It seems to me that I know my parents. I do not know them perfectly, as God knows them. I do not need to know them perfectly to know them at all. It would be more speculative — more dishonest — for me to claim that I know nothing of my parents than to admit I know something about them.

As St. Thomas says in his commentary on Boethius, all knowledge is received in the manner of the receiver. The human intellect's grasp on the intelligibility of things is necessary finite, imperfect, discursive and processual. We do not grasp things in their entirety, nor is what we grasp present to us all at once. This is simply the nature of human knowledge, that it is not angelic knowledge. But this does not make it such that there is no such thing as human knowledge, only knowledge from the "God's eye view."

. I admit to knowing nothing, but I claim to be aware of many things. Those are not the same things to me. Indeed, people react less well in general to someone claiming some awareness than they do to someone lying to them and claiming knowing. This is a terrible problem with understanding in most people. It is inherently more correct to applaud and suffer with the person only claiming some awareness. That is the gist of my claim stated fairly plainly.

I take it that you then might agree with the following claims, that human beings are intrinsically motivated to seek truth, to attain to veracity

By veracity I do not mean a virtue; it is something more elementary. It is in us from the beginning. Veracity is the impulse toward truth, and the virtue of truthfulness is its proper cultivation. Veracity is the origin of both truthfulness and the various ways of failing to be truthful. Thus, lying, refusing to look at important facts, being careless or hasty in finding things out, and other ways of avoiding truth are perversions of veracity, but they are exercises of it. Curiosity is a frivolous employment of it. Veracity means practically the same thing as rationality, but it brings out the aspect of desire that is present in rationality, and it has the advantage of implying that there is something morally good in the fulfillment of this desire. It also suggests that we are good and deserving of some recognition simply because we are rational. Veracity is the desire for truth; it specifies us as human beings. It is not a passion or an emotion, but the inclination to be truthful. The passions are not the only desires we have, and reason is not just their servant; we also want to achieve the truth.

If we cultivate our rationality we become truthful, and if we frustrate it we become untruthful or dishonest (or merely pedantic), but it is not the case that truthfulness and dishonesty are two equivalent alternatives for us
to pursue. It is not the case that we are defined by veracity (rationality) and that we can cultivate it in these two different ways. Being untruthful is not one of the ways of being a successful human being.

Robert Sokolowski - The Phenomenology of the Human Person

However, I think there is a misplaced sense of piety if we begin to claim that we do not know anything of our parents, anything of arithmetic, or anything of ourselves for fear of error. This strikes me as the "fear of error become fear of truth," that Hegel discusses in the preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit. For, "as a matter of fact, this fear presupposes something, indeed a great deal, as truth, and supports its scruples and consequences on what should itself be examined beforehand to see whether it is truth."

No one lives as if they actually "know nothing." Phyrro of Elis, the arch skeptic of ancient Greece was himself caught running away from a wild dog, apparently confident that it would indeed harm him if it bit him. As Aristotle remarks on such skeptics, they obviously believe they know some things, as they find their way to the Lyceum to bother him, following paths that take them there, whereas if they truly knew nothing they should not prefer one path over any other when they set out to travel to some place, or should not even assume that walking will get them from one place to another.

One cannot live into veracity while thinking they truly know nothing. To be sure, we can always doubt, just as Moore points out that we can always ask of something "is it truly good?" or just as we can always ask "is it truly beautiful?" or "why is it beautiful?" This is part of the reason that truth, beauty, and goodness were proposed as transcendentals by the scholastics. Reason is transcedent, ecstatic. We can always go past current beliefs and judgements (moral or aesthetic as well). This is what makes reason special, it's ability to transcend who we.currently are and make us into something new.

But it is a mistake to take this property of reason as grounds for doubting everything. This makes veracity impossible. We can not overcome a doubt of reason itself with reason, and this is the risk of misology. Yet embracing misology is to fail at living as a rational agent.

As Plato says in the Phaedo:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places …” (114d)

Belief in reason itself is a noble risk, and reason shows us we know some things. We know them in our manner, not in a divine manner. This does not mean we lack all knowledge.

Now if your point is merely to use the word "know," in a very uncoventional way, such that people don't "know their parents," or "know that two and two makes four," because radical skepticism can always ask of anything "but is it really true?" this does not seem to me like a worthwhile exercise. Not only that, but it seems that many of our experiences are not even open to this sort of doubt. If I am in terrible pain, I might very well ask, "ah, but am I truly in pain?" but to deny that I know the truth of this matter is simply self-deception. Being in terrible pain is an ostentatious reality. Likewise, if we cannot know our own propositional beliefs, then veracity becomes impossible, for we cannot even know what we hope to improve.

It makes more sense to me, to applaud and enjoy with the people who demonstrate that they have knowledge. You can't know that it is inherently less correct, right? — wonderer1

I think that the self-indulgent position you take here is part of the problem, not the solution. Enjoyment of awareness is STILL NOT knowing.

Agreed that I cannot know its less correct. I believe it though. That is the claim. That claiming to know finally is immoral compared to claiming only some awareness. Then that means its better to speak and write that way.

Even Kevin does not know Kevin. He surprises himself all the time. If you claim to know Kevin you are just clearly wrong. If we mean to say 'know of' or better yet 'are aware of' then that is a better way to speak and believe than is 'knowing'.

It is precisely the dread and mistaken certainty in the word itself and the way it is used that is the problem. That problem will only worsen until it is addressed, properly. We can all continue to wade through hordes of people that believe they know something, or we can begin, in wise discipline to cast aspersions properly on that methodology. We should morally call into question such terminology and the practices surrounding its use in that way. If one enjoys what is wrong, one is wrong to do so.

It seems to me that I know my parents. I do not know them perfectly, as God knows them. I do not need to know them perfectly to know them at all. It would be more speculative — more dishonest — for me to claim that I know nothing of my parents than to admit I know something about them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is MY point. You are ... aware ... of many aspects of your parents and how they are, who they are. But you DO NOT know them. They do not know themselves. That way of writing and speaking is BETTER than saying knowing.

When we say incorrectly that we know someone or something we imply that we are done. That implies that they are done. So many erroneous conclusions. We can rest if we know. But we do not know. Doubt remains and so the humility should advise us to say we are only fairly aware of this or that or someone.

As St. Thomas says in his commentary on Boethius, all knowledge is received in the manner of the receiver. The human intellect's grasp on the intelligibility of things is necessary finite, imperfect, discursive and processual. We do not grasp things in their entirety, nor is what we grasp present to us all at once. This is simply the nature of human knowledge, that it is not angelic knowledge. But this does not make it such that there is no such thing as human knowledge, only knowledge from the "God's eye view." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with his point, but his conclusion is wrong. If he was instead to say we are only aware of things, he would have spoke or written better. There is no cut-off of something or someone pour-soi. Even if they die and are en-soi there is still false awareness of what was.

I am not denying partial knowledge. But even that term is less than best because the term to know is an absolute negating for the most part the word 'partial'. It's just like the goofy people that say 'very unique'. Its redundant and shows the person has no awareness of what the word 'unique' means. Now people IN GENERAL will understand what is meant. But the confusion happens then when the more aware person objects and takes issue with the formulation, just like I am doing here. It's ok. I am used to it.

I admit to knowing nothing, but I claim to be aware of many things. Those are not the same things to me. Indeed, people react less well in general to someone claiming some awareness than they do to someone lying to them and claiming knowing. This is a terrible problem with understanding in most people. It is inherently more correct to applaud and suffer with the person only claiming some awareness. That is the gist of my claim stated fairly plainly. - Chet Hawkins
— Count Timothy von Icarus

I take it that you then might agree with the following claims, that human beings are intrinsically motivated to seek truth, to attain to veracity — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not at all. They are often in fact motivated to seek delusion. The comforting lies desire is all over this thread. Truth is elusive and hard to hold on to. The wise suffer more and exquisitely compared to others. Awareness is a burden and causes suffering and that is ok. All virtues are similar. Wisdom is nothing so much as the union of all virtues.

