting the four people—that’s exactly what it means to use something as a means (i.e., it is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome). This is no different than the case where one steals the water to quench someone’s thirst. — Bob Ross

Your argument is that <A means is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome; Q is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome; Therefore Q is a means>.

This is unwieldy. I like @Herg's definition better:

A means is something that facilitates or enables the performance of some action. — Herg

You responded:

Killing one person to save the five is what enables the person to save the five. Without being able to kill the one person, they cannot save the five. — Bob Ross

Now Herg's point was that pulling the lever is what enabled the person to save the five, and killing the one person is not what enabled the person to save the five, and I agree with him.

A point that Herg and I have both made is that a clear case of using one as a means to save five occurs in the hypothetical where one person is killed so that their organs can be transferred to five people in dire need of an organ transplant. When this case is compared to the trolley case, it is clear that the death of the one is a means in the transplant case but not in the trolley case.

I gave two cases of intent: "two birds with one stone," and "the basketball bank shot." Consider the metaphor of passing an electrical current through the shape of the letter "V" and the number "7". We feed current into the bottom vertex and our goal is to get current to the upper left vertex ("P"), as can be seen at <this link>.

Now Q_v is not a means to P_v, but Q₇ is a means to P₇. Do you see the difference? In the language of one way of expressing double effect, P_v and Q_v both follow immediately from A_v, but P₇ follows Q₇ mediately from A₇. Because P_v and Q_v follow immediately from A_v, Q_v cannot be a means to P_v.

Every second I am just sitting there is not another action of sitting in the chair—to continue sitting there is not an action: it is inaction. — Bob Ross

The problem with this analysis is that to discretely decide to continue sitting is an act. It is a decision to omit standing. If someone decides to omit an act then they have acted, by deciding to continue in the course they were already in. But again, I am going to leave this omission vs. commission question for another day.

I actually have to run, so I am going to post what I have so far and return to this tomorrow. Most of what you say relates to the omission vs. commission question, which I think is better left for later. Still, I will try to revisit anything I have missed in your post. Hopefully what I say here will be enough to go forward.

CC: @Herg

Okay good, but the key thing you need to do is explain the case in which Q is not intended. Are you saying that it is not intended whenever it is not a means to P?

I already explicated this in my response: Q is not intended if Q is not a means towards P and P was intended.

This business about judging one's responsibility for an omission vs. a commission comes from my charge that the pilot's omission of ceasing to fly the plane is a culpable omission.

No. I explicitly stated in my response that it is immoral for them to cease flying the plane.

A: Some action done by P1
• P: Some effect
• Q: P2's death

Did P1 kill P2?

I am assuming you meant to draw up a scenario where P1’s action results in P2’s death. If so, then it obviously follows that P1 killed P2.

Or to be more precise, did P1 intentionally kill P2, or else did P1's action merely cause P2's death?

Whether or not P1 intentionally killed P2 is a completely separate question, which you cannot conflate. That is going to rest on whether or not P1 deliberately did it.

So I propose we avoid the verb "kill" altogether, and talk about murder vs. causing death. "Murder" isn't a perfect word, but it's better than anything else I can think of.

By “murder” do you mean an unlawful, premeditated, killing OR an immoral, deliberate, killing? I am going to straight up reject the former (legal) definition if that is what you meant; because it is going to derail the conversation substantially.

Your argument is that <A means is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome; Q is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome; Therefore Q is a means>.

This is unwieldy. I like @Herg's definition better:
A means is something that facilitates or enables the performance of some action.

I don’t see any difference between our definitions. Everything I said in #6 still applies with Herg’s definition.

Now Herg's point was that pulling the lever is what enabled the person to save the five, and killing the one person is not what enabled the person to save the five, and I agree with him.

Everything you said in this section of your response was a reiteration of what you already said and did not address the #6 point I made; so it was unhelpful. I understand already what you both are arguing, and addressed it in #6.

A point that Herg and I have both made is that a clear case of using one as a means to save five occurs in the hypothetical where one person is killed so that their organs can be transferred to five people in dire need of an organ transplant. When this case is compared to the trolley case, it is clear that the death of the one is a means in the transplant case but not in the trolley case.

