The problem wouldn't be that these beliefs are arbitrary, but rather that they are determined by a biology, social and personal history, etc. that can be completely explained without any reference to "goodness," — Count Timothy von Icarus

In this case, we would be working already outside the scope of moral subjectivism¹.

1 – Not the view that morals are subjective (as the name would suggest), but that what makes a moral proposition true is whether we believe in it.

I interpret these to mean the same exact thing: am I missing something you are trying to convey? How have I changed it? — Bob Ross

Yes, they mean the same thing, I rephrased it.

then your belief that it is true is independent of the truth-value of the proposition itself; otherwise, you have to concede that the proposition is not distinct from the belief — Bob Ross

Does it follow from A not being dependent on B, that A is not distinct from B?

The point you--in my opinion, correctly observed--supports, for me, the conclusion that the "reality" we are trying to decipher, is as it turns out, "causily connected to itself," a "loop," all of it, the "thing," the proposition (about thing)and the belief, taking place as a single process "appearing" as separate, giving rise to more propositions about subjects, objects, Beings and Truths. — ENOAH

The issue is not that the belief circles back to itself, but that it is caused by itself. So we have that A→A. In logic, this is tautological. In metaphysics, this either implies creation from nothing or causa suis (pantheistic god). Obviously, in either case it becomes nonsense when we are talking of beliefs.

Your challenge does not demonstrate a unique uncovering of real truth — ENOAH

Certainly not unique but it does point to something that has been covered. Whatever the "real truth" might be, it is not something we possess and not something we can come to know through a misguided model of reason based on the success of mathematics.

It is just another conditioned path which surfaced because multiple "words" moving in your locus of history triggered the beliefs you are espousing. — ENOAH

"Words" can have multiple paths that can be traced by their history. To do so may require desedimentation. Doing so can open paths that have been closed, leading us away from our conditioning. Paths can be walked and paths can be made.

Both do not kill and don't eat meat follow that process and are neither relative to subjective choice, nor grounded in Natural Law. — ENOAH

What these prohibitions mean is subject to interpretation. Is killing an enemy in war prohibited? Is killing an animal to eat it prohibited? Do fish and fowl count as meat? The process by which such determinations have been made is not always a process that already exists to be followed. At some point it had to be established. Exceptions had and in some cases still have to be dealt with.

That’s fair. I could have sworn it was a technical term for it but, upon re-searching, I do not find it anywhere. All I mean by it, is the trueness or falseness of something (and not necessarily that it is true). — Bob Ross

I understood better what you meant when you explained it -- I'd have called the concept https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803105953845", which is a term I've come across in the literature that means a sentence is able to be true or false (Unlike sentences like "How are you today?")

I didn't want to interrupt the flow of things for something so minor, but since it came up I thought I'd offer a possible word to use.

I'm not really sure what you're trying to say here

I gave examples and an elaboration here, which you seem to have ignored. If there is anything in there that requires further elaboration or clarification, then please let me know!

I go for a job interview. For whatever reason, I am confident that I am going to get the job. As a result, I am very relaxed and personable, and this in turn is what helps me beat out another candidate. But suppose that if I thought I was unlikely to get the job I would have been much more nervous and flubbed the interview, in which case I wouldn't have gotten the job.

In this case, my belief that I would get the job is not independent of my getting the job. It is a determinate factor.

I have no problem with this; again, I refer you back to my response: a proposition referencing something about a belief does not make the proposition itself true or false relative to a belief…I cannot stress this enough. It is the difference between, e.g., saying that “1 + 1 = 2” is true because one believes it and saying that “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” is true because they do, in fact, have that belief (that 1 + 1 = 2). This is the distinction which you are currently overlooking.

The only thing I can say, that is not a reiteration of my response (linked above), is that this is a bad example, although I understand why you would use it, to give to counter my points in the response; because you didn’t specify what the proposition is that you are claiming has a truth-value relative to a belief. I am assuming you don’t mean to say that the proposition “I got the job” is relative to a belief (even if your subjective disposition contributed to you getting the job) (:

I don't disagree with a premise. I simply prove the conclusion false, and therefore prove that one of the premises is false or that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. I'll leave it to you to determine where you've gone wrong.

