Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said...but, that's because this isn't the agenda of the work, despite discussing many relevant positivist ideas, and problems. — 013zen

That suggests you agree with Russell in a way that I do not. Russell says:

The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts. Given the syntax of language, the meaning of a sentence is determined as soon as the meaning of the component words is known. In order that a certain sentence should assert a certain fact there must, however the language may be constructed, be something in common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of Mr. Wittgenstein’s theory. That which has to be in common between the sentence and the fact cannot, he contends, be itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be shown, not said, for whatever we may say will still need to have the same structure. — ibid.

The text does not support this addition to the thesis. The portion I quoted brings the "same structure" idea into question.

I hope this helps. — 013zen

It doesn't. You make a distinction between the world as pictures in the mind and reality not being pictures in the mind.

A proposition is a picture of reality.

(4.021)

What do you find in the text regarding pictures that is true of the world but not true of reality? Wheren does he make a distinction between the pictures of the world being in the mind and pictures of reality not being in the mind?

From that perspective, Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said... — 013zen

Of course we can make statements about ethics and aesthetics, but we cannot compare them to the facts of the world in order to determine whether they are true or false. They are outside the bounds of logic.

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

(6.42)

What can be said are the propositions of science. The only proper propositions are those that say something about the way things are in the world, that is, matters of fact. Ethics and aesthetics are not matters of fact. They say nothing about the world. Treating them the way we treat propositions leads only to confusion and fallacy. This does not mean that ethics and aesthetics and unimportant, but that they are so important that we should not regard them as something other than they are.

I'll accept that defense, thank you for the insight. I decided to pick up the text and got an audiobook of it also. Would you say Wittgenstein was attempting to bridge the gap between the disciplines of science and philosophy?

Not quite, I'm here to learn, not debate. Zen's insight was enough of a glimmer to find a path I could get behind. A simple deflection isn't going to convince someone who has a healthy skepticism now will it? Thanks for the SEP post by the way. The replies to it were actually more interesting but without it, you and zen wouldn't have had that little exchange.

That suggests you agree with Russell in a way that I do not. Russell says: — Paine

I apologize, I must have been unclear in my writing. I was trying to say that, from Russell's perspective, such seems to be the case. I do not agree with Russell on this point.

It doesn't. You make a distinction between the world as pictures in the mind and reality not being pictures in the mind. — Fooloso4

So, this all depends on what we take Witt to mean by "logical space". Where or what is logical space?

For this, I draw on Frege's writing in "The Thought" wherein he wants to say that there are ideas, such as for example Pythagoras' theorem which is true regardless of what anyone thinks about the theorem, and seems to exist in its own space, therefore. It can exist in the mind, and form the content of thought, but is in some sense mind independent without being a "part" of reality.

I think Witt has a similar conception. Logical space is like the the common playing field of thoughts, without being tied to any individual instance of thought.

I can, for instance, imagine a purple pig dancing the macarena while smoking a joint, and despite existing in my mind at the moment, its possibility lies in logical space prior to the thought. Someone else can have the same thought, or may have already had the same thought before me; it isn't a genuine creation of my mind, but it is instantiated in my mind.

Pictures and the world exist in the logical space...they mirror the logic of reality, but they are distinct from it and exist separate from it.

What do you find in the text regarding pictures that is true of the world but not true of reality? — Fooloso4

"What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner rightly or falsely is its form of representation" (2.17).

The only commonality between pictures which compose the world, and reality, is the logical form of the picture and the state of affairs it is a picture of.

Wheren does he make a distinction between the pictures of the world being in the mind and pictures of reality not being in the mind? — Fooloso4

This is tangled.

The world is made up of pictures, and those pictures are pictures of possible or actual reality. The world, is a possible picture of reality.

There are not "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality", with one being in the mind and the other not.

Would you say Wittgenstein was attempting to bridge the gap between the disciplines of science and philosophy? — DifferentiatingEgg

It depends on what you mean by "attempting to bridge the gap".

Witt is quite clear that he considers Science as an activity involved in one type of business, and philosophy another activity....he does believe, however, that the activity of philosophy can, if anything, be helpful to the activity of science, without taking part in the activity of science itself. The relationship is mutually beneficial, but each is doing their own thing.

"Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.
(The word 'philosophy' must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences)" (4.111).

"The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity...

Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the
thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred." (4.112)

"Philosophy limits the disputable sphere of natural science" (4.113)

not sure how to delete a post but it posted a few times

Sure, sounds like Wittgenstein's approach is more of a style of marriage between science and philosophy, where as Russell and the others were more in the line of trying to make a baby out of science and philosophy?

They say nothing about the world. Treating them the way we treat propositions leads only to confusion and fallacy. This does not mean that ethics and aesthetics and unimportant, but that they are so important that we should not regard them as something other than they are. — Fooloso4

I agree with this. What originally got me interested in Witt many, many, moons ago was my BA thesis on Wittgenstein's ethics. It's clear that Witt considered ethical considerations important, but academically stale.

As you say, he suggests that the common theme of treating "the good" as an adjective, or something to discover about the world is entirely wrong headed, and leads to confusion.

The ethical dimensions of the Tractatus have always been of interest to me, especially considering the letter Witt wrote to Von Ficker wherein he identifies the purpose of the work as "ethical".

↪013zen Sure, sounds like Wittgenstein's approach is more of a style of Marriage between Science and Philosophy, where as Russell and the others were more of trying to make a baby out of Science and Philosophy? — DifferentiatingEgg

The discussion is centered around the ancient distinction between science and metaphysics, with the latter being the domain of philosophy.

Aristotle said we engage in philosophy to explain why things happen, as opposed to science which explains how they happen.

Bacon, calling philosophy and metaphysics the "handmaiden" of the sciences calls attention to this relation, and sets to set up philosophy in a manner which can be truly helpful to science.

Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, etc all trying to establish this agenda at different times in their projects, set out to establish a course for philosophy wherein one could derive genuine metaphysical knowledge.

Russell and others came in after this, and were concerned with the same project. They thought philosophy should mirror the rigor and style of mathematics, whereby things could be "proven" true.

Witt, I think is commenting on this, saying that this conception of the relationship is wrongheaded. Philosophy can only aid the sciences by clarifying what science provides us. It can't, on its own, tells us what's true.

So, to summarize, I take Russell and other's approach to the relationship between science and philosophy to be constructive in their conceptions. They thought philosophy could provide insights that go above and beyond science. Witt takes the relation to be more interpretive; philosophy can only help clarify thoughts for scientists.

Logical space is like the the common playing field of thoughts, without being tied to any individual instance of thought. — 013zen

Logic underlies both thought and the world. Logic is prior to, independent of, and the transcendental condition for them.

The only commonality between pictures which compose the world, and reality, is the logical form of the picture and the state of affairs it is a picture of. — 013zen

The pictures do not compose the world. The world is not a collection or arrangement of pictures. The pictures of the world are pictures of reality made possible by the logical structure underlying both the picture and the world, that is, the picture and reality.

The world is made up of pictures — 013zen

The world is not made up of pictures. Nowhere does Wittgenstein say this.

The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

(1.1)

A fact is not a picture, although a picture can picture a fact.

The world, is a possible picture of reality. — 013zen

The world is not a possible picture.

The world is all that is the case.

(1)

All that is the case is not a picture of what might be the case.

There are not "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality", with one being in the mind and the other not. — 013zen

Isn't that what you said?

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. — 013zen

The pictures do not compose the world. The world is not a collection or arrangement of pictures. The pictures of the world are pictures of reality made possible by the logical structure underlying both the picture and the world, that is, the picture and reality. — Fooloso4

I agree that pictures don't compose the world. Wittgenstein's picture theory is composed of thought and propositions, thought (we picture facts to ourselves, and a logical picture is a thought T. 2.2 and 3) being the precursor to the proposition. All propositions are possible pictures of facts in the world. True propositions are pictures of actual facts, as opposed to possible facts. The logical structure of both the proposition and the world of facts provide the impetus for his picture theory.

The world is not made up of pictures. Nowhere does Wittgenstein say this. — Fooloso4

Witt tells us that:

“The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts” (1.11).

“The facts in logical space are the world” (1.13).

So, all of the facts, IN logical space constitute the world. But, in what sense is a fact in logical space?
Well, later Witt says:

“We make to ourselves pictures of facts” (2.1).
“The picture presents the facts in logical space” (2.11)

So, here there is a distinction being made between “facts” and “pictures of facts”. The latter presents facts in logical space, and thereby constitute the world.

