They would have to be, or they aren’t propositions at all. That’s the mistake you keep making: you think there are types of propositions. — Bob Ross

The mistake you are making is believing that I think there are moral propositions, when I think I have made it quite clear that I don't think there are.

You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former

I already did: I said it would be what is morally good (which is not dependent on beliefs). — Bob Ross

Unfortunately for your argument you are depending on something which either doesn't exist or is unknowable. It is nothing more than an empty tautology to say that what is morally good is a truth maker for what is morally good.

It can be known to be true, if what the proposition refers to corresponds to reality. — Bob Ross

How would we know if it corresponded to reality? What kind of reality? Certainly not an empirical reality. So, it's of no help to us.

Then, that is not truth, nor are they normatively binding (in the strict, traditional sense). You cannot have the cake and eat it too (; — Bob Ross

You're really not paying attention. I've already said I don't think anything is "morally binding". The very idea is incoherent, meaningless as far as I can tell. Even if there were a God, a lawgiver of objective moral truths, that would not be "binding", it certainly isn't for those who profess to be believers, even priests. As I said before the normative is what is normal, not what is imperative.

Because moral statements are not truth-apt

Then they don’t have the “form of a proposition”. — Bob Ross

Now you're starting to get it.

Then, you don’t think they are propositions; and should abandon your view that beliefs make moral propositions true or false. You can’t just ad hoc change what a proposition is because you don’t believe moral statements fit the standard description. — Bob Ross

I said that what people believe, morally speaking, makes it true for themselves, in the sense of being "true to themselves". I said that if all normal people believe in some moral principle, or in feeling something to be right or wrong, then it makes it true, makes it right or wrong, not in some imaginary "objective" sense, but for all those normal people.

Those normal people make up the largest part of the communities we live in, and the fact that they all agree on moral issues constitutes normativity, normativity is not some abstract principle or some purported objective moral imperative, the guarantor for which can bever be found.

I have never invoked any moral beliefs, feelings, or thoughts that are propositions; but, yes, a statement can be one...that’s just the nature of propositions 101: a proposition is a truth-apt statement. — Bob Ross

People stating their feelings or beliefs does not necessarily qualify as propositional..

What I was saying, is that, at best, what you were conveying (viz., the underlying meaning of which you were speaking) was denying moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross

What I am conveying and what you take it to mean are not the same. I am not denying moral subjectivism. I am questioning the value of the terminology. I reject claims that morality is objective. The problem is, if I reject that morality is objective, you might conclude that I must therefore be a moral subjectivist, and if I am a moral subjectivist I must believe whatever Wiki says I do.

a proper analysis — Bob Ross

I agree with the importance of a proper analysis. For you this means an analysis of concepts. For me it is first and foremost an analysis of deeds and the practice of the examined life.

You cannot analyze X if you do not have an idea about what X is. — Bob Ross

As I see it, moral deliberation has its roots in the world of opinion, in the world at large rather than in the cloistered world of concept formation and analysis shaped by argumentative strategies.

Rereading this argument -- your P1 doesn't match 1 from above it:

It is not supposed to: 1 matches P2. P1 is more general: it is the major premise.

"Cognitive" doesn't necessitate truth-independence

All I was claiming is the that the cognitive stance about something is independent of the truth about that something. This doesn’t require that all cognitive stances necessitate that they are about something...although I happen to believe that as a well. I think a belief always latches onto a proposition, and if there isn’t a proposition then one will pretend, implicitly, if there is and latch onto that. But this is not a required position for the OP.

The Liar's sentence, for instance: we can think "This sentence is false", meaning we can cognize it, but the truth, or falsity, of the Liar's sentence is wholly dependent upon how we interpret the sentence.

The liar’s sentence is non-cognitive: just because you can try to interpret what the sentence means does not mean you can evaluate it as true or false.

What if the MS was a coherentist on truth? In that case beliefs fit within an inferential web, and that web just is what truth is, so they'd claim to be a cognitivist while stating that they do believe that beliefs depend upon one another for their truth or falsity.