The hardest things is usually more moral than the thing that is easier.

By veracity I do not mean a virtue; it is something more elementary. It is in us from the beginning. Veracity is the impulse toward truth, and the virtue of truthfulness is its proper cultivation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I disagree that truth seeking is a fundamental choice. If you are saying instead what I would, in other words, it would be this:
Desire exists and its perfection impacts us, despite our choices to ignore it or overwhelm it with immoral intent. As such, the truth of perfection, via evolution, is a great suffering we must experience. We fear to be unequal to it and we thus compete with less aims as practical excused cop-outs. We desire to already be perfect and thus we also wallow in worthlessness instead of assuming or aspiring to the perfect.

But in neither case is truth seeking an assumed thing. It is always and only a matter of choice.

Veracity is the origin of both truthfulness and the various ways of failing to be truthful. Thus, lying, refusing to look at important facts, being careless or hasty in finding things out, and other ways of avoiding truth are perversions of veracity, but they are exercises of it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I disagree entirely. That is a messed up way of looking at it. The choice to delude oneself and in what ways one does so, are not veracity and we should not poison that word as well with foolish interpretations. There is no false veracity. There is only accurate veracity and all else is moral failure. Even if the failure is relatively better than everyone else's, it is still failure, finally. It is just BETTER than others morally /relatively. The wording is critical to understanding properly.

Curiosity is a frivolous employment of it. Veracity means practically the same thing as rationality, but it brings out the aspect of desire that is present in rationality, and it has the advantage of implying that there is something morally good in the fulfillment of this desire. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Truth seeking is wise, but, amid that process we often fail. Especially if we believe that truth or morality is subjective.

I find curiosity to be a part of wisdom mostly, lighthearted truth seeking as defined.

Yes, curiosity shows the desire infusion of awareness, the desire to know ... more. Desire is always the more-needer.

It also suggests that we are good and deserving of some recognition simply because we are rational. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not think that is curiosity. I think that is judgement.

Veracity is the desire for truth; — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, veracity is a state. It could be the truth value of a thing, its expected state. But curiosity itself or just truth seeking would be fine for stating a desire for truth. I don't agree that veracity means that.

it specifies us as human beings. It is not a passion or an emotion, but the inclination to be truthful. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Inclination is desire is passion. All desire is passion. One could also say that inclination is pattern is order is fear, as in a trait. But I do like the idea that inclination includes some desire.

The passions are not the only desires we have, and reason is not just their servant; we also want to achieve the truth. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I disagree. Passion to me is synonymous with desire. There is no need to muddy the waters there for me. Reason is not the servant of anything, but its own thing entirely. And that thing is sourced in fear. It is only a pattern that is something one can be aware of or not or to greater and lesser degrees.

Reason cannot exist without the objective. If there is nothing objective then reasoning is a lie.

If we cultivate our rationality we become truthful, and if we frustrate it we become untruthful or dishonest (or merely pedantic), but it is not the case that truthfulness and dishonesty are two equivalent alternatives for us to pursue. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I disagree. Dishonesty is a lack of truthfulness. Honesty is a part of truth. We are all always partially dishonest. It is the same thing in some ways as saying we cannot know. We cannot be truthful absolutely. We can only intend to be truthful and do the best we can.

It is not the case that we are defined by veracity (rationality) and that we can cultivate it in these two different ways. Being untruthful is not one of the ways of being a successful human being.

Robert Sokolowski - The Phenomenology of the Human Person — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree that truthfulness is something to aspire to as part of perfection.

However, I think there is a misplaced sense of piety if we begin to claim that we do not know anything of our parents, anything of arithmetic, or anything of ourselves for fear of error. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agreed, but since I did not claim that your idea is moot. I did not say we have no awareness which is what your strawman argument there implies. You are trying to act as if I am claiming that we are aware of nothing, as in we have no awareness at all. We do not have knowledge because any knowledge is all knowledge really. Only by knowing all can we know any. But we are indeed aware of a lot. And awareness to me is already steeping in the understanding of its limitation, which is far better.

This strikes me as the "fear of error becomes fear of truth," that Hegel discussed in the preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit. For, "as a matter of fact, this fear presupposes something, indeed a great deal, as truth, and supports its scruples and consequences on what should itself be examined beforehand to see whether it is truth." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, that is MY point. I am unafraid of error enough to admit not knowing, and only claim to some awareness, a far wiser position than to fear error by claiming to know and be thus error free. You make my point for me, as I understand it.

But no one lives as if they actually "know nothing." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, this is using the word know wrongly, colloquially. To know is an absolute is my claim. I agree that no one lives as if they have no awareness. But they SHOULD live as if they know nothing. They are just wrong not to. It means they do not understand the subtle difference in the terms.

Phyrro of Elis, the arch skeptic of ancient Greece was himself caught running away from a wild dog, apparently confident that it would indeed harm him if it bit him. As Aristotle remarks on such skeptics, they obviously believe they know some things, as they find their way to the Lyceum to bother him following paths that take them there, whereas if they truly knew nothing they should not prefer one path over any other when they set out to travel to some place. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This conflation you offer again proves my point. The word 'know' is an absolute and should not be used hardly ever. If you change to my term as directed your statements are more correct. Most such are marginally aware of some things, yes, like the way to the Lyceum. But they all know nothing because knowing is unattainable as a skill.

It is the failure to admit this that causes the confusion of certainty in people and then on to 'being done' and not needing to know any more because you already know. Nope! There is more, so, you do not know (anything).

I cut it short because I suspect we are just doomed to stand our ground on opposed sides. And that is fine.

No, 'only' and 'mere' are PRECISELY the same (to me) in meaning and they are certainly no worse than 'subset'. So, I confess, I do not get this complaint. It's like saying to 'them' that 'OK, if you concede the main point about your door, we will agree to paint it chartreuse, as you direct.' — Chet Hawkins

'mere' has negative connotations.

adjective
used to emphasize how small or insignificant someone or something is.

and only can have the same meaning. Not necessarily, but possibly. Oh, it's only a regular pizza, no toppings. And given that you present them as the same, I disagree with their use there. And subset alone is fine.

Subset is neutral. British cities are a subset of the category cities.

Yes, groups can do this. On the other hand, given their methodologies, I trust the information I get from some groups and some individuals more than others. I'm not exactly sure what you meant in the two parts I quoted here.
— Bylaw
Most 'grouping up' as a fallacious attempt to argue by mass or numbers, is cowardly, if you follow, an approach/need of fear and order. Anger does not care if others agree or not. It will hold the line to the balance of its own belief, regardless. At least that is GOOD anger. — Chet Hawkins

I mentioned methodologies. This would include my own methodologies also, so really it has nothing to do with number. I am lying in bed and I think it's raining. I thought they maybe said something on the news that it would rain today, but I'm not sure. But I believe it is raining. Or, I get up, look out the window, see drops falling, hitting puddles. I now also believe it is raining, but the methodology I used in the second instance I respect more. So, it is when I evaluate how others reach conclusions: their methodologies - and perhaps past record, my sense of their trustworthiness and other criteria.

This has nothing to do with fear or anger.

While there are bad dentists, I don't go with a toothache to prison guards or stock traders.
— Bylaw
Yes, on some of that we can agree. But we both know that in reality and especially human reality, there are many situations where the fox ends up guarding the henhouse. Why is that? I 'know' (ha ha) why. It's fair to use the fox's tricks against them, maybe (not really) The fox is likely to sell out truth. The fox is likely to call it doubters facetious when they are the serious ones. The fox was appointed by other foxes. It's there to corrupt the serious nature of truth, precisely to let slip things in a certain way. We are all beset by wisdom, by truth. It is too hard to live up to. The 'powers that be' have to make sure that some roads to truth are obscured. This aids in the pragmatic short cutting of truth in daily life. This aids in immorality, the opposite of wisdom. — Chet Hawkins

Sure, I haven't said: if the experts say X, X must be true.

