So idealists believe our perceptions are the objects? What brand of idealists does that? — Mww

Subjective idealism or phenomenalism perhaps?

So, I'm curious and I've circled around some questions I'd like you to answer. I've hinted, I guess is one way to put it. Now, I'm going to directly ask(pardon the pun).

There's some barbecue chicken in the kitchen. I can smell it, because the molecules are entering into my body unimpeded, carried along in the air. My biological machinery is doing what it does.

To me, I am directly perceiving the chicken in the other room, because small parts of it entered my nose.

I'm guessing you'll deny that my perception of the chicken is direct. I'm guessing that you'll deny that the chicken is a constituent of my perception or my experience. I'm guessing that you'll deny that the molecules are a constituent of my perception or experience.

Do I have that right?

What brand of idealists does that?
— Mww

Subjective idealism or phenomenalism perhaps? — Michael

I dunno. But even the Good Bishop, if acknowledged as the foremost subjective idealist, granted to his fellow humans the reality of objects, the existence of non-mental entities.

The pure phenomenalist**, on the other hand, wants to deny, or limit, the real object’s non-mental existence, which is absurd, considering the inescapable affect plane crashes or mosquito bites have on our intelligence.
(** not to be confused with the Kantian sense of intuitive representations called phenomena, which isn’t technically phenomenalism. He gave it a quick once-over gloss with phenomenology, but left such naming as philosophically inconsequential)

To me, I am directly perceiving the chicken in the other room, because small parts of it entered my nose. — creativesoul

The indirect realist accepts that odour molecules from the chicken enter his nose, but denies that his perception of it is direct. Therefore, at the very least, what he means by "direct" isn't what you mean by "direct".

So according to his meaning, your use of the word "because" above is a non sequitur.

I'm guessing that you'll deny that the chicken is a constituent of my perception or my experience. I'm guessing that you'll deny that the molecules are a constituent of my perception or experience.

Yes. Experience exists within brain. Chickens and odour molecules exist outside the brain. Therefore, chickens and odour molecules are not constituents of experience. Experiences are caused by chickens and odour molecules, but that's the extent of their involvement.

In evolutionary progression terms...

I cannot make sense of hallucination unless compared to non-hallucinatory experience. Non hallucinatory experience does not depend upon hallucinatory in the same sense of "depend". Existential dependency. On the indirect realist account, there is no difference between the constituents.

That's just plain wrong.

A hallucination or dream of an apple does not require a distal object(an apple) except sometime in past experience. For that is when the biological machinery does its perception work. In dreams and hallucinations, its (mis)firing as though it has once again perceived or is once again perceiving an apple, despite no apple being perceived.

So at least according to his meaning, your use of the word "because" above is a non sequitur. — Michael

Well, whether or not something follows from one's terms is established by one's meaning, not the others'.

If cake molecules entering the body and interacting(physically) with one's biological machinery does not count as direct perception, then nothing will.

Well, whether or not something follows from one's terms is established by one's meaning, not the others'. — creativesoul

Sure, but then you have to accept that you are not necessarily arguing against indirect realism. This is clear if you each replace the word "direct" with your intended meanings.

I cannot make sense of hallucination unless compared to non-hallucinatory experience. Non hallucinatory experience does not depend upon hallucinatory in the same sense of "depend". Existential dependency. On the indirect realist account, there is no difference between the constituents.

That's just plain wrong.

A hallucination or dream of an apple does not require a distal object(an apple) except sometime in past experience. For that is when the biological machinery does its perception work. In dreams and hallucinations, its (mis)firing as though it has once again perceived or is once again perceiving an apple, despite no apple being perceived.

There is no difference between the constituents of an hallucination and a veridical experience. Their difference is in their causes.

There is no difference between the constitution of an hallucination and a veridical experience. Their difference is in their causes. — Michael

According to the account you're arguing for/from.

Is hallucination of an apple possible if one has never ever seen an apple, if one is completely unaware that there are such things as apples?

Is hallucination of an apple possible if one has never ever seen one, if one is completely unaware that there are such things as apples? — creativesoul

I'm not sure, I only recall hallucinating once and that was patterns of colours and spatial distortions. I think a schizophrenic or regular user of psychedelics would have to answer that

If hallucination of an apple amounts to the biological machinery doing the same thing it has done in past, while looking at an apple, then it becomes clear which one is existentially dependent upon the other.

