P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something. — Bob Ross
1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the truthity of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross
I would agree with Lionino here, that this isn't capturing the position very well. — AmadeusD
One's belief in what one 'ought' to do is true in vitue of the fact that one believes it. This does, as Lionino point out, make it entirely arbitrary. — AmadeusD
There is moral proposition X.
I believe X is true.
Believing X makes it true (subjectivism strictly defined).
X was not true before I believed it. — Lionino
[...] especially if we accept the requirement that a belief is motivated by evidence and evidence is causally connected to the matter of fact of the belief. — Lionino
Initially, I would change truthity for just truth.
So it seems to me the argument begs the question by rejecting the challenged view from the start.
Believing X makes it true (subjectivism strictly defined).
When it comes to the rejoinder, I am not sure, I haven't wrapped my hand around it yet. A rewording in simpler terms would be welcome.
I would agree with Lionino here, that this isn't capturing the position very well.
One's belief in what one 'ought' to do is true in vitue of the fact that one believes it. This does, as Lionino point out, make it entirely arbitrary.
"I believe one ought not torture babies" is NOT a moral proposition: the moral proposition is that "one ought not torture babies". — Bob Ross
C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false.
My thesis is simple: moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent. — Bob Ross
Truthity is whether or not something has truth, and not that it has truth. — Bob Ross
it is an uncontroversial claim that the stance taken on something is distinct from that something — Bob Ross
This is internally inconsistent — Bob Ross
P1 is not the claim that beliefs cannot make something true or false (which would beg the question): it is an uncontroversial claim that the stance taken on something is distinct from that something. — Bob Ross
My example of "I believe that aliens exist" being true iff I believe that aliens exist is proof that a belief can make a proposition true or false.
As such you are left with this:
You’ve stipulated conditions under moral subjectivism, but you haven’t stipulated moral subjectivism itself. What if moral subjectivism, as a self-consistent doctrine, has nothing to do with mere belief?
deontological moral doctrine predicated on necessity of law alone, which makes the contingency of mere belief irrelevant?
What makes subjectivism “moral” anyway?
What it is that makes subjectivism in general reducible to a particular instance of it?
Would any of that matter with respect to your thesis?
The issue is more that "truthity" is a word that quite literally doesn't exist.
P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something.
P1: A stance taken on the truth-value of something is independent of the truth-value of that something.
The moral subjectivist will reject that.
A moral proposition is true if and only if I believe it is true.
If A is distinct from B, then B is distinct from A. But if A is independent from B, it does not follow that B is independent from A.
There seems to be a desire to go from uncontroversial to "absolutely true" or "objectively true"?
This seems to be the crux of your argument, and I am not following this distinction you are making.
All I meant, was that the truth-value of something is completely independent of any stance taken on it. — Bob Ross
P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something. — Bob Ross
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the truthity of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false.
One's belief in what one 'ought' to do is true in vitue of the fact that one believes it. This does, as Lionino point out, make it entirely arbitrary.
1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the truthity of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross
P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the truthity of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false.
However:
P3: "I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist
This is just a re-iteration of your previous post, which does not address which premise you disagree with. — Bob Ross
In terms of your “P3”, I responded here. — Bob Ross
1. "Torturing babies is wrong," is propisitional. It has "truthity"; i.e. it is either true or false. (Do I understand your use of "truthity" correctly here?)
5. a) Is that I believe torturing babies is wrong dependent on torturing babies being wrong?
5. b) Is torturing babies being wrong dependent on me believing that torturing babies is wrong?
How do you arrive at that conclusion? You have shown that the belief is independent of the truth(ity). You have not shown that the truthity is independent of the belief.
I think you've both highlighted the initial problem though, which is P1 here
↪Bob Ross
. It seems entirely possible that a belief could be related to the truth value of some proposition.
When it comes the sort of self-reference at work in the OP though
P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something. — Bob Ross
C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false. — Bob Ross
where do you disagree with my assessment here? — Bob Ross
Being that the fact of the propositions comes to be once I start believing in them, something is causally connected to itself, which I am confident is not desirable. — Lionino
This marks a wrong turn in the history of philosophy that fails to strike us as odd and out of touch because we have become so accustomed to philosophers making such claims, as if thinking and feeling are two separate, independent things. — Fooloso4
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