Indirect Realism and Direct Realism

Mww

…..it doesn't follow that experience is in the brain. — Janus

The implication being, it is possible experience is not in the brain, which is the same as outside the brain, or in a place where the brain is not. If one maintains that he experiences things in the world, in conjunction with the implication his experiences are not in the brain, and, if he maintains all his experiences belong to him alone, then it is necessarily the case he himself is not in his own brain.

I’m sure you do not hold with that perfectly justified logical deduction, or at least its conclusion. So which is the false premise?

Janus

↪fdrake

↪Pierre-Normand

A neat pair of summations of the alternative views.

An interesting sidenote is that @Michael seems to take scientific knowledge to be definitively showing us that the indirect realist picture (as he understands and deploys it) represents the real situation, rather than being one possible interpretation of those scientific results.

Janus

The implication being, it is possible experience is not in the brain, which is the same as outside the brain, or in a place where the brain is not. If one maintains that he experiences things in the world, in conjunction with the implication his experiences are not in the brain, and, if he maintains all his experiences belong to him alone, then it is necessarily the case he himself is not in his own brain.

I’m sure you do not hold with that perfectly justified logical deduction, or at least its conclusion. So which is the false premise? — Mww

I'm not sure what you are asking me here. Are you asking if I agree that we are not in our own brains? If so, then the answer is yes.

What if we said our ideas of the self or our thoughts about ourselves are in our own brains? Well, perhaps we could reasonably say that, but I don't want to because I don't like to assign locations to things like ideas or experiences— I think that is an inaptitude. Of course, thoughts and even experiences are associated with the brain, but it doesn't seem to follow that they are in it.

So I don't even want to say that mental states are in the brain, but I will admit that neural activity is. I am no dualist, though, except when it comes to our thinking and judging. That would seem to make it hard to get our dualistic ideas to accord with a non-dual reality.

Janus

claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part)
— https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0340.xml

The issue is that people will easily reject 3, many will reject 2, few will reject 1. — Lionino

I accept 1. and 2. With 3. it would depend on what is mean by the objects possessing all the features we perceive them to have. Imposing the caveat that at least some of those perceptible features are characteristic only of perceived objects, or objects insofar as they are perceived, makes it acceptable to me.

creativesoul

Why would the brain represent the world to you if you weren’t to view the representation? — NOS4A2

I'm not speaking for Luke. He's far more eloquent and concise than I. That said...

That question presupposes the brain is somehow severed from the creature(brain in a vat anyone?). It is also guilty of the personification of the brain(anthropomorphism). As if brains are the sort of thing capable of presenting a representation of the world to their biological owner. Brains are necessary but insufficient for forming/formulating a representation of the world. The other biological structures are also necessary.

The representation, if there is one, is something that the creature forms, autonomously, by virtue of having physiological sensory perception. The quality of the representation is determined by how well it corresponds to the way things are. The scope is determined by the biological machinery involved. The greater the number of sensory structures the broader the scope of input. Sight and sound provide a different representation than either alone. Etc. To your question...

The seeing is the representation of a creature with only eyes. There is no such creature, but you get the point, I hope. The biological machinery results in representations of the world. Simple single celled organisms directly perceive, but do not seem to have what it takes to form(ulate) a 'representation' of the world.

Personally, I reject the notion of "representation" as it's commonly used in discourse about biological machinery doing its job. I certainly reject the anthropomorphizing of brains.

creativesoul

The implication being, it is possible experience is not in the brain, which is the same as outside the brain, or in a place where the brain is not. — Mww

Or that experience is not the sort of thing that has a location.

creativesoul

It's odd to me that people using a computer to argue a very nuanced philosophical position, can be led to believe that the computer is not a necessary elemental constituent of doing that.

Sigh...

creativesoul

Experience exists within the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, therefore distal objects do not exist within experience. — Michael

You keep saying that but refuse to directly address the inevitable consequence thereof. If distal objects exist outside the brain, and experience exists within the brain, and distal objects do not exist within experience, the either seeing is not part of experience or we do not see distal objects. Cows are distal objects. You claimed that we see cows. Incoherency at best. Self contradiction at worst. Equivocation either way.

