No it's not. Light often causes us to see colours, but they are not the same thing, as evidenced by the obvious fact that I can see colours when I dream and my eyes are closed in a dark room. — Michael

measure the wavelength of light and then program it to output the word "red" if the wavelength measures 700nm.

Well, say what you will... when your eyes are closed in a dark room or you're dreaming, you're doing neither seeing light nor seeing colors. You're dreaming or hallucinating. I've seen enough here.

Be well.

Naive realists claim that distal objects and their properties are literal constituents of conscious experience and that as such we are acquainted with distal objects and their properties, and so our knowledge of them is direct and there is no epistemological problem of perception. The external world just is as it appears. They call this "direct perception of distal objects". — Michael

According to the Fish article, this is the naive part (3), not the direct part (2):

Naïve realism is a theory in the philosophy of perception: primarily, the philosophy of vision. Historically, the term was used to name a variant of “direct realism,” which claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part).

You keep trying to argue that the rejection of (3) is also the rejection of (2), but it's not.

I don't think there's much point in continuing since you refuse to acknowledge that my position is even possible: that one can reject naive realism without being an indirect realist.

If you get a few minutes I wonder if you could give this article a read and tell me what you think?

I don't think there's much point in continuing since you refuse to acknowledge that my position is even possible: that one can reject naive realism without being an indirect realist. — Luke

As has been established, your position misunderstands indirect realism. You think that by "we perceive mental phenomena" the indirect realist means "our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena". They don't.

So given that neither non-naive direct realism nor indirect realism believe that our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena; given that both groups believe that some distal object reflects light, that this light stimulates the sense receptors in our eyes, that this then triggers activity in the visual cortex, and that distal objects and their properties are not literal constituents of the resulting conscious experience, where is it that non-naive direct realism and indirect realism diverge?

If you get a few minutes I wonder if you could give this article a read and tell me what you think? — frank

It's a big one. But I'll have a look at it for sure!

Bye the way, my outlook owes much to John Haugeland, Hubert Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty who themselves owe much to Heidegger.

It's a big one. But I'll have a look at it for sure! — Pierre-Normand

Cool. If you're cut for time, 2.4 and 2.5 are the sections where subjectivism is discussed: that tendency to oppose the subject and object.

Bye the way, my outlook owes much to John Haugeland, Hubert Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty who themselves owe much to Heidegger. — Pierre-Normand

I think I'm starting to understand what you're saying.

You think that by "we perceive mental phenomena" the indirect realist means "our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena". They don't. — Michael

Direct realists claim that we have direct sensory perceptions of external objects:

DR: Sensory perception----of----external object

Indirect realists claim that we have indirect sensory perceptions of external objects:

IR: Sensory perception----of-----[something, e.g. mental representation]----of----external object

This is consistent with Fish's definition. Otherwise, I don't know what indirect realists mean by indirect perception.

where is it that non-naive direct realism and indirect realism disagree? — Michael

As I've stated several times now, it is over part (2) of Fish's definition:

(2) that our visual perception of [...] material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part);

As I've stated several times now, it is over part (2) of Fish's definition: — Luke

Except according to what you mean by "perceive some other entity, such as sense-data", (2) is something that indirect realists accept.

Otherwise, I don't know what indirect realists mean by indirect perception. — Luke

I have spent 70 pages explaining it.

As I've stated several times now, it is over part (2) of Fish's definition:
— Luke

Except according to what you mean by "perceive some other entity, such as sense-data", (2) is something that indirect realists accept. — Michael

It's something I do not accept.

According to what I mean by it, it is that we have sensory perceptions of sense-data. but you have been telling me that that's not what you mean by it.

It's something I do not accept.

According to what I mean by it, it is that we have sensory perceptions of sense-data. but you have been telling me that that's not what you mean by it. — Luke

By "we do not perceive some other entity, such as sense-data" you mean "our eyes do not respond to light reflected by some other entity, such as sense-data".

Indirect realists agree with you that our eyes do not respond to light reflected by some other entity, such as sense-data.

So what is it that indirect realists believe that you do not?

So what is it that indirect realists believe that you do not? — Michael

That our perceptions of material objects are mediated by the perception of some other entity, such as sense-data.

