You don't think concepts are determinate? How is the concept of a circle not determinate? — Bob Ross

Because in order to establish determinacy of the kind you suggest requires there to be an agreement between the circle and the language that is "speaking" the features of the circle and its features. Note that there certainly IS determinacy in the general way we use this term in many contexts. But for philosophy, we require an account that brings inquiry to a level of presuppositions, that is, even though the a quantitative amount is designated by a number, say, and a number is a determinate concept (the radius of a circle, perhaps) this designation presupposes the language that is used to speak the determinacy. One has to establish the determinacy of this in order to achieve the, as you put it, primitive and unanalyzable concept of the circle or modus ponens, or anything else you can think of.

But language is presupposed in an analysis of the nature of language, as is logic. You see the problem. This finds it strongest expression in Derrida.

But you haven't defined what it means to exist — Bob Ross

Yes, that is what I am trying to say. What is the definition of existence? It seems, as your post brings up, it can only be defined circularly, which is no definition. We can have an idea of what it is to be, but we can't say exactly what is its essence. But there is one thing we know about it: it is counterfactual to any action or state of a subject. Defining a concept by its consequence might be better than not defining it at all.

I accept that the space and time which are our forms of experience are a priori, but not that space and time do not exist beyond that in reality. — Bob Ross

That’s fine. Until the Enlightenment space and time were considered by the majority of thinkers as constituents of reality, and never as a priori conditions for experience.

If you don’t accept that space and time don’t exist in reality, wouldn’t you want to offer at least an idea on how it might be that they do? Is it even possible to grant to space and time coexistent intuitional a priori and cosmic a posteriori conceptual schemes?

"To be or not to be" means "should something exist, or should it not?" — Bob Ross

But Hamlet doesn't exist. Hence "Exist" on its own, is vague and obscure. It is said to indicate things that doesn't exist as if it exists. When a claim is made "X exists", it must be supplied with more information on where, how and when. Without the info, it is a meaningless utterance such as "I think therefore I am."

So, do you agree that some concepts are absolutely simple, and thusly unanalyzable and incapable of non-circular definitions, but yet still valid; or do these so-called, alleged, primitive concepts need to be either (1) capable of non-circular definition or (2) thrown out? — Bob Ross

What does a brick mean on its own lying on the ground apart from being a brick? Nothing. Many bricks must be piled with the cement mix into a shape to form a barbecue, a wall, workshop or a house to be meaningful for its manifestation.

Likewise what does "being" or "exist" mean on its own in a grammatically incomplete utterance? Nothing apart from being an object of inference, intuition or poetry, which must be thrown out in philosophical discussions as nonsense.

I didn’t understand this question: can you re-phrase it? — Bob Ross

Apologies. You answered my question already.

To use a concept, is to deploy it; and to presuppose a concept is to use a concept in a manner whereof one does not explicate its meaning (but, rather, uses it implicitly in their analysis). — Bob Ross

I'd very much like to see an example of this. I'm not saying I don't understand or have any idea of what you mean, I'd just like to see where you're coming from with this distinction between deploying a concept and explicating its meaning. I can imagine a world in which deploying a concept is an instance of explicating a meaning, regardless of whether a definition is offered.

Oh, I think I understand where your are heading; so let me clarify: by claiming ‘being’, or any absolutely simple concept, is unanalyzable and primitive, I DO NOT mean to convey that we cannot come to know what they are. I mean that we can’t come to know them through conceptual analysis: they remain forever notions, which are acquired via pure intuitions (about reality). — Bob Ross

I think I see what you mean. Though I think you're relying on a strict distinction between regular acts of speech and the analysis of concepts. I can certainly see that there is a distinction between them. What we're doing right now is a very analytical use of language. But you do pick up and refine concepts just by listening and chatting.

My only problem with that is the problem of us teaching the youth concepts like being, because they are not intrinsic to our nature. Concepts can always have definitions but become circular because of the nature of linguistics. Plato is known for defining being and it is noncircular if articulated correctly.