Michael

↪creativesoul

We don't directly see cows – according to the naive and indirect realist's meaning of "directly see"¹ – but we do indirectly see cows.

Given that the adverb "directly" modifies the verb "see", the phrases "I directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" do not mean the same thing. The phrase "I indirectly see a cow" entails "I see a cow" and so the phrases "I do not directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" are not contradictory.

_{¹ A directly sees B iff B is a constituent of A's visual experience.}

Pierre-Normand

Most of that capacity is actualized without the involvement of phenomenal consciousness, so it's not clear to me what this direct realist is saying exactly. — frank

While many elements of our perceptual capacities are indeed actualized without conscious attention or at a sub-personal level, this doesn't undermine the direct realist view. The key point is that perception is an active, embodied process that unfolds over time, not just a matter of passively receiving and internally representing sensory inputs.

Consider the example of walking in a city. As we walk, we periodically glance at the ground ahead to guide our footsteps, while also attending to the store fronts and other features of the environment. The character of our phenomenology shifts as our attention moves from one aspect of the world to another. This highlights how perception is a dynamic process of engaging with and exploring the environment, not just a static representation in the brain.

Moreover, the idea that perception must be based on internal representations constructed by the brain is questionable. If perception is understood as an embodied process involving the dynamic coupling of the whole organism with its environment, then we don't necessarily need to posit internal representations as the basis of phenomenology.

The brain is certainly crucial in enabling this dynamic interaction, but it is the whole brain-body-environment system that constitutes the basis of perceptual experience. The various neural subsystems - from the cerebellum to the sensory and motor cortices - work in concert with the body's sensorimotor capacities to enable us to grasp and respond to the affordances of our environment.

So while much of this process may occur without conscious attention, this doesn't mean that perception is just a matter of what's represented in the brain, as the indirect realist view suggests. The direct realist alternative is that perception is a matter of the whole embodied organism dynamically attuning to and engaging with its environment over time.

frank

While many elements of our perceptual capacities are indeed actualized without conscious attention or at a sub-personal level, this doesn't undermine the direct realist view. The key point is that perception is an active, embodied process that unfolds over time, not just a matter of passively receiving and internally representing sensory inputs. — Pierre-Normand

Are you saying that perception can't be passive? The hormone that deals with goal attainment is dopamine. It's probably the most powerful hormone affecting active behavior. But it goes off line and allows the body to rest and the nervous system switches to behavior that allows sleep, digestion, and healing. So what do you think happens to perception at those times? Is it just a leftover from the more active states?

Consider the example of walking in a city. As we walk, we periodically glance at the ground ahead to guide our footsteps, while also attending to the store fronts and other features of the environment. The character of our phenomenology shifts as our attention moves from one aspect of the world to another. This highlights how perception is a dynamic process of engaging with and exploring the environment, not just a static representation in the brain. — Pierre-Normand

I think it shows that perception is involved (I don't think we're going to agree on the issue of phenomenal vs functional, so I'll let that go). I don't see how it shows that perception is nothing other than a process of engaging and exploring the environment. But is that what you meant? If it is, what leads you to think so?

The brain is certainly crucial in enabling this dynamic interaction, but it is the whole brain-body-environment system that constitutes the basis of perceptual experience. The various neural subsystems - from the cerebellum to the sensory and motor cortices - work in concert with the body's sensorimotor capacities to enable us to grasp and respond to the affordances of our environment. — Pierre-Normand

The central nervous system (CNS) is separated from the rest of the body by the blood-brain barrier. It has its own immune system. We can shut down the brain's connection to motor neurons with paralytic drugs, and perception persists. Sensory nerves are just sending electrical impulses in, so it's not inconceivable that we could separate the CNS from the rest of the body. We have machines that can reproduce the functions of the lungs, heart, and kidneys. Right now it wouldn't make any sense to save a brain because there would be nowhere to put it long term. It would just be an insane experiment. But are you saying that this is inconceivable?