But I recognize differences between beliefs. I use the word knowledge for beliefs that I consider very likely to be correct. It is a subset of beliefs that I have confidence in over other subsets of beliefs. I don't expect perfection, because I and we are fallible. We do our best.

Messi is a football player. He is one football player in the set of football players. But I would choose him to play on my team over three random players.

The parallel here is not that Messi is a kind of knowledge, though he certainly has that.
It's just I have no reason to say he is only a football player or a mere football player because he is part of that set.

Set's include better and worse members, given the purposes one has.

If I am interested in surprising beliefs, then out of the set of beliefs, many beliefs not considered knowledge and many considered knowledge will fit my needs.

If I am trying to successfully navigate the world, then those in the subset knowledge tend to work better.

But I see no reason to use mere or only, especially if the latter is considered a synonym of the former.

Sorry, I missed this response initially.

I have no problem with what you are saying, because you are using the term 'certainty' in the sense of ~'that which one doesn't have good reasons to doubt': in that sense, I agree that I am 'certain' that I am writing this reply.

In terms of whether it is absolutely true that I am writing this reply, I cannot afford an answer.

It makes more sense to me, to applaud and enjoy with the people who demonstrate that they have knowledge. You can't know that it is inherently less correct, right?
— wonderer1
I think that the self-indulgent position you take here is part of the problem, not the solution. Enjoyment of awareness is STILL NOT knowing. — Chet Hawkins

And yet here you are hypocritically indulging in discussion with knowledgeable people, and using the internet which only exists as a result of people having the knowledge required to make the internet work.

I would say 'seeing that there is something to be mimicked', 'seeing that another individual behaved in some certain way', 'seeing that someone did something or other'. Unless the case is that those things were not seen but reported by someone else, in which case 'believing' would be, for me, the apt term. — Janus

Believing another's words is one species of belief; one way to draw correlations; one way to make connections; one way to attribute meaning(in this case to the terms "belief" and "believing").

One way to talk? Sure. A bit shallow though.

Until one becomes aware of their own human fallibility; until one no longer believes their own eyes; until one begins the endeavor of metacognition with a particular focus upon the shortcomings of the human perceptual capabilities; seeing is believing.

Well, if we take it that adiaireta, awareness of something, is a sort of knowledge, it seems like we can possess it without formulating any propositional beliefs about a thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for the engagement. I agree that some knowledge(that a thing exists; is there) does not require forming propositional belief about that thing. So, I agree with the above. I've not claimed that all knowledge is existentially dependent upon propositional belief. I'm claiming that all knowledge is existentially dependent upon belief of some sort or another, in some way or another. The sorts and ways are many. There is more than one kind.

Whether or not a case of awareness counts as knowledge that is not existentially dependent upon belief greatly depends upon 1.) what may be called "the object of awareness"(what it is - exactly - that one is aware of), and 2.) the biological machinery of the candidate. Awareness of some things is only possible via language use.

One cannot become aware of something that does not exist(purely imaginary things) without language use.

However, belief about the world and/or oneself is being formed long before language acquisition begins in earnest. So, I would think awareness is needed during those times. I may agree with calling some cases of awareness during such times "knowing"(that something is there).

We can have false propositional beliefs about something... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. We can.

I'm not sure if we can have a "false awareness" of something. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Depends upon the something.

Secondhand info exists. The recent public usage of "CRT" is evidence of how one can become aware that there is a theory named "Critical Theory" based upon false belief about the theory. If based upon false belief, and it counts as an awareness that there is such a thing as "Critical Theory", it could be said that they know Critical Theory exists. Such awareness/knowledge seems to require propositional belief though, so it's not a good example of the criterion/outline you've offered, although it seems to be a case of "false awareness".

So, at least this sort of knowledge seems possible... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would think it's impossible to become aware of something that one does not believe exists. I do not see how one can become and/or be aware of something else that they do not believe is there.

...the total reduction of knowledge to propositional beliefs and their truth values so common in modern analytical philosophy. It seems obvious to me that I know my brother for instances, but I can know him more or less well than I currently know him. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed. I've long argued against those practices.

In terms of whether it is absolutely true that I am writing this reply, I cannot afford an answer. — Bob Ross

Failure to commit? No, rather "absolutely true" is like "solicitous chalk" or "oligarchic sandwich"; putting two words together doesn't necessitate that the result makes sense. You perhaps can't afford an answer because "absolutely true" is a nonsense.

There's something incongruous in Chet being so certain of his lack of confidence.

He is in effect asserting that his claim that there are no truths is true. Such self-defeating nonsense should not overly concern us.

The claim that knowledge is only belief ignores the simple point that the things we know are true. To know some statement, that statement must be at least a true belief. The things we know are a proper subset of the things we believe, differentiated from our other beliefs by being as at least true.

One way to talk? Sure. A bit shallow though. — creativesoul

If it seems shallow to you, then so be it.

seeing is believing. — creativesoul

No, seeing is seeing and believing is believing. I can see the tree outside the window, I don't need to believe it's there in order to see that it is. Belief is only operative where the possibility of doubt exists.

Awareness of some things is only possible via language use.

Exactly. A lot of phenomenological treatments go a step further, claiming that one cannot be aware of the intelligibilities of things without language. Language is what allows us to both explore the intelligibility of things (dividing and composing á la Aquinas/Aristotle) and in turn to develop a noetic grasp of their natures (essential vs accidental, genus, species, etc.). There is, of course, awareness prior to language, and animals are aware of things, but this would be the sort of awareness associated with Aristotle's "sensible soul," not the "rational soul." This sort of awareness does not allow us to be agents of truth in that it cannot allow us to "say things about things."

I'll admit that I was initially skeptical from this view point, but I find Husserl's explanation of how predication emerges from the phenomenology of human experience quite convincing. It's not that this view necessarily replaces the Kantian view of certain properties of mind shaping how we come to the world, or the neuroscientistic view of how our faculties are grounded in biology. Rather it's a "yes, and..." addition to how the nature of experience creates the ground for predication, which in turn allows for language, syntax, and the grasp of intelligible edios.

Perhaps there are species somewhere in the universe with an intelligence on par with humans whose grasp of intelligibilities is not like this. If we were a solitary species, something more akin to a tiger, language and conversation might not be so essential to how we grasp the world. But it seems true in the human case at least.

One cannot become aware of something that does not exist(purely imaginary things) without language use.

Or incorporeal entities/properties, e.g. economic recessions, complexity, information, chaos, order, communism, liberalism, Catholicism, etc.

Secondhand info exists. The recent public usage of "CRT" is evidence of how one can become aware that there is a theory named "Critical Theory" based upon false belief about the theory. If based upon false belief, and it counts as an awareness that there is such a thing as "Critical Theory", it could be said that they know Critical Theory exists. Such awareness/knowledge seems to require propositional belief though, so it's not a good example of the criterion/outline you've offered, although it seems to be a case of "false awareness".

That's one way of looking at it. I think the Aristotlean view would tend towards saying that this is an awareness of something, namely a propaganda narrative. The person is simply mistaken about what they are aware of. That is, they have both false propositional beliefs about CRT and they are also simply ignorant of many facets of it. They are aware of a real thing, CRT, but their awareness is quite incomplete, for they are ignorant of much of it.

In the case of UFOs, we are aware of other people's experiences of what they take to be extra terrestrial craft. Those people are aware of some sensory experience they have explained in terms of UFOs. Something caused that experience, and so the awareness of it isn't false. It is an awareness of something. Rather their propositional beliefs about the causes of that experience may be false. Similarly, chemists used to think they were aware of phlogiston when they saw flames. We now realize they were aware of the process of combustion. The awareness was of something (not false), it just has false beliefs attached to it.