This pecularity indicates, by my lights, that ‘being’ is a primitive concept and, as such, is absolutely simple, unanalyzable, and (yet) still perfectly valid. — Bob Ross

Existence seems to be a property of entities that exist and as a property it can be defined by its instances, that is, by entities that exist. What is more primitive: a property or its instances? I would say neither; instances cannot exist without a property and a property cannot exist without instances.

You posts often do not come up in mentions and are not flagged. Something to do with the way you are editing them, at a guess.

Oh, I am sorry to hear that. Unfortunately, I am unsure as to what mistake I may be doing—all I do is hit the reply button and it adds a reply link at the top of my response.

In terms of your response, I only have one problem with it: you are analyzing “is” in the english language when you refer to ‘being’ and not the concept of being.

I have no problem with you analysis that ‘is’ is deployed in various different ways, and that some of them do not even make any sort of existential claim—all of that is completely correct. However, “is” is linguistic, not conceptual. I am asking what it means ‘to exist’, not how we use the term ‘is’ (or similar words).

This is important, because your definition of ‘being’ is really the valid definition of the usage of ‘is’; and not the definition of ‘being’ in the sense of the concept of ‘to be’.

An easy example, is your existential quantification sense of ‘is’:

the "is" of existential quantification ∃(x)f(x), "there is something that is green".

Existential quantification presupposes, and does not answer itself, what it means ‘to exist’. It is a way to quantify existence (in a way). E.g., by claiming “there is something that is green” in the sense that there exists something green, presupposes the concept of what it means to exist—so it can’t itself being a proper analysis of ‘to be’. See what I mean?

Apart from that, I totally agree (:

I think we know exactly what being is: I just don't think we can properly explicate it. Knowledge isn't just the sphere if explicable information.

We can have an idea of what it is to be, but we can't say exactly what is its essence. But there is one thing we know about it: it is counterfactual to any action or state of a subject.

Yes, subjects are negativity; insofar as they negate what exists. But this seems like you are agreeing now with me that you cannot define being.

I think physics demonstrates quite sufficiently that space and time are valid 'entities' in our calculations, and not in the sense that they are merely our modes of intuition, but I would be interested to hear how you would interpret it (since you obviously disagree).

I don't think that space and time are proper substances, because I don't think literal extension and temporality exist in reality (beyond our modes of intuition): but I do think, at a minimum, the things in themselves must be related to each other with the concepts of space and time---it just seems like physics goes out the window otherwise at this point.

???

You just tried to prove 'being' is vague because 'to be or not to be' doesn't refer to Hamlet's existence: why would Hamlet not existing have anything to do with it?

Concepts have their own meaning despite how they relate to concepts. The concept of the number 3 is obviously distinct from the number 2, and they don't rely on how they relate to each other to be defined.

I'd very much like to see an example of this. I'm not saying I don't understand or have any idea of what you mean, I'd just like to see where you're coming from with this distinction between deploying a concept and explicating its meaning.

I think ‘using’ a concept is more generic than ‘presupposing it’: both are ‘using’ it, the former is just what it means to ‘use’ generally, and the latter is to leave it unexplicated.

You are absolutely right that one can learn a concept through merely interacting with it or observing other people discuss about it, without its exact definition being clarified. I just don’t see how this negates my position, I guess.

If we want to be really technical, then I would say that we first, in our early years, learn notions; then we (tend to) refine them in our young adulthood into ideas; then we (tend to) refine them more in our older years into concepts. I just mean to convey that we sort of grasp the ‘idea’ behind a thing slowly (usually) through experience (whether that be of other people conversing or interacting with something pertaining to the ‘idea’); and I sometimes convey this by noting a sort of linear progression of clarity behind an ‘idea’ with notion → idea → concept. It isn’t a super clean schema, but you get the point.