So while much of this process may occur without conscious attention, this doesn't mean that perception is just a matter of what's represented in the brain, as the indirect realist view suggests. The direct realist alternative is that perception is a matter of the whole embodied organism dynamically attuning to and engaging with its environment over time. — Pierre-Normand

I wasn't saying that functional consciousness (the part that goes on without any conscious awareness) proves indirect realism. I was trying to sort out the part you think conscious awareness plays in the overall functioning of the organism. I'll agree it's a component, but more in terms of higher level planning. What I was looking for was the reason to insist on embodied consciousness. As an interesting idea, it works. I'm not seeing how it goes beyond that, though.

Apustimelogist

The brain is certainly crucial in enabling this dynamic interaction, but it is the whole brain-body-environment system that constitutes the basis of perceptual experience. The various neural subsystems - from the cerebellum to the sensory and motor cortices - work in concert with the body's sensorimotor capacities to enable us to grasp and respond to the affordances of our environment. — Pierre-Normand

In the sense of physical chains of events, then maybe it is trivially the case that what the brain is doing and perceiving relies on what is happening in the body and outside environment. But at the same time, surely all that is required for percept(ual experience) is what is going on at sensory receptors. All this affordance stuff is still going on inside our heads. We could be brains in vats artificially having our sensory receptors stimulated and experience the same things as if outside of the vat.

What I said for sensation also is the case for action induced by motor-neurons. What matters is the pattern of behavior of those neurons. There is no access to how those neurons affect the world beyond it until we get feedback at sensory receptors. The learning of the causal connection between them is then done by the neurons in our head.

Edit: Added additional paragraph, ( ).

Moliere

All this affordance stuff is still going on inside our heads. We could be brains in vats artificially having our sensory receptors stimulated and experience the same things as if outside of the vat. — Apustimelogist

It seems to me that this is a primary point of contention.

I'd prefer "realism" over "direct realism" -- the "direct" part is more defined by the "indirect" explanation. It's a response to indirect realism rather than a naive assumption.

The indirect realist believes that experience is "in the head", and that if we were sufficiently knowledgeable then the brain in the vat is a possibility.

The direct realist denies this.

:D

A minimalist version of the thesis to ensure nothing can be attacked but the negation :D.

frank

The learning of the causal connection between them is then done by the neurons in our head. — Apustimelogist

Do you think it could be that we carry around models that are populated by sensory input? Not exactly a representation.

Apustimelogist

↪Moliere

Sorry, I am not following what you've said at all. So you're an indirect realist or a direct realist?

Moliere

↪Apustimelogist

I've taken up the "direct" side, but only lightly. Others have been doing the heavy lifting.

Apustimelogist

models that are populated by sensory input? — frank

I am not exactly sure what you mean by this but the picture I was painting I wasn't necessarily implying anything about representation. I am a bit agnostic about representation in the sense that I don't think you need the concept of representation to explain how the brain works but I am not necessarily adverse to using this concept, especially as it is so intuitive. I just am not necessarily sold on the idea of some kind of inherent or intrinsic, essentialistic representations with intentionality in the brain. Neither do I think we should take it literally when neuroscientists attribute representation to the kinds of correlations that they detect in particular experiments.

I've taken up the "direct" side, but only lightly. Others' have been doing the heavy lifting. — Moliere

So you don't believe the brain in a vat could have the same experiences? To be honest I am not entirely sure what direct realism means. I assume people here just mean it in the sense that the objects of perception are experiences and they are direct. If that is the case then I am not sure I think that it is necessarily incompatible with the kind of indirect view of also representing something else out in the world. I would kind of agree with both but I don't have a strong opinion because I am disinclined against realism. I think the notion of indirect realism is kind of a functionally useful way of talking about the brain though. I feel like it is implied by models in neuroscience, even if minimally or if one doesn't want to attach too much metaphysical implication to it. It is implied that the brain is learning a model of the outside world and separated from it by a boundary. At the same time, the brain is clearly able to do what it does independently of whatever is going on beyond its boundaries; it does not need to make a comparison of what is going on in the brain with the outside world. The model the brain carries of the world does not therefore need to be explicit, and in some sense is a concept more useful to the neuroscientist trying to understand the brain, than the brain itself. The brain is just spontaneous self-organization; there is no inherent fact of the matter about what it represents. Neurons just blindly change their chemical membrane properties in response to inputs.