That’s an interesting point: I am not sure how that would work—my OP is directed as correspondance theorists. The problem with taking the coherentist theory of truth, is that truth is reduced to beliefs (which is convenient for a moral subjectivist) but just pushes the issue back further. If a moral subjectivist came around and objected to the theory of truth presupposed in the OP, then I would have to take a step back and demonstrate why their coherentist (or whatever) theory is nonsense (; before getting into the OP.

Morality is rooted in our immediate visceral response to what happens to us or others. My suffering does not begin with the concept of suffering. I do not need to form a concept to know that it is bad. Most of us are capable of empathy and do not first develop or appeal to a concept of empathy in order to be able to empathize. We do not need a concept of care in order to care. We do not need a concept of something mattering in order for something to matter to us. — Fooloso4

100 :up:

delete

delete

The mistake you are making is believing that I think there are moral propositions, when I think I have made it quite clear that I don't think there are.

Are you serious, Janus?!? Your whole position here has been moral (inter-)subjectivism from the start. You’ve admitted implicitly and explicitly to moral judgments being propositional countless times:

here you did:

If torturing babies is wrong because normal people think it is wrong then it is true that it is wrong for most people, I have not claimed anything beyond that

You cannot use an if conditional if “torturing babies is wrong” is non-propositional. This implies that “torturing babies is wrong” is a proposition; and you are claiming that it is true relative to beliefs people have about it.

here as well:

If a proposition expresses how something ought to be for some individual, then it is the fact that the individual believes that proposition that "supports the ought", so to speak.

You literally called it a proposition in this one, so…..

here as well:

There is nothing about any moral proposition that obligates anyone to adhere to it. If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, I am unlikely to torture babies,

If I say, "I believe torturing babies is wrong" then that amounts to saying, "I believe no one should torture babies".

:yawn: Need I go on?

Your position obviously has been holding that moral judgments are propositional but that they are true or false relative to beliefs about them...and that’s called moral subjectivism.

Unfortunately for your argument you are depending on something which either doesn't exist or is unknowable. It is nothing more than an empty tautology to say that what is morally good is a truth maker for what is morally good.

Whether or not you think that we can adequately account for moral propositions or not, is independent of whether your ad hoc fix is internally coherent. It isn’t. If you really believe this, then you should abandon the idea that there are moral propositions and, thusly, abandon moral subjectivism. Become a non-cognitivist or nihilist.

How would we know if it corresponded to reality? What kind of reality? Certainly not an empirical reality

The only reality there is, and we can absolutely investigate what is right and wrong naturalistically (and empirically). Like I said, I take a neo-aristotelian view that eudamonia is the highest moral good.

You're really not paying attention. I've already said I don't think anything is "morally binding"

Thank you for finally admitting this. You need to take more care in the words you use to express your views. You’ve been speaking as if you do believe there is moral bindingness and it is essentially peer-pressure (in the form of laws):

The only truth of moral beliefs, the only normative force they could possess, the only bindingness, lies in the fact that most normal people believe them, think and/or feel them to be true.

The problem is not me failing to pay attention; its your failure to coherently explain your position.

Now you're starting to get it.

You keep flip-flopping as we go. One minute you argue against what I am saying and then, once you realize it doesn’t work, you switch while admitting no fault. You were literally arguing that moral statements have the form of a proposition but are not “proper” propositions (like mathematical ones). Now you just act like you were denying this all along.

I said that what people believe, morally speaking, makes it true for themselves, in the sense of being "true to themselves"

If you don’t believe moral judgments are propositional, then this is incoherent; the only way it can be true for themselves is if it is propositional: propositions are the only kind of statements which can be true.

You should just abandon moral subjectivism and go for something like emotivism.

The problem is, if I reject that morality is objective, you might conclude that I must therefore be a moral subjectivist, and if I am a moral subjectivist I must believe whatever Wiki says I do.

I never implied or said this. Moral subjectivism is a specific moral anti-realist position; and is not merely the negation of moral objectivism. There are other forms of moral anti-realism (e.g., non-cognitivism, nihilism, etc.).

It is not supposed to: 1 matches P2. P1 is more general: it is the major premise. — Bob Ross

OK, then maybe I'm back to saying it's an instance of begging the question, after all. :rofl: @Lionino

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

I'm (clearly) finding the argument hard to understand.