I would think it's impossible to become aware of something that one does not believe exists. I do not see how one can become and/or be aware of something else that they do not believe is there.

Consider the case where the Loch Ness monster is real. Someone sees a huge ripple in the loch, like something big moving under the surface. They ascribe this to some normal animal or a drone. In reality, it was Nessy, the last elamasaurus!

Well, in this case they have been made aware of Nessy, or at least effects produced by Nessy (which are signs of their cause). They just have false propositional beliefs about what they experienced vis-á-vis it's causes.

This is, of course, just one way to look at it. But I think the Aristotlean frame is useful here in that otherwise we very quickly slip into having the opposite of awareness become falsity rather than ignorance. However, I do think there is a difference between ignorance and false belief, and that it's helpful to keep them apart.

Sokolowski talks about the problem of "vagueness." Vagueness often creeps in when people talk about a topic they understand poorly, e.g. quantum mechanics. Vagueness is the product of a mix of ignorance and false propositional belief, a sort of haze over something, a poor grasp of its intelligibility such that we not only predicate the wrong things of a thing, but are also simply ignorant of what might properly be predicated of it.

No, 'only' and 'mere' are PRECISELY the same (to me) in meaning and they are certainly no worse than 'subset'. So, I confess, I do not get this complaint. It's like saying to 'them' that 'OK, if you concede the main point about your door, we will agree to paint it chartreuse, as you direct.'
— Chet Hawkins
'mere' has negative connotations. — Bylaw

Colloquial or personal nonsense notwithstanding:

adjective being nothing more than specified
“a mere child”
synonyms:
specified
clearly and explicitly stated
adjective apart from anything else; without additions or modifications

That is the first AND second official definition of the word. I'm fine with that. And even so, I am now stating regardless of definition (because some of them are wrong) what I mean. It is the same as definitions 1 & 2 here, and nothing more.

Subset is neutral. British cities are a subset of the category cities. — Bylaw

Subset has the word sub in it. By bizarre personal or colloquial standards of the day I could claim you are trying to dominate British cities by the category cities and you expect sub drop and eyes lowered. Why? Why?

Yes, groups can do this. On the other hand, given their methodologies, I trust the information I get from some groups and some individuals more than others. I'm not exactly sure what you meant in the two parts I quoted here.
— Bylaw
Most 'grouping up' as a fallacious attempt to argue by mass or numbers, is cowardly, if you follow, an approach/need of fear and order. Anger does not care if others agree or not. It will hold the line to the balance of its own belief, regardless. At least that is GOOD anger.
— Chet Hawkins
I mentioned methodologies. This would include my own methodologies also, so really it has nothing to do with number. I am lying in bed and I think it's raining. I thought they maybe said something on the news that it would rain today, but I'm not sure. But I believe it is raining. Or, I get up, look out the window, see drops falling, hitting puddles. I now also believe it is raining, but the methodology I used in the second instance I respect more. So, it is when I evaluate how others reach conclusions: their methodologies - and perhaps past record, my sense of their trustworthiness and other criteria. — Bylaw

I suppose that sounds fine enough. You have SOME means of accrediting supposed authorities. But the only final authority is you, yourself, for your beliefs. Even if you choose to accredit or validate an external authority, your own nexus/locus of choice is still 'to blame' for your beliefs and you have to own those beliefs by way of moral responsibility.

This has nothing to do with fear or anger. — Bylaw

So, I WILL write in terms of my model to answer or post. That means, as in my model, there is nothing in this universe that does not ALWAYS partake of all three emotions, fear, anger, and desire. So, it is not factual at all to say that anything at all has nothing to do with fear, anger or desire. Of course such facts are only potentially facts to me, but they are facts by my definition. I have done as much due diligence as I can to validate these assertions as facts.

While there are bad dentists, I don't go with a toothache to prison guards or stock traders.
— Bylaw
Yes, on some of that we can agree. But we both know that in reality and especially human reality, there are many situations where the fox ends up guarding the henhouse. Why is that? I 'know' (ha ha) why. It's fair to use the fox's tricks against them, maybe (not really) The fox is likely to sell out truth. The fox is likely to call it doubters facetious when they are the serious ones. The fox was appointed by other foxes. It's there to corrupt the serious nature of truth, precisely to let slip things in a certain way. We are all beset by wisdom, by truth. It is too hard to live up to. The 'powers that be' have to make sure that some roads to truth are obscured. This aids in the pragmatic short cutting of truth in daily life. This aids in immorality, the opposite of wisdom.
— Chet Hawkins

Sure, I haven't said: if the experts say X, X must be true. — Bylaw

So, far, you have been ... excellent in your approach, as in: not just dismissive of a let's call it 'fresh' viewpoint and willing to temper what I usually get, a rudeness. The rudeness is fine to me. I don't mind a fight, of any type really, as it is the nature of reality. But the dismissiveness is when the fighter offers no argument at all for their side and just says 'you're wrong'. They lose when they do that, but, it doesn't mean they lose the public vote. This is just one reason why Democracy is a deeply immoral system. You cannot vote truth into existence, nor out of existence.

I agree experts are not always right. But I go further, amid honesty. Experts cultivate their position in order to sell out. It is the NORM, not the exception. The Capitalist system (and others but especially that one) foment a culture of sell outs. Fake it til you make it and then sell out. What a system!

In my olden times, the word 'drip' was not synonymous with personality or demeanor as it seems to be today on the street. Instead it meant a square, someone who was not street smart, a boring and unstylish person.

My ROTC detachment commander was a man I greatly respected. He had been a Pentagon consultant for decades. He understood communication so well, I suspected he was involved in inventing it. He referred to 'experts' in the following way: 'X is an unknown quantity, and a spurt is just some drip under pressure' I have to say, I agree with all my heart.

As an ENTP on the MBTI scale I am prone to upending experts at their chosen professions. They are not sufficiently 'perfect-aiming' in their own disciplines. They are used to the sell out angles. They prefer them. They want to make things easy and defensible. They are children in wisdom and in the pursuit of truth. I do not seek out this situation and it costs me dearly in all walks of life. Yet it has served me and the people I love quite well as a disposition. Do not trust anything at face value, especially authority. I still hold to that ... near truth.

But I recognize differences between beliefs. I use the word knowledge for beliefs that I consider very likely to be correct. It is a subset of beliefs that I have confidence in over other subsets of beliefs. I don't expect perfection, because I and we are fallible. We do our best. — Bylaw

I do not expect perfection either. In fact I dismiss claims of it. That is what this is about. Expose those that say, 'I know', for they do not, and they should not say that they do. Certainty is absurd. We should speak as if that is true.

I coined the (OK its obvious) phrase 'non-conclusion' for my book (upcoming). It means what people believe improperly that the word 'conclusion' means. Look at how hard truth is! I can literally change the phrase to ostensibly its opposite and still be NOT ONLY CORRECT, BUT MORE CORRECT. THAT is critical to understand. To continue to 'conclude' is a damning failure of wisdom. One cannot conclude. That word partakes again of perfection, too much. The assumption would be that 'our work here is done' and that is ALWAYS a lie. What is this need to wallow in the delusion of certainty? Did we not learn from philosophers of the past? Was Voltaire joking?

"It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you do know, for certain, that just ain't so." - Samuel Clemens

I disagree with Sam (or Mark) on that one. What you don't know is at least equally likely to cause you trouble, but, his point is along the lines of the MUCH BETTER quote by Voltaire.

Messi is a football player. He is one football player in the set of football players. But I would choose him to play on my team over three random players.

The parallel here is not that Messi is a kind of knowledge, though he certainly has that.
It's just I have no reason to say he is only a football player or a mere football player because he is part of that set. — Bylaw

This analogy is incorrect.

Knowledge is wholly subsumed into belief.
Messi is not wholly subsumed into football player.