That doesn’t help at all: I provided an argument, which outlines a certain way of thinking about it, to demonstrate the conclusion; and all you have done is taking a claim that I am obviously going to deny, which is the very thing under contention, and posited it as true to negate my conclusion.

Your definition of moral subjectivism misses the mark because it rests on two questionable assumptions:

1. That moral beliefs are adequately addressed in terms of propositions.
2. What makes a moral claim true or false is whether or not it is believed.

#1 sounds like this form of “moral subjectivism” denies moral cognitivism; which is a contradiction in terms.

#2 is absolutely a required, essential aspect of moral subjectivism. By moral subjectivism, I am not merely referring to any “subjective morality”: I am referring to a specific moral anti-realist position.

Does it follow from A not being dependent on B, that A is not distinct from B?

I apologize: I was using “distinct” and “independent” interchangeably: reread my response as using “independent” instead of “distinct”.

Fair enough! However, I do not mean truth-aptness by truthity: I to the assessment of the truth of the thing or lack thereof and not its capacity for truth---it is the 'lack thereof' that disbars me from simply saying 'truth' instead of 'truthity'. I went ahead and changed the OP to use 'trueness or falseness' instead of 'truthity'.

and all you have done is taking a claim that I am obviously going to deny — Bob Ross

So you deny that “I believe that aliens exist” is a proposition?

- Good OP. :up:

Going back to the example, “2 + 2 = 4” is a mathematical proposition. Imagine that one held that (1) mathematical propositions exist, (2) they are true or false relative to beliefs, and (3) the belief is contained in the mathematical proposition (as described in the rectification section for moral propositions): it is clear that by accepting #3 (which is the rectification to the internal inconsistency) the original mathematical proposition must be transformed into “I believe 2 + 2 = 4” and that this proposition is not mathematical. In fact, since every mathematical proposition would have to be transformed in this manner, there would be no mathematical propositions anymore—they would get transformed away. — Bob Ross

Yes, good.

1. "2+2=4"
2. "I believe that 2+2=4"

1. "Aliens exist"
2. "I believe that aliens exist"

Although (1) and (2) are quite different, folk on this forum like to equivocate between (1) and (2). When we do philosophy we are usually concerned with statements of type (1), not of type (2). (2) represents a more specialized inquiry which should not be conflated with (1). Nevertheless, (2) is a proposition, it is just an unusual proposition because it depends on beliefs. The question is whether ethics concerns statements of type (1) or type (2). When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter, and is not about peoples beliefs. An ethical proposition is no more made true by beliefs than a mathematical proposition is made true by beliefs.

• A: "It is wrong to torture babies."
• B: "I believe it is wrong to torture babies."

The moral subjectivist is liable to redefine ethics such that it is about statements of type (2) rather than statements of type (1); they wish to talk about B rather than A. The first problem with this is that it is simply not what ethics is, historically speaking. The second problem is that if ethics were only about things like B and in no way about things like A, then ethics would not be a science or field of inquiry except in the most insubstantial sense. Ethics would then reduce to irrational claims like, "I believe it is wrong to torture babies, and I have no rational grounds for so believing."

Yes that is a proposition, and whether or not it is true or false is independent of any belief about it: that's what you keep missing, because you keep conflating a proposition referencing something about a belief with a proposition having its trueness or falseness being relative to a belief (e.g., the difference between claiming "aliens exist" is true relative to a belief one has and "I believe aliens exist" being true).

:up:

I would add, that a proposition can never actually be true or false relative to a belief; and this is the real, underlying problem.

Many people are inclined to say "it is wrong to torture babies" is a (1) proposition and (2) its truth is relative to beliefs; however, they then proceed to re-write it, to make it valid, as "I believe it is wrong to torture babies" which is not the original proposition. What they have done is NOT the demonstration of a proposition that has its trueness or falseness relative to beliefs but, rather, have demonstrated that there are certain kinds of propositions, of which their truth is still not relative to beliefs, that is about beliefs.

(@Michael, @Count Timothy von Icarus) The proposition "I believe <...>" is NOT true or false relative to a belief. I can't say "oh, well, 'I believe X' is true because I believe that 'I believe X' is true".

Yes that is a proposition, and whether or not it is true or false is independent of any belief about it — Bob Ross

As per Tarski’s T-schema, “P” is true iff P. As such, “I believe that aliens exist” is true iff I believe that aliens exist.

