You don't actually see a distal object when you dream and the schizophrenic does not actually hear a distal object when hallucinating. That what makes them dreams and hallucinations instead of instances of seeing or hearing real objects.

An indirect realist would argue that imaginary friends are directly perceived but real friends are only indirectly perceived. — Luke

Correct.

You don't actually see a distal object when you dream and the schizophrenic does not actually hear a distal object when hallucinating. That what makes them dreams and hallucinations instead of instances of seeing or hearing real objects.

An indirect realist would argue that imaginary friends are directly perceived but real friends are only indirectly perceived.
— Luke

Correct. — Michael

Last month, I had a conversation with Claude 3 regarding the phenomenology of dreaming experiences. We drew some implications from Hobson's AIM model. Hobson's model was devised to better explain various states of consciousness including drug induced hallucinatory states and dreams.

One salient feature of hallucinatory and dream states is that when we experience them, our abilities to notice their anomalous nature is diminished or suppressed.

Many people with aphantasia are entirely incapable of conjuring up images in their mind's eyes. They can't picture to themselves what their friends and family members look like, and they remember facts and emotions associated with events that they lived, but can't imagine visually what it looked like to experience them. Their episodic memories are mostly language based. Interestingly, many people with aphantasia believe that they can have visual impressions when they dream, but some of them are unsure if, after they wake up, they immediately forgot (and became unable to conjure up) what those dreams looked like or if they rather were dreaming purely "in words," as it were, but didn't notice the absence of the visual elements and now are unable to remember whether it was indeed lacking or not.

I don't have aphantasia, myself, but I have some dreams that have vivid visual features as well as dreams that are more abstract in nature and that feel like I am merely narrating what it is that I am experiencing without actually seeing anything. Some of my dreams also are experienced from a first-person point of view, just like awaken experiences are lived, or from a third-person point of view where I am witnessing myself living the events in that dream from some distance. Clearly, all of those ways of dreaming have a very distinct phenomenological character. Unless the dream becomes lucid (which happens to me occasionally) we take no notice of those phenomenological characters when they are anomalous. We don't notice being effectively blind (and having no visual experiences) or that we aren't supposed to be seeing ourselves from outside of our own bodies. Those anomalous "experiences" correspond to perfectly normal modes of daydreaming - for when we are daydreaming we are aware that we are conjuring up those experiences rather than perceiving the world around us. When we are dreaming, we become unaware that the productions of our own brains/mind are our own.

One important lesson that I draw from this is that just because an abnormal state of consciousness is subjectively indistinguishable from a normal state of experience (e.g. due to drugs or sleep) doesn't mean that they have the same phenomenological character. Imaginary friends aren't perceived. They are conjured up and conjuring them up has a different phenomenological character than seeing them. Furthermore, seeing them occurs when they themselves - their presence in front of you - direct and structure the content of your phenomenology whereas conjuring them up meets no external constraint at all. This is why you can dream that you are meeting a friend and, the next moment, they are 20 years younger or they are your favorite pet and you don't notice a thing.

What exactly do you mean by "phenomenological character"? At the moment all you seem to be saying is that waking experiences are to dreams what a photorealistic portrait is to cubism. Either way it's all mental percepts and so by any reasonable definition indirect realism.

The first sentence is a paradox, isn't it?
— frank

I wouldn't say so. That scientific realism entails indirect realism is contingent on a posteriori facts, not a priori truths. — Michael

It's that the scientist starts by assuming direct realism, then disproves direct realism. It's an ouroboros.

One salient feature of hallucinatory and dream states is that when we experience them, our abilities to notice their anomalous nature is diminished or suppressed. — Pierre-Normand

Yea, but I've had dreams that were complex, with customs and history to it. One involved physicists who had giant potatoes where their torsos should be. It all seemed perfectly normal to me in the dream. What that demonstrates is sophisticated world-building capability. While awake, I start to think about how much of this world I'm in is a creation, and I realize it's actually quite a bit. I'm filling in blanks.

I think what the direct realist might be driven by is the necessity of a world. There's really no way to verify all of what we call the world, though. I think the difference between us is how comfortable each of us is about accepting that the mind is a masterful creator.

It's that the scientist starts by assuming direct realism, then disproves direct realism. It's an ouroboros. — frank

I don't quite get what you're saying. Flat earthers assume that the Earth is flat, do experiments, and determine that the Earth is not flat. It's not a paradox; it's just that the experiments have proven them wrong.

Direct realists assume that colours are mind-independent properties of objects, do experiments, and determine that objects are bundles of atoms that reflect various wavelengths of light. They then study the brain and determine that we see colours in response to stimulating various areas of the primary visual cortex. They've determined that that colours are not mind-independent properties of objects but mental/neurological phenomena.

But as it stands the science of perception supports indirect realism and so a direct realist must reject the science of perception, although I don't know how he can justify that rejection. — Michael

Have scientists been able to explain how a physical, colorless brain causes visual experiences, like visual depth and colors? How do colors come from something colorless?

What role does the observer effect in QM play here?

If a color is directly perceived and the wavelength is indirectly perceived, and your mind with all of it's colors and sounds and feelings, are part of reality, then isn't it safe to say that you directly experience part of the world? If so, then doesn't the distinction between indirect vs direct realism become irrelevant?

What part of you directly interacts with the world? What is "you" or "I" in this sense? If you define "you" and "I" as our bodies, then isn't your body directly interacting with objects by holding them and with light by opening your eyes? Indirect realism only makes sense if you define "you" and "I" as homunculus in your head.

I don't quite get what you're saying. Flat earthers assume that the Earth is flat, do experiments, and determine that the earth is not flat. It's not a paradox; it's just that the experiments have proven them wrong. — Michael

The question is about why you have confidence that your observations reflect the facts, when you've concluded that your observations are creations of your brain. It's just that indirect realism opens the door to skepticism.

The question is about why you have confidence that your observations reflect the facts, when you've concluded that your observations are creations of your brain. — frank

If the direct realist can believe in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and the Big Bang and in the veracity of a Geiger counter then the indirect realist can believe in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and the Big Bang and in the veracity of a Geiger counter.

Direct perception of something is not required to be justified in believing in that thing.

If a color is directly perceived and the wavelength is indirectly perceived, and your mind with all of it's colors and sounds and feelings, are part of reality, then isn't it safe to say that you directly experience part of the world? If so, then doesn't the distinction between indirect vs direct realism become irrelevant? — Harry Hindu

The question is whether or not I directly perceive some distal object. That I directly perceive some aspect of the world (i.e. my mental phenomena) isn't that I directly perceive the particular aspect of the world that direct realists claim we directly perceive (i.e. the distal object).

Have scientists been able to explain how a physical, colorless brain causes visual experiences, like visual depth and colors? How are colors come from something colorless?

What role does the observer effect in QM play here? — Harry Hindu

The hard problem of consciousness hasn't been resolved. Some believe that it is reducible to brain activity (e.g. pain just is the firing of c fibres), and some believe that it is some mental phenomenon that supervenes on such brain activity.

Either way, few (if any) believe that conscious experience extends beyond the body such that distal objects and their properties are literally present in conscious experience. At the very least there's no scientific evidence to suggest that it does. As referenced earlier, I suspect something like objective idealism would be required for that.

What part of you directly interacts with the world? What is "you" or "I" in this sense? If you define "you" and "I" as your body, then isn't your body directly interacting with objects by holding them and with light by opening your eyes? — Harry Hindu

Different parts of me directly interact with different parts of the world. My eyes directly interact with light, the neurons in my brain directly interact with each other, etc.

Indirect realism only makes sense if you define "you" and "I" as homunculus in your head.

"I feel pain" doesn't entail a homunculus. "I see shapes and colours when I hallucinate" doesn't entail a homunculus. Saying that these very same mental percepts occur when awake and not hallucinating doesn't entail a homunculus. You're just reading far too much into the grammar of "I experience X".

If the direct realist can believe in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and the Big Bang and in the veracity of a Geiger counter then the indirect realist can believe in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and the Big Bang and in the veracity of a Geiger counter. — Michael

But the direct realist relies on the observations that support belief in electrons (like the light dots on a CRT). The indirect realist has to say that those light dots are creations of the brain, and so may not reflect the facts. Btw, the idea that there was a Big Bang is declining these days (according to Matt O'Dowd from Spacetime.

The question is whether or not I directly perceive some distal object. That I directly perceive some aspect of the world (i.e. my mental phenomena) isn't that I directly perceive the particular aspect of the world that direct realists claim we directly perceive (i.e. the distal object). — Michael

I don't see how using "direct" and "indirect" is useful here. We perceive objects. If there is no difference in the information acquired, then there is no useful distinction between "direct" and "indirect".

No, the hard problem of consciousness hasn't been resolved. Some believe that it is reducible to brain activity (e.g. pain just is the firing of c fibres), and some believe that it is some mental phenomenon that supervenes on such brain activity. Either way, few (if any) believe that conscious experience extends beyond the body such that distal objects and their properties are literally present in conscious experience. — Michael

The observer effect does not assume that objects are present in conscious experience, rather that act of observing distal objects has an effect on those distal objects and how they are perceived.

Different parts of me directly interact with different parts of the world. My eyes directly interact with light, the neurons in my brain directly interact with each other, etc. — Michael

Then "direct" realism is the case? Again, if we can directly interact with certain parts of the world and a direct interaction is a necessary component of an indirect perception, then "direct" and "indirect" is a false dichotomy. It's not either or. It's both.

No it doesn't. "I feel pain" doesn't entail a homunculus. "I see shapes and colours when I hallucinate" doesn't entail a homunculus." Saying that these very same mental percepts occur when awake and not hallucinate doesn't entail a homunculus. You're just reading far too much into the grammar of "I experience X". — Michael

How can I be reading to much into the grammar when I'm just trying to get some clarification of your use of the word, "I".

But the direct realist relies on the observations that support belief in electrons (like the light dots on a CRT). The indirect realist has to say that those light dots are creations of the brain, and so may not reflect the facts. — frank

Both the direct and indirect realist infers the existence of some entity from some effect it is claimed to have caused. They just disagree on which effect is directly perceived. The direct realist claims to directly perceive the dot on the screen as caused by the unobservable entity. The indirect realist claims to directly perceive the mental phenomenon as caused by the dot on the screen as caused by the unobservable entity.

We see colours. Colours are mental phenomena, perhaps reducible to activity in the primary visual cortex, often caused by light interacting with the eyes (although not always given the cases of dreams and hallucinations). That's indirect realism.

Direct realism claims that colours are mind-independent properties of distal objects à la the naive realist theory of colour.

These are quite clearly different positions and at least one of them is wrong. I say that the scientific evidence supports the former and contradicts the latter, e.g. from here:

A stimulus produces an effect on the different sensory receptors, which is being transmitted to the sensory cortex, inducing sensation (De Ridder et al., 2011). Further processing of this sensory stimulation by other brain networks such as the default mode, salience network and frontoparietal control network generates an internal representation of the outer and inner world called a percept (De Ridder et al., 2011). Perception can thus be defined as the act of interpreting and organizing a sensory stimulus to produce a meaningful experience of the world and of oneself (De Ridder et al., 2011).

Arguing over the grammar of "I experience X" leads to confusion and misses the substance of the dispute entirely. See here.

The indirect realist claims to directly perceive the mental phenomenon as caused by the dot on the screen as caused by the unobservable entity. — Michael

Right. The question is: what is the source of the indirect realist's confidence that the mental phenomena are caused by the dot?

Right. The question is: what is the source of the indirect realist's confidence that the mental phenomena are caused by the dot? — frank

What is the source of the direct realist's confidence that the dot is caused by some unobservable entity?

What is the source of the direct realist's confidence that the dot is caused by some unobservable entity? — Michael

Practicality probably. Is that the source of the indirect realist's confidence?

Practicality probably. Is that the source of the indirect realist's confidence? — frank

Perhaps, yes. Both direct and indirect realists are realists rather than subjective idealists because they believe that the existence and regularity and predictability of experience is best explained by the existence of a distal world which behaves according to regular and predictable laws.

Perhaps, yes. Both direct and indirect realists are realists rather than subjective idealists because they believe that the existence and regularity and predictability of experience is best explained by the existence of a distal world which behaves according to regular and predictable laws. — Michael

True. I once asked a neuroscientist why he believed he had access to the real world, and he said "practicality."

does experience provide us with direct knowledge of the external world? — Michael

Both direct and indirect realists are realists rather than subjective idealists because they believe that the existence and regularity and predictability of experience is best explained by the existence of a distal world which behaves according to regular and predictable laws. — Michael

Both the direct and indirect realist infers the existence of some entity from some effect it is claimed to have caused — Michael

I don't infer the existence of some entity -- I infer that there are causes and effects because I directly perceive the entity.

I'd also say there is no external world as much as a world.

I'd also say there's no "distal object" -- that this is a conceit of indirect realism.

***
I think internal/external has been already mentioned as a point we could drop, but you're insistent upon it when you say "external world", so I can't approach that angle.

Inference is the basis of your understanding of direct realism, so it seems we're just saying "yes/no" to one another there -- not exactly fruitful.

"Distal object" is a term of art that was invented for this discussion, but I'd say "distal" poisons the well in favor of indirect realism.
****

So I feel like there's a web of thoughts that are very different from mine, which are likely informed by philosophy, but I remain uncertain how to proceed.

Is direct realism a contention with inference, a contention with internal/external, or a contention with "distal object"?

You are one of these indirect realists, but are there others? Who ought I read to get a better picture?

I directly perceive the entity. — Moliere

Which means what?

I'd also say there's no "distal object" -- that this is a conceit of indirect realism. — Moliere

It's a term used in the science of perception. See here:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

The different kinds of sensation (such as warmth, sound, and taste) are called sensory modalities or stimulus modalities.

Which means what? — Michael

The same as it means to perceive causes and effects -- one has to start somewhere. We can call that starting point "blotches of color", "cause-and-effect", "the cup", or any other such things. In terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object, be it causes, cups, or color-blotches.

The same as it means to perceive causes and effects -- one has to start somewhere. We can call that starting point "blotches of color", "cause-and-effect", "the cup", or any other such things. In terms of the epistemological problem of perception we have direct access to some kind of object, be it causes, cups, or color-blotches. — Moliere

We have access to percepts. Percepts are often the consequence of the body responding to some proximal stimulus (dreams and hallucinations being the notable exceptions). The proximal stimulus often originates from some distal object.

The nature of our percepts is determined by the structure and behaviour of our sense organs and brain such that different distal objects can cause the same percept and that the same distal object can cause different percepts (e.g. the dress that some see as white and gold and others as black and blue).

This is indirect realism. Any direct realist who claims that this is direct realism has simply redefined the meaning of "direct" into meaninglessness.

The question is whether or not I directly perceive some distal object. That I directly receive some aspect of the world (i.e. my mental phenomena) isn't that I directly perceive the particular aspect of the world that direct realists claim we directly perceive (i.e. the distal object). — Michael

I think much of the dispute between direct and indirect realists may revolve around the fact that direct realists limit the meaning of the word "perception" to sensory perceptions that are stimulated by distal objects, whereas indirect realists give the word "perception" a wider meaning that includes non-sensory "perceptions" that lack any external stimulus, such as hallucinations, dreams and imaginings. Neither side has the monopoly on correct usage, but given the question of whether or not I directly perceive some distal object, the former meaning would typically be assumed.

I think much of the dispute between direct and indirect realists may revolve around the fact that direct realists limit the meaning of the word "perception" to sensory perceptions that are stimulated by distal objects, whereas indirect realists give the word "perception" a wider meaning that includes non-sensory "perceptions" that lack any external stimulus, such as hallucinations, dreams and imagininings. Neither side has the monopoly on correct usage, but given the question of whether or not I directly perceive some distal object, the former meaning would typically be assumed. — Luke

Which is precisely why I have argued that the dispute over the grammar of "I experience X" is a red herring.

The philosophical dispute between direct and indirect realists concerns the epistemological problem of perception. Are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience such that their mind-independent nature is presented to us or is experience nothing more than a mental phenomenon, with is features being at best only causally-covariant representations of those mind-independent properties? Direct (naive) realists argued the former and indirect (non-naive) realists argued the latter.

We have access to percepts. Percepts are often the consequence of the body responding to some proximal stimulus (dreams and hallucinations being the notable exceptions). The proximal stimulus often originates from some distal object.

The nature of our percepts is determined by the structure and behaviour of our sense organs and brain such that different distal objects can cause the same percept and that the same distal object can cause different percepts (e.g. the dress that some see as white and gold and others as white and blue).

This is indirect realism. Any direct realist who claims that this is direct realism has simply redefined the meaning of "direct" into meaninglessness. — Michael

We have access to percepts. And we have access to the world. It is through this access that we are able to determine when we are hallucinating or dreaming and when we are not.

So, direct realism. Both percepts and world are accessible.

We have access to percepts. Percepts are often the consequence of the body responding to some proximal stimulus. The proximal stimulus often originates from some distal object. — Michael

Mmm... You don't have "access" to a percept. A percept is identical with either the whole, or a part of, the conceptual-perceptual state of an organism at a given time. That's a numerical/definitional identity, rather than an equivalence. Like the percept is not what perception or experience is of, the percept is an instance of perception. The taste percept of my coffee is the same as how I taste it in my tasting event.

The distinction there is between saying that a percept is an instance of perception vs saying that a percept is what perception acts upon.

We have access to percepts. And we have access to the world. It is through this access that we are able to determine when we are hallucinating or dreaming and when we are not.

So, direct realism. Both percepts and world are accessible. — Moliere

Our access to the wider-world is indirect with those percepts being the intermediary. If those percepts are missing (e.g. where someone has cortical blindness) then some access to the wider-world is lost.

All you're saying is that with a CCTV camera I have access to the inside of the bank vault. But it's indirect access.

We have access to percepts. And we have access to the world. — Moliere

The indirect realist isn't denying this.

Mmm... You don't have "access" to a percept. A percept is identical with either the whole, or a part of, the conceptual-perceptual state of an organism at a given time. That's a numerical/definitional identity, rather than an equivalence. Like the percept is not what perception or experience is of, the percept is an instance of perception. The taste percept of my coffee is the same as how I taste it.

The distinction there is between saying that a percept is an instance of perception vs saying that a percept is what perception acts upon. — fdrake

I have access to colours and pain and smells and tastes. These are all percepts.

When I see things when I dream and hear things when I hallucinate I am seeing and hearing something.