Our world picture is subject to change isn't that the purpose of Wittgenstein's riverbed analogy in OC 96? — Sam26
Moore conflates, as many people do, the use of "I know..." as an expression of a conviction, as opposed to an expression of epistemology (JTB). "Suppose I replaced Moore's 'I know' by 'I am of unshakeable conviction' (OC 86)?" — Sam26
certain hinge beliefs ground all of our systems, and these hinge beliefs tend not to change or change very little over time. Again, examples include: "There are other minds," "There are objects," "We have hands," and "The Earth has existed for a long time, etc." These hinges should be in a group of their own because they tend to be the most solid and beyond the reach of any reasonable doubt. They seem to be core hinges. — Sam26
Note that with a mere belief, one might respond to the question "Why do you believe that?" with the answer "I just do," and that's acceptable as a mere belief; but a claim to knowledge as JTB requires more, it requires that the belief be justified and true. And of course, Wittgenstein in challenging Moore's use by asking what would count as a justification for "I know this is a hand." Wittgenstein is telling us that Moore's use of "I know..." is akin to an expression of a conviction, not objective knowledge as Moore thinks it is. — Sam26
Wittgenstein's point is that no justification is required. Certain propositions, viz., hinge propositions are generally outside our epistemological language games. — Sam26
What I am emphasizing here is what Wittgenstein says in On Certainty in the following:
110 “….As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.” — Richard B
But recall that Wittgenstein regarded the ordinary meaning of "to know" to not imply infallibility, in the sense that even if a fact P necessarily implies another fact Q, "knowing that P" does not necessarily imply Q. — sime
This stems from his epistemic consideration that in a literal sense nothing is knowable in the sense demanded by a philosopher. And yet he appreciated that everyone including himself ordinarily use the verb "to know" all the time. Therefore he concluded that the ordinary meaning of "to know" isn't an insinuation of ideal knowledge. — sime
3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.
7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.
41. ... But "I know where you touched my arm" is right.
160. The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief.
354. Doubting and non-doubting behavior. There is the first only if there is the second.
510 .. It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts.
I'm saying that knowing and doubting as epistemological uses are more sophisticated language games. — Sam26
You don't seem to be following my position carefully. — Sam26
Knowing and doubting come much later — Sam26
So, if you're speaking in terms of primitive man there is no knowing and doubting epistemologically. — Sam26
And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations. — Sam26
Epistemological considerations may come much later but knowing and doubting do not. It is not clear what the distinction you are making between knowing and doubting and their epistemological uses. If the point is that epistemology as an branch of philosophy arises later then yes, of course. — Fooloso4
Since hinges can and do change, even if only rarely and slowly, epistemological considerations are not off the table — Fooloso4
I see, not knowing and doubting, but believing and doubting as more inextricably tied. The problem I have with the idea that knowing involves uncertainty or defeasibility, is that it seems weird, inconsistent or incoherent. to say that you know, but that you could be mistaken. — Janus
It could simply mean that your inductive reasoning, which is a legitimate form of knowing is only probable (most of science is inductive). So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken. This happens all the time. Evidence changes and so do our conclusions. I think the problem is when we conflate the meaning of knowledge as JTB for example, and one's claim to knowledge, they are two different things. The definition is one thing, that is what it means to know, but your inductive claim doesn't have the same force of necessity (if necessity is the correct word). — Sam26
Science is a form of knowing in a participatory and a practical sense. We know the world, in the sense of participating in it, via science. It is practical too in the that it is a practice, a know-how. Propositional knowledge though, it seems to me, requires observation. I know I have hands because I can see them, observe myself using them and so on. I know it is raining when I am out and I feel the rain on my body and see the drops falling. In those kinds of cases, of which there are countlessly many in our lives, we cannot be mistaken, barring faux-doubt and bizarre thought-experiment scenarios, which I don't believe deserve our concern. — Janus
When you say "So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken." I have no problem agreeing with you because it is not a claim that I know, but a claim to have good reason to believe that I know. And this highlights the strangeness of saying that I could know, without knowing that I know. For me, if I don't know that I know, as I say I do in cases like 'I am a human being' 'my body is bilaterally symmetrical (more or less)', I have hands and feet'. 'My head sits on my shoulders' and so on endlessly, then I would say instead that I don't know, but I believe or don't believe this or that, or I reserve judgement. — Janus
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