A fact itself cannot be presented in logical space, only pictures of facts can be presented in logical space.

There are not "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality", with one being in the mind and the other not.
— 013zen

Isn't that what you said?

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind.
— 013zen — Fooloso4

No, read the two comments carefully. In the former, there are two concepts: "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality" with one being in the mind and the other not being in the mind. I do not adopt this view.

There are only pictures of reality presented in the mind. These picture, in the mind, constitute the world.

The latter presents facts in logical space, and thereby constitute the world. — 013zen

What do you mean by constitute? The world is not made up of pictures. The world and pictures of it are not the same thing. Analogously, you and a picture of you are not the same thing. If they were then you could be in two or more places at the same time, depending on the number of pictures.

You asked:

Which distinction? — 013zen

To which I responded:

Between the world as pictures in the mind and reality as not made up of pictures in our mind. — Fooloso4

Here is your original claim:

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. — 013zen

The first claim is wrong. The world is not made up of pictures. The second claim is correct, reality is not made up of pictures, but, as I pointed out:

A proposition is a picture of reality.

(4.021)

Both the world and reality are pictured. Whatever distinction you are trying to make between them, that distinction cannot be based on pictures.

What do you mean by constitute? — Fooloso4

What else could I possibly mean by constitute? :razz: And, your next response shows that you take my meaning.

The world is not made up of pictures. — Fooloso4

You just disagree.

I gave quotes which seem to suggest that the world is, in fact, made up of pictures. Let's talk a bit about them.

We both can agree that in the Tract, the world is composed, or constituted by all the facts in logical space.

1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.

Witt, later says:

""We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (2.1).
"The picture presents the facts in logical space" (2.11)

So, the facts in logical space that make up the world are presented in logical space by pictures.

A fact, can only "exist" in logical space and present the world insofar as it is a picture.

I'm interested to hear what your take on the relation between:

1. Reality
2. Facts
3. Pictures
4. The world

How does it all coherently fit together and to what purpose?

What else could I possibly mean by constitute? — 013zen

You could possibly mean:

be (a part) of a whole.
make up, form, compose
found
establish
to be or be considered as something

You just disagree. — 013zen

I do disagree, but gave you a chance to clarify what you meant. The world is not "pictures in the mind". A picture and what is pictured are not one and the same.

So, the facts in logical space that make up the world are presented in logical space by pictures. — 013zen

Your use of the term 'presented' is ambiguous. There is a difference between phenomena as what shows or presents itself and what is or can be presented in a picture. What is presented "by" pictures are not the facts themselves that are presented in the picture. The picture re-presents what is pictured. It is an image of it. Your toe does not hurt in a picture of you stubbing your toe.

A fact, can only "exist" in logical space and present the world insofar as it is a picture. — 013zen

There are no illogical facts. Facts are what is the case. If the book is on the table then it is the case, a fact, that the book is on the table. A statement of fact "the book is on the table" is not the fact that the book is on the table. A statement of fact is a picture of the fact. The fact itself, the book is on the table, is not a picture. If we want to read the book we do not find it in a picture.

I do disagree, but gave you a chance to clarify what you meant. — Fooloso4

I see now what you meant; I was just confused because I had already been attempting to clarify all along the way :sweat:

At any rate, yes, you disagree...and I can appreciate your perspective, I'm just not certain that its correct. I don't outright disagree with you, however. You make some claims that I agree with. For example, you said:

What is presented "by" pictures are not the facts themselves that are presented in the picture. The picture re-presents what is pictured. It is an image of it. — Fooloso4

I agree with this. This is the same in my view.

I previously said:

“We make to ourselves pictures of facts” (2.1).
“The picture presents the facts in logical space” (2.11)

So, here there is a distinction being made between “facts” and “pictures of facts”. — 013zen

We both make the distinction between facts, and pictures which re-present the facts.

Something I disagree with, is when you say:

Your use of the term 'presented' is ambiguous. — Fooloso4

If you read the comment, I am only using the term insofar as I am quoting the text wherein Witt uses the expression "presented" here:

"The picture presents the facts in logical space" (2.11)

So, while I understand that you disagree with me that the world is made up of pictures, we need to somehow make sense of the fact that:

1. Fact in logical space make up the world
2. Facts are presented in logical space by pictures

What I take Witt to be saying is: The fact is re-presented as pictures in logical space. An exhaustive collection of all the facts re-presented in logical space, as pictures, form the world.

