Indirect Realism and Direct Realism

Banno

,

The dispute between naive realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. That's not a grammatical dispute. — Michael

Here's a characterisation in grammatical terms: When one says one sees that there is a cow in the field over there, the direct realist says we can be referring to the cow, but the indirect realist says we can refer only to the sensation-of-cow, and must rely on some form of inference to talk about the cow-in-itself.

At issue is whether the word "cow" in "I see a cow" refers to the cow or the sensation-of-cow.

Anscombe, and I submit, Austin, say it can do either. Michael appears to claim that can only ever refer to the sensation-of-cow, and that further work is needed to ever talk about cows.

Banno

Which brings us again to the things lurking in the background here.

Oversimplified, Frege gets mentioned because of his separation of sense and denotation; what we might now call extension and intension, sense and reference. He introduced these in response to problems with substitution.

Anne believes that Venus is the morning star.
the morning star = the evening star.
Therefore, Anne believes that Venus is the evening star.

But Anne may believe no such thing.

This discussion runs in parallel with the discussion here, with indirect realism as the intensional description, direct realism as the extension.

"I see the cow in the field" if seen as direct, picks out the cow in the field. But if seen as only indirectly referring to the cow, is opaque. Hence Michael's insistence that one can see the cow without there being a cow.

Not unlike other issues involving other propositional attitudes... "I believe the cow is in the field"; "I hope the cow is in the field"; "I see the cow is in the field"?. And this of course goes to intentionality and hence to action.

Kripke and Donnellan put an end to some of this by showing us problems with the description theory of names. Their arguments can be rounded on Michael's idea that we infer the cow from our perceptions. Just as a description need not pick out the same individual in every possible world, our perceptions need not pick out the cow.

I'm sooting from the hip here, by way of showing some of the relations between this topic and various other philosophical problems.

And providing a pile of ammunition for folk who wish to shoot back.

But it might take the thread in new and interesting directions.

frank

Or if you are by yourself, you might come back tomorrow and puzzle as to if the smell has changed.
. — Banno

It's puzzling that I could have recognized the smell as something I'd experienced before. It might seem that the private language argument excludes this. The trick is to see that this conclusion is based on the notion that meaning is rule following. Kripke shows that it's not.

Banno

It's puzzling that I could have recognized the smell as something I'd experienced before. — frank

Well, here's the puzzle: did you recognise it, or just think you recognised it? Dejà vu?

You have no way to tell.

Hence, following a rule has to be public.

Kripke shows that it's not. — frank

Perhaps. That's another multifaceted issue. But all the more grist for the mill.

Pierre-Normand

Ordinary Objects Caveat: perceptual experiences are directly of ordinary mind-independent objects in the sense that mind-independent objects reliably cause percept properties to hold which intersubjectively count as each other. By this I don't mean that your red is identical to my red, but that if we both see the same apple, we can come to agree on whether it's red or not. For the dress, we can come to agree that it's either black and blue or gold and white.

[...]

I imagine, though please correct me if I'm wrong Pierre-Normand, that my ordinary objects caveat is similar to @Pierre-Normand's reference to Evans'. Though I come at it from the belief that there's good evidence perception - as well as its character - is socially mediated. — fdrake

Earlier, I've followed Jeff Speaks in characterising Evans, Wiggins and McDowell's accounts as forms of non-descriptive Fregeanism. Although Speaks speaks of theories of meaning, so to speak, (and he doesn't mention Wiggins,) such accounts apply to all singular modes of reference, including acts of perception and episodic memories deriving from encounters with particular objects.

In his critique of descriptive Fregeanism, Kripke highlighted the modal character of the referential function of proper names (which makes them rigid designators). In order to account for this specific modal character, Kripke proposed his causal theory of reference (while denying that it was a theory!) Non-descriptive Fregean accounts build on Kripke's causal theory in a way that makes them less vulnerable to deviant causal chains and better accounts for the active role that agents play in securing reference for their mental acts. Those theories also incorporate Putnam's ideas about the linguistic division of labor and his prototype theory of the semantics of natural kind terms. On that view, referring to particular objects is more akin to applying a technique securing intersubjective agreement about the references of singular thought and singular terms (and natural kind terms, etc.) than it is reliably being caused to enjoy percepts. Thanks to the division of linguistic labor, blind people also are able to express singular thoughts about objects (or secondary qualities) that they wouldn't be able to recognise perceptually. But it is indeed the linguistic calibration of 'percepts' (how people are typically being affected by the sensory experience of specific objects or qualities) that accounts for the intersubjective, socially mediated, character of perception.