That our perceptions of material objects are mediated by the perception of some other entity, such as sense-data. — Luke

Except by this you mean "our eyes respond to light reflected by sense data" which isn't what indirect realists believe.

Except by this you mean "our eyes respond to light reflected by sense data" which isn't what indirect realists believe. — Michael

Except your explanation of what indirect realists believe is that our perceptions of material objects are not mediated by the perception of some other entity, which is therefore not indirect realism.

Except your explanation of what indirect realists believe is that our perceptions of material objects are not mediated by the perception of some other entity, which is therefore not indirect realism. — Luke

What indirect realists mean by "perception of some other entity" isn't what you mean by "perception of some other entity". You're equivocating.

Indirect realists do not and never have believed or claimed that our eyes respond to light reflected by sense data.

What indirect realists mean by "perception of some other entity" isn't what you mean by "perception of some other entity". You're equivocating. — Michael

My usage is consistent. Indirect realists equivocate over the meaning of "perception", using it to mean both the sensory perception of external objects and the Russellian acquaintance of mental representations.

My usage is consistent. Indirect realists equivocate over the meaning of "perception", using it to mean both the sensory perception of external objects and the Russellian acquaintance of mental representations. — Luke

It's only equivocation if they start from the premise that we are acquainted with mental phenomena and then conclude that our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena, but they never make this conclusion. This is the strawman conclusion that you are fabricating.

It's only equivocation if they start from the premise that we are acquainted with mental phenomena and then conclude that our eyes respond to light reflected by mental phenomena, but they never draw this conclusion. This is the strawman conclusion that you and others are fabricating. — Michael

There is no sensory perception, then, only acquaintance?

Acquaintance primarily concerns knowledge. The direct/indirect realism dispute primarily concerns sensory perception, as I (and ChatGPT) noted in this post.

Acquaintance primarily concerns knowledge. — Luke

Yes, hence the epistemological problem of perception.

The direct/indirect realism dispute primarily concerns sensory perception — Luke

It concerns whether or not sensory perception provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects.

Naive realists claim that sensory perception does provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are literal constituents of conscious experience, and so we are acquainted with distal objects.

Indirect realists claim that sensory perception does not provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not literal constituents of conscious experience, and so we are only acquainted with mental phenomena.

Yes, hence the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael

The direct/indirect realist debate concerns perceptual directness, not epistemological directness. Russellian acquaintance is concerned with epistemological directness, not perceptual directness.

Naive realists claim that sensory perception does provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are literal constituents of conscious experience, and so we are acquainted with distal objects.

Indirect realists claim that sensory perception does not provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not literal constituents of conscious experience, and so we are only acquainted with mental phenomena. — Michael

Also, as Fish notes, direct realists claim that sensory perception does provide us with direct knowledge of external objects because such perception is not mediated by the perception of some other entity, such as sense data.

And indirect realists claim that sensory perception does not provide us with direct knowledge of external objects because such perception is mediated by the perception of some other entity, such as sense data.

And you're just making the same mistake again and falsely claiming that indirect realists believe that our eyes respond to light reflected by sense data. They don't. If you're going to continue to argue against this strawman then I'm out.

Do you restrict experience to only humans? Are non human animals forbidden, by definition, from having any experience? — creativesoul

Experience, as such, yes, the reason being, all of that by which experience is considered a valid concept is derived purely a priori from the nature of human intelligence alone, and insofar as this concept is a priori, it can never apply outside the intelligence from which it arises. That being said, experience, as such, is forbidden to non-human animals, but that does not preclude them having something conceptually congruent with it, albeit exclusive to their kind of intelligence.

Besides, and we’ve previously agreed on this without equivocation, to profess that a human condition may also be assigned to non-humans, is anthropomorphism, the bane of good philosophizing. So while other animals may have something, we aren’t qualified to say what that something is, even if logically we are authorized to say what it is not.
————-

For my part, although we cannot know everything, we can surmise one very important feature of our own experience. It is meaningful to us. — creativesoul

Yes, I suppose experiences are meaningful, but to surmise meaning from experience is to presuppose experience, which still leaves the primary question of what it is, which just means that in order for experiences to be meaningful, experience would need to be defined in such a way as to accommodate meaningfulness in it.
(Sidebar: my definition of experience is unlikely to meet with more than your passing glance, which is fine; I don’t mind. No theoretical philosophy is correct, after all, right?)