P1 reads like a definition to me. It defines that a stance-taken within the domain of true/false somethings has the property of independence with respect to that same something (be it propositions or objects, it doesn't matter -- just some true something and stance-taken)

P2 also reads like a definition to me. So in some sense it seems that the concepts, by definition, and through an informal logic, leads to C1. But what if we formalized a bit? How would it read? Syllogistically starting with "A" in P1 and "A" in P2 suggests that the major premise is "Some P" and the minor "Some Q", which is an invalid form.

How would you render it formally? Any logic works for me.

I'll keep it to this because it seems I'm not understanding so I don't want to go off on yet another tangent before I understand.

I never implied or said this. Moral subjectivism is a specific moral anti-realist position — Bob Ross

You just said it! The problem is that moral subjectivism is not a specific position.

Here is a current overview of the literature.

Here different types of moral subjectivism are listed.

There are other forms of moral anti-realism (e.g., non-cognitivism, nihilism, etc.). — Bob Ross

Your attempt to clarify compounds the problem by dragging in additional contested terminology.

If truth is objective, then propositions are true or false stance-independently.
If propositions are true or false stance-independently, then a proposition, X, cannot be true or false relative to a belief about it.
If a proposition, X, cannot be true or false relative to a belief about it, then the only way one can express X in a way that would be true or false relative to a belief about it is by writing a new proposition, Y, that is "I believe X". — Bob Ross

This argument seems to be: truth-apt propositions are stance-independent, the MS claims that moral propositions are stance-dependent, so — for the MS — moral propositions are not truth-apt, thus they are not propositions at all unless the MS rewrites it as "I believe X", which is not moral anymore. Is that right?

“my truth”, “your truth”, “their truth”, etc. is patently incoherent; and no legitimate philosopher will back that kind of idea because they know it is nonsense. — Bob Ross

We are just different, you and I, I find Nietzsche to be a legitimate philosopher. Though he is quite a complexity I suppose.

But what if we formalized a bit? How would it read?

P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)

Couple things to note:

1. The only part that isn’t just standard predicate logic, is that I am representing the predicate ‘stance’ with two typename arguments: position 1 is what is the stance and position 2 is what the stance is about (e.g., if s is a stance about p, then it is true that Stance<s, p>).

2. The transition, in sentential form, from a ‘something’ to a ‘proposition’ is implicit. As can be seen in the logic, it doesn’t matter if one sticks with ‘something’ or refers to specifically a ‘proposition’.

P1 reads like a definition to me.
…
P2 also reads like a definition to me.

P2 is a definition; P1 is an assertion about the nature of a stance and how it relates to what it is about.

Moral subjectivism is standardly, in the literature, a family of moral anti-realist theories that posit:

1. Moral judgements are propositional (i.e., moral cognitivism).
2. Moral judgements express something subjective (i.e., moral non-objectivism).
3. At least one moral judgement is true (i.e., moral non-nihilism).

This is standard: I would suggest, as a good entry article, to look at SEP. No serious philosopher is going to disagree with this, although they may have more to add.

this link, without elaboration, was not helpful. Some of it, wasn't even about moral subjectivism (e.g., ethical relativism is NOT a form of moral subjectivism, let alone a form of moral anti-realism).

this one is an article states nothing that helps your case. I think you just linked these half-lazily thinking I would do your argumentation for you...which I am not going to do (:

This argument seems to be: truth-apt propositions are stance-independent, the MS claims that moral propositions are stance-dependent, so — for the MS — moral propositions are not truth-apt, thus they are not propositions at all unless the MS rewrites it as "I believe X", which is not moral anymore. Is that right?

Not quite: that would beg the question and would be false. As painfully noted in this thread, a proposition can be true or false relative to a belief, but that is not what the OP is saying is inconsistent: instead, it is that a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

It is stance-independent, only insofar as the proposition-at-hand cannot be true or false relative to a belief about it.

I cannot remember a single time in Nietzsche's work where he references a pluralist idea or notion of truth. Not a single time; in fact, he thought it was nonsense (just like pretty much every other philosopher out there).