Nope. You are right to say there is a valid distinction between the two cases, but it is not that one is a means and the other isn’t: it is that one is an immediate means and the other isn’t. Again, it does not help your case to demonstrate that ideally an act can be carried out without X when X is necessary to carry out that act in the specific scenario we are discussing. You completely ignored this part of my response.

The problem with this analysis is that to discretely decide to continue sitting is an act. It is a decision to omit standing. If someone decides to omit an act then they have acted, by deciding to continue in the course they were already in. But again, I am going to leave this omission vs. commission question for another day.

This rests on a false understanding of an act. Deliberating staying seated is not an act: it is choosing to NOT act. One is choosing to NOT get up.

I actually have to run, so I am going to post what I have so far and return to this tomorrow. Most of what you say relates to the omission vs. commission question, which I think is better left for later. Still, I will try to revisit anything I have missed in your post. Hopefully what I say here will be enough to go forward.

I don't think you addressed anything really that I said, to be completely honest.

I already explicated this in my response: Q is not intended if Q is not a means towards P and P was intended. — Bob Ross

No, you have not already explicated that. You gave a case when Q is not necessarily intended, and this is different from giving a case where it is not intended.

So now you say <If Q is not a means to the intended P then Q is not intended>. Okay, it is good that you answered, even though your answer is false. If A is throwing a stone, P is hitting bird 1, and Q is hitting bird 2, then Q is intended even though it is not a means to P. This is the “two birds with one stone” case that I already gave, which is the same as the “V” circuit where vertex P and vertex Q are both intended.

But what you have failed to do over and over again is to tell us when Q is the means and when Q is not the means. You have been begging the question by repeating, “Q is a means in the trolley/plane/car case!” Herg and I have been providing analyses of when something is a means and when it is not, and we have been trying to lure you into a real analysis of what it is for something to be a means. Of course you have now provided an analysis in terms of conditional necessity.

What I am going to do is focus on the water case, because that is the sole case where you claim that Q is not a means to P. If it is shown that your claim fails there according to your own analysis of what it is to be a means, then it will become more apparent that you have offered no substantial analysis of what it is for something to be a means. For parity let us assume that the water is necessary to live:

• A: Give water to the first person
• P: The first person lives (because of the water)
• Q: The second person dies (for lack of water)

If we look at the quotes from your previous post, we find that you must hold that Q is intentional killing, because you must hold that Q is a means to P:

1. Q is intended in this case because it is a means towards P. Without hitting the two people, one cannot avoid hitting the four people—that’s exactly what it means to use something as a means — Bob Ross

In the water case, without the second person dying for lack of water, one cannot avoid the death of the first person. P cannot be achieved without Q. Therefore on your reasoning, Q is a means to P, and is therefore intended.

3. Hitting the two people to save the five is an action which results in the deaths of the two; which is thereby an act of killing (as opposed to letting them die). — Bob Ross

In the water case, depriving the second person to save the first is an action which results in the death of the second person. On your reasoning, this is an act of intentional killing, where P cannot be achieved without Q.

6... does NOT takeaway from the fact that one cannot in this scenario achieve the end without X. — Bob Ross

One cannot achieve P without Q, therefore on your reasoning Q was a means to P.

Your error in all of this is conflating conditional necessity with the presence of a means. You are trying to say, “If in causing P I necessarily cause Q, then Q was a means to P.” This is actually contrary to our mutual premise that <If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q>. The presupposition behind this premise is that P is a good effect and Q is a bad effect, and that there are cases where we cannot get P without also getting Q. That is the whole point of the rider: even when I know that A causes Q. You are more or less just denying that rider by claiming that whenever A is known to cause Q, Q is automatically a “means” to P. If P were possible without Q then A would not cause both P and Q.

Or else, go study the diagram I drew up, paying particular attention to the “V” shape. If we are aiming to provide current to vertex P, then we must apply current to vertex A, and this will necessarily result in current flowing to vertex Q, but it does not follow that the current flowing to Q is a means to the current flowing to P! A will supply current to P whether or not Q exists, and this is completely different from the “7” shape.