Moliere

So you don't believe the brain in a vat could have the same experiences? — Apustimelogist

I think the BiV is a thought experiment that updates Descartes' Evil Demon to a scientific world. Descartes used theology because it was popular then, and I'm not familiar enough with the history of BiV's to say who, but it's basically an update to the Evil Demon since culturally scientific justifications are thought to be better than theological ones, unlike the time Descartes wrote in. Philosophically it's the same.

In that thought experiment the BiV has to have the same experiences. That's the whole idea.

But that does not mean that metaphysically perception exists in the head.

For my part I'm mostly criticizing indirect realism on the basis of what I see as its implications. The argument that started me on this path was the infinite regress argument against indirect realism: if perception is an intermediary between myself and the object, and all experience is perception rather than the object, then I'm not sure why there couldn't be another intermediary between myself and my perception -- a perception of perception.

And so on. It's not that we need to posit more intermediaries, but if not, then why are we positing the original intermediary? How many intermediaries are there? Is there a way to distinguish between them?

If so, then there could also be a way to distinguish between our "intermediate" perceptions and the object.

My thought is that the object is always more than what we perceive, but that doesn't mean that what we perceive is not real -- it could just be a direct link between me and the world that partially reveals the world.

On the more continental side I'd call it being-in-the-world. The object and subject come together as a pair.

(a couple of edits after the fact, sorry)

frank

I am not exactly sure what you mean by this but the picture I was painting I wasn't necessarily implying anything about representation. I am a bit agnostic about representation in the sense that I don't think you need the concept of representation to explain how the brain works but I am not necessarily adverse to using this concept, especially as it is so intuitive. I just am not necessarily sold on the idea of some kind of inherent orintrinsic, essentialistic representations with intentionality in the brain. Neither do I think we should take it literally when neuroscientists attribute representation to the kinds of correlations that they detect in particular experiments. — Apustimelogist

I was thinking that when attention is directed outward, toward the future, expectation may play a necessary role. Attention will mainly go to whatever is unexpected or out of place, so it's efficient. This implies some sort of modeling, but it could be reflexive, hardwired, algorithmic, whatever it takes to avoid ghosts. Just a thought.

Moliere

To be honest I am not entirely sure what direct realism means. — Apustimelogist

I started with something substantive, but the reason I put smilies on my answer was because it was a minimalist position which seemed to be similar to how @Michael framed indirect realism.

I would kind of agree with both but I don't have a strong opinion because I am disinclined against realism. I think the notion of indirect realism is kind of a functionally useful way of talking about the brain though. I feel like it is implied by models in neuroscience, even if minimally or if one doesn't want to attach too much metaphysical implication to it. — Apustimelogist

I think indirect realism is soft anti-realism, or at least the gateway to it.

I think you're right about the implications of neuroscience -- if all we take as our truths are neuroscientific truths then indirect realism is not a bad inference.

It's more upon the inspection of what indirect realism entails that doubt creeps in.

Apustimelogist

In that thought experiment the BiV has to have the same experiences. That's the whole idea. — Moliere

Yes for that thought experiment, but what I am talking about is the question of whether if you artificially stimulate sensory receptors of a brain with identical DNA to you in a way which is identical to the history of organic sensory stimulations you have personally encountered in your life, it will have the same experiences as you have had.