Moral subjectivism is standardly ... — Bob Ross

There is no agreed upon standard as to what moral subjectivism means. From the article you cited on moral anti-realism, (another term without an agreed on definition):

All three terms [Anti-realism,” “non-realism,” and “irrealism”] are to be defined in opposition to realism, but since there is no consensus on how “realism” is to be understood, “anti-realism” fares no better.

It goes on to say that it is:

unlikely that the label “moral anti-realism” even succeeds in picking out a definite position.

... this link, without elaboration, was not helpful. Some of it, wasn't even about moral subjectivism (e.g., ethical relativism is NOT a form of moral subjectivism, let alone a form of moral anti-realism). — Bob Ross

It supports the claim that there is no single agreed upon definition of terms.

Some authors do treat ethical relativism as a form of moral subjectivism. From the IEP article on moral relativism:

In principle, the standpoint in question could be narrowed to that of a single individual, in which case, the relativism becomes a form of moral subjectivism.

Moral relativism is also a contested concept. It can refer either to a culture, a group, or an individual.

this one is an article states nothing that helps your case. — Bob Ross

Of course it does! There are various forms of moral or ethical subjectivism. The article cites some of them that can be found in the literature. The first is under the heading of "Old Fashioned Subjectivism and Relativism, which according to the article are:

... invariably about the attitudes of a certain individual or a group.

An attitude is not a proposition, but can be expressed as a proposition. Using an example from the text, if my attitude is that eating meat is wrong, it is my attitude toward eating meat that makes it wrong. This is not some grand, universal, apodictic moral claim that must be either true or false for all human beings for all time. Attitudes toward such things change. This change should be acknowledged as a condition under which moral claims are made and discussed rather than a defect to be remedied by attempting to universalize such claims.

Under "New Wave Subjectivism and Relativism" he says:

... the proposition invariably expressed by a given moral sentence does not have an absolute truth value, full stop or in and of itself. Rather, the key idea is that the proposition can be only true relative to a context of assessment.

In other words, moral propositions do not stand on their own in some world of eternal verities.

I think you just linked these half-lazily thinking I would do your argumentation for you...which I am not going to do (: — Bob Ross

I think it clear that you are not sufficiently acquainted with the literature and will not, as you admit here, do the research to become better informed. What I cited should be enough to show that there are terminological differences. They cannot be waved away. Once again, what this means is that you cannot start with your preferred definitions and proceed from there as if what these terms mean is settled and moral discourse is an analysis of these settled terms.

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.


P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)

Couple things to note:
1. The only part that isn’t just standard predicate logic, is that I am representing the predicate ‘stance’ with two typename arguments: position 1 is what is the stance and position 2 is what the stance is about (e.g., if s is a stance about p, then it is true that Stance<s, p>).

2. The transition, in sentential form, from a ‘something’ to a ‘proposition’ is implicit. As can be seen in the logic, it doesn’t matter if one sticks with ‘something’ or refers to specifically a ‘proposition’.

P2 is a definition; P1 is an assertion about the nature of a stance and how it relates to what it is about. — Bob Ross

How do you feel about this rendition:

All stances are independent
All beliefs are stances
All beliefs are independent

?

That makes sense to me.

I'm not sure what the rule of inference you're using in the formalization. It doesn't appear to follow to me.

The notes help though.

EDIT: Another thought I have is with respect to the domain. P1 seems generally uncontroversial -- our stances towards some proposition don't imply whether that proposition is true or false (although I think I'd carve out the weird sentences for other topics, like the Liar's). So a subjectivist could deny 2 on the basis that beliefs don't imply stances with respect to P -- the belief could be "Everyone deserves q", and the stance could be "As a member of Everyone, John deserves q"

The belief, in this case, while being clearly related to the stance, is different from the stance and so would not fall to the criticism that there's a contradiction.

Your whole case against my arguments seems to rest on my use of the word "propositional" which I did put in inverted commas several times to indicate that I have not accepted moral statements, beliefs, thoughts, feelings or whatever you want to call them as being propositional in the sense that empirical, logical and mathematical claims are.

I have explicitly stated that several times as well, saying that no truth makers can be found for such expressions of moral thought and feeling. So, you are now, it seems, resorting to the practice of uncharitable reading, on account of which I now have no interest in conversing with you further.