It’s not so hard to logically demonstrate the contradiction:

1. (P $\to$ Q) $\to$ (Q is a means to P)
2. (A $\to$ (P ^ Q)) $\to$ (A $\to$ (P $\to$ Q))
3. A $\to$ (P ^ Q)
4. ∴ A $\to$ (Q is a means to P)
5. Contradiction with respect to our agreed premise: <If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q>

(If (4) were true then Q is necessarily intended given that P is intended.)

Your error is (1). It does not follow from the conditional necessity of Q that Q is a means. Note that, "One cannot achieve P without Q," is the same as (P $\to$ Q).

The other absurdity that results from your view is that Q is a means to P and P is a means to Q, which is of course impossible. This is because in (2) (P ^ Q) is interchangeable with (Q ^ P), and what this means is that A leads both to the conclusion that Q is a means to P and to the conclusion that P is a means to Q. In other words: (A $\to$ (P ^ Q)) $\to$ (A $\to$ (P $\leftrightarrow$ Q)).

By “murder” do you mean an unlawful, premeditated, killing OR an immoral, deliberate, killing? I am going to straight up reject the former (legal) definition if that is what you meant; because it is going to derail the conversation substantially. — Bob Ross

By murder I mean intentional killing, and by “causing death” I mean killing that is not necessarily intentional. The simple word, “killing,” is completely inadequate to our purposes given its ambiguity with respect to intention. I suggest we avoid using that word unless we prefix it with “intentional” or “non-intentional.”

If I have understood him correctly, then I would like to ask him what, in his view, underpins this truth? Does he, for example, think that it is a moral truth because God makes it so? — Herg

I would say the immediate underpinning is that beings of a rational kind have rights, rights are inherently deontological, and they have the right to not be killed if they are innocent. The ultimate underpinning is that eudamonia (viz., flourishing, well-being, and happiness in the deepest, richest, and most persistent sense) is the highest moral good; and the best way to pragmatically structure society is to give people basic rights to best promote and progress towards a world with the richest and most harmonious sense of eudamonia. — Bob Ross

When you say that 'eudamonia is the highest moral good' is the ultimate underpinning, do you literally mean that nothing further underpins that? Because if so, then I must ask you, what reason do we have to believe that the proposition 'eudamonia is the highest moral good' is true?

6. That the act of swerving is the immediate means of saving the four, it does NOT follow that killing the two people was not a means of saving the four. If the course of action intended requires the sacrificing of an innocent person, even if it be mediated, then the sacrificing of that innocent person is a means towards that course of action (i.e., end). — Bob Ross

You are claiming here that sacrificing the two people is required in order to avoid killing all four — in other words to save the other two. Let's see.

There are four people strung out across the road: from left to right, they are Alan, Betty, Charles and Dora. If the car does not swerve, all four will be killed. In the event, the car swerves to the left, and only Alan and Betty are killed: Charles and Dora are saved.

If you are right, and the killing of Alan and Betty is required in order to save Charles and Dora, then that must mean that if Alan and Betty had not been there, the car could not have swerved and saved the lives of Charles and Dora. But this is clearly not true: whether Alan and Betty are present has no bearing on whether the car can swerve and hence save the lives of Charles and Dora. So it can't be true that their presence, and their being sacrificed, is required in order for Charles and Dora to be saved.

If it really was true that Alan and Betty's presence, and their being killed, was required in order that Charles and Dora can be saved, then I would agree with you that the killing of Alan and Betty is a means of saving the lives of Charles and Dora. But their presence, and their being killed, is not required, and therefore it is not a means of saving Charles and Dora.

BTW, I hope it is clear that you can give up the belief that the killing of Alan and Betty is a means to saving the lives of Charles and Dora, without also giving up the belief that it is wrong to kill an innocent person. I agree that it is wrong to kill an innocent person, except in circumstances where it cannot be avoided, or where it is necessary in order to prevent some greater wrong. The point is that the driver (if he is a moral sort of person) would save all four innocent lives if he could, but the situation prevents him from doing so, and for that, he is not to blame.

Ok, good points.

By “means”, I mean “a necessary utility expended to produce an desired outcome”.
By “intention”, I mean “a purposeful or deliberate course of action”.

Because I accept the premise that “if I cannot achieve A without causing B, then I cannot intend A without intending to cause B”, I reject the premise I previously accepted (that “If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q”).