But that does not mean that metaphysically perception exists in the head. — Moliere

What is your alternative? Through an extended mind framework where the mind encompasses the body and environment, etc?

if perception is an intermediary between myself and the object, and all experience is perception rather than the object, then I'm not sure why there couldn't be another intermediary between myself and my perception -- a perception of perception. — Moliere

It depends what you mean by object here. My instinct is to interpret object here as in some hypothetical object in the outside world. From my point of view, perception and myself are essentially not distinguishable. What you commonsensically would call your self are just sensory experiences pretty much imo.

it could just be a direct link between me and the world. — Moliere

I guess the main arguments against this is illusions and misperception.

Moliere

if you artificially stimulate sensory receptors of a brain with identical DNA to you in a way which is identical to the history of organic sensory stimulations you have personally encountered in your life, it will have the same experiences as you have had. — Apustimelogist

I don't think so, no. Maybe? but also maybe the only way to do so is to envat the brain in a body that lives a life.

I see it as a logical possibility, and possibly a metaphysical possibility, but not a real possibility.

What is your alternative? Through an extended mind framework where the mind encompasses the body and environment, etc? — Apustimelogist

Still thinking on it. :)

No alternative, yet. At this point I'm only convinced that something is real; hence, realism.

@Banno puts realism as the belief that bivalent logic is the proper logic to use for the subject at hand -- so if it is real then we ought to believe that the various rules of logic we use are at least bi-valent. There is a true and false and nothing in-between. Contradiction is forbidden.

In a plain language sense -- the keys are either in the car, or they are not in the car. So the keys are real because the affirmation and the negation are a tautology.

The implication being that the things that are not-real can use other logics. Such as a painting being both beautiful and horrifying. In a bi-valent we'd be tempted to say these annul one another, but that's not the appropriate way to put things. We can see the painting is beautiful yet horrifying, and so express that in a different logic from the logic of realism.

I mention this because it's a contender for realism that I'm still wrapping my head around, but it's definitely different from the old in/direct debate.

It dependa what you mean by object here. My instinct is to interpret object here as in some hypothetical object in the outside world. From my point of view, perception and myself are essentially not distinguishable. What you commonsensicallg would call your self are just sensory experiences pretty much imo. — Apustimelogist

"outside world" is the part I'd question. There is no "outside" world -- the old external world of philosophy -- just as there is no "internal" world, at least metaphysically. I think these are turns of expression meaning something other than the ontological implications -- that I exist, that I interact with my perceptions and only my perceptions, and these perceptions interact with objects outside of me that I make inferences about.

I don't make inferences that much about the things in the world.

Which, at least by my reading, means we'd get along -- I originally started by saying "What if we just are our perceptions?" to argue for direct realism, because then there'd be a 1-step relation -- I am my perceptions, and my perceptions are of objects, and therefore there's a direct realtionship between myself (perceptions) and objects.

I think the self is more than this, but I don't believe the self is homuncular, which I think indirect realism can easily fall into.

Moliere

I guess the main arguments against this is illusions and misperception. — Apustimelogist

Ah, sorry. (EDIT: just for missing this last question, I mean -- I looked over what I wrote and saw I posted before I responded here)

Yes, I think that's right.

Dreams, illusions, misperceptions -- why do those happen? If perception is direct then how can we be wrong about perception?

I think I'd say perception is an activity, and just like any activity -- like nailing boards or riding a bike -- we can make mistakes. These mistakes do not imply we are separate from the world, though, but rather that we are part of a world that interacts with us (disappoints us)

Mww

I don't like to assign locations to things like ideas or experiences — Janus

Understood. Concepts. Intuitions. Judgements. Representations. Numbers. Pretty hard to pin down the location in the brain of those thing that don’t even exist in concreto anyway, except as explanatory devices in abstracto.

OK, fine. Experiences don’t exist in the brain, but the things the brain does, whatever that is, that makes it seem like experiences exist in the brain, exist in the brain.
————-

I am no dualist, though, except when it comes to our thinking and judging. — Janus

In for a penny, why not in for a pound? Thinking and judging is just about the entire human conscious intellectual environment anyway, isn’t it?