There is no agreed upon standard as to what moral subjectivism means. From the article you cited on moral anti-realism, (another term without an agreed on definition):

Did you read the moral subjectivism section?

It supports the claim that there is no single agreed upon definition of terms.

No. SEP is just being very careful to include the nuances of the topic. There is a generally agreed upon definition, that I already outlined.

Some authors do treat ethical relativism as a form of moral subjectivism. From the IEP article on moral relativism:
In principle, the standpoint in question could be narrowed to that of a single individual, in which case, the relativism becomes a form of moral subjectivism.

You are misunderstanding: moral relativism stands opposed to moral absolutism. Generally speaking, moral relativists are moral realists. Of course, since relativism vs. absolutism is a different debate than objectivism vs. non-objectivism, some moral relativists are moral subjectivists; but moral relativism IS NOT the same as moral subjectivism.

You are trying to hide behind some nuanced disagreements philosophers have, as if there is a gulf of disagreements about these terms.

It goes on to say that it is:
unlikely that the label “moral anti-realism” even succeeds in picking out a definite position.

Of course! This doesn’t help your point at all. Moral anti-realism is the negation of moral realism, and is defined as such: there’s no controversy to that definition.

Moral relativism is also a contested concept. It can refer either to a culture, a group, or an individual.

That the definition encompasses many positions in a broad fashion, does not mean its definition is contested. Moral relativism is any cognitivist view that holds that the truth of moral judgments have an indexical element. This is uncontroversial, and I suggest you read up on the literature more.

Of course it does! There are various forms of moral or ethical subjectivism.

I never said that there aren’t various forms of moral subjectivism: that doesn’t negate the fact that there is an uncontroversial definition of moral subjectivism. Each form of moral subjectivism, meets the basic criteria of moral subjectivism. It is a family of theories, and not one particular theory.

How do you feel about this rendition:

All stances are independent
All beliefs are stances
All beliefs are independent

?

It seems incomplete: independent...of what?

I'm not sure what the rule of inference you're using in the formalization. It doesn't appear to follow to me.

I can write it out in sentential form (if that helps):

P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is true; and there does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is false }

P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
{ For every b and p such that b is a belief about p, b is a stance about p. }

C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is true; and there does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is false }

The rule of inference is from the existential and universal quantifiers: in short, if there cannot exist some relation for Xs and Ys and all Bs are Xs, then the same relation cannot exist for Bs and Ys.

P1 seems generally uncontroversial -- our stances towards some proposition don't imply whether that proposition is true or false (although I think I'd carve out the weird sentences for other topics, like the Liar's)

Agreed, and that is the point...that most of these moral subjectivists are missing in here (;

So a subjectivist could deny 2 on the basis that beliefs don't imply stances with respect to P -- the belief could be "Everyone deserves q", and the stance could be "As a member of Everyone, John deserves q"

Hmmmm...I would need a rebust exposition of what a ‘belief’ is then.

:kiss:

I think we by-at-large were talking passed each other. Take care, Janus!

:up: You too, Bob.

It seems incomplete: independent...of what? — Bob Ross

I was thinking we can stuff all those details into the name "Independent" -- but I'm mostly just after the basic form because I've been missing it, which you provided in your follow up.

P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is true; and there does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is false }

P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
{ For every b and p such that b is a belief about p, b is a stance about p. }

C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is true; and there does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is false }

The rule of inference is from the existential and universal quantifiers: in short, if there cannot exist some relation for Xs and Ys and all Bs are Xs, then the same relation cannot exist for Bs and Ys. — Bob Ross

OK so...

P1: All B's are X's
P2: X's ~Relate-to Y's
C: B's ~Relate-to Y's

So rather than

All P
All Q

it's

All P
Some Q

(with a middle term relating them)

That work?

(And yes, the sentential form helped a lot -- I was struggling from the plain-language to the logic, and then I was struggling with the predicates because that's all beyond my actual education and only "gleaned" at this point -- usually I just translate predicates into single-variables or bound sentences so it's still propositional just not predicate. And I wasn't see the All/Some or the All/there-exists-a structure until you explicitly pointed it out)

Did you read the moral subjectivism section? — Bob Ross

If you are talking about the SEP link to "Moral Anti-Realism", this is the whole of what is says about moral subjectivism:

[This entry uses the label “non-objectivism” instead of the simple “subjectivism” since there is an entrenched usage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one’s own mental attitudes (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong” means “I disapprove of stealing”). So understood, subjectivism is a kind of non-objectivist theory, but there are many other kinds of non-objectivist theory, too.]