Sonnet suggestions

Claude 3 Sonnet:

A few thoughts:

1. Your characterization of these accounts as forms of "non-descriptive Fregeanism" that build on Kripke's causal theory of reference is clear and helpful context. Highlighting how they aim to avoid the issues with descriptive theories while still capturing the modal character of reference is a valuable framing.

2. Explaining how these views incorporate ideas from Putnam on the division of linguistic labor and prototype theory is also illuminating. It shows how they go beyond just causal chains to account for the active, socially-mediated processes involved in securing reference.

3. Your point about how these accounts apply not just to theories of meaning but to all singular modes of reference, including perception and memory, is an important generalization. It highlights the broad scope of these philosophical frameworks.

4. The way you contrast referring to objects through the application of intersubjective techniques vs. merely being caused to enjoy percepts is a nice articulation of the key distinction between these views and more passive, causal accounts of perception.

5. Bringing in the example of how blind people can still express singular thoughts about objects they cannot perceive directly is a great illustration of the socially-mediated, linguistically-calibrated nature of reference on these accounts.

A few potential areas for further elaboration or clarification:

1. You could say a bit more about how the non-descriptive Fregean accounts specifically handle the "active role that agents play in securing reference for their mental acts." What is the proposed mechanism or process by which agents play this active role?

2. It might be helpful to unpack a bit more what you mean by the "linguistic calibration of 'percepts'" and how this accounts for the intersubjective character of perception. Are you suggesting that our perceptual experiences themselves are shaped by linguistic practices, or just our ability to refer to and communicate about those experiences? [Note by Pierre-Normand: Both. Think of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis!]

3. You could potentially draw a tighter connection between the ideas you're discussing and fdrake's specific point about perception being "directly of ordinary mind-independent objects" and the intersubjective agreement about properties like color. How do the non-descriptive Fregean accounts shed light on this issue of direct realism and the objectivity of perceived qualities?

Overall, though, this is a rich and substantive response that situates the key ideas within a broader philosophical context. The density is appropriate given the complexity of the issues, and fdrake's familiarity with Evans should allow him to follow your analysis.

Michael

Naive realists claim that “visual experience” includes distal objects among its constituents. Indirect realists claim that “visual experience” does not include distal objects among its constituents. Therefore, both groups mean something different by “visual experience”. — Luke

They mean the same thing by "visual experience" but disagree on what constitutes it.

Taken from What’s so naïve about naïve realism?

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).

...

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

It is important to note the distinction between naive realism and intentionalism. The former argues that distal objects are constituents of experience and the latter that distal objects cause experience, where each group means the same thing by "experience".

Given that you have said such things as "perceptual experience is a representation" and "we cannot directly perceive distal objects as they are in themselves" you reject naive realism. This rejection of naive realism is the substance of indirect realism, even if you disagree with the grammar of "we see representations".

But as has been said before, arguing over the grammar of "we see mental phenomena" is a confusion and a red herring. It's not the case that either we experience mental phenomena or we experience distal objects. There are just different meanings of the word "experience" such that both are correct depending on the meaning being used, e.g. "I feel pain" and "I feel the fire".

Michael

Michael appears to claim that can only ever refer to the sensation-of-cow — Banno

No I don't. We can refer to things that we don't directly experience, e.g. Hitler and dark matter.

But this dispute has nothing to do with language. Consider that we are all deaf, illiterate mutes. Naive realists claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of our experience and indirect realists claim that they're not.

Luke

They mean the same thing by "visual experience" but disagree on what constitutes it. — Michael

I could equally say that direct and indirect realists mean the same thing by "I see X" but disagree on what constitutes X.