Fair enough! However, I do not mean truth-aptness by truthity: I to the assessment of the truth of the thing or lack thereof and not its capacity for truth---it is the 'lack thereof' that disbars me from simply saying 'truth' instead of 'truthity'. I went ahead and changed the OP to use 'trueness or falseness' instead of 'truthity'. — Bob Ross

Then I don't think I understand after all.

What does "The assessment of the truth of the thing or lack thereof" mean? That it has been judged or justified, or that it can be judged or justified?

Many people are inclined to say "it is wrong to torture babies" is a (1) proposition and (2) its truth is relative to beliefs; however, they then proceed to re-write it, to make it valid, as "I believe it is wrong to torture babies" which is not the original proposition. — Bob Ross

Yes, exactly.

The proposition "I believe <...>" is NOT true or false relative to a belief. I can't say "oh, well, 'I believe X' is true because I believe that 'I believe X' is true". — Bob Ross

• P: "I believe that aliens exist"
• P2: "I believe that I believe that aliens exist"

I would say that the truth of P is relative to a belief, namely my belief regarding aliens. However, I think you are right in saying that it is not necessarily relative to the belief expressed by P2.

The main point is that even though some propositions depend on beliefs, ethical propositions such as <Do not torture babies> do not depend on beliefs, and are therefore not made true or false in virtue of a belief.

I tried and it didn't help.

(@Count Timothy von Icarus)

Correct, but no need for “Tarski’s T-schema”: it plainly and obviously follows that p ↔ p.

You are also correct that “I believe that aliens exist” is true iff I believe that aliens exist. However, this does not entail that the truth of the proposition is contingent on beliefs.

There’s a couple ways to explicate this to you, which I have done already (but let me try again).

The first way, is to note that if “I believe that aliens exist” has its truth-value relative to a belief, then it is true iff I believe that I believe that aliens exist. This plainly follows, because one would be literally evaluating whether or not the proposition, which is “I believe that aliens exist”, is true or false relative to another belief.

The second way, is to abstract it out: let’s call the proposition “I believe X” Y. If Y’s truth-value is relative to a belief, then Y is true iff I, or some group of people, believe, or believes, that Y is true. Y is, though, NOT X. So let’s apply this to your example. If you were to argue that “aliens exist” has a truth-value that is relative to beliefs, then “aliens exist” is true iff I believe “aliens exist”. What you are trying to do, is express this with “I believe aliens exist”; but this is not the same proposition: you have went from X to Y in an equivocating fashion. If “aliens exist” is true iff I believe “aliens exist”, it does NOT follow that “I believe aliens exist” is true iff I believe that “I believe aliens exist”: the latter is a separate proposition, which does not have its truth-value necessarily relative to beliefs. I merely recognize, in my argument, that, in fact, propositions cannot be true or false relative to a belief: “I believe aliens exist”, like any other proposition, is true or false irregardless of what you or I believe about “I believe aliens exist”.

What you are doing, is confusing X with Y: you are thinking that "aliens exist" is true or false relative to a belief when really you are working with the separate proposition "I believe aliens exist". You have to re-write it this way for your idea to be a valid proposition, but that contradicts your idea: it transforms it into a different proposition that does not demonstrate that "aliens exist" is true or false relative to a belief.

I just meant that whether or not a thing is true or false, is independent of the stance one has of whether it is true or false. That's all.

Does it follow from A not being dependent on B, that A is not distinctdependent fromon B?

The answer is "yes".

:up:

In logic, this is tautological — Lionino

Preface that I'm not confident (as in my own weakness) beyond generally that I understand your concern about the logic and precisely how it applies. Sorry in advance as, despite my best efforts, I limp through any logical aspect of what follows.

But, I'm asking genuinely, if something is impossible in logic, can it not be possible "outside" of logic? Is there no outside? Who says? Logic? Is that tautological?

You might choose to stop here, and just answer.

If your answer is yes, logic precludes it, you might not want to read further. Understandably, it may frustrate.

And I respect that. But what Im about to ask, I ask sincerely, and neither to disrespect nor challenge well supported thinking. Plus I'm eager to be corrected let alone challenged because my thoughts have never been just my own. Are anyone's?