You are confusing intersection with subset. They are not the same. And in doing so, you make again, my point for me, like so many have in this thread. For my part, it does not matter if others conceded the point that resonates BETTER with truth than those that they defend. Truth and falsehood ... you know (ha ha) the rest; or do you? Is the meaning actually lost?

You can rest assured of public support for the wrong choices, the wrong theories. That is only because they are relatively acceptable to the colloquial audience. Actual truth resonates more only with one side of this argument. That proximal resonation is not based in opinion.

Set's include better and worse members, given the purposes one has. — Bylaw

Incorrect. Reality is objective, so subjective belief does not matter to truth.

Sets include only members and set theory has no designation for 'lesser' and 'greater' until we redefine the set in those terms. You are wrong.

If I am interested in surprising beliefs, then out of the set of beliefs, many beliefs not considered knowledge and many considered knowledge will fit my needs. — Bylaw

Characteristics of elements within a set are a case for intersection, not exclusion. So you are burning a strawman. I do not know (ha ha) what else to say. More properly: I am not aware of how better to express this to you. That is a lie to some degree. I can go on and on. But I admit to not knowing, nor having the capacity to arrive at a conclusion (delusion). Therefore I am eternally engaged as is morally proper. I suggest a similar way. "This is the Way!' - Mando

If I am trying to successfully navigate the world, then those in the subset knowledge tend to work better. — Bylaw

Indeed, one should be able to depend more thoroughly upon one's beliefs that one has vetted well. Bu even the best is not knowledge, really. It is not to the objective standard and should be treated that way. I am NOT suggesting dismissal of moral duty related to judgment of which beliefs are better or worse. In fact, quite the opposite. I am saying that the dread finality of words like 'know' and 'certain', and even 'fact' and 'conclusion' are dangerous as colloquially used. They are used by choosers possessed of LESSER awareness only. They imply a perfection, an objectivity, that is NOT and CANNOT be present. They should be frowned upon as modes/tools of speech and writing.

But I see no reason to use mere or only, especially if the latter is considered a synonym of the former. — Bylaw

I used it because 'mere' IS only or merely a synonym of 'only'. That is a fact. Other beliefs are using tertiary and beyond interpretations of this word. I certainly consider it no less disparaging a word than any word with a prefix of 'sub' in it. I mean really!?

It makes more sense to me, to applaud and enjoy with the people who demonstrate that they have knowledge. You can't know that it is inherently less correct, right?
— wonderer1
I think that the self-indulgent position you take here is part of the problem, not the solution. Enjoyment of awareness is STILL NOT knowing.
— Chet Hawkins

And yet here you are hypocritically indulging in discussion with knowledgeable people, and using the internet which only exists as a result of people having the knowledge required to make the internet work. — wonderer1

Since knowledge is delusional belief, knowledgeable people are delusional. And that is ok. But we are trying to become MORE AWARE in this process, or at least that is my aim.

Practical manifestations of effort that 'work' are also fine. It has no bearing on the delusional nature of their 'knowledge'. Society worked quite well when it was all 'Sky Daddy saves!', or mostly so. Use your illusion is 'workable'. But, the work of philosophy, the love of wisdom, is to acquaint the quaint with the esoteric truth. That is to say, truth SHOULD NOT BE esoteric. We should live in resonation with it.

And I am called Hypocrite for championing this cause of denial of delusion, acclimation to truth, on a forum dedicated to the love of wisdom.

It IS true that I indulge myself amid the struggle. But my delusions of being on the right side are still a lesser failure than ... yours. (And by all means let's restrict that assertion to JUST THIS set of posts and case).

There's something incongruous in Chet being so certain of his lack of confidence. — Banno

Coherency certainly isn't his strong suit. (Not to say he scores better when it comes to correspondence.)

Subset has the word sub in it. By bizarre personal or colloquial standards of the day I could claim you are trying to dominate British cities by the category cities and you expect sub drop and eyes lowered. Why? Why? — Chet Hawkins

Yes, sub means under orginally, but it has lost that connotation, means part of the set. I'm happy to us any other noun for mean it contains some of the members of the larger set of beliefs. But....
The issue isn't really the word. If you don't mean something negative with only and mere, then it doesn't matter. It seems like you are saying all beliefs are the same when you say this. If that's what you mean then we can discuss that. If that's not what you mean we can hop over that discussion.

I agree experts are not always right. But I go further, amid honesty. Experts cultivate their position in order to sell out. It is the NORM, not the exception. The Capitalist system (and others but especially that one) foment a culture of sell outs. Fake it til you make it and then sell out. What a system! — Chet Hawkins

I recognize this phenomenon. But still, I will tend to believe experts over random non-experts. And, as I say later in my previous post, I also take a portion of beliefs to be better than others. I have my own methodologies. I am not separating beliefs into different categories just on expert opinion.

It's not clear to me yet what your overall position is, so much of what I am doing is triangulating, probing, until, hopefully I do understand it.

Do not trust anything at face value, especially authority. — Chet Hawkins

I'd say I am an outlier in my criticism of authority and expert opinions. Of course, often I am going with marginalized expert opinions that have informed my disagreement. Also my understanding in general that leads to my rejection of authority, when I do that, is also informed by the work of experts. I have intuition, experience added into the mix and also a sense of paradigmatic biases.

Set's include better and worse members, given the purposes one has.
— Bylaw
Incorrect. Reality is objective, so subjective belief does not matter to truth.

Sets include only members and set theory has no designation for 'lesser' and 'greater' until we redefine the set in those terms. You are wrong. — Chet Hawkins

It's not wrong. And I went on to give examples. Of course better and worse have subjective elements - given our purposes!!!!!!, but if we are saying all members are the same and we have no context for that, well, who cares. But to me there is a context for discussing the issue of knowledge and beliefs and that has to do with what we want and how we use these things.

If this topic is just about sets for you and getting the members that fit those sets and you have no other purpose, OK, fine. It's not a topic that interest me and I'll bow out.

Notice that I even gave examples of different subjective uses for the set of beliefs.

, given the purposes one has. — Bylaw

you quoted this part but seem to have ignored it. Given the purposes we have which would be based on our subjective values. I'd prefer to know that 2 inches of ice would likely hold my weight and I'd want a good source for that information. I don't want just any belief from the set of beliefs, I want one that meets my criteria. Our purposes are subjective, yes. That condition is right there in my explanation (given our purposes). A surgeon has a set of tools available but doesn't ask for 'a tool', she asks for the one that is better for her purpose. If they were playing some game in the operating room with no patient there, than other purposes might be afoot and any tool would do.. Given the purposes.

Characteristics of elements within a set are a case for intersection, not exclusion. So you are burning a strawman. — Chet Hawkins

Honestly I have no idea why you called my explaining my thinking....note: my thinking - a strawman.

For me when two people are communicating with each other, here online especially, I think it is important to lay out my thinking. This often helps prevent talking past each other. In the process of trying to understand and yes, possibly also criticize, someone else's position, I will do a number of different things.

You mentioned earlier that you were used to being insulted or it seems implicit in what you said. Is it possible you are seeing my posts through the lens of how other people have reacted to you? Are you assuming that I fully understand your position, so, for that reason and/or other factors you think everything I say is an attack or somehow supposed to be a representation of your position? If so, that's not what I'm doing.

They imply a perfection, an objectivity, that is NOT and CANNOT be present. — Chet Hawkins

I find the distinction useful and at the same time do not assume knowledge, for example, must be and is perfectly correct. I don't even assume despite the capitals and lack of qualification in what you said above that you mean what you said MUST be 100% correct. Perhaps you think it is, but I don't assume that's the way you think. And even if one avoids using those words - the ones that you think entail a claim of infallibility - one still batches some beliefs over there, some here, some in another batch. With varying degrees of confidence in them. I'm happy to use the word knowledge. If someone else assume this means perfection, well, I disagree, but I'm open to whatever noun they use for the category of beliefs they have a great deal of confidence in.

