the nature of a proposition: they are always objective and absolute — Bob Ross
the MS under attack believes that beliefs are true or false, and the value of T/F is not dependent upon another belief (or itself) — Moliere
But it can be modified pretty easily by noting that 2 can be changed to "feelings/the world make moral propositions true or false" — Moliere
As I explained in the absence of any other truthmaker belief is all we've got. I'm opting for intellectual honesty. — Janus
According to Wikipedia ethical subjectivism is cognitive-propositional, and I have found this to be the case among self-professed subjectivists. I don't think you are disputing this even though your thesis draws near to emotivism, but here is the problem I see with subjectivism and emotivism:
1. Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others
2. Subjectivist and emotivist propositions are in no way binding upon oneself and others
3. Therefore, subjectivist and emotivist propositions are not moral propositions
(I.e. Subjectivism and emotivism are therefore not moral theories, because they fail to achieve normativity.)
"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. Feelings do not seem to be adequate to justify moral propositions. Going back to the OP, I would say that it is not only beliefs that are inadequate to justify moral propositions, but that feelings are also inadequate. — Leontiskos
That would no longer be MS, would it? — Lionino
I've tried to make the case to him that this would still count on the basis of the wiki articles criteria for MS since the truth of these propositions is still dependent upon the person's attitude in some necessary way while maintaining some cognitive component. — Moliere
A subjectivist ethical theory is a theory according to which moral judgments about men or their actions are judgments about the way people react to these men and actions—that is, the way they think or feel about them
But we don't have the calculus of attachment just yet. — Moliere
How do you know? — Moliere
If the truth of all moral language just is the day-to-day operations of living, though, then I think emotions are exactly how hierarchies are established. Fear, guilt, and shame are powerful motivators in moral codes, and they are reinforced by social hierarchies established by emotional attachments. — Moliere
a person who is surrounded by people who shame them can feel guilt for that particular thing and want to change, or they can feel anger and define themselves against that group, and perhaps they can feel both at the same time in roughly similar proportion (and this is where the sense of free will comes from). Each leads to a kind of articulatable ethic that justifies the choice, so it really would depend upon whether or not the person is attached to this or that ethic if they speak the truth — Moliere
In our example the man wouldn't say "One ought not lose their temper" -- that's goofy as hell for someone to say when they are contrite or angry or whatever genuine expression towards an ethic, and a real person's utterance would express this proposition differently. "One ought not lose their temper" is the proposition which the utterance can be reduced to, for the purposes of making the MS position philosophically palatable... — Moliere
The redemption story is one of recognition, shame, anger, and relief. The cognitive part is all the philosophy, but the reason people seek redemption isn't because of the cognitive part. — Moliere
Looking at the wiki definition ---
Ethical subjectivism (also known as moral subjectivism and moral non-objectivism)[1] is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
(1) Ethical sentences express propositions.
(2) Some such propositions are true.
(3) The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.[2][3]
3's the proposition under dispute for you, I believe. — Moliere
So for any true ethical proposition the MS would try to demonstrate that its truth is dependent upon the attitudes of people, and the same with any false ethical proposition. — Moliere
I think the plausible part of the meta-ethic is that statements of ethics have practical, relational components when they are being followed so there is a sense, if all ethical statements are social creeds and nothing else, then the truth of them, if ethical statements are cognitive, would have to depend upon the attitudes of people because what else is there? — Moliere
Your premise that the activity of ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning is an opinion, a belief. — Fooloso4
the nature of a proposition: they are always objective and absolute — Bob Ross
I see no meaning in this phrase.
1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross
Your premise that the activity of ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning is an opinion, a belief.
— Fooloso4
'Never said it was. — Leontiskos
When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter, and is not about peoples beliefs. — Leontiskos
I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter ... — Leontiskos
I think the reason moral subjectivism is basically non-existent in professional philosophy is because ... — Leontiskos
The latter being these type 1 propositions. If ethical reasoning concerns and pertains to type 1 propositions then ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning. — Fooloso4
1. Moral judgments are proposition (i.e., moral cognitivism). — Bob Ross
I was obviously using the example of 2+2=4 because Bob Ross had already been using it, not because I think ethics is the same as mathematics. — Leontiskos
The rather obvious point of that post is that ethical claims are about ethical truths, not beliefs (or beliefs about ethical truths). — Leontiskos
All you can say is that “you believe that torturing babies is wrong”; and this is not normatively binding nor is it a moral proposition. — Bob Ross
NO. You cannot deny that “torturing babies is wrong” can be evaluated as true or false (which can only be done objectively) and then turn around and say it can be if we just evaluate people’s beliefs about it. — Bob Ross
"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. — Leontiskos
Moral subjectivism holds that moral propositions have no objective truth values independent of individual belief.
You see you're stuck in this objective "True" or "False" mode. There isn't a "True" or "False" to a subjective moralist.
They're all the same argument, or it seems that way to me, and that's why I was getting at your bias definition for belief and truth.
If I came to you and said your belief is false because it's not my truth, then I'm being objective.
Moral judgments can be stated in propositional form, but this does not mean that they are propositions.
We do not regard something as right or wrong or good or bad as the result of propositional acceptance or analysis.
You are looking through the wrong end of the telescope. Moral philosophy should not begin with some set of contested definitions.
They are binding socially (normatively) only insofar as most normal people hold to them.
but when it comes to significant moral issues like murder, rape, child abuse, theft, and so on I think it works well enough.
Whether or not you claim moral propositions are true or false relative to one or a several beliefs about them does not get around the issue expounded in the OP. Your moral “inter-subjectivism” falls prey to the same internal inconsistencies. — Bob Ross
There’s a difference between a proposition being binding, and people being forced to honor something: the former is binding purely in virtue of the truth-value of the proposition, whereas the latter is binding insofar as one wants to avoid the consequences of not obeying it. — Bob Ross
What you have described, is the irrational position that we should impose beliefs which do not even attempt, in principle, to correspond with the truth on other people. Do you see how irrational that is? — Bob Ross
(e.g., how can something be stated in “propositional form”, yet not be a valid proposition?). — Bob Ross
I don't think so. Make your argument and we'll see how it stands up.
No, most people hold to finding murder, rape, etc., morally wrong because they feel compassion for the victim, and that is normal.
You keep talking about truth being binding, but it's not.
…
What other imaginable criterion could there be?
There is no reason other than a love for truth that would bind someone to accepting a true claim
I have nowhere spoken about forcing anyone to do or not to do anything. In any case the most significant moral prescriptions, those regarding what are considered to be serious crimes, are codified in law, and those laws would not hold if most people didn't agree with them.
This is classic! People can propose whatever they like, valid or not. It's the soundness, not the validity of moral "propositions: which cannot be established
I think you need to ask yourself whether you can imagine any kind of truth maker for such "propositions".
Then you are denying that moral subjectivism is true at best — Bob Ross
Everything starts with concepts: there’s no way around that. — Bob Ross
I already did, and I will, at this point, refer you to the OP. You are still fundamentally claiming that propositions can be made true or false relative to beliefs about them which is quite obviously the issue I was expounding in the OP. — Bob Ross
You are confused about how moral propositions, beliefs, and truth work: if they are true, then they are binding irregardless if the subject-at-hand realizes it or is motivated by it. — Bob Ross
Janus, you don’t believe that there is a truth of the matter about moral judgments; so I don’t see how you are confused about this: the moral judgments you are advocating for are not even attempting to get at the truth because there is no truth of the matter. This plainly follows from what you are saying. — Bob Ross
It is patently incoherent to think that a statement can and cannot be propositional; which is what you just said (with word-salad). — Bob Ross
This is an entirely separate question: I am just trying to get you to see the implications of your moral anti-realism; because you don’t see it yet. — Bob Ross
What I am denying is that thinking constricted by select definition of terms leads to what is true at best. Rather than appeal to a definition we should determine what someone means when they use a term. It is foolish and wrongheaded to insist that what someone means is not what they say they mean but rather what you found in a definition.
My suffering does not begin with the concept of suffering. I do not need to form a concept to know that it is bad. Most of us are capable of empathy and do not first develop or appeal to a concept of empathy in order to be able to empathize. We do not need a concept of care in order to care. We do not need a concept of something mattering in order for something to matter to us.
Well I tend to agree, but you are the one claiming that feelings are truth-makers for moral propositions. :wink: — Leontiskos
Colloquially we have phrases to represent this, such as, "Do not be carried away by your emotions!" When we become pure patients, at the whim of our emotions, something has gone wrong. E-motions are moving forces which are meant to coordinate with our agency, not to override and destroy our agency. — Leontiskos
If emotions are the things by which we are to know what to do, then what is the thing that tells us to not act on an emotion? — Leontiskos
It's not an emotion, because emotions don't persuade, they overpower or incline. What I am assuming here is that the experience of the emotion is what constitutes the truth-maker. Of course the emotion-subjectivist could draw up an extrinsic map about which truths are "made" by which emotions, and that map might include, "Anger →
→
do not strike," but this is pretty weird given the fact that the experience of anger tells us to strike. Such a map apparently cannot be emotion-based if it is telling us to act contrary to emotion. (Anger is relevant because I do not think an emotion-based ethic would be able to restrain anger nearly as much as our common, rational ethics do.)
The point here is that whatever it is that establishes the hierarchy, it isn't emotion. Emotion does not do calculus. I am convinced that reason establishes the hierarchy, but I am content with the claim that whatever it is, it isn't emotion. This reduced claim seems sufficient to overcome emotion-subjectivism. — Leontiskos
I think this misses the point I have already made about emotion-as-sign vs. emotion-as-cause. To claim that ethics is just emotion-conditioning would be to reject ethics as a cognitive science. — Leontiskos
"I act this way because my emotions determine me, and my emotions are determined by the conditioning that my parents and society imposed, and their emotions were determined by the conditioning that was imposed upon them, ad infinitum." This is more a theory of emotional determinism than a theory of ethics, and as such it destroys the agency of the human being (as already noted). Ethics involves making choices, not just being pulled around by emotions. — Leontiskos
There is causal confusion at play, here. Does the choice lead to the ethic, or does attachment to the ethic lead to the choice? I think the cognitive aspect of ethics is again being trampled, especially if the attachment leads to the choice. Plato would say that reason (choice, deliberation) can be subordinated to the passions, but that this is a form of passion-tyranny. — Leontiskos
But what is the "utterance" which can be reduced to, "One ought not lose their temper"? On your theory of emotion-subjectivism an emotion is supposedly translated into moral propositions of this sort, but I'm still waiting for you to cash out this claim that the emotion is the truth-maker for the moral proposition. Prima facie, the claim doesn't make any sense. What is the emotion that translates into the moral proposition, "One ought not lose their temper"? — Leontiskos
You worried that I am divorcing reason from emotion, but here it seems that you are the one doing that. You contrast four things with philosophy/the cognitive part and assume that they are devoid of reason: recognition, shame, anger, and relief. I don't think emotions are separable from reason in this way. See for example my analysis of fear <here>. — Leontiskos
I think a shift is occurring here. Instead of trying to support moral propositions in the way that standard ethics does, the moral subjectivist turns to abductive ethical reasoning and combines it with the assumption that whatever best supports moral propositions, sufficiently supports moral propositions. I think the reason moral subjectivism is basically non-existent in professional philosophy is because it is recognized that even if nothing supports moral propositions better than attitudes, it remains the case that attitudes are insufficient to support moral propositions. In that case one turns away from moral cognitivism and classical ethics. — Leontiskos
The problem is you are treating moral "propositions" as though they are empirical, logical or mathematical propositions.
You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former
You just keep claiming this. You need to give an argument for why moral propositions, if they could be known to be true, would be binding.
What part of the following do you not understand?:
If “I should not torture babies” is true, then I should not torture babies.
If I should not torture babies, then I am obligated not to torture babies.
“I should not torture babies” is true.
Therefore, I should not torture babies.
Therefore, I am obligated not to torture babies.
The other point is that you apparently cannot explain how a moral proposition could ever be known to be true.
The only truth of moral beliefs, the only normative force they could possess, the only bindingness, lies in the fact that most normal people believe them,
Because moral statements are not truth-apt
I don't see how they qualify as propositions in the sense that empirical, logical or mathematical do
coherence of your reference to moral beliefs, feelings, thoughts or statements as "propositions" hinges on it.
P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross
1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross
They would have to be, or they aren’t propositions at all. That’s the mistake you keep making: you think there are types of propositions. — Bob Ross
You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former
I already did: I said it would be what is morally good (which is not dependent on beliefs). — Bob Ross
It can be known to be true, if what the proposition refers to corresponds to reality. — Bob Ross
Then, that is not truth, nor are they normatively binding (in the strict, traditional sense). You cannot have the cake and eat it too (; — Bob Ross
Because moral statements are not truth-apt
Then they don’t have the “form of a proposition”. — Bob Ross
Then, you don’t think they are propositions; and should abandon your view that beliefs make moral propositions true or false. You can’t just ad hoc change what a proposition is because you don’t believe moral statements fit the standard description. — Bob Ross
I have never invoked any moral beliefs, feelings, or thoughts that are propositions; but, yes, a statement can be one...that’s just the nature of propositions 101: a proposition is a truth-apt statement. — Bob Ross
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