You are trying to say, “If in causing P I necessarily cause Q, then Q was a means to P.”

Correct; and I like your diagrams for explaining it. I understand that, from your perspective, P is not a means to Q in V because if one removes P from A then Q is still connected to A. The problem is that when Q and P are necessary utilities for bringing about A, then A cannot exist without being connected to Q and P: you cannot remove P and keep Q connected to A—A disappears.

If I draw out your diagram without having to share a dropbox, then I would represent the V like this:

P ← A → Q

The problem is that this doesn’t completely represent the relationship whereof Q and P are necessary for A. I don’t know how to represent it this way, but in logic it would be “A → (P & Q)”: you can’t say that A → P is true when Q is false given “A → (P & Q)”.

What you are doing is conflating the necessary conditions for facilitating A in specific example E with in a general example G. In G, you are absolutely right: A → P is fine. In E, this is not necessarily true; and is false in the case of the examples we have been using.

Now, an easy way to understand the flaw in your reasoning is to reflect on your 7 diagram; because it implies that if you were to remove P that Q is still connected to A, which is not true, for example, in the case of the car swerving example. If A is “swerving to save four people” and P is “saving four people” and Q is “hitting two innocent bystanders”, then removing P does not result in A → Q. Viz, if the intention is to save four people, then the effect of hitting two innocent bystanders is no longer connected with the intention in the event that there are no four people to save.

A: Give water to the first person
• P: The first person lives (because of the water)
• Q: The second person dies (for lack of water)

If we look at the quotes from your previous post, we find that you must hold that Q is intentional killing, because you must hold that Q is a means to P

Fair enough--except for the killing part: it is not a killing. Yes, from what I have said, and I did not catch it on my last response, it follows that letting the second person die is a means towards saving the first person: I accept this.

In the water case, without the second person dying for lack of water, one cannot avoid the death of the first person. P cannot be achieved without Q. Therefore on your reasoning, Q is a means to P, and is therefore intended.

Correct.

3. Hitting the two people to save the five is an action which results in the deaths of the two; which is thereby an act of killing (as opposed to letting them die). — Bob Ross

In the water case, depriving the second person to save the first is an action which results in the death of the second person. On your reasoning, this is an act of intentional killing, where P cannot be achieved without Q.

NO! You lack a distinction between letting something bad happen and doing something bad. My action was to give the first person water to save them; and the simultaneous deprivation of water (from that act) of the second person is an inaction: it is a negative counter-part to a positive. You do not seem to have fully fleshed out this kind of distinction, and instead insist on everything being an action.

I intentionally let, in this example, the second person die: I did not kill them. This is morally permissible because (presumably) there was no morally permissible way to save them.

2. (A → (P ^ Q)) → (A → (P → Q))

This premise is false in the examples we have given: A entailing P and Q does not imply that A entails that P entails Q—you are thinking in terms of the 7 diagram instead of a reciprocated V diagram (where A cannot exist without being connected to both Q and P). Take the car example, I am actually saying (as opposed to this premise 2):

{A → (P ^ Q)} → {![(A → P) && !(A → Q)]}

If you remove Q (or P), then A no longer exists (in the diagram).

The other absurdity that results from your view is that Q is a means to P and P is a means to Q

That’s exactly what it means for a thing to be dependent on two other things that are independent of each other. Operating this computer with two screens requires two different monitors. Monitor 1 and Monitor 2 are independent of each other analogous to the V diagram, but A (which is the operation of the computer with two screens) requires both. If you remove 1 or 2, then you cannot operate the computer with two screens (A); and it is not like the 7 diagram either: the monitors are independent of each other and mutually required for A.

By murder I mean intentional killing, and by “causing death” I mean killing that is not necessarily intentional. The simple word, “killing,” is completely inadequate to our purposes given its ambiguity with respect to intention. I suggest we avoid using that word unless we prefix it with “intentional” or “non-intentional.”

I would prefer we just refer to it as intentional killing vs. killing: that is the most clear way of presenting it. Murder is usually defined differently than what you said here.

@Herg

If you are right, and the killing of Alan and Betty is required in order to save Charles and Dora, then that must mean that if Alan and Betty had not been there, the car could not have swerved and saved the lives of Charles and Dora.