They are not the same. Indirect realism cannot seem to account for that.

patterns of colours — Michael

Fungus huh?

:lol:

If hallucination of an apple amounts to the biological machinery doing the same thing it has done in past, while looking at an apple, then it becomes clear which one is existentially dependent upon the other.

They are not the same. Indirect realism cannot seem to account for that. — creativesoul

I don't understand what you think indirect realism has to account for.

Experiences, whether veridical or hallucinations, are reducible to (or supervene on) brain activity. Therefore anything that exists outside the brain cannot be a constituent of experience. Do you not accept this reasoning?

Fungus huh?

Yep. Was a great night. For a while I even had a split mind which was weird.

I don't understand what you think indirect realism has to account for. — Michael

That perception of apples is required in order to later have hallucinations thereof. Therefore, they are not the same thing.

What is the difference between the cause of hallucination as compared to veridical experience on the indirect account you're arguing for/from?

I still see something when I dream and hallucinate, — Michael

The "common kind claim", clarified in the SEP article on the problem of perception. When in an internationalist mood, following Anscombe and Davidson, I might consider it. When I'm in a more disjunctive mood I would deny it. Here's were there might be some actual new content to this discussion, were it to rise above the mediocrity of this thread. I speculate that there might be a way of achieving some compatibility between intentionalism and disjunctivism. I haven't worked through it. Another PhD for someone.

You're welcome to redefine "direct perception" if you like, but in doing so you're no longer addressing the indirect realist's claim. Your arguments against indirect realism are against a strawman. — Michael

This again assumes that the only alternative to indirect perception is direct perception. Have you stoped beating your wife yet?

Careful, if you think about this too much you might come to understand how words do things. — wonderer1

Yep.

Reminiscent of Kant's Noumena. The whole denial that I know that the heater grate to my right is what I'm seeing. I know what it's made of. I know where it's located. I know the size and shape. I know it's function. I know some dangers it poses to passersby. I know it's not located in my head/body. I know mental representations are. Thus, the grate I'm looking at is not a mental representation. — creativesoul

Again, indirect realism's framing of the discussion is oddly passive, as if all we ever do is look.

There is no difference between the constituents of an hallucination and a veridical experience. — Michael

I'm not convinced. An hallucinatory cow and a veridical cow are very different things.

We do, after all, have the word "hallucination", "dream", "delusion' and so on precisely because we are aware of that difference.

You want to say that the experience is the same, but having a dream is qualitatively different to being awake; having an hallucination is different to having a cow.

(I had to work a Bart joke in there somewhere).

Yep. Was a great night. For a while I even had a split mind which was weird. — Michael

So, I've heard about 'shrooms. More and more, I personally find myself liking life much better with the natural chemical cocktails that the body makes all by itself. When younger, things were different.

Experiences, whether veridical or hallucinations, are reducible to (or supervene on) brain activity. Therefore anything that exists outside the brain cannot be a constituent of experience. Do you not accept this reasoning? — Michael

Reducible? No. Supervene on, perhaps, if that means that all experience emerge in part at least, as a result of brains being part of what it takes. I'm in agreement with that much.

Your earlier argument was valid. I simply disagree with the notion of experience you're working with. It seems to beg the question of regarding the necessary element constituents of perception/experience. You deny external content/constituents. I do not.

So, hallucinations are reducible to brain activity. Seeing a cow includes a cow. Hallucinating a cow does not. It requires having already seen cows.

How do you distinguish between veridical experience and hallucination? It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that you can distinguish them because the English word "see" should only be used for veridical experience.

I would confer with others or seek more information otherwise. If they see the same thing it is a good indication I am not hallucinating. I certainly wouldn’t seek confirmation from the phenomena of my hallucinations.

By definition, if I have to infer some X then I do not have direct knowledge of X, so I don't understand your argument here. Are you asking how inferences are even possible? Are you calling into question the very scientific method?