If I read your post it comes across that you are not just a skeptic. You tell me, for example, something I said was incorrect, period. No qualification. Many of your positions and reactions seem very confident. Nothing wrong with that. So, when you assert things this way, that set of assertions, which presumably reflect beliefs of yours, what do you call that set?

The term intention has very different uses, particularly between laypeople and philosophers. I'm guessing you know this already. Just thought it worth mention. It's relatively new to me. That said... — creativesoul

That idea is not new to me, although much too much is made of this, and without a proper intent (yes, according to me).

That is to say, the goal of a philosopher SHOULD BE to unite the people with their wisdom, thereby aiding in all of us living in a better world, a world where more properly informed choices is more likely. 'Their wisdom' being that served to them by the experts, ha ha, the philosophers, people intending to understand what this truth thing is and how it's pursuit can help us all. That IS NOT aligned with accepting these 'different uses'. We should clear up these differences and put the right way into use as much as we can.

If we're using the layman's notion of intention or the philosopher's, intentionally mimicking for the sake of mimicking requires believing one is mimicking for the sake of mimicking. The object of intention(the philosopher's kind) is the mimicry in both cases, it seems to me. Although, I suppose ridicule could be the object in the deliberate cause of mimicry. The difference between mimicking without knowing one is mimicking and intentionally mimicking is the knowing part. In either case, one knows how to mimic when one mimics. — creativesoul

Since knowing is impossible, when we use a BETTER term, 'to be aware of' this cleans up a lot of conjecture and confusion. For some, it may seem to add confusion, but that is only because they believed that knowledge was somehow actually fundamentally different than belief. The truth is it offers a better understanding to all to aim or intend in that direction.

My own belief with intent makes rather quick work of the so-called divide between metaphysical naturalism and religious or spiritual naturalism. Since nature and all its laws are NOTHING BUT consciousness (to me as fact), they are the same. Done.

Intentionality, like all concepts, all things, is grounded in natural truth which is all consciousness. So, of course, intent is a matter of conscious action, choice.

Choice can only and always only involved JUST the three emotions. Even matter is only the three emotions. Of course that last bit is a HUGE derail, but I am mentioning it for completeness.

Any intent can thus be broken down into fear, anger, and desire components. Further, an intent could be said to contain any number of sub-intents, either wholly subsumed or merely intersecting the base intent. So intent is a rich world of consciousness. And its focal point can be said to colloquially and understandably be any nexus/locus of choice.

So, it would be wrong and or adding to confusion to say 'let's maintain or respect this difference of definition for the same thing.' Clarity is, well, again, perhaps only to a few including me, a goal of actual wisdom. To maintain without a statement of belief one way or the other disparate viewpoints is useful for imagination, but not advisable finally as wisdom or as intent.

Both cases require believing that there is something to be mimicked; believing that another individual behaved in some certain way; believing that someone else did something or another. — creativesoul

Yes, and in all cases, 'knowing' nothing (for sure). It is my assertion that the word or verb and all its ramifications, 'to know' is misused and further that its misuse is a causal agent for confusion, allowing and encouraging confusion to grow, as opposed to wisdom.

Earlier you wrote that one without hands cannot plane a board. Strictly speaking that's not true of everyone without hands, but yes... that's the gist of the existential dependency I'm setting out regarding knowledge and belief. — creativesoul

The decision that one 'knows' is merely in error. In all cases that sort or quality of error is MORE ERROR than just admitting to belief instead of claiming 'knowing'. Knowledge in this case is shown to defy belief. It claims to be transcendent or better than belief. That is a lie. Instead say the supporting argument by which you harden your belief. Or claim the belief as fact with the tacit admission that fact is only a subset of belief. All beliefs, facts included, are partially in error. That does mean I am claiming that belief is not important and wise. But claiming to know is surely unwise. That is my belief.

I understand that this is not really germane to the thread topic, but it involves belief, and I'm a sucker for that topic. — creativesoul

I am a sucker for most topics because all meaning is embedded in every topic. This is both a joke and a truism and humor and seriousness are juxtaposed but non-contradictory.

As far as the OP goes, you and I agree much more than disagree. It's when we unpack our respective notions of knowledge and belief that things begin to get more contentious. It seems that way to me anyway. — creativesoul

He is the OP. So, what do you mean?

No, seeing is seeing and believing is believing. I can see the tree outside the window, I don't need to believe it's there in order to see that it is. Belief is only operative where the possibility of doubt exists. — Janus

Until we are perfect, objective in understanding, until we do 'know'; we have only varying degrees of awareness and of course, belief.

I don't need to believe it's there in order to see that it is. — Janus

I see the tree in the yard but do not believe it's there.

And I am called Hypocrite for championing this cause of denial of delusion, acclimation to truth, on a forum dedicated to the love of wisdom. — Chet Hawkins

You seem more a lover of your belief that you are particularly wise, than a lover of wisdom.

But here's a chance for you to show me that I'm wrong. Name five posters on TPF who you have learned from.

Subset has the word sub in it. By bizarre personal or colloquial standards of the day I could claim you are trying to dominate British cities by the category cities and you expect sub drop and eyes lowered. Why? Why?
— Chet Hawkins
Yes, sub means under orginally, but it has lost that connotation, means part of the set. I'm happy to us any other noun for mean it contains some of the members of the larger set of beliefs. — Bylaw

Well you can get that you claimed I was implying something negative with the word 'merely' or 'only' if I recall properly. I was not.

So, I am very concerned about the proper use of words and in the case where they are used improperly or let's say oddly, that they should then be accompanied by a personal definition, and, I do try to do that if the context of the discussion is not already making that abundantly clear.

But....
The issue isn't really the word. — Bylaw

If one feels or believes one has been misunderstood, one tries to determine why. If people cannot agree on some aspects of what a word means, that is OFTEN the reason for the confusion and miscommunication. So, the issue is OFTEN the word or words.

If you don't mean something negative with only and mere, then it doesn't matter. — Bylaw

I do not mean anything negative. I do not consider subsets of sets to be a negative thing either. But again, that speaks to MY point. Neither is merely or only. They properly infer the condition or state of being a subset.

It seems like you are saying all beliefs are the same when you say this. — Bylaw

Not at all and that is another strawman as an implication. I never said that but I know you used the word 'seems'. So, ok.

No, what I want to show or assert is that:
1) Facts are ONLY or MERELY beliefs.
2) Knowledge in the colloquial sense is really only beliefs.

Neither of those assertions assert that any random individual's process for validating 'facts' and colloquial 'knowledge' is incorrect or useful in any way, including my own. I must say colloquial when I say knowledge because, to me, knowing and thus the term knowledge partakes of perfection and is not really best used to show belief unless of course we all agree that knowledge is only belief. And round and round we go.

I agree experts are not always right. But I go further, amid honesty. Experts cultivate their position in order to sell out. It is the NORM, not the exception. The Capitalist system (and others but especially that one) foment a culture of sell outs. Fake it til you make it and then sell out. What a system!
— Chet Hawkins
I recognize this phenomenon. But still, I will tend to believe experts over random non-experts. And, as I say later in my previous post, I also take a portion of beliefs to be better than others. I have my own methodologies. I am not separating beliefs into different categories just on expert opinion. — Bylaw

Yes you are separating them as you just admitted. It's ok. Even I do that some. I tend also to trust people who have a vested interest in a subject of being at least marginally aware of the truths related to it. But, it is also true that in most cases I find that my allowance in that regard was woefully incorrect and I should have treated the expert as potentially worse than a common sense guess, e.g. a random non-expert's opinion. It is frankly quite scary what passes for expertise and it always has been.

It's not clear to me yet what your overall position is, so much of what I am doing is triangulating, probing, until, hopefully I do understand it. — Bylaw

No worries and thank you. I do appreciate someone that tries to understand my point. I get of lot of what I would characterize as intentional misunderstanding. That relates to your later question I will answer about 'feeling insulted' etc.