This is a good example of the problem I have been pointing to. It is as if certain terms must be avoided and replaced to avoid confusion regarding terminology.

No. SEP is just being very careful to include the nuances of the topic. There is a generally agreed upon definition, that I already outlined./quote]

It goes beyond being careful. This is the sentence that follows it:
— Bob Ross

Crispin Wright (1992: 1) comments that “if there ever was a consensus of understanding about ‘realism’, as a philosophical term of art, it has undoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various debates—so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat.”

Rather than there being general agreement there is, in his words, no general consensus of understanding about 'realism'.

You are misunderstanding: moral relativism stands opposed to moral absolutism. — Bob Ross

We are at an impasse. You treat this as if it were a terminological problem. My position is that treating ethics as if it is about terminology is the problem.

I was thinking we can stuff all those details into the name "Independent" -- but I'm mostly just after the basic form because I've been missing it, which you provided in your follow up.

But, then, you are just muddying the waters in an attempt to clear them.

OK so...

P1: All B's are X's
P2: X's ~Relate-to Y's
C: B's ~Relate-to Y's

So rather than

All P
All Q

it's

All P
Some Q

(with a middle term relating them)

That work?

I am not following what you are trying to do…

(And yes, the sentential form helped a lot -- I was struggling from the plain-language to the logic, and then I was struggling with the predicates because that's all beyond my actual education and only "gleaned" at this point -- usually I just translate predicates into single-variables or bound sentences so it's still propositional just not predicate. And I wasn't see the All/Some or the All/there-exists-a structure until you explicitly pointed it out)

I am basically arguing:

P1: Ss relate to Ps in manner R.
P2: All Bs are Ss.
C: Bs relate to Ps in manner R.

Although, this isn’t completely accurate...but the accurate version is what I gave.

If there cannot exist a relation between Ss & Ps and every B is an S, then it plainly follows that the same relation cannot exist between Bs & Ps.

If you are talking about the SEP link to "Moral Anti-Realism", this is the whole of what is says about moral subjectivism:

Sorry, I thought there was a moral subjectivism section in there: it is actually here. It appears as though SEP has refurbished the term from ‘subjectivism’ to ‘non-objectivism’ in their newer articles. So let me address the quote you had:

This entry uses the label “non-objectivism” instead of the simple “subjectivism” since there is an entrenched usage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one’s own mental attitudes (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong” means “I disapprove of stealing”). So understood, subjectivism is a kind of non-objectivist theory, but there are many other kinds of non-objectivist theory, too.

Yes, this is accurate...but there’s no need to get this far into the weeds for the OP. If we must, then there is a couple things worth noting:

1. Moral subjectivism is a form of moral non-objectivism: the former is the three-pronged thesis I already explicated, and the latter is a broader term for any view that holds moral judgments express something non-objective.

2. Moral non-objectivism includes only one other family of positions other than moral subjectivism: moral inter-subjectivism. They don’t use the term ‘inter-subjectivity’, but it is clear that they are referring to this.

3. My OP addresses moral subjectivism, and technically NOT moral inter-subjectivism; but I think my line of reasoning plagues both.

4. None of this suggests that there are not generally understood definitions. All you are doing, is trying to explode the conversation into a “who shot john” situation: at this point, I think it may be a sophistical tactic you are trying to deploy. If it helps, just contend with the underlying meaning in the OP and not the semantics.

It is as if certain terms must be avoided and replaced to avoid confusion regarding terminology.

What terms should be avoided? They avoided using the term moral subjectivism because they were not just discussing, in that section, moral cognitivist and moral non-nihilist views that claim moral judgments are expressing something subjective. The OP is not discussing moral non-objectivism.

Rather than there being general agreement there is, in his words, no general consensus of understanding about 'realism'.

Realism is generally understood a three pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional.
2. Moral judgments express something objective.
3. At least one moral judgment is true.