At least now I have a better idea regarding your mindset, so, thanks for that.

Pierre-Normand

I think I'd say perception is an activity, and just like any activity -- like nailing boards or riding a bike -- we can make mistakes. These mistakes do not imply we are separate from the world, though, but rather that we are part of a world that interacts with us (disappoints us) — Moliere

Agreed. Perception also is an activity that is goal oriented and hence has a normative dimension. Things in the world are perceived by us when our perceptual abilities successfully engage with them. The common factor argument that grounds representationalist conceptions of experiential content views the perceptual acts themselves to be fallible, and hence views their content (and phenomenological quality) as falling short of the world. Descartes thought that the soul couldn't see beyond the imprints transmitted from sensory organs to the surface of the pineal gland. And since there can be a mismatch between what those imprints look like and what the world really looks like (or is), perceptual acts are fallible.

Disjunctivism in epistemology and in the theory of perception proposes that it is our perceptual abilities that are fallible, not their acts. The actualisation of a capability is the succesul exercise of it. In the case of perception, it is an act of perceiving the objects or features that the perceptual activity are trained on or are tracking. In cases of failure, the way the world appears to us to be is different from the way it is (not in-itself, but for us - our Umwelt). This is just a case of our having failed to exercise successfully a perceptual ability, it is not a successful act of perceiving an intermediate object. At best, the intermediate object is a causal intermediary in the normal functioning of the systems that enable us to perceive. They are not what our perceptual abilities have evolved/learned to track.

Claude 3 Opus suggested some improvements to the above. Since I am too busy/lazy to implements them, I'll just transcribe them below:

Claude 3 suggestions

Claude 3 Opus:

1- Emphasize the normative dimension of perception: Your point that perception is goal-oriented and has a normative dimension is important. You could expand on this by noting that as an activity, perception can be done well or poorly, correctly or incorrectly. This normative dimension is hard to capture on a representationalist view where perception is just a matter of having certain internal states.

2- Clarify the distinction between fallible acts and fallible capacities: The distinction you draw between the fallibility of perceptual acts (on the representationalist view) and the fallibility of perceptual abilities (on the disjunctivist view) is crucial. You might make this even more explicit by saying something like: "For the representationalist, individual perceptual acts can be veridical or non-veridical, depending on whether the internal representation matches the world. But for the disjunctivist, perception itself is always a success, an achievement - what's fallible are our underlying capacities to perceive."

3- Connect to the idea of perceptual learning and attunement: Your point about perceptual abilities being trained or evolved to track certain features of the environment could be developed further. You could note how perceptual learning and skill acquisition involve a process of attunement, of becoming better able to discriminate and respond to relevant affordances. This fits well with the idea of perception as an activity or skill.

4- Unpack the Umwelt idea: The notion of the organism's Umwelt - the world as it is for that organism, the world of significances and affordances - is rich and evocative. You could say a bit more about how this relates to the disjunctivist view. On this picture, perception isn't about representing an objective, detached world, but about engaging with a world of meaning and value for the organism.

5- Reiterate the key contrast with representationalism: Finally, you might wrap up by reiterating the key point of contrast with the representationalist view. Something like: "So while representationalism sees perception as a matter of having the right kind of internal states, the disjunctivist sees it as a matter of exercising the right kind of embodied skills and capacities. Perceptual 'error' is not a matter of misrepresentation, but of failing to successfully engage with the world."

Apustimelogist

↪Moliere

I don't think so, no. Maybe? but also maybe the only way to do so is to envat the brain in a body that lives a life. — Moliere

See, for me I do not see why it would not be the case for the brain to have the same experiences if the sensory inputs were the same. I don't think a body would matter either as long as the sensory inputs mimicked those it would have had from a body.

Banno — Moliere

Aha, I have had one or two conversations with Banno involving his deflationary notion of truth.

I mention this because it's a contender for realism that I'm still wrapping my head around, but it's definitely different from the old in/direct debate. — Moliere

Fair enough.