Please see me and @Leontisk conversation which I am responding to here as well. I addressed this with their diagrams above.

BTW, I hope it is clear that you can give up the belief that the killing of Alan and Betty is a means to saving the lives of Charles and Dora, without also giving up the belief that it is wrong to kill an innocent person. I agree that it is wrong to kill an innocent person, except in circumstances where it cannot be avoided, or where it is necessary in order to prevent some greater wrong

I agree that an exception is when one cannot avoid it; but we are differing on what we mean by “avoid it”. I make a distinction between letting someone die vs. killing them that doesn’t appear in your view at all.

I make a distinction between letting someone die vs. killing them that doesn’t appear in your view at all. — Bob Ross

It doesn't appear in my view because I don't think it is morally significant.

Here's the car driver barrelling along the road. He turns a corner and suddenly sees four people in front of him. (Perhaps he is in a road race and these people are from out of town and didn't know it was happening.) He realises that they are too close for him to avoid altogether: avoiding all four is therefore not an available choice. He has two choices: if he doesn't turn the wheel, he will kill all four, whereas if he turns the wheel, he will only kill two. To kill four is worse than to kill two, so he turns the wheel.

The point is that not turning the wheel is just as much a choice as turning it. The decision whether to turn the wheel is his and his alone; if he chooses to turn it he will be responsible for the outcome (or such part of the outcome as is under his control; the fact that he will inevitably kill at least two people is not under his control), and if he chooses not to turn it he will be equally responsible. Since he is equally responsible whether he turns the wheel or not, he is just as morally responsible whichever he chooses to do. There is no sense in the suggestion that he is less morally responsible if he doesn't turn the wheel: the moral responsibility attaches to the act of choosing, not to the physical action of turning the wheel, and there is no special exemption for acts of choosing that do not result in physical movements of the body or of machines moved by the body; that is not where moral responsibility has purchase.

It doesn't appear in my view because I don't think it is morally significant.

It is morally significant if one accepts that they cannot commit immoral acts to avoid bad or produce good outcomes.

If one agrees that it is immoral to intentionally kill an innocent human being and they cannot save a person without intentionally killing an innocent human being, then the only morally permissible option is to do nothing.

He has two choices: if he doesn't turn the wheel, he will kill all four, whereas if he turns the wheel, he will only kill two. To kill four is worse than to kill two, so he turns the wheel.

He should continue and kill all four; because doing so is not an action. He is deciding to not change the course he is already on, thereby letting four die instead of swerving (which is an action resulting in intentionally killing innocent people).

The point is that not turning the wheel is just as much a choice as turning it

You are confusing decisions (or choices) with actions. Deciding NOT to do something, is NOT an action.

When you say that 'eudamonia is the highest moral good' is the ultimate underpinning, do you literally mean that nothing further underpins that? Because if so, then I must ask you, what reason do we have to believe that the proposition 'eudamonia is the highest moral good' is true?

I meant in the sense of what morally grounds it. Being the highest moral good, it is the ultimate good which everything else is assessed under. Of course, I believe there are reasons to believe that it is the highest moral good.

The point is that not turning the wheel is just as much a choice as turning it — Herg

You are confusing decisions (or choices) with actions. Deciding NOT to do something, is NOT an action. — Bob Ross

I didn't say not turning the wheel was an action, I said it was a choice, so it is not true that I am "confusing decisions (or choices) with actions". You are changing what I wrote. Please don't do that.

If one agrees that it is immoral to intentionally kill an innocent human being and they cannot save a person without intentionally killing an innocent human being, then the only morally permissible option is to do nothing. — Bob Ross

I don't agree that it is UNCONDITIONALLY immoral to intentionally kill an innocent human being. As I've said, I think it is morally acceptable if either one has no other choice, or it is done in order to prevent a greater wrong. This is perhaps the essential bone of contention between us. I think we owe each other an explanation of why we take the positions on this that we do. I will start by explaining why I think the way I do.

I am an ethical naturalist and hedonist: I believe that the only intrinsic good is pleasure (strictly, pleasantness), and the only intrinsic evil is pain (strictly, unpleasantness). If you wish to go into further detail, I can explain further why I believe this.