I rather attribute meaning to conceptions, in that whatever is represented by a conception is the meaning of it. To attribute “round” to an object just means that object is understood to have a certain shape and no other is attributable to it without self-contradiction. This pertains because we can attribute concepts and thereby meanings to a thing without ever actually experiencing it, that is to say, we can merely think it, re: algebra. Or, heaven. But I guess all that just reduces to all experiences are meaningful but not all meaningfulness is experiential.

Anyway…..for what it’s worth.

Experience, as such, yes, the reason being, all of that by which experience is considered a valid concept is derived purely a priori from the nature of human intelligence alone, and insofar as this concept is a priori, it can never apply outside the intelligence from which it arises.That being said, experience, as such, is forbidden to non-human animals, but that does not preclude them having something conceptually congruent with it, albeit exclusive to their kind of intelligence. — Mww

Even granting Kantian terms, that first part makes little to no sense to me whatsoever M.

:brow:

Have you forgotten that, in philosophy, a priori and a posteriori are used to distinguish types of knowledge, justification, or argument by their reliance on experience. A priori knowledge is supposed to be independent of any experience.

I agree that there are differences between human experience and other animals', but there also are similarities. Finding and/or figuring out what those similarities are finds importance here. I mentioned a general rule of thumb which ought help guide our endeavor. All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Here, despite our differences in preferred terminological frameworks, perhaps progress can be made. You wrote "exclusive to their kind of intelligence" which may provide segue.

I'm arguing that there are things we can know about other creatures' minds, and thus experience, based upon adequate evidence and sufficient reason to infer/conclude that other creatures have minds/experiences. The catch here, however, is that we must first get our own meaningful experience right prior to being capable of discriminating between experiences that only humans are capable of and experiences that some other creatures are as well. Successfully doing so avoids anthropomorphism. It is worth mentioning here again, that we need not know everything in order to know some things.

Circling back to the OP...

Direct perception of distal objects is one physiological capability that all experiencing creatures must possess. This points towards the irrevocably important role that biological machinery plays.

These sort of considerations warrant their own thread.

…..we must first get our own meaningful experience right prior to being capable of discriminating between experiences that only humans are capable of and experiences that some other creatures are as well. — creativesoul

And how do we get our experiences right?
——————

Direct perception of distal objects is one physiological capability that all experiencing creatures must possess. This points towards the irrevocably important role that biological machinery plays. — creativesoul

This presupposes all experiencing creatures experience via direct perception, which makes explicit there is no other way to experience, irrespective of the type of creature. We have no warrant for claiming that is a valid condition, from which follows there is nothing necessarily pointing to the irrevocably important role biological machinery plays. Just because it is so for humans does not mean it is so for all intellects.

Just because it is so for humans does not mean it is so for all intellects. — Mww

Agreed. A little early on for an anthropomorphism charge though.

If it is the case that multiple kinds of creatures are capable of meaningful experience, including those without naming and descriptive practices, then we would expect to find some shared common denominators/elemental constituents between the candidates that satisfy the bare minimum criterion for being a meaningful experience. One basic common denominator - a bare minimum criterion for experience - shared between all individual cases thereof, is that the experience itself is meaningful to the creature having it.

If all experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience, then the candidate under consideration(the creature having the experience) must be capable of attributing meaning to different things. That basic capability must be shared/possessed by all creatures capable of having meaningful experience(s). I'm saying that direct perception of distal objects is necessary for all cases of human perception, and that there are many other creatures capable of it as well.

Are you saying that direct perception of distal objects is not necessary for meaningful experience, or that direct perception of distal objects is insufficient for meaningful experience, or that direct perception of distal objects is something that is exclusive to only humans?

This presupposes all experiencing creatures experience via direct perception, which makes explicit there is no other way to experience, irrespective of the type of creature. We have no warrant for claiming that is a valid condition... — Mww

Sure we do. It just hasn't been laid bare yet. It's a complicated topic, and you're not easily convinced into believing anything that contradicts your current view.

What meaningful experience is of a creature that is entirely incapable of perceiving distal objects? How could mindless behaviour evolve into meaningful experience(becoming meaningful to the creature) if not by virtue of the creature being and/or becoming capable of attributing meaning to different elements/constituents therein?

..we must first get our own meaningful experience right prior to being capable of discriminating between experiences that only humans are capable of and experiences that some other creatures are as well.
— creativesoul

And how do we get our experiences right? — Mww

That's a great question. Methodological approach matters. Guiding principles matter. Basic assumptions matter. Comparison to/with current knowledge base matters.

I think one important thing to keep in mind is that meaningful human experience happens long before we begin to take account of it. I would go as far as to say that meaningful human experience began happening prior to language creation, acquisition, usage, and/or mastery of it.

There is when and where we would 'look for' common denominators with language less creatures also capable of having meaningful experience(s).

Again, I think that one basic necessity for having meaningful experience is the ability/capability of attributing meaning to different things. I do not see how it is possible for any creature that is inherently incapable of perceiving different things. Hence...

The biology matters.

I agree with you that we are justified in believing that things must have significance (meaning) for other animals, simply on the grounds that we can tell by observing their behavior that they can recognize environmental affordances enabling them to survive. They must be able to do that, or they could not survive.

…..a bare minimum criterion…. — creativesoul

I agree that for a creature to have a meaningful experience, such creature must be able to at the very least describe the conditions of that experience, even if only to himself, in order for the meaning of it to be given.

I'm saying that direct perception of distal objects is necessary for all cases of human perception, and that there are many other creatures capable of it as well. — creativesoul

I agree with that as well, with the caveat that mere direct perception is very far from meaningful experience. It would be far less contradictory to posit creatures with eyes directly see things, than it is to posit that same creature that directly sees things obtains a meaningful experience from that direct perception alone.

Are you saying that direct perception of distal objects is not necessary for meaningful experience….. — creativesoul

Assuming the possibility of experience in general, yes, not necessary for meaningful experience, re: echolocation in bats and whales. Direct perception is an unmediated receptivity by the creature, whereas echolocation is direct receptivity of that which has been initially projected from the creature.
(awful loosely-goosey here, cuz the counterpoint will inevitably take the form….light reflected off objects enabling direct perception by vision is no different in kind that echolocation reflecting off objects. Depends on how precisely one needs his definitions to be, I guess, and their relation to a complete system)

…..or that direct perception of distal objects is insufficient for meaningful experience…. — creativesoul

In humans, yes, it is very much the case that very much more than mere perception is necessary for experience. In any other creature, it is impossible to justify with the same irreducible certainty, in that it is not so certain that other creatures have experiences, as such, in the same form as those creatures which require more than mere perception for the meaningfulness of their experiences to even be possible in the first place.

…..or that direct perception of distal objects is something that is exclusive to only humans? — creativesoul

We are entitled to say that direct perception is necessary for human experience, but we are not entitled to say experience predicated on direct perception is exclusive to humans.
—————

I think one important thing to keep in mind is that meaningful human experience happens long before we begin to take account of it. — creativesoul

Oh, absolutely. One of my philosophical pet peeves is the gross mistake in thinking a speculative prescription of the human cognitive system, which requires language use, is how the damn thing actually works, which needs no language use whatsoever. I’ve said in this conversation, that we in fact do not know what experience in humans really is, but that doesn’t dissuade us from inventing stuff in order to relieve the itch of wanting tell ourselves at least something about it.

So, yes, I agree without equivocation that whatever human experience is, it happens long before it can be talked about. And if such is the case, and is the case beyond legitimate scepticism, what does that say about our talking about those creatures, the only indicator for the possibility of experience in them, manifests as nothing more than mere behavior? From which logically follows…plants have meaningful experience insofar as they behave in a very specific fashion in relation to sunlight.

How dare we, from no more than perceiving whales in the motionless vertical position, suppose they are experiencing sweet dreams over gruesome nightmares.
—————-

Again, I think that one basic necessity for having meaningful experience is the ability/capability of attributing meaning to different things. I do not see how it is possible for any creature that is inherently incapable of perceiving different things. — creativesoul

This still leaves the problem of attribution of meaning even when the perception is given. It now becomes the situation where the perception is merely the occassion by which a meaningful experience is possible, but in itself, perception does not give whatever meaning the experience will end up having.

This relates to our conversation because in humans there is an established methodology for attribution of meaning to experience predicated on biological structure, and it is always and only by this methodology we can say what experience is. It is, therefore, illegitimate to attribute this known established methodology to those creatures the biological structure of which cannot support the conclusions thereof.

Ya know….if we say other creatures have meaningful experiences, just not like ours….what have we really said? Nothing. Not a damn thing. Who the hell cares about an experience that isn’t like ours, when it is ours alone by which we can understand anything at all?
————-

And how do we get our experiences right?
— Mww

That's a great question. Methodological approach matters. Guiding principles matter. Basic assumptions matter. Comparison to/with current knowledge base matters. — creativesoul

Do you have, can you iterate, offer examples of, those?
————-

…..a priori and a posteriori are used to distinguish types of knowledge, justification, or argument by their reliance on experience — creativesoul

Distinguish types, yes, but not by reliance on experience. By the origins of conceptions and their relation to each other in cognitive propositions which are one or more of either knowledge, judgement or argument. All of which is a function of understanding alone, not of, hence not in reliance on, experience. This minor rejoinder would have been different if you’d said distinguished in relation to, rather than by reliance on, experience.

But most indirect realists do think that these explanations are directly evidencing indirect realisms. — Apustimelogist

Right.

My take is that there isn't really evidence for indirect realism as much as indirect realism is an interpretation of what we know -- so I'm providing an alternate interpretation to weaken the justification for indirect realism. Or at least that's the strategy.

No, I'm not implying it in a fundamental metaphysical sense. But some have pointed out that my actual view on mind-body metaphysics is not so dissimilar from a kind of neutral monism (maybe a very minimalist one) so maybe you would still think it the case of my view anyway. Though I don't think I see my view that way. — Apustimelogist

I'll take your view of your view over my view of it any day :) -- if I view your view differently then I'd say I'm incorrect about your view.

I think a neutral monism could go either way regarding in/direct realism -- it'd depend upon whether our perceptions are representations or presentations, I think. But cool, I can take up the notion that this isn't an issue of fundamental metaphysics.

I'm not sure to be honest. I think it depends on the angle you take. As you say below, it can be quite vague all this talk I think. I don't think indirect realists necessarily have to bring strong metaphysics into it beyond the talk of realism about representations, similar to the way you can talk about whether scientific theories (are real)*. The science I think provides quite a good description of how perceptions would be indirect so not much work is needed to be done there. Naive direct realism I'm not so sure. — Apustimelogist

Mkay, fair.

But the experiences still extend into the outside world beyond the head? — Apustimelogist

It seems so to me, yes.

I can understand the motivation for representation when it comes to sight, but I don't understand what a representation of my toe would be when I'm stubbing it or not.

Minimally I have a hard time thinking of the perception of my body as a representation: I can go as far as to say it's a bundle, and there is no "I", but I don't think my body is a bundle of representations.

Well I only use it in a weak sense as opposed to a fundamental, tangible ontology. — Apustimelogist

Cool.

Well I'm not sure since it seems you were perhaps using affordance in different sense, ha. But possibly yes, I definitely think I have preferred starting points in my reasonings that are probably not the same as yours. — Apustimelogist

Probably :)

Of course, that's why it's interesting to converse in the first place, so nothing wrong with that.

I don't know exactly what you mean for experience to compliment activity. — Apustimelogist

Behaviour viz adaptation, metabolism, sensitivity (in the physical sense) do not entail experience. Yet, we have experience. It appears to be something over and above the physical facts, on it's face. This is what I mean. Experience accompanies behaviour.

If everything is experience, there is no hard problem because the problem just becomes "why are there experiences?" — Apustimelogist

That literally is the hard problem. Perhaps you have an erroneous idea of what it is? The hard problem consists in this exact question.

then this is no different from "why does anything exist?" — Apustimelogist

AS above, clearly this is not right.

And maybe people similarly-minded to Dennett actually want to turn the hard problem of consciousness into this kind of more trivial hard problem - i.e. the reasoning going something like - Why does anything exist? Can we even answer that? Do we have to make up an additional metaphysical substance of consciousness that needs its own separate answer? — Apustimelogist

Agreed, but that's pretty senseless. Its just ignoring one problem for another. Dennett, as it goes, actually denies qualia. So, that's novel, but even less coherent that ignoring hte problem, I think.

only come about in idealism when you postulate something like observers that have a way they seem to themselves, via their own experiences, which is different to how they seem from another observer's perspective. — Apustimelogist

It's very hard to see how this could matter. If one is having an experience, that's all that's needed. The framework in whcih is sits isn't relevant the Hard Problem. It is the experience per se that needs explaining.