Given that you have said such things as "perceptual experience is a representation" and "we cannot directly perceive distal objects as they are in themselves" you reject naive realism and agree with the substance of indirect realism, even if you disagree with the grammar of "we see representations". — Michael

I do not agree with the substance of indirect realism. To reject naive realism is not necessarily to accept indirect realism. This is not a grammatical dispute over "we see representations". The claim "we see representations" is the substance of the dispute between direct and indirect realists. Indirect realists claim that we see representations, whereas direct realists claim that we do not see representations.

To say 'perceptual experience is a representation' (as I said), is not equivalent to saying 'we perceive representations' (as indirect realists claim). To say that the perceptual experience is a representation is not to say that the perceptual experience is the perceived object, or the thing seen. The representation is the seeing, not the thing seen.

Michael

The claim "we see representations" is the substance of the dispute between direct and indirect realists. Indirect realists claim that we see representations, whereas direct realists claim that we do not see representations. — Luke

What do you think "see" means? What do you think "feel" means?

Do I see colours? Are colours a mental phenomenon? Do I feel pain? Is pain a mental phenomenon?

Luke

Do I see colours? Are colours a mental phenomena? Do I feel pain? Is pain a mental phenomena? — Michael

Do I see distal objects? Do I feel distal objects when I touch them? Are distal objects a mental phenomena?

Michael

Do I see distal objects? Do I feel distal objects when I touch them? Are distal objects a mental phenomena? — Luke

Yes, we experience distal objects like cows. And we experience mental phenomena like colours and smells and tastes and pain.

This is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" is a confusion and a red herring. Both direct and indirect realist grammar is correct.

Luke

Yes, we experience distal objects like cows. And we experience mental phenomena like colours and smells and tastes and pain. — Michael

I asked whether we see distal objects. Why are you now talking about experience instead of seeing?

Michael

I asked whether we see distal objects. Why are you now talking about experience instead of seeing? — Luke

Because I'm including hearing and smelling and tasting and feeling. It's not all about sight.

Luke

Because I'm including hearing and smelling and tasting and feeling. It's not all about sight. — Michael

I never said it was all about sight. I asked whether we see distal objects.

Michael

I never said it was all about sight. I asked whether we see distal objects. — Luke

Yes, we see distal objects. And we see colours. We feel distal objects. And we feel pain. We smell distal objects. And we smell smells.

Pierre-Normand

And we feel pain. We smell cakes. And we smell smells. — Michael

Both of those seem to be especially amenable to an adverbial treatment. We do smell cakes but do we smell the smell of cakes? Do we smell smells? Pain is a feeling. Feeling pain in your foot is a way to feel your foot. But do you feel feelings? If you could really feel a feeling in this or that way, then just like appears to be the possible with your account of seeing colors (i.e. "perceiving a mental phenomenon"), there could conceivably be cases of inverted pain/pleasure qualia whereby what feels to me like pleasure feels to you like pain and vice versa. And there would be no way for us to ever know without analysing the structure of our brains and investigating those mysterious psychophysical laws. Does that even make sense?

Michael

If you could really feel a feeling in this or that way, then just like appears to be the possible with your account of seeing colors (i.e. "perceiving a mental phenomenon"), there could conceivably be cases of inverted pain/pleasure qualia whereby what feels to me like pleasure feels to you like pain and vice versa. — Pierre-Normand

By "what feels to me like pleasure feels to you like pain and vice versa" do you mean that the sort of things that would cause me pain might cause you pleasure and vice versa?

That's certainly possible. Masochism might be one such example. I don't think it either incoherent or physically impossible for burning the nerve endings in my fingers to stimulate the pleasure centres in my brain; it just requires a "malformed" central nervous system.