"outside world" is the part I'd question. There is no "outside" world -- the old external world of philosophy -- just as there is no "internal" world, at least metaphysically. I think these are turns of expression meaning something other than the ontological implications -- that I exist, that I interact with my perceptions and only my perceptions, and these perceptions interact with objects outside of me that I make inferences about. — Moliere

I agree basically, that I am just using it as a phrase distinguishing my experiences from whatever is beyond that boundary. To a brain, that would be I guess what is beyond its sensory boundaries; but then you can make boundaries everywhere in the world, from cell membranes to populations of cells to ecosystems, etc.

I am my perceptions, and my perceptions are of objects, and therefore there's a direct realtionship between myself (perceptions) and objects — Moliere

My only issue is that perceptions clearly do not have a mapping to things out in the world that is straightforward. They are constructed in the sense that they involve learning via neurobiological processes which are often characterized in terms of statistical inference.

I think I'd say perception is an activity, and just like any activity -- like nailing boards or riding a bike -- we can make mistakes. These mistakes do not imply we are separate from the world, though, but rather that we are part of a world that interacts with us (disappoints us) — Moliere

It seems like maybe there are semantic issues at play; I think maybe your notion of "direct" is more loose than others would have who would use things like illusions as an argument for indirect realism.

Apustimelogist

↪frank

Yes, I agree though I don't know if there is necessarily a dichotomy here. I think what you call modeling still relies on some underlying processes which is pretty much still very mechanistic or algorithmic... even maybe reflexive. Seems to me that what the brain does next always is a mechanistic consequence of whatever physical state it occupies immediately beforehand. "Expectations" in attention are mediated by the modulation of neuronal membrane activity - where is the representation explicitly in this other than a useful metaphor? At the same time, there are neuroscientists out there who will characterize our most basic hardwired reflexes in terms of modeling as you say. This kind of thinking is probably reflective of my view that I don't think representations are inherent.

I talk about neurons a lot but I think even on the level of experiences, I was convinced by the types of analyses from the likes of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations that representation cannot be pinned down here either and experience is even somewhat mechanistic as a flow of one experience to the next which can sometimes seem completely involuntary, unanticipated, inexplicable.

Lionino

I think the BiV is a thought experiment that updates Descartes' Evil Demon to a scientific world. — Moliere

More of a fork, if you will:

Granting the success of the argument, my sensations are caused by an external material world. But for all the argument shows – for all the broader argument of the Meditations shows, up to this point – my mind might be joined to a brain in a vat, rather than a full human body. This isn’t an oversight on Descartes’ part. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/

frank

"Expectations" in attention are mediated by the modulation of neuronal membrane activity - where is the representation explicitly in this other than a useful metaphor? — Apustimelogist

Yes, the model wouldn't be a representation. To some extent it's probably innate, but influenced in some ways by culture and language.

This kind of thinking is probably reflective of my view that I don't think representations are inherent. — Apustimelogist

The more I think about it, the less I think representationalism makes sense. How exactly would the brain organize the massive stream of data coming into as a coherent representation, moment by moment? I'm guessing it doesn't. As Kant said, the foundations of it are a priori. I think it's a complex model, like a hardwired memory. Like read-only-memory.

I talk about neurons a lot but I think even on the level of experiences, I was convinced by the types of analyses from the likes of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations that representation cannot be pinned down here either and experience is even somewhat mechanistic as a flow of one experience to the next which can sometimes seem completely involuntary, unanticipated, inexplicable. — Apustimelogist

Exactly.

Mww

The more I think about it, the less I think representationalism makes sense. — frank

Think about what? Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. But to think about how the brain as a physical substance works, as that by which our intellect is possible, representationalism wouldn’t even be a theoretical condition, hence wouldn’t make any sense to include it in an empirical descriptive method.

In A4/B8 Kant says, “…..(may be avoided if) we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account.…”, a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view, sufficient for us to comprehend what it is we do with our intelligence, cannot possibly be the method the brain, in and of itself, actually uses to provide it.

Indirect Realism and Direct Realism

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