Obviously, this construction has an inherent indirect aspect to it in the sense that there are experiences out in the world and then your own experiences which seem to be about those experiences but are not the same - they are separated. — Apustimelogist

This is hte empirical notion of how perception produces experience (and leads to the problem this thread has instantiated. Using hte word 'perception' for both the experience and the process it arises from is ridiculous).

At the same time, without indirect mediation I feel like there would be no need to identify brain processes and experiences or distinguish internal experiences from external stuff. — Apustimelogist

I think is true, and is weakly entailed by my positions on the above passages of yours. Indirect causal processes result in experience. That much is known in experience. We can't access anything other than experience, so it seems were stuck with the Hard Problem however we slice it. The indirect nature of perceptual awareness is just another spanner for the likes of Banno who are deathly afraid of being less-directly acquainted with objects than they'd like to be.

So I think in that sense hard-type problems in idealism do presuppose indirect realism (including external objects to be realist about which are qualitatively different from internal perception). — Apustimelogist

An idealist rejects that there are external objects. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding what you're getting at here.

So it appears you already anticipated the answer I gave about why idealism doesn't necessarily have a hard problem of consciousness. — Apustimelogist

It isn't clear to me - what I was doing with that passage was cutting off, at its base, the chess move you tried to make earlier in the post around an Idealist holding that external objects exist. They don't, but this has nothing to do with teh Hard Problem. Is it the experience per se that needs explaining.

For instance, if realism is a concept that can be attributed to mathematical scientific theories, why can't it be attributed to the representations and models built in machine learning? — Apustimelogist

Because you're misattributing what 'realism' stands for within each framework. Perceptually indirect/direct realism is not the same debate as that among scientifici realists/antirealists or moral realists/antirealists. You could be a scientific realist, and just deny that we have adequate acces to the world for our experiments to mean a huge amount. Or just take the probablity response to Hume hook line and sinker.

I agree that this “perception of a perception” is confusing and unnecessary. It’s a large part of the reason why I am not an indirect realist. — Luke

As was pointed out several times in the first 20 pages of this thread, this is purely a mistake in terminology.

If we, instead, actually f'ing do our jobs and improve our tools, we can use terms like the below:

1.The act of turning ones eyes: To look at -->causes
2.The act of processing visual data: To perceive --> causes
3. Having the resulting conscious experience: To see.

These aren't airtight as more specific terms could be invented, but if we use them, we can see that the debate is actually not a debate. Being a Direct Realist is a position which requires that (2.) is (3.) which is patently is not, and can't be explained in terms of. The conscious experience is simply not reducible to either of (1.) or (2.).
Hand-waving aside, there has been no response whatsoever in this thread that even tries to solve this problem in Direct Realist terms. Hell, literally hte best-known and respected proponent of Direct Realism has to (literally) hand-wave away the problems of perception, claims to be a Direct Realist, then gives an intentionalist account of perception, while utterly and completely overlooking the lack of connection between object and experience. It isn't even touched.

(ala Searle above, is the reference to make sense of this part)Ironically, one of his biggest arguments is the exact same as mine above - except he is so obviously wrong in his own terms, its hard to understand why this book is around.

"The reason we feel an urge to put sneer quotes around “see” when we describe hallucinatory “seeing” is that, in the sense of intentionality, in such cases we do not see anything. If I am having a visual hallucination of the book on the table, then literally I do not see anything."

This is him making the mistake he's arguing everyone else makes.

"This shift is to move from the object-directed intentionality of the perceptual experience to treating the visual experience itself as the object of visual consciousness. I do indeed have a conscious experience when I see the table, but the conscious experience is of the table. The conscious experience is also an entity, but it is not the object of perception; it is indeed the experience itself of perceiving. [...]"

This is not only counter to what actually happens in perception, it is clearly an attempt to escape from the problem of conscious experience qua experience and instead substitute in it's place the 'perception of an object'. Which is not an experience, and he admits is not a constituent of experience - yet advocates speaking as if that's the case.