Do not trust anything at face value, especially authority.
— Chet Hawkins
I'd say I am an outlier in my criticism of authority and expert opinions. Of course, often I am going with marginalized expert opinions that have informed my disagreement. Also my understanding in general that leads to my rejection of authority, when I do that, is also informed by the work of experts. I have intuition, experience added into the mix and also a sense of paradigmatic biases. — Bylaw

All of that is as it should be, or, let's say simply, I agree.

Set's include better and worse members, given the purposes one has.
— Bylaw
Incorrect. Reality is objective, so subjective belief does not matter to truth.

Sets include only members and set theory has no designation for 'lesser' and 'greater' until we redefine the set in those terms. You are wrong.
— Chet Hawkins
It's not wrong. And I went on to give examples. Of course better and worse have subjective elements - given our purposes!!!!!!, but if we are saying all members are the same and we have no context for that, well, who cares. — Bylaw

I mean, what is going on here? I am aware of what is happening to some degree, but still ...

The set is or is not accurately believed as 'related in the sense of what defines the set' Sets do not include better or worse members until we filter or intersect them, perform some function on that set which reveals the ordering. Granted that the set of things of which a person is aware can be divided into 'beliefs believed more strongly', and 'beliefs believed less strongly'. That is not really the point I have been after.

The assertions are like this:
1) Knowledge is only belief.
2) The word and its ramified terms, 'to know' is not well used often. It is taken most often to mean certainty, which is wrong. ... Because ...
3) Belief is almost always partially in error. Belief is almost never certain.
These assertions are crafted more carefully to avoid the superlatives that one is tempted to use.

But to me there is a context for discussing the issue of knowledge and beliefs and that has to do with what we want and how we use these things. — Bylaw

What is 'wanted' is often self-indulgent and wrong. What should be wanted is the objective truth in each case. The want to obscure truth by encouraging or not calling to task issues like how often and incorrectly people believe that 'knowing' and certainty are acceptable, is not wise. The desire or want to call that bad habit to task may be unpopular, but it is wise.

If this topic is just about sets for you and getting the members that fit those sets and you have no other purpose, OK, fine. It's not a topic that interest me and I'll bow out. — Bylaw

So that is only the meat of the argument, as in what is needed to explain the relationship between certainty and belief. Beliefs are most commonly accepted as uncertain, by definition. Knowing is sadly not understood to be only a matter of belief. Therefore many and most people treat 'knowing' as if the believer is certain. That is and always will be an error. It is an error even if the use of that belief works and works regularly.

Notice that I even gave examples of different subjective uses for the set of beliefs.
, given the purposes one has.
— Bylaw
you quoted this part but seem to have ignored it. Given the purposes we have which would be based on our subjective values. — Bylaw

Right but although we are all left with only subjective belief finally, we should aim at being as objective as we can be. Even still, we will not arrive at objectivity. So we should not claim to 'know'. It confuses people CLEARLY as this thread shows. Many of them believe that 'knowing' is the same as certainty.

I'd prefer to know that 2 inches of ice would likely hold my weight and I'd want a good source for that information. I don't want just any belief from the set of beliefs, I want one that meets my criteria. Our purposes are subjective, yes. That condition is right there in my explanation (given our purposes). A surgeon has a set of tools available but doesn't ask for 'a tool', she asks for the one that is better for her purpose. If they were playing some game in the operating room with no patient there, than other purposes might be afoot and any tool would do.. Given the purposes. — Bylaw

None of this is anything but tangential to the issue I am trying to get across.

I'm just genuinely concerned that some people consider knowledge and facts to be something more impressive than beliefs quintessentially, when they are not. It does make some difference, I suppose, when you yourself have validated the belief somewhat, but no matter what it's still just, only, merely, belief. I mean if we agree on that then that is the whole reason for the thread.

In order for me to be wrong, knowledge, a given bit of it, would have to be greater quintessentially than belief. It is not. That means it would have to break the set barrier and belong to a superset rather than a subset.

Characteristics of elements within a set are a case for intersection, not exclusion. So you are burning a strawman.
— Chet Hawkins
Honestly I have no idea why you called my explaining my thinking....note: my thinking - a strawman. — Bylaw

Because you made a case for purposes or value judgements UNRELATED to the categorical formation of the set mattering, when they do not. It is always the case that your thing is the strawman when a strawman is being used. I did not bring that to the argument. Correct. You brought that strawman. So, my usage of the term is also correct. I would not bring a strawman for you to burn (unless you are going to burn me, in which case let me know and I will indeed bring a strawman for you to burn in effigy).

For me when two people are communicating with each other, here online especially, I think it is important to lay out my thinking. This often helps prevent talking past each other. In the process of trying to understand and yes, possibly also criticize, someone else's position, I will do a number of different things. — Bylaw

I agree. But the implication is that I have not done that which is in error. I have laid out my thinking. And I do not get the sense that we are only talking past each other. Some other posters in this thread are doing that with me, but not you.

You mentioned earlier that you were used to being insulted or it seems implicit in what you said. Is it possible you are seeing my posts through the lens of how other people have reacted to you? — Bylaw

It is possible, even probable. I apologize for being on the defensive, to the degree to which I am.

Are you assuming that I fully understand your position, so, for that reason and/or other factors you think everything I say is an attack or somehow supposed to be a representation of your position? If so, that's not what I'm doing. — Bylaw

I do not assume ANYONE understands my position, or at least well. I do not really think it's all that hard to understand it. But, that seems to be an ineffective impediment to many let's call them 'detractors' of my assertions.

So, over time, that effect has given me a fairly robust ability to hang on, keep explaining, until at least some few can relate my position back to me in enough detail to allow me to feel heard. It is NOT strictly necessary, thank the fates, that I be understood at all. It is again a truism that relative resonance is acceptable in place of some foolish expectation of certain or complete resonance.

They imply a perfection, an objectivity, that is NOT and CANNOT be present.
— Chet Hawkins

I find the distinction useful and at the same time do not assume knowledge, for example, must be and is perfectly correct. I don't even assume despite the capitals and lack of qualification in what you said above that you mean what you said MUST be 100% correct. — Bylaw

Well, I did qualify it. But at least you and I are in agreement on that point of knowledge not being certain and therefore being ... yep ... merely belief.

Perhaps you think it is, but I don't assume that's the way you think. — Bylaw

Good. I think I made it abundantly clear I do not even like the implication of certainty, let alone the assertion of it.

And even if one avoids using those words - the ones that you think entail a claim of infallibility - one still batches some beliefs over there, some here, some in another batch. With varying degrees of confidence in them. — Bylaw

And that is my point. All beliefs, including all knowledge, are in the belief bucket (only). They cannot escape that bucket.

I'm happy to use the word knowledge. If someone else assume this means perfection, well, I disagree, but I'm open to whatever noun they use for the category of beliefs they have a great deal of confidence in. — Bylaw

In any case THAT is the problem. The reason it is a problem is one that I have qualified over and over and over again in these posts. That is ... people use it as a stand in for certainty. Maybe you don't. But you are participating willingly by your own admission in a cultural practice that spreads confusion. That confusion is allowed or caused by the situation that people object to or TYPICALLY intend for the word 'know' to mean certainty. And it is being OK with that nonsense, that is the root problem. It is not wise. It cannot be wise. It is wise to challenge people to stop doing that. It is wise to NOT be happy to use that word as long as so many people use it that way. So very many communications are confused by this concept.

If I read your post it comes across that you are not just a skeptic. You tell me, for example, something I said was incorrect, period. No qualification. Many of your positions and reactions seem very confident. Nothing wrong with that. So, when you assert things this way, that set of assertions, which presumably reflect beliefs of yours, what do you call that set? — Bylaw

Beliefs and you could say then, assertions, which are also only beliefs.