From the fact (as I see it) that pleasure and pain are the only intrinsic good and evil, I derive the more or less Benthamite view that the entities that have moral status are all and only those entities that can experience pleasure and pain. These are therefore the entities we should treat as ends, not as mere means.

We do not treat an entity as an end if we kill it without good reason. We also do not treat it as an end if we let it die, when we could save it, without good reason. The mere fact that letting an entity die does not involve physical action, whereas killing an entity does, is not a good reason, because the only intrinsic evil is pain, and the good (i.e. pleasure) that that entity would have experienced is equally lost either way. The physical act of killing has no intrinsic value, either good or bad: its only value is whatever value it acquires through being instrumental in a course of action (or inaction) which either treats an entity as an end or fails to do so, or (subject to the primary requirement to treat entities as ends) increases pleasure or decreases pain (or the reverse). Killing an entity and letting it die are therefore, morally speaking, on all fours.

There you have my reasoning. If I have left anything unclear, let me know and I will elucidate if I can.

I would now like you to tell us the reasoning that leads you to conclude that it is UNCONDITIONALLY immoral to intentionally kill an innocent human being.

The floor is yours.

When you say that 'eudamonia is the highest moral good' is the ultimate underpinning, do you literally mean that nothing further underpins that? Because if so, then I must ask you, what reason do we have to believe that the proposition 'eudamonia is the highest moral good' is true? — ”Herg”

I meant in the sense of what morally grounds it. Being the highest moral good, it is the ultimate good which everything else is assessed under. Of course, I believe there are reasons to believe that it is the highest moral good. — Bob Ross

Can you tell us at least some of the reasons?

This post is pretty up-to-date on my ethics (although I have sublated it a bit since then). Let me know if you have any questions or would like to discuss it further. Perhaps we should go into that thread to avoid derailing this one.

I didn't say not turning the wheel was an action, I said it was a choice, so it is not true that I am "confusing decisions (or choices) with actions". You are changing what I wrote. Please don't do that.

I apologize: I must have misunderstood what you said then. It sounded like you were considering them both actions.

Either way, the issue, as will be expounded later hereon, with your idea of “having no choice” is that you tie it to “killing”--viz., it is morally permissible to choose to kill someone when they have no choice to not kill them.

The scenarios you keep giving, are NOT examples of a situation where one does not have any other choice than to kill people—that’s what you keep missing. Letting someone die is a choice, but not a choice to kill someone. Killing is an action.

I don't agree that it is UNCONDITIONALLY immoral to intentionally kill an innocent human being

Ah, I see where we disagree. You don’t believe an innocent person has the right to not be killed (or you hold a view of ‘rights’ which is confused and incoherent [such as claiming that they can be revoked for the greater good]).

I think people have rights, rights are inherently deontological, and that the most basic one is to not be killed if one is innocent.

As I've said, I think it is morally acceptable if either one has no other choice, or it is done in order to prevent a greater wrong.

In the case of the latter, you are denying that a person has a right not to be killed; and in the case of the former, this is muddied (as exposed in your examples you keep giving): saying one cannot choose to not kill someone because they only have the option to kill someone or let them be killed is just to confuse what it means to make a decision to (1) kill someone vs. (2) let them die—either I accept the face-value of your assertion that “one has no other choice” and in the car example it would then (according to you) be morally impermissible to swerve (because they have the choice to not kill people but, rather, let them die), or I have to, again, interpret your assertion as ~”one has no other choice but let someone die or kill someone” and then I simply disagree (because letting someone die is morally omissible in some cases).

This is perhaps the essential bone of contention between us. I think we owe each other an explanation of why we take the positions on this that we do. I will start by explaining why I think the way I do.

Fair enough.

I am an ethical naturalist and hedonist

Cool. I am an ethical naturalist and a neo-aristotelian.

I believe that the only intrinsic good is pleasure (strictly, pleasantness), and the only intrinsic evil is pain (strictly, unpleasantness)

I believe that there are plenty of intrinsically good “things” (because intrinsic goodness is identical to intrinsic valuableness and intrinsic valuableness is grounded in intrinsic “motivational-ness”). Hence, I completely agree that pleasure and pain are intrinsically good and bad (respectively) but disagree that they are the most intrinsically good and bad. E.g., a state of deprivation and decadence is surely worse, in terms of its power to intrinsically (negatively) motivate, than pain; and the sate of supreme flourishing is surely better, in terms of its power to intrinsically (positively) motivate, than pleasure.