Can it be that belief does come back to itself, in the sense that "belief" is not what the word conventionally signifies; (or is that but is also) a mechanism within a perpetual loop, a process becoming out of and back to itself. Not just belief; everything.

And talk about A --> A, what if even logic proceeds from itself within that process? Hence, the loop (which) defies logic.

The "reality" we're "writing" about precisely here is morality (for e.g.), and we think we are discerning the "real" of it. But we are nowhere near the real of it, "trapped" within the loop holding and forming our inquiries and their emissions. We search for the real of morality in subject or object for e.g.. The loop constructed "difference". The loop constructed Subjective/objective both writing themselves into the narratives moving everything in becoming, changing as we go albeit to us, slowly. Our resistance to change another mechanism having evolved to ensure that slow and complex dialectic functionsoptimally for the survival and prosperity of the loop. Logic evolved, a "tool" in the dialectic; a "successful" mechanism to expedite a settlement/belief. And from belief proceeds the Dialectical process settling at a new belief, and so on, and so on, becoming belief, never being True or Real.

The loop never uncovers any independently existing Reality. There might be a Natural Law of "morality," we might naturraly live by it, but we're not going to uncover it with our constructions, fantasy or logic. We are in a loop "constructions" proceeding from a constructed system of construction; affecting our bodies to act and feel; but displacing all of our natural attention with experience in narrative form, all of it fleeting and empty of any of that "the real of it" which we will always endlessly pursue. Illustrating yet again illogicality even of this hypothesis bothering to express itself. Unless expression is the only point. It dresses itself up with logic and poetry to give it the maximum chance for survival and with the hope of its prosperity, that is, settlement by others.

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross

You seem to misunderstand moral subjectivism. Beliefs do not make moral, or any other, propositions true or false per se, but moral subjectivists may assert that their believing what they understand to be a moral proposition makes it true for them. It doesn't follow that the propositions they hold to be true are truth apt—propositions may or may not be truth apt, regardless of whether or not they are believed to be true or false.

Whatever the "real truth" might be, it is not something we possess and not something we can come to know through a misguided model of reason based on the success of mathematics. — Fooloso4

I'm with you there.

"Words" can have multiple paths that can be traced by their history. To do so may require desedimentation. Doing so can open paths that have been closed, leading us away from our conditioning. Paths can be walked and paths can be made. — Fooloso4

Almost shocking how much I see it that way too. Funny how it takes me a few "call-and-responses" to start to understand another's narration.

What these prohibitions mean is subject to interpretation. — Fooloso4

Right. If it appeared otherwise, pardon my unwieldiness. I was saying both moral issues are similarly the product of and resolved by and as language (and not by reference to some eternal law accessible to Language and its multiform projections). But don't kill, being a path well tread seems like it comes to us from nature; more than don't eat meat which requires a dialectic on the surface to take place first but they are both similarly projections of Language and its autonomous processes

you are thinking that "aliens exist" is true or false relative to a belief — Bob Ross

No I'm not.

I'm only saying that "I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist. Therefore your conclusion that "a belief cannot make a proposition true or false" is false.

"I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist. Therefore your conclusion that "a belief about the proposition cannot make a proposition true or false" is false. — Michael

I think you're missing Bob Ross's point.

A belief that "aliens exist" is not the same as a belief about the proposition "I believe that aliens exist"

I think you're missing Bob Ross's point.

A belief that "aliens exist" is not the same as a belief about the proposition "I believe that aliens exist" — ChrisH

I haven't claimed otherwise.

I have only claimed this:

"I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist. Therefore his conclusion that "a belief cannot make a proposition true or false" is false.

Apologies, you're right - It's Bob who's missing your point.

"a belief cannot make a proposition true or false" is false. — Michael

Yes, but a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false (which is maybe what Bob is claiming)

Okiedoke.

In that case I agree with:

My criticism is that P1 begs the question. — Lionino

they are both similarly projections of Language and its autonomous processes — ENOAH

I don't think so. I think we are historically/culturally/linguistically situated but not thereby determined.

then your belief that it is true is independent of the truth-value of the proposition itself; otherwise, you have to concede that the proposition is not distinctindependent from the belief — Bob Ross

Yes. The moral subjectivist will concede that because that is their view.