At this point I don’t really care if you agree with the semantics: that’s besides the point of the OP.

We are at an impasse. You treat this as if it were a terminological problem. My position is that treating ethics as if it is about terminology is the problem

There is absolutely nothing in my OP that hinges on semantics, nor have I had to go into this painful, semantically discussion with anyone else in this thread. Somehow, no one else was worried about the terms….

Do you have anything to say about the actually ideas expressed in the OP?

I am basically arguing:

P1: Ss relate to Ps in manner R.
P2: All Bs are Ss.
C: Bs relate to Ps in manner R. — Bob Ross

Right, and the OP itself is clear that beliefs are one kind of stance (P2). My point to @Moliere earlier was that cognitive feelings of the sort he has in mind would seem to just be another kind of stance:

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A feeling is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a feeling about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

P3: Feelings make moral propositions true or false.
P4: C1 and P3 being true are logically contradictory.
C2: Therefore, moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent. — Leontiskos

I am basically arguing:

P1: Ss relate to Ps in manner R.
P2: All Bs are Ss.
C: Bs relate to Ps in manner R.

Although, this isn’t completely accurate...but the accurate version is what I gave.

If there cannot exist a relation between Ss & Ps and every B is an S, then it plainly follows that the same relation cannot exist between Bs & Ps. — Bob Ross

Mkay, that makes sense to me now.

But then it seems to go back to whether or not the subjectivist would accept P1, or your rendition of P2. While P1 is uncontroversial in a common-sense way, a philosopher may have a reason to endorse truth-coherentism, or a difference in domain between stances and beliefs to claim that P2 is false, and yet All B's are still cognitive for all that.

It seems that if the subjectivist is a correspondence theorist, and they accept P2, then they have an inconsistency. But is that inconsistency fatal to the overall idea?

In my experience, usually not. Though it seems this idea is eluding me.

I'm claiming that MS is consistent, at least, and making a steel-man attempt at making it plausible to its detractors. My pet theory is error theory just to put my cards out there, but I'm trying to think through the position and see if there's some way to render it coherent, and palatable to those on the other side as an example of the meta-ethic. — Moliere

Okay.

Capital-F Feelings are the truth-makers in this hypothetical meta-ethic. The sorts of examples I've given here are "X wants to be Y" -- the emotions arise because of the Feelings, to think of "emotions" as you do here: — Moliere

Have you given examples? I searched for "wants to be" on the first five pages on the thread and didn't find any occurrences.

I'd claim that when Jesus expels the money-changers from the temple that he is enacting a rationality because his anger is justified. — Moliere

But you aren't appealing to his anger, you are appealing to the justification of his anger, like I said <here>. This is not appeal to emotion; it is appeal to something which justifies an emotion.

"Calculus" is confusing on my part -- I just meant in the generic sense where logical symbol manipulation or the operations of a computer are also calculus -- so it need not even be numeric, and can even be a philosophical calculus rather than something truly mathematical. Spinoza's Ethics comes to mind here. — Moliere

Okay, but when I say "emotions don't do calculus" I am also saying that emotions don't do "logical symbol manipulation," or, "the operations of a computer," or, "philosophical calculus." Emotions don't do calculus in any of these senses.

Isn't the MS doing that?

Though I wouldn't do it for the MS position, I don't think ethics is a cognitive science either. Another reason a meta-ethics thread might be interesting. — Moliere

So you agree with me that your theory of emotion-subjectivism is not a (cognitive) science?

Couldn't it be both? Even for Plato -- if one is ruled by Passion then one would choose a Passionate ethic, just as the one who is ruled by Reason chooses the rational ethic, yes? — Moliere

Either the choice leads to the ethic or attachment to the ethic leads to the choice. It can't be both, because two things cannot simultaneously cause each other.

For Plato the one ruled by passion does not choose; passion is his master, and one enslaved to passion does not engage in rational choice (i.e. they do not engage in choice in obeying their master, only in carrying out his bidding). Contrariwise, the one who chooses is not "ruled by reason;" he is rational. Passion and reason are not for Plato parallel realities vis-a-vis enslavement or "rule." This is in line with common sense, for we do not say, "Don't get carried away by your reason!"