It was not an argument, it was a question. Usually we have direct knowledge of the grounds, evidence, and arguments to make inferences towards one conclusion or another. I’m just wondering what direct knowledge or evidence derived from mental phenomenon can lead one to believe there is a proximal stimulus that causes the cortex to generate an auditory experience, and further, that that experience represents mind-independent objects.

Makes sense.

Makes sense. — Janus

The cow joke?

:up:

Experience exists within the brain. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects (and their properties) do not exist within experience.

The first premise is supported by neuroscience. The second premise is true by definition. The conclusion follows. — Michael

The first premise is not unequivocally supported by neuroscience, it is one interpretation of neuroscientific results.

If all you mean by saying that distal objects are not in the body or brain, well so what? Every child knows that...that's just what is meant by "distal objects".

I speculate that there might be a way of achieving some compatibility between intentionalism and disjunctivism. — Banno

Thanks for mentioning the SEP article on the problem of perception. Tim Crane, who authored it, was the perfect person for the job. What feature of intentionalism is it that you wish to retain that you think might be compatible with disjunctivism? Some disjunctivists like Gareth Evans, John McDowell, Gregory McCulloch, John Haugeland and Michael Luntley also endorse a form of direct realism that may retain the best features of intentionalism while, obviously, jettisoning the thesis Crane refers to as the "Common Kind Claim."

We do, after all, have the word "hallucination", "dream", "delusion' and so on precisely because we are aware of that difference. — Banno

The difference is in what causes the experience, not in what constitutes the experience.

You want to say that the experience is the same, but having a dream is qualitatively different to being awake; having an hallucination is different to having a cow.

There's a qualitative difference only in the sense that there's a qualitative difference between photorealism and cubism; it's still just paint on canvas. It's not as if in the veridical case distal objects and their properties are constituents of the experience.

If all you mean by saying that distal objects are not in the body or brain, well so what? — Janus

Then distal objects and their properties are not constituents of experience. The smells and tastes and colours that are constituents of experience are therefore not distal objects or their properties (even if you want to claim that there is a resemblance between them).

I don't agree that experience is located in the brainbody, so where does that leave us?

I don't agree that experience is located in the brainbody, so where does that leave us? — Janus

Are you arguing for something like substance dualism then, with consciousness being some non-physical phenomenon that extends beyond the body?

No I just don't think speaking about experience being located anywhere makes sense.

Yes. Experience exists within brain. Chickens and odour molecules exist outside the brain. Therefore, chickens and odour molecules are not constituents of experience. Experiences are caused by chickens and odour molecules, but that's the extent of their involvement. — Michael

When human beings experience features of the world by means of sense perception, the things that they experience cause them to experience them in some specific ways, but the understanding that they bring to bear also shapes the character and content of those experiences.

Consider the rabbit–duck ambiguous figure. Maybe Sue, who is familiar with perceiving rabbits in her environment, and never saw a duck, would immediately recognise the figure as the representation of a duck. And for Lia, it's the opposite. Would you say that Sue and Lia are caused by the visual presentation of the figure to experience, or see, the same mental phenomenon and that that they give it different interpretations, or would you say that they experience different mental phenomena?

In the case where Sue hallucinates (or pictures in her mind's eye) a duck, notice that it doesn't make sense to say that the thing that she hallucinates (or imagines) affords two possible interpretations - duck or rabbit. The act of hallucinating or imagining an animal carries with it its own interpretation, as it were. There is no second guessing since each new act of imagination has its own independent content.

There's a distinction between a distal object being a constituent of experience and being a cause of experience. Indirect realists accept that distal objects are a cause of experience but deny that they are a constituent of experience. — Michael

Do you think that indirect realists can accept that distal objects are the proximate cause of experience? That is the sense I meant.

When human beings experience features of the world by means of sense perception, the things that they experience cause them to experience them in some specific ways, but the understanding that they bring to bear also shapes the character and content of those experiences. — Pierre-Normand

I'm not sure how that's relevant to the dispute between direct and indirect realism?

Would you say that Sue and Lia are caused by the visual presentation of the figure to experience, or see, the same mental phenomenon and that that they give it different interpretations, or would you say that they experience different mental phenomena? — Pierre-Normand

I don't understand the distinction. Interpretation is a mental phenomenon. Either way, like above, I don't see how it's relevant to the dispute between direct and indirect realism.