You seem more a lover of your belief that you are particularly wise, than a lover of wisdom. — wonderer1

Well that's your belief. It is not mine. I do pursue wisdom. And I am happy to engage in the false modesty of Socrates when I say, 'I am not wise'. It covers the point a bit nicely. That is to say, despite the fact that no one else I can find is wiser, I admit as well that I am not finally wise. This is rather the same point about perfection that I am making with saying something as goofy as 'knowing' when its colloquial definition is an error involving certainty.

But here's a chance for you to show me that I'm wrong. Name five posters on TPF who you have learned from. — wonderer1

I learn from everyone, even if it's just how they are usually.

So I could name any five. But, to not avoid your challenge I would say:

wonderer1
Tom Storm
Bob Ross
Bylaw
and heck we will even throw Banno and Janus into the set.

I did six so I am excelling at this task.

2) Knowledge in the colloquial sense is really only beliefs. — Chet Hawkins

Is there another sense where it means something else?

2) The word and its ramified terms, 'to know' is not well used often. It is taken most often to mean certainty, which is wrong. — Chet Hawkins

I don't take it that way. I guess I'd need to know the context to know if it is most often taken to be certain (and then perhaps what certain means - does this mean that someone is infallible when they categorize something as knowledge? I can't say I know how many groups would answer, but it seems like there are quite a few people who think knowledge may end up getting revised and are aware that this has been the case in most fields in the past. But I don't know numbers.

The set is or is not accurately believed as 'related in the sense of what defines the set' Sets do not include better or worse members until we filter or intersect them, — Chet Hawkins

again
given our purposes. If I look at the set of beliefs and my purpose is to find a range of unique suggestions/strange seeming ideas, I will view different members of the set as better or worse...for my purpose. If I want to know how deal with a loose chain on my bike, because I really want to fix it, some beliefs about this will be better than others. They're all peachy members of the set, if the only issue is, does it belong in the set. But my purposes will lead to some members being better than others. And given that knowledge is part of the topic, that often leads to purposes, for me, around how to navigate my way around life and the world. Some will be better or worse for that, given my purposes. And I have critieria for determining which I will try - whose beliefs I am more likely to try out myself, for example.

So that is only the meat of the argument, as in what is needed to explain the relationship between certainty and belief. Beliefs are most commonly accepted as uncertain, by definition. Knowing is sadly not understood to be only a matter of belief. Therefore many and most people treat 'knowing' as if the believer is certain — Chet Hawkins

As if the believer is certain or as if the belief is accurate. Do you mean that people assume that if someone says they know those people falsely assume the person is certain or they falsely assume that what that person claims to know is correct?

In any case THAT is the problem. The reason it is a problem is one that I have qualified over and over and over again in these posts. That is ... people use it as a stand in for certainty — Chet Hawkins

I don't. I am aware of scientists that consider knowledge to be open to revision. We have rigorous criteria, they would say and if something passes those it gets considered knowledge, but they are aware that it might be revised later. I know people in other fields who have similar ideas. As I said earlier I can't really speak to numbers, but I find this a fairly common position. Of course, sometimes it is the official position but this gets forgotten in the specifics.

Well, I did qualify it. But at least you and I are in agreement on that point of knowledge not being certain and therefore being ... yep ... merely belief. — Chet Hawkins

There is the whole knowledge is JTB camp and in discussions in other threads some people, myself included, objected to using the T. I think that objection is fairly common in philosophy forums.

In any case THAT is the problem. The reason it is a problem is one that I have qualified over and over and over again in these posts. That is ... people use it as a stand in for certainty. Maybe you don't. But you are participating willingly by your own admission in a cultural practice that spreads confusion. That confusion is allowed or caused by the situation that people object to or TYPICALLY intend for the word 'know' to mean certainty. And it is being OK with that nonsense, that is the root problem. It is not wise. It cannot be wise. It is wise to challenge people to stop doing that. It is wise to NOT be happy to use that word as long as so many people use it that way. So very many communications are confused by this concept. — Chet Hawkins

So, if you do decide that some beliefs are more likely to be true or better justified, what do you call that set of beliefs, if you call it anything?

So, if you do decide that some beliefs are more likely to be true or better justified, what do you call that set of beliefs, if you call it anything? — Bylaw

You can call it whatever delusional thing you prefer to call it. It still is actually JUST belief.

I suppose one could, as we already have, delve into justification methods and qualification of so-called experts. That misses the point.

We cannot KNOW or be certain of anything. If we are all fine using the term 'know' as colloquially meant which is 'nigh unto certain', then I suppose my advice is stop using it until people get used to the idea that it does not really mean that.

That is to say, it is better to use 'I am aware of some aspects of this subject' rather than I KNOW this subject. In every way, the former is more accurate. The latter is intended to and DOES for most people imply an assertion of 'dread certainty'. It is humorous that many 'believers' will indeed be the ones to claim that knowing is certain and then that their belief is certain.

We need a better way of expressing ourselves that allows for doubt, the unpleasant condition, to be maintained with less need for the false comfort of the delusion of certainty.

You can call it whatever delusional thing you prefer to call it. It still is actually JUST belief. — Chet Hawkins

So, if you or I labeled some beliefs that we thought were more likely to be true than others, that label would have to be delusional?

We cannot KNOW or be certain of anything. — Chet Hawkins

Presumably including this and that any label for beliefs we consider better justified would be a delusional label.

If I said that believing asking my bicycle chain to repair itself was a less well justified approach than replacing a broken chain with one I buy, I would be delusional? IOW if I break my or someone's beliefs down into well justified and other beliefs.

We need a better way of expressing ourselves that allows for doubt, the unpleasant condition, to be maintained with less need for the false comfort of the delusion of certainty. — Chet Hawkins

I can manage to use a lot of formulations, even 'knowledge' without feeling that there can be no doubt belief X is correct.

That is to say, it is better to use 'I am aware of some aspects of this subject' rather than I KNOW this subject. In every way, the former is more accurate. — Chet Hawkins

Yes, but people can manage to assert things in ways where they seem certain, without using know or knowledge. And they do all the time. In fact, I'd say this is more common. People asserting things without qualification. Rather than saying I know this subject, they act like they know the subject. I don't hear that formulation much 'I know this subject'. Instead one gets a lot of blunt statements.

Failure to commit? No, rather "absolutely true" is like "solicitous chalk" or "oligarchic sandwich"; putting two words together doesn't necessitate that the result makes sense. You perhaps can't afford an answer because "absolutely true" is a nonsense.

Absolute truth would refer, in your terminology, to anything that is considered true with absolute certainty; and 'absolute certainty' would refer to a level of certainty which cannot be doubted legitimately (e.g., a tautology) as opposed to what one doesn't have good reasons to doubt.

I see the tree in the yard but do not believe it's there. — creativesoul

I don't believe it is possible to actively disbelieve in something you see in front of you. Well, I know I can't at least. I also don't see that as supporting the notion that active belief is necessary in those situations. That said, I don't deny that you can talk about believing that the tree you see is there, rather than simply saying you see it there, but I think the former way of speaking is less parsimonious, even redundant. But ye know, that's just me; I don't have a problem with others disagreeing.

Until we are perfect, objective in understanding, until we do 'know'; we have only varying degrees of awareness and of course, belief. — Chet Hawkins

You have your way of thinking about it, and I have mine, and the twain shall never meet, it seems. I think we know many things, as I've said, but I admit there is no perfect, absolute, context-independent knowledge, and since such a thing is impossible, I find it to be an absurd inapt principle by which to attempt to assess and understand our concepts.

Absolute truth would refer, in your terminology, to anything that is considered true with absolute certainty; and 'absolute certainty' would refer to a level of certainty which cannot be doubted legitimately (e.g., a tautology) as opposed to what one doesn't have good reasons to doubt. — Bob Ross

What's the difference between having no good reason to doubt something and not being able to doubt something legitimately?