If you read the comment, I am only using the term insofar as I am quoting the text wherein Witt uses the expression "presented" here:

"The picture presents the facts in logical space" (2.11) — 013zen

You say more than that:

a)

The world is made up of pictures in our mind ... — 013zen

and:

b)

A fact, can only "exist" in logical space and present the world insofar as it is a picture. — 013zen

a) Wittgenstein does not say that the picture that presents the facts is something in the mind

b) A fact does not present the world. The picture presents the facts.

... we need to somehow make sense of the fact that:

1. Fact in logical space make up the world
2. Facts are presented in logical space by pictures — 013zen

1. Wittgenstein is making a distinction between facts and things or objects. The world is all that is the case. Facts and not things determine what is and is not the case. That a thing can exist in a state of affairs is not accidental. The possibility of it occurring in states of affairs is necessary. This necessity is logical necessity. The space in which it occurs is logical space.

2. The logical structure underlying both the facts and the pictures of the facts is what makes it possible for pictures to present the facts.

An exhaustive collection of all the facts re-presented in logical space, as pictures, form the world. — 013zen

The pictures do not form the world. The facts do. The facts exist even if they are not pictured.

That suggests you agree with Russell in a way that I do not. Russell says:
— Paine

I apologize, I must have been unclear in my writing. I was trying to say that, from Russell's perspective, such seems to be the case. I do not agree with Russell on this point. — 013zen

When you said:

Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said...but, that's because this isn't the agenda of the work, despite discussing many relevant positivist ideas, and problems. — 013zen

Do you agree with Bertie that Witt disregarded his own statements?

For my part, I disagree with a particular observation made by Russell:

That which has to be in common between the sentence and the fact cannot, he contends, be itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be shown, not said, for whatever we may say will still need to have the same structure. — ibid. emphasis mine

Russell is reading an isomorphic mirroring where Wittgenstein is not. The problem is not with correspondence between separated items but the nature of representation. Before propositions are discussed in Tractatus, depictions are observed from different points of view.

One feature of the following statements is that they condition each other as well as build to a larger argument.

2.151. What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

2.141. A picture is a fact.

2.151. Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.

2.1511. That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.

2.172. A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it. — ibid.

The mutual conditioning here is important because taking "a picture is a fact" out of context would seem to collapse the difference between the depiction and what is depicted. But the limit to depicting a "pictorial form" restores the distance from "reality." The act of making pictures is one of the events that happen. The problem is that we lack the vantage point to make a picture of making a picture using that process. The statement is not reversible, allowing one to say: "a fact is a picture." Saying that would void the quality of "reaching out" to what it is not. Observations like these are explicit claims by Wittgenstein of "expressiveness" and not a resort to mysticism as Russell describes.

Stating what cannot be represented qualifies all the assertions about what can be. Talking about "possibility" keeps returning to the limits of what the argument can uncover. The following are examples of this boundary:

4.0312. The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives.
My fundamental idea is that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts. — ibid.

4.12. Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form.
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world. — ibid.

4.121. Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it. — ibid.

It can be (and has been) argued that articulating the boundary in this way is a paradoxical attempt to stand both "inside" and "outside" the world despite arguing it cannot be done. But that aspect is quite different from Russell's suggestion that ideas banned from entering through the front door are sneaking in through the back.

Wittgenstein does not say that the picture that presents the facts is something in the mind. — Fooloso4

I would go further and say that Wittgenstein is opposed to the framework of things in themselves versus things for us.

Kant's depiction of intuitions, as the portal of experiencing what exists, can be imagined as a condition of the person. In the Tractatus, the vivacity of perception is expressed as an observation that does not require that set of assumptions:

3.1. In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. — ibid.

I would go further and say that Wittgenstein is opposed to the framework of things in themselves versus things for us. — Paine

I agree. The discussion of the cube at 5.5423 is instructive:

This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts.

Facts are separate from and independent of our perception of them.

Sorry for the late reply. Work has been busy, lately, and I've needed time to parse your comment. Truthfully, however, it has still been quite difficult to determine, exactly, why we're at loggerheads. With that being said, I believe it's regarding how we are interpreting the notion of "logical space".

As you point out:

a) Wittgenstein does not say that the picture that presents the facts is something in the mind — Fooloso4

I agree that he does not explicitly say this; this is how I am making sense of the notion of "logical space". Would you admit that there is a clear distinction being made between, on the one hand:

1. Pictures - in logical space
2. Facts - not in logical space

b) A fact does not present the world. The picture presents the facts. — Fooloso4

I do not disagree with this.

A Picture does present the facts, in logical space. A fact, is simply that, a fact. It is a fact, for example, that I am typing this comment. That fact does not exist in logical space, it just is...it can, however, be pictured in logical space, and the picture is what presents the fact.

The space in which it occurs is logical space. — Fooloso4

And where is that space, exactly? It's certainly not physical reality. Physical reality is only what is the case, namely positive atomic facts.

1. Wittgenstein is making a distinction between facts and things or objects. The world is all that is the case. Facts and not things determine what is and is not the case. That a thing can exist in a state of affairs is not accidental. The possibility of it occurring in states of affairs is necessary. This necessity is logical necessity. — Fooloso4

I don't disagree with your main points, you and I have similar understandings, which isn't wholly strange...but, I find your point here a bit muddled, and doesn't appreciate the depth of the notion of logical space. Let me see if I can explain...

There are three things that are pointed out about facts:

1. They determine what is and what is not the case.
2. The existence of a fact means the existence of an atomic fact.
3. The world is determined by them.

When you say:

"That a thing can exist in a state of affairs is not accidental. The possibility of it occurring in states of affairs is necessary. This necessity is logical necessity" — Fooloso4

You are conflating facts and atomic facts. The possibility of a thing occurring in an atomic fact is a logical necessity.

Note that Witt says that the existence of a fact means the existence of an atomic fact.

Later, he says:

"The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality.
(The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact,
their non-existence a negative fact.)" (2.06)

This is important. Reality, is the existence and non-existence of atomic facts, while the world is only the existence of an atomic fact.

This is because the world is limited in a manner that reality is not. The world, that is determined is determined by a possible arrangements of objects. But reality is made up of only what obtains. This is because, you cannot know, for example, that I am not a sophisticated a.i. that you've been conversing with this whole time.

Your view fails to appreciate the common sense aspects of Witt's view without being - in my opinion - wholly wrong. But, by understanding the distinction between on the one hand, reality, and on the other the world, you see that reality isn't determined by facts it is all facts...positive and negative. The world, however, is determined by positive facts, things we've experienced, and with it comes all possibilities left open to it. But, reality, is simply what is and isn't.

Logical space is the playing field of those possibilities, but they are lacking insofar as epistemologically it gets us only possible knowledge.

2. Facts - not in logical space — 013zen

All facts are in logical space.

The facts in logical space are the world.

(1.13)

Logic underlies and makes possible both fact and pictures or representation of facts.

2. The existence of a fact means the existence of an atomic fact. — 013zen

'Atomic fact' is an infelicitous translation from the Ogden translation.

The Pears/McGuinness has:

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.(2)

In German "das Bestehen von Sachverhalten".

The term'Sachverhalt' simply means a fact, what is the case, a state of affairs, not an atomic fact.

This is important. Reality, is the existence and non-existence of atomic facts, while the world is only the existence of an atomic fact. — 013zen

This distinction does not hold:

The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)

For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case. (1.12)

The sum-total of reality is the world. (2.063)

All facts are in logical space. — Fooloso4

What is the point, on your reading, of telling us:

"We make to ourselves pictures of facts.
The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and non-existence of atomic facts" (2.1-2.11).

That it is pictures of facts that present those facts in logical space, if the facts are already in logical space?

and why does this comment immediately follow:

"The total reality is the world" (2.063).

Right after Witt tells us:

1. Reality is the existence and non-existence of atomic facts
2. The world is only existent atomic facts

Logic underlies and makes possible both fact and pictures or representation of facts. — Fooloso4

I don't disagree with this.

'Atomic fact' is an infelicitous translation from the Ogden translation.

The Pears/McGuinness has:

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.(2)

In German "das Bestehen von Sachverhalten".

The term 'Sachverhalt' simply means a fact, what is the case, a state of affairs, not an atomic fact. — Fooloso4

I agree that the there is a certain complication caused due to the fact that one translator heavily uses the expression: State of affairs while the the other uses Atomic facts. But, whether you translate it as one or the other, it still is the case that a fact, which is what is the case, breaks down into something simpler which has the role we are speaking of- namely the logical necessity of the object being a part of it. A fact does not have this necessity - it's objects and their relations are merely accidental.

The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)

Yes, they do determine the world, but they do not make up the world. Pictures do, and insofar as pictures are pictures of facts, the facts ultimately determine the world.

Again, we don't disagree on many core points - I don't think...we disagree over the role of logical space and its location as opposed to the role of reality.

Witt is thinking, I believe, of the realist/idealist/, empiricist/rationalist debate.

On the one hand, we have reality, and on the other we have our "picture" of reality. What bridges that gap? Well, I think Witt's answer is the logical relations.

Witt is thinking, I believe, of the realist/idealist/, empiricist/rationalist debate. — 013zen

He denigrates that distinction in the Tractatus and in the Philosophical Investigations. It is one of the persisting themes preserved from the early works and carried on into the later ones.

That it is pictures of facts that present those facts in logical space, if the facts are already in logical space? — 013zen

The facts are in the world.(1.13) A picture of the facts is in the world. The picture represents a possible situation (2.202) What is represented, however, may not be in the world.

Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.

(6.375)

That it is possible to picture the world is a logical possibility.

What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.

(5.4731)

Put differently, thought too is in logical space.

A fact does not have this necessity - it's objects are their relations are merely accidental. — 013zen

The structure of a fact is not accidental. That some facts exist and others do not is accidental.

In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.

The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)

Yes, they do determine the world, but they do not make up the world. Pictures do, and insofar as pictures are pictures of facts, the facts ultimately determines the world. — 013zen

If I want to eat, a picture is not going to do the job. You do not make up a pizza from pictures of dough and cheese. This seems so obvious that I think you must mean something else, but I can't figure out what that is.

Witt is thinking, I believe, of the realist/idealist/, empiricist/rationalist debate. — 013zen

I am reminded of something Wittgenstein said:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight

[CV, p. 47].

Shoes that are too tight make it difficult to walk. The language used by philosophers make it difficult to think.

Thank you for the comment.

I'd appreciate some quotes from the Tractatus that shows that this is, in fact, the case.

I know that Witt mentions "idealism" once, in direct reference to Kant's manner of thinking, suggesting that it won't do. But, he offers an alternative which is exactly what I am referring to. He critiques the notion that we see reality through some predetermined form of space, that we bring to bear upon the the experience. He critiques it because logically, this lacks the correct "multiplicity". It fails to account for different spatial relations that we encounter. If there were no space out there in reality, and we were just wearing "glasses" that tinted what we experienced, there wouldn't be inherently distinct spatial relations, which there clearly are.

Again, what bridges the gap and ties our experience to reality? Logic. There must be the correct logical multiplicity between pictures I make of facts, and those things out there in reality. Of this, I can be certain.

At any rate, I don't see any direct denigration of the distinction made in the work, but I could be mistaken.

If I want to eat, a picture is not going to do the job. You do not make up a pizza from pictures of dough and cheese. This seems so obvious that I think you must mean something else, but I can't figure out what that is. — Fooloso4

Correct lol That's why there is a distinction between "The world" and "reality". In reality, I make my pizza out of dough and cheese xD In logical space, however, I can picture the process of making a pizza, without it actually obtaining in reality.

At any rate, again reading through your comments I am stricken by similar thoughts:

1. We don't disagree on much
2. I am having trouble parsing out, exactly, why we are disagreeing besides how we are interpreting logical space.

3. I do disagree with certain manners you characterize things.

Like, you're seemingly outright conflating the world and reality, and having the world do all the work. Perhaps, if you told me more about what work you think

A) the world does
B)Reality does

I feel like we are talking past each other on some things, but I could be wrong. I'm having difficulty parsing why you make certain points in response to my points.

Does that make sense?

Idk perhaps I'm dense lol

In logical space, however, I can picture the process of making a pizza, without it actually obtaining in reality. — 013zen

In your imagination you can make this pizza, but this pizza does not exist in the world. It is not real.

Like, you're seemingly outright conflating the world and reality, — 013zen

In order to conflate them there must be some pertinent distinction that is not understood. I do not see how or where Wittgenstein makes such a distinction. It is a distinction you impose on the text.

When he says:

Reality is compared with propositions.

(4.05)

he is talking about the propositions of natural science, that is, propositions about the world. Propositions about what is the case. Facts.