The most intrinsic good is to be a eudaimon; because it is the richest, most persistent, and deepest state of flourishing, well-being, and happiness.

From the fact (as I see it) that pleasure and pain are the only intrinsic good and evil, I derive the more or less Benthamite view that the entities that have moral status are all and only those entities that can experience pleasure and pain. These are therefore the entities we should treat as ends, not as mere means.

I can mostly get on board with this. Living beings are special, insofar as they are the only beings capable of these intrinsically valuable states; and the more complex the living being, arguably, the more potency of well-being they can achieve (and thusly making them more valuable than simpler living beings).

As a side note, I don’t think a principle of ends-in-themselves is compatible with your view; but that’s a separate issue (I guess).

I would not say that we should always treat living beings as ends-in-themselves and never merely as a means; because I find it perfectly permissible for higher living beings to use lower living beings as means towards their ends (within certain limits and with certain stipulations) because they are more valuable and there is no feasible means for them to survive otherwise.

We do not treat an entity as an end if we kill it without good reason. We also do not treat it as an end if we let it die, when we could save it, without good reason.

“without good reason” is doing a lot of heavy-lifting here; so I am not sure how to address this.

I would say that beings of a rational kind deserve rights which beings of irrational kinds do not—such as not being killed when innocent—and, although we do need to treat all life with a certain amount of respect, we can use beings of non-rational kinds as means towards good ends (to some extent). E.g., if pulling the lever in the trolley problem results in killing an innocent cow to save five people, then I am morally obligated to pull the lever.

The mere fact that letting an entity die does not involve physical action, whereas killing an entity does, is not a good reason, because the only intrinsic evil is pain, and the good (i.e. pleasure) that that entity would have experienced is equally lost either way.

I agree one can be held morally responsible for letting someone die; but letting someone die can be morally omissible--specifically in the case that one cannot do anything to save them that is morally permissible. That is the big difference between our views. I hold that one cannot commit an immoral act to save someone, whereas you do.

I would now like you to tell us the reasoning that leads you to conclude that it is UNCONDITIONALLY immoral to intentionally kill an innocent human being.

The floor is yours.

Hopefully I answered this adequately; but to elaborate a bit more: beings of rational kinds have rights which beings of irrational kinds do not have—such as not being killed when innocent. The reasons for this are that beings of rational kinds are:

(1) capable of rational, civic, and social contributions to societies. A human being that contributes, as a citizen, to a society deserves some basic rights that cows do not (for example) since they are engaging, rationally, in a social contract with society.

(2) rational beings have the sufficient free will to engage in projects, which makes them significantly more valuable than irrational beings because they are significantly more capable of being moral agents.

(3) rational beings have significantly higher levels of complexity, awareness, and consciousness than irrational beings. They are impacted, in terms of well-being, more potently and at a wider-range than irrational beings. E.g., if I kill an ant, the other ants will not be as impacted (in terms of their well-being) than if I kill a human being’s brother or sister.

All of these render, to me, a warranted belief that beings of rational kinds have these innate rights that we typically associate with human beings in well-developed societies.

I am an ethical naturalist and hedonist: I believe that the only intrinsic good is pleasure (strictly, pleasantness), and the only intrinsic evil is pain (strictly, unpleasantness). If you wish to go into further detail, I can explain further why I believe this. — Herg

What if sadistic aliens come down and offer us the following deal: if you give us a little kid so that we may torture them, we will gift you with fabulous technologies. If you don't give us the kid, all humans will become our slaves.

On a purely hedonic calculus, isn't the moral thing to do to give them the kid to torture? What would you do?

On a purely hedonic calculus, isn't the moral thing to do to give them the kid to torture? — RogueAI

It would be, indeed. But I take the view that the hedonic calculus should only be applied subject to the imperative to treat sentient beings as ends, and handing the kid over for torture would be treating him or her as a mere means, not an end.

The moral thing to do is what it has always been in such situations, e.g. in 1939 when we were made a not dissimilar offer by the Nazis: you fight the bastards.