"I'm sorry, I won't do it again" or something like that works. The emotion would be guilt. The Feeling would be "I want to be accepted by my friends". — Moliere

I would say that neither of the quoted phrases are emotions or feelings. The first is a kind of promise and the second is the expression of a desire. But let's look at the latter quote:

(under the rendition that ought-statements are nothing more than this reduction to an is-statement of attachment, and an imperative, which is what my next chunk is on) — Moliere

I don't quite know what you meant by this, because I think a self-provided imperative is sufficient for an 'ought', and I don't think "an is-statement of attachment" is sufficient for an 'ought'.

Suppose you need to start drinking alcohol to be accepted by your friends. In that case you might say, "I want to be accepted by my friends, therefore I will drink alcohol" (non-hypothetical ought-judgment). Or you might say, "If I want to be accepted by my friends, then I should drink alcohol" (hypothetical ought-judgment). More realistically, you might say, "My friends will only accept me if I drink alcohol, so perhaps I should start drinking alcohol." The problem here is that your "Feeling" is equivocal, and the various senses over which it sprawls are the very senses that the debate is about.

More generally, "I want to be accepted by my friends" either represents/justifies a bona fide choice or else it does not. Someone might have started drinking alcohol years ago, and when asked why they did so, they might say, retrospectively, "I suppose I wanted to be accepted by my friends." In this case their desire explains their behavior, and Aristotle would call their subsequent drinking volitional but not deliberate (i.e. not chosen). On the other hand, someone might have made a deliberate decision to start drinking in order to be accepted by their friends. The three cases I offered just above relate to this possibility. But when you want to talk about the 'Feeling' of "I want to be accepted by my friends," there are a large variety of things that you could be talking about.

Do you see how this isn't a divorce of reason from emotion? — Moliere

Yes, more or less, but I believe the initial reason you posited emotion-subjectivism is because you did not want to bear the burden of justification that rational approaches require. So if we talk about "emotion" then we don't need to rationally justify our emotion, but if that same emotion can be a truth-maker for moral propositions then we can have our cake and eat it, too. We can avoid the pesky problems of rational justification while simultaneously possessing good reasons for our truth-claims. By reintroducing reason you reintroduce the onus of justification.

To be frank, I think moral subjectivism is goofy. I don't think professional philosophers hold it. It is no coincidence that there is no SEP or IEP article on it. I won't name names, but there are a handful of people on this forum who try to hold it. Bob Ross gave it up: good for him. Janus is distancing himself from it: good for him. I don't think charity requires us to prop up a theory without legs, lol.

Feelings are attachments to people, things, ideals, propositions, states of mind, patterns, and, in some cases, morals. And I've also allowed that "Feelings" may be collective, in some sense, to accommodate things like legal and collective -- not just individual -- moral rules. It seems to me that this must be the motivation for the MS position because they want to retain that some moral propositions are true in the way that it's intuitively felt, but don't believe there is an objective science or something along those lines. — Moliere

I think moral subjectivists do not see any way that moral propositions can be true or false, but they find this result unintuitive and so they engage in hand-waving and end up abusing language in the process. For example, the moral subjectivist wishes to have a notion of "truth" that is unverifiable and is not averse to contradiction. Of course such a thing is not truth at all. To say that everyone has subjective states which adequately ground truth-claims, even when these truth-claims all contradict one another, is not to be speaking about truth in any legitimate sense.

And another reason for a thread on the philosophy of emotion. — Moliere

I think it would be a more interesting topic. :up:

To lay my cards on the table, I don't really want to argue over a thesis that you don't hold, especially when that thesis has no authorities to legitimate it. It doesn't seem to me that it will be fruitful. I would rather talk about a thesis that you actually hold, such as error theory or a theory of emotion or a theory of moral 'oughts', etc. It would be different if the thesis had philosophical authorities behind it, but I don't see that moral subjectivism does. Of course, your attempt to salvage moral subjectivism has been admirable in certain ways, but I don't think it is ultimately salvageable, and given that you don't actually hold to the theory, you must not think that the arguments you are giving are that good. :wink: Plus if I let you go on there is the dangerous possibility that you actually talk yourself into this thing. :joke: