I think it would be objectively good if sentient beings existed but that’s only because I think sentience is intrinsically valuable and good.

I think it would be objectively good if sentient beings existed but that’s only because I think sentience is intrinsically valuable and good. — Captain Homicide

I agree, but I believe I can objectively show this to be true as well. Just starting with this part and writing the next part after if this part seems rather clear with few objections.

Do you have a counter proposal for existence 180 Proof? — Philosophim

For me, "existence" is atemporal and things which "exist in time" are temporal – like the relation between 'the continuum' and 'sets', respectively – following from how Spinoza conceives of Substance (sub specie aeternitatis) and its Modes ... (sub specie durationis). So while (some of) that which "exists in time" might be "good" – better (for you/us/all) existing than not existing – "good" "bad" & "indifferent" existents presuppose existence that makes possible – is prior to and in excess of – any and all "value". Thus, in my understanding, evaluating the ground of all evaluations (i.e. judging the ground of all judgments) – e.g. "existence is inherently good" – seems to me viciously circular and therefore incoherent.

As for "objective morality", I propose that its objective basis is nature in general and disvalues (i.e. suffering of natural beings) in particular – whatever harms, or is bad (dysfunctional, maladaptive) for, our kind (and other species) – which I summarize in this post ...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/843592

and elaborated on here ...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/887625

The problem is that you are using a concept of "good" that is incoherent; and it is the base of your entire theory. Without a proper concept of "good", I don't think one can delve into ethics.

For example, the title is " In any objective morality existence is inherently good". If "good" is "ought to exist", then "inherently good" is "inherently ought to exist": there is no such distinction between intrinsic (inherent) and extrinsic 'ought to exist". Either something ought to exist, or it shouldn't.

Also, you define "good", as a concept, in a moral sense when it should be being defined in its generic sense: otherwise, you have invalidly omitted goodness simpliciter.

These are just issues that your theory, to be complete and have a proper foundation, needs to address (I would say).

:up: :up:

Thus, in my understanding, evaluating the ground of all evaluations (i.e. judging the ground of all judgments) – e.g. "existence is inherently good" – seems to me viciously circular and therefore incoherent. — 180 Proof

That is fair as I have not delved deeper into it yet. I will have more time this weekend to do so.

As for "objective morality", I propose that its objective basis is nature in general and disvalues (i.e. suffering of natural beings) in particular – whatever harms, or is bad (dysfunctional, maladaptive) for, our kind (and other species) – which I summarize in this post ... — 180 Proof

While nice, I still don't see it as objective. For example, why should humans flourish? Why should humans be reasonable? All of this makes sense in a subjective self-beneficial viewpoint. But it doesn't answer anything more fundamental than this, and we all know how subjective morality ends up.

there is no such distinction between intrinsic (inherent) and extrinsic 'ought to exist". Either something ought to exist, or it shouldn't. — Bob Ross

This is true. Again, it seems I need to go into the second part where we actually measure what existence is and how we calculate it. For now as an intro, I'm not bothered by these issues. We'll see if they remain pertinent on the next drill down.

I still don't see it as objective. — Philosophim

Suffering (i.e. dysfunction, loss of homeostasis, fear) happens, like life itself, is a ubiquitous, objective fact (e.g. human facticity).

For example, why should humans flourish?

We flourish in order not to languish. Not to flourish is maladaptive.

Why should humans be reasonable?

We are (often) reasonable in order to cooperate, or negotiate non-zerosum resolutions to conflict. Not to be reasonable (more often than unreasonable) is maladaptive.

Nothing in this is moral. You continually mistake 'state of affairs' for 'moral fact'. It will be an extremely interesting post when you come up with something non-circular to support the morality part of the position.

:ok: :roll:

Hilariously, I initially wrote the post this way:

You continually mistake 'state of affairs' for 'moral fact' and respond with Emoji's when this is pointed out.

I await something interesting from you. Given your constant need to deride those you think are incorrect, isn't it just delightful that you're wrong.

An assertion without argument deserves to be dismissed without argument. :wink:

Suffering (i.e. dysfunction, loss of homeostasis, fear) happens, like life itself, is a ubiquitous, objective fact (e.g. human facticity). — 180 Proof

Correct. But how should I respond to my suffering? If I'm in constant pain, should I be on pain killers to the point that I become a blissful zombie? If I suffer in war, should I abandon my post? And this still does not answer the more fundamental: "Why should I exist to suffer at all?"

We flourish in order not to languish. Not to flourish is maladaptive. — 180 Proof

No disagreement here. But should we flourish to the point where we wipe out other species? What if in one section of the world can one person flourish 3 times as much at the cost of killing one person on the other side of the world? And the more fundamental: "Why should humanity exist to flourish at all?"

We are (often) reasonable in order to cooperate, or negotiate non-zerosum resolutions to conflict. Not to be reasonable (more often than unreasonable) is maladaptive. — 180 Proof

And what if it is reasonable that murdering the other person resolves my conflict and helps me to flourish? Lets say we have a resource, oil, that is limited and drives economies. Wouldn't it be reasonable to wipe out any competitors to oil on the other side of the world to greatly benefit the country where I live? And once again, to the more fundamental: "Why should beings with reason exist at all?"

Again, these are all nice guidelines to live a subjective moral life. But these are not objective moral answers which transcend personal benefit and self-interest. Morality is more than one's own self-interest. It sometimes asks us to suffer, die, or be 'unreasonable'. Why should I spend 18 years of my time and money raising a child I don't love? Who cares if the human race dies out after if I'm happy and flourishing? There are more fundamental questions that need to be answered.

This is true. Again, it seems I need to go into the second part where we actually measure what existence is and how we calculate it. For now as an intro, I'm not bothered by these issues. We'll see if they remain pertinent on the next drill down.

If this is true, as you have stated, then your concept of 'good' is incoherent; which will not get resolved by elaborating on what you think is good (i.e., this or that is good: existence is good). You are confusing an explication of the property of goodness with what can be predicated to have it.

If this is true, as you have stated, then your concept of 'good' is incoherent; which will not get resolved by elaborating on what you think is good. — Bob Ross

Can you drill into that more?

If I claim good is "What should be" then note, "Existence should be", then existence is good. If I go to the next step and say, "If existence is good, then more existence is better," how is that incoherent?

You are confusing an explication of the property of goodness with what can be predicated to have it. — Bob Ross

Considering good is "What should be" I'm not seeing what you're stating. Should "X" be? Then it is good. Should "Y" not be? Then it is not good. The property of goodness is something that a thing has, or it doesn't. The question of, "Why is X good?" is different from the property itself. Is that the division you're noting?

Can you drill into that more?

I was referring to:

For example, the title is " In any objective morality existence is inherently good". If "good" is "ought to exist", then "inherently good" is "inherently ought to exist": there is no such distinction between intrinsic (inherent) and extrinsic 'ought to exist". Either something ought to exist, or it shouldn't.
…

Also, you define "good", as a concept, in a moral sense when it should be being defined in its generic sense: otherwise, you have invalidly omitted goodness simpliciter.
…
I don't think this is internally coherent for your position: you use the term 'good' to denote things which you do not thereby concede should exist. Let's take it by example.

Imagine you could combine two elements (in the periodic table) to formulate another element and, let's stipulate, this would produce "more existence" than if the combination were not done. This combination would be, then, "good".

Imagine, though, that you could combine those two elements with two other elements to formulate another element and, let's stipulate, that would produce "more existence" than if the combination were not done. This combination, likewise, would be, then, "good".

However, imagine that the first combination doesn't produce as much existence as the second combination: they are both "good", when considered in themselves, but the second one is more "good".

Let's say you can only perform one of the combinations (as performing one eliminates the possibility of performing the other): obviously, you would choose the second one (because it is more "good"). However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')".
…
As an external critique, the other issue is that defining goodness in this manner eliminates many commonly accepted usages of the concept; e.g., by saying that this clock is good for telling the time, one is not at all implying that the clock should exist.

Claiming that “good” is “to ought to be” is incoherent. Talking coherently about existence being “good” in the sense that it ‘should be’ doesn’t help: that’s talk about what you are ascribing as ‘good’, and not what ‘good’ is itself.

Considering good is "What should be"

This isn’t a definition of ‘good’ as a concept: ‘what should be?’ is not a concept, it is a question.

I'm not seeing what you're stating. Should "X" be? Then it is good.

This doesn’t explain what ‘good’ is. That's like:

Me: “X is green”.
You: “What is ‘green’”?
Me: “It is ‘green’ because X has color”.

That is besides my original point, though: if I grant ‘good’ is the same as ‘to ought to be’ (which would avoid the above issue), then we are back to the original issues (that I quoted above). None of these issues get addressed by explicating that you think existence is good.

Morality is more than one's own self-interest. — Philosophim

Agreed, just as I point out here (this link below was included in the post before my previous one):

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/887625

In sum, the objective fact of the matter is this: 'all human beings suffer because we are alive and to varying degrees we human beings flourish – e.g. (in general) form more adaptive than maladaptive habits by daily preventing and reducing suffering without causing more suffering – in order not to merely languish'. For me, this is the objective, naturalistic basis of ethics and I observe that moral conduct or norms, to varying degrees of customary or subjective performance, manifest and/or conflict with this ethos.

Correct. But how should I respond to my suffering?

Prevent or reduce your (or another's) suffering without increasing your (or another's) suffering. In other words, you should either seek help from others or help yourself and both without causing more harm to others or yourself.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/843592

And this still does not answer the more fundamental: 'Why should I exist to suffer at all?'

You exist, there is no "why" (because every conceivable "fundamental why" begs the question). Also, "why should ... exist" conflates prescription with description which is a category error; the question is incoherent (and therefore not "fundamental").

No disagreement here [ ... ] And the more fundamental: 'Why should humanity exist to flourish at all?'

Humans exist, there is no "why" (because every conceivable "fundamental why" begs the question). Also, "why should ... exist" conflates prescription with description which is a category error; the question is incoherent (and therefore not "fundamental").

We are (often) reasonable in order to cooperate, or negotiate non-zerosum resolutions to conflict. 
— 180 Proof

And what if it is reasonable that murdering the other person resolves my conflict and helps me to flourish?

"Murdering" is not a non-zero sum resolution to conflict, which may "help" you to survive but survival is not the sufficient condition for flourishing. Again, your question – in effect, 'what if being un-reasonable (maladaptive) helps me to flourish' – does not make sense as a reply to what I wrote above about being reasonable.

And once again, to the more fundamental: 'Why should beings with reason exist at all?'

Beings with reason exist, there is no "why" (because every conceivable "fundamental why" begs the question). Also, "why should ... exist" conflates prescription with description which is a category error; the question is incoherent (and therefore not "fundamental").

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/887625

However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')".

That's not coherent to my claim. I already mentioned if both could co-exist then both should as that's more existence. The only case in which we decide one over the other is if both cannot co-exist, or we only have the capacity to choose one over the other.

Talking coherently about existence being “good” in the sense that it ‘should be’ doesn’t help: that’s talk about what you are ascribing as ‘good’, and not what ‘good’ is itself. — Bob Ross

I'm still scratching my head at this Bob. If good is "What should be", then that's what good is. If "X is good" then I am ascribing X as good. Can you give me an example of your terminology division?

This isn’t a definition of ‘good’ as a concept: ‘what should be?’ is not a concept, it is a question. — Bob Ross

Its not a question, there's no question mark! :D If I used the phrase, "This is what is", you understand that's not a question. Same here.

I'm not seeing what you're stating. Should "X" be? Then it is good.

This doesn’t explain what ‘good’ is. — Bob Ross

Right. Good = "What should be". If "X is good" then "X should be". We have the definition of what good is, and then a demonstration of something which has the attribute of being good.

‘to ought to be’ — Bob Ross

That's just an odd phrase. You can just drop the 'to' and leave it as 'ought to be' if the 'what' part of the phrasing is causing issues.
Good = ought to be
Something which is good = A specification of what ought to be"

is this the division you're looking for between good and what is ascribed as good?

In sum, the objective fact of the matter is this: 'all human beings suffer — 180 Proof

There is no question that we all suffer. You view morality as a methodology of easing human suffering and providing benefits to humanity. But that's not objective. That's just a methodology that benefits mankind. I've defined morality as, "What should be." The problem with a human centric morality is, "Why should there be humans?" If the answer is, "I want there to be," then its really a culturally subjective viewpoint for self-benefit.

The morality I'm looking at is the deeper morality that would give us an objective justification for concluding that humanity should flourish. The morality I'm asking would exist even if humans didn't. Its a morality that can be applied to animals, and even the non-conscious universe itself. It does not care about our personal benefit, or our cultural subjective viewpoints.

Correct. But how should I respond to my suffering?
Prevent or reduce your (or another's) suffering without increasing your (or another's) suffering. — 180 Proof

Why? If I can benefit while hurting another, why not? Lets say I have no emotional feelings of empathy towards other people. In fact, murdering a person gives me great happiness. Why should I listen to your morality? If I can make a billion dollars and be respected by the world while giving my employees the most minimal of human respect and decency, why shouldn't I? An objective morality cannot be based on emotions, nor can it only appeal to normal or good people.

Humans exist, there is no "why" (because every conceivable "fundamental why" begs the question). Also, "why should ... exist" conflates prescription with description which is a category error; the question is incoherent (and therefore not "fundamental"). — 180 Proof

There's no category error here at all. Going back to my start, notice I never say, "I'm proving an objective morality exists." I'm noting, "If an objective morality exists, then this is what we can rationally conclude must be an answer to the fundamental question." If you claim, "I don't believe there is an objective morality," or that there is no objective answer to whether there should or should not be something, then there's nothing else to explore. We have subjective morality, and we all take our own corner of what we think ought or ought not to be. But in entering this discussion, we are assuming there is an objective morality. And if so, the question of, "Should there be existence?" is an absolutely imperative question that must be answered to build upon anything else.

"Murdering" is not a non-zero sum resolution to conflict, which may "help" you to survive but survival is not the sufficient condition for flourishing. — 180 Proof

Why should I care whether others flourish? Why shouldn't I eliminate every other person on this Earth for peace and quiet? Again, I personally agree with flourishing as a goal, but it is nothing we objectively conclude, only emotionally conclude.

You made the assertion. Beginning to think you don't understand half the words you use.

That's not coherent to my claim. I already mentioned if both could co-exist then both should as that's more existence. The only case in which we decide one over the other is if both cannot co-exist, or we only have the capacity to choose one over the other.

You sidestepped what I said: mentioning that both co-existing would be better doesn’t address the hypothetical I gave you. ‘What should be’ is a final consideration: it leaves out any discussion of a hierarchy of good things that never make the cut for being things which should exist.

I'm still scratching my head at this Bob. If good is "What should be", then that's what good is. If "X is good" then I am ascribing X as good. Can you give me an example of your terminology division?
…
Right. Good = "What should be". If "X is good" then "X should be".
…
is this the division you're looking for between good and what is ascribed as good?

That’s fine, I was talking about your response which tried to discuss that existence is good to address what is good. Saying existence is good doesn’t address what good is. This just loops back around to the various incoherencies with the concept of ‘good’ being ‘what should be’ that I already mentioned (e.g., a clock that is good for telling the time is not necessarily a clock that should exist, etc.).

Its not a question, there's no question mark! :D If I used the phrase, "This is what is", you understand that's not a question. Same here.

That’s fair! I misread that (:

‘to ought to be’ — Bob Ross

That's just an odd phrase. You can just drop the 'to' and leave it as 'ought to be' if the 'what' part of the phrasing is causing issues.

That’s fine: it means the same thing.

Okay, we're only talking past each other.

You sidestepped what I said: mentioning that both co-existing would be better doesn’t address the hypothetical I gave you. ‘What should be’ is a final consideration: it leaves out any discussion of a hierarchy of good things that never make the cut for being things which should exist. — Bob Ross

Ah, it wasn't my intention to side step the issue. Let me take a look at it again.

Let's say you can only perform one of the combinations (as performing one eliminates the possibility of performing the other): obviously, you would choose the second one (because it is more "good"). However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')".

You might be missing context as the important factor. Within the context in which both can co-exist, it is good for both to co-exist. In the context in which only one can exist, it will be a greater good for one of them to exist over the other. But this second context does not universalize that the one which will not exist wouldn't be good if they could both exist.

Lets use people. An 80 year old man is out with their 5 year old grandson. As they pass by a building, an explosion happens. The still spry grandfather can leap out of the way, but his grandson will die. If he stays, he will die, but his grandson will live.

Ideally both should be able to live. But given the situation, only one can. In the situation between the grandfather and grandchild its not that the grandfather shouldn't exist, its that the best outcome within this specific situation is that the grandfather dies protecting the grandson. A moral outcome based on a limitation does not mean that we will have the same moral outcome with that limitation removed.

Okay, we're talking past each other. — 180 Proof

No worry. Feel free to chime in any time later if it hits something you feel like exploring.

I think you might have an equivocation with your use of "should" here. "Should" can mean "ought," or "it would be good to..." but it can also be used as in "x should follow from y," where it is basically standing in for "x entails y."


It seems possible that an objective standard could exist that says "things ought not to exist." This would simply mean that existence is not good, but it might still obtain anyhow. There is some self-reference at work here, in that the objective standard of good, by itself existing, is a bad thing, but this does not seem to be a contradiction.

Now, it is the case that if nothing exists, then no standard of goodness can exist. If that's what you're getting at, that seems fine. But here, the term "exists" seems like it could also be equivocal. Do facts like 1+1=2 exist outside of created existence? Do they exist necessarily?

Well, if they do exist in a way different from how chairs and tables exist, and the standard of good exists in the way necessary facts exist, then it seems possible for it to exist while also stating that created existence "ought not exist."

Within the context in which both can co-exist, it is good for both to co-exist

The hypothetical stated that they cannot both co-exist; but I understand what you are saying: it just doesn’t address the issue.

. In the context in which only one can exist, it will be a greater good for one of them to exist over the other.

Here’s a great example of you using the concept of good incoherently with your definition: there is no way to rewrite that sentence in terms of “greater should exist” or “should exist more than” without losing the original meaning (in the sentence) of “greater good”. That’s why I used the example: there is one thing that is good but should not exist; which contradicts your definition.

Also, on a separate note, I’ve always thought something fishy is going [ (; ] on with your derivation of existence being good but couldn’t pin point it: I think I found it. In order for there to be a standard, there must exist already something that is morally good. If this is true, then existence cannot be that standard; because that would be circular.

I think what you are really noting, without realizing it, is that whatever is morally good will presuppose that it is morally good for it to exist. I think you are just extrapolating invalidly too far by concluding that “should something exist or nothing?” is the fundamental question because of it.

f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist.

g. If it shouldn't exist, then the answer "No" objectively shouldn't exist thus contradicting itself. — Philosophim

Then isn't your proposition only proving that objective morality itself should exist, i.e. is a moral end? I don't see why it would apply to any other forms of existence (whose existence wouldn't affect the existence of the objective morality)

I think you might have an equivocation with your use of "should" here. "Should" can mean "ought," or "it would be good to..." but it can also be used as in "x should follow from y," where it is basically standing in for "x entails y." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wouldn't say that x should follow from y is the same as 'entails'. Should or ought in are words of intention or preference. If x should follow from y, it means that there is a possibility that it does not. If existence should be, it doesn't mean that it necessarily will be for example.

It seems possible that an objective standard could exist that says "things ought not to exist." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Then how would it answer its own contradiction? Anytime you reach a contradiction in logic, its an indicator its something that's not possible. To be clear, the question is, "Should there be existence?" or the binary of "Something vs Nothing". Meaning in the face of an absolute void, there still ought to be something. Does this mean, "If we can have 2 somethings vs the 1 something, that the 2 something is always better?" No. We are setting a base good, and nothing more at this point.

Now, it is the case that if nothing exists, then no standard of goodness can exist. If that's what you're getting at, that seems fine — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's about the gist. So if there is an objective standard of goodness that exists, it cannot logically conclude that it ought not to exist. For if it did, then that logically means it would be good if the objective conclusion did not exist. If we got rid of the objective morality based on its own conclusions then, we are left with only one answer, that there ought to be existence.

Objective reality cannot be a contradiction. Objectivity is a state of reality that is, while a contradiction is a claim that something both is and is not at the same time in purely equivalent positive and negative terms or A = !A. No objective conclusion that I know of leads to a contradiction of itself, therefore anything which is a contradiction cannot be objective. Ergo, "Existence ought to be" is the only conclusion which an objective morality could conclude.

Do facts like 1+1=2 exist outside of created existence? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. They are observations and logical conclusions about created existence. Everything that is exists. There are no ghosts 'outside of existence', floating concepts in the aether 'outside of existence', or other nonsense. You cannot get outside of existence. If it is, it exists.

Also, a better word than possible would be plausible. Something possible is the knowledge of something that has occurred at least once. So it is possible it could happen again. What is plausible is something in our imagination that we have not actually explored. So its plausible that a green man is outside of my home monitoring me right now. Plausibility however is not a very good induction if there is something above it, which is possibility or impossibility. What I am claiming is that it is impossible for there to exist an objective morality that contradicts itself, because that which is objective does not contradict itself. Therefore anything plausible to the contrary we can imagine is a consideration to explore, but by itself unexplored can be dismissed as a serious challenge.

So, if you believe it is plausible that there is an objective morality which concludes there ought to be no existence, feel free to propose a proof of its counter where I have proposed it is impossible. But if you cannot raise it to the level of possibility or impossibility, then cogently, we can dismiss the argument as a thought that cannot be elevated enough to be a serious consideration in the argument.

The hypothetical stated that they cannot both co-exist; but I understand what you are saying: it just doesn’t address the issue. — Bob Ross

How? I don't understand. Please give an example of the issue in another way so I can understand then. You can use the grandfather, the grandson, and the explosion to demonstrate if you wish.

That’s why I used the example: there is one thing that is good but should not exist; which contradicts your definition. — Bob Ross

Should not exist in that context. In another context both the boy, the grandfather, and the explosion ought to exist, just separately. Because when you get into existences, we find that some combinations create more potential and actual existences than others. But we're getting too far ahead now within the scope of this conversation. Lets just break the basic example down.

If you wish, chart it out. Take the boy, the grandfather, and the explosion and set them to every variation of true and false you can think of. True = exist, while false = does not exist. Of course the optimal set would be where all three are true. But if we're in a situation in which one must be false, that is a less optimal situation. Meaning we have a situation that is the greatest good, and situations which are not as good. As you can see, we can have one set which is the greatest good, with other sets that are not as good.

Perhaps you're missing the notion of relativite vs absolute. In an absolute sense (within the context of this simple thought experiment only, don't go any deeper than this!) all three should exist. But we are not Gods. Just because something ought to be, doesn't mean it can be. There are limitations in which we cannot reach the ideal. In this case, the explosion is going to exist and either the grandfather or son will be set to false. In such cases we must take the best of what is available to us. Meaning that when we cannot reach the case in which all three can exist without eliminating the other, we must chose from what is remaining. Meaning there is an ideal good, and a reachable good. If this is incoherent, please point out with clear examples, not abstracts.

Also, on a separate note, I’ve always thought something fishy is going [ (; ] on with your derivation of existence being good — Bob Ross

Ha ha! No worry. It needs to be challenged in every way. A claim to objectivity requires it.

In order for there to be a standard, there must exist already something that is morally good. If this is true, then existence cannot be that standard; because that would be circular. — Bob Ross

A logically necessary requirement for something is not a circular fallacy. Something circular would be something which tried to prove itself by illogical self-assertion. "The bible is entirely true." How do we know its true? "Because the bible tells us its true." I am using a proof by contradiction to note that existence should be, not circular logic. Consequently, it would be that something good already exists, but that is not being used as a proof for the claim that existence is good.

Then isn't your proposition only proving that objective morality itself should exist, i.e. is a moral end? — finarfin

No. There is one assumption that I noted in the OP. We are assuming an objective morality exists. If it exists, logically, what must the answer be to "Should there be existence?" Logically, any objective morality must conclude, "Yes." We aren't proving that an objective morality exists, we are simply proving what it must entail if it does exist.

I understand that, and I was a bit unclear in my wording. My point was that objective morality, which we presume is true, proves only that the existence of the system itself is moral and ought to exist (i.e. it would be immoral for there no such system, like if we were judging an alternate amoral universe by our universe's standards). I don't think your proposition proves that existence as a concept is moral, only that the existence of an objective moral system is moral (which is somewhat redundant and tautological). To conflate the existence of a moral system with the existence of an object or sentient being is a stretch, in my opinion. And since an objective morality is not dependent on sentient beings (or anything else, it exists as a universal truth) which has already been stipulated, our existence is not moral/immoral based on this argument.