Pierre-Normand

That's certainly possible. Masochism might be one such example. I don't think it either incoherent or physically impossible for burning the nerve endings in my fingers to stimulate the pleasure centres in my brain; it just requires a "malformed" central nervous system. — Michael

In the case where burning the nerve endings in your fingers stimulates the pleasure centres in your brain, what you feel is pleasure. You are not feeling pain as pleasure. There is no inverted qualia. And the fact that what you feel is pleasure rather than pain is not something private and incommunicable (as red/blue inverted qualia allegedly are) but rather is manifested by the fact that you don't feel a strong urge to retreat your hand from the flame but rather are inclined to prolong the stimulus.

Michael

There is no inverted qualia. — Pierre-Normand

I'm not sure what you mean by "inverted qualia".

All I mean by such a term is that the same kind of stimulus (e.g. light with a wavelength of 700nm) causes a different kind of colour experience in different organisms (e.g. red for me and orange for you and some unnamed colour for the mantis shrimp). We have empirical evidence of this with the case of the dress that some see to be white and gold and others as black and blue.

Michael

And the fact that what you feel is pleasure rather than pain is not something private and incommunicable (as red/blue inverted qualia allegedly are) but rather is manifested by the fact that you don't retreat your hand from the flame but rather are inclined to prolong the stimulus. — Pierre-Normand

The experience is prior to and distinct from the response. Those with locked-in syndrome can feel pain. I can resist and fake an itch.

Pierre-Normand

The experience is prior to the response. Those with locked-in syndrome can feel pain. — Michael

When we imagine a person with locked-in syndrome feeling pain we imagine a person wishing a feeling (or its causal source) to go away. Them being locked-in prevents them from expressing this wish or doing anything about it. The internal conceptual connection that exists between the pain and the aversive behavior remains intact. It still doesn't make sense to say that what you feel as pleasure (the sensation itself) feels to them as pain.

The case of masochism is different since the erotic character (and context) of a special sort of pain gives it a different phenomenal quality (and utility) rather in the way a red circle looks different against a blue background than it does against a green background. Masochists aren't people who generally feel pleasure as pain. It's a sexual fantasy that they enact. They don't go out of their way to step barefoot on Lego blocks or seek root canal treatments just for fun.

Michael

It still doesn't make sense to say that what you feel as pleasure (the sensation itself) feels to them as pain. — Pierre-Normand

I wouldn't say that. I don't even know what this would mean.

I only say that the same kind of stimulus can cause different experiences for different organisms, and that sentences such as "I feel pain" and "I see the colour red" refer to these experiences and not the stimulus or distal object.

Luke

Yes, we see distal objects. — Michael

So, are distal objects a mental phenomena?

Michael

↪Luke

No

Luke

Yes, we see distal objects.
— Michael

So, are distal objects a mental phenomena?
— Luke

No — Michael

Then I don't understand the point of this post:

What do you think "see" means? What do you think "feel" means?

Do I see colours? Are colours a mental phenomena? Do I feel pain? Is pain a mental phenomena? — Michael

Michael

↪Luke

I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. I see cows and cows are distal objects. I see colours and colours are mental phenomena.

Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism, which concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience. Naive realists claim they are, indirect realists claim they're not.

Luke

I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. I see cows and cows are distal objects. I see colours and colours are mental phenomena.

Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism. — Michael

Are the following statements also true?
"I see cows and cows are mental phenomena."
"I see colours and colours are distal objects."
"I feel pains and pains are distal objects."

Michael

Are the following statements also true?
"I see cows and cows are mental phenomena."
"I see colours and colours are distal objects."
"I feel pains and pains are distal objects." — Luke

No.

Lionino

↪Luke

Each of these is either wrong or ambiguous.

Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism — Michael

Babies only properly learn object permanence when they approach their first birthday. Some people struggle with hypotheticals and simply retort "But I do have X" or "But Y didn't happen" when they are posed one. Likewise, I suppose some peoples' manner of thinking is dominated by language and they ignore possible states of affairs that are distinct from what is implied by the proper semantics of a given phrase.

Luke

Are the following statements also true?
"I see cows and cows are mental phenomena."
"I see colours and colours are distal objects."
"I feel pains and pains are distal objects." — Luke

No. — Michael

Then how is it merely grammatical? You said:

I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. — Michael

Indirect Realism and Direct Realism

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