In terms of giving an example, I would envision that one could grasp the idea of a ‘triangle’ without ever knowing any precise sort of definition, by merely experiencing triangles and what not, and using the idea of ‘triangle’, conceptually (in a less refined conceptual sense), such as to separate shapes into their own groups or what not, would be an example of presupposing the ‘concept’. There’s not explication of what it actually means, but, rather, just an implicit, assumed, understanding of it.

To ‘use’ a concept in an explicated sense, would be have some sort of sufficiently robust concept of what it is, which is explicated sufficiently. Such as ‘a triangle is a three sided shape, whereof the sides connect at three points, each line is straight, the angles add up to 180 degrees, etc.’. Of course, the level of precision and robustness will vary: an expert in the given field that the concept relates to will probably have a more robust analysis than a layman (which gives most likely a basic definition).

I can imagine a world in which deploying a concept is an instance of explicating a meaning, regardless of whether a definition is offered.
…
But you do pick up and refine concepts just by listening and chatting.

That’s fair, and I agree. I just don’t think one can explicate what primitive concepts are, albeit understood by pretty much everyone.

‘being’ is the best example, but also ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘true’, ‘value’, and ‘false’ are good ones. They are very intuitional, and inexplicable (and some more than others).

What definition does Plato give that isn't circular?

Teaching children primitive concepts are the easiest to convey, ironically, because they strongly intuition. E.g., conveying what space is super easy to a child and much easier than explaining the concept an combustion engine. Complex concepts require more experience and knowledge, than their primitive siblings.

I would say the property is less fundamental than the concept it refers to; because it presupposes it.

The interesting thing with 'being', is that it isn't really a property: that opens up the discussion to absurd ideas, like beings which themselves contain being in their essence and other beings which do not (e.g., Spinoza's view).

I'm not sure I see a problem with the idea that some concepts must reference themselves to be analyzable. I feel like, coming from ideas of axiomatic set theory, people view "the world" or "the set of all true statements in a system" as a tree, where there are fundamental truths (axioms) that one must start with and everything branches from there. Such a visualization does make it seem difficult to reconcile understanding those fundamental truths because nothing grounds them—they are the ground. But rather than a "tree of truth", I view the world as more of a nervous system, a graph or network (whichever you prefer) where everything is interconnected, and there aren't necessarily "undefinable" elements like the axioms. It should be noted that in such a visualization, everything would perhaps technically be circular, just more or less removed because there is no presupposed foundation.

So with respect to your example about being, I personally have a somewhat sophisticated (at least more sophisticated than "being" is "to be") understanding of it, which does rely on some circularity, but also incorporates elements of other concepts, such that a network can start to be realized. In my view, existence means "to stand in relation" to other things in an ontological sense (this is ontic structural realism). So if we're looking at the "network model" of the world, to say something exists means it is a node (or perhaps bridge between nodes) in that world. With some additional understanding, this implies a few things about existence that informs us of its nature: 1) There can be no world of just one node (one thing, because it doesn't stand in relation to anything else), 2) Something that exists in one world need not exist in another world; i.e., existence is relative, or 3) there is some barrier between that which exists actually and that which exists conceptually (concepts, like a physical unicorn, may fail to exist actually, in which case we may be said to be non-existent, although the concept exists in some sense).

Also, you also pose truth/falsehood as potential fundamental concept, but related to this definition of being, that may be explainable too: recall (1) that nothing can exist by itself, so there must at least be, say, two things that stand in relation. The most primitive relation of this nature can only be that of "something", and "not that something": this I believe, without additional structure giving weight to the meaning of "true" and "false", is the relationship that truth/falsehood describes. It's also akin to the idea of being and non-being, and harkens back to the Greek beliefs about opposites.

Don't mean to pontificate about my own beliefs, but with regards to your topic, I would say I think ultimately, not just some, but all concepts experience some level of circularity, but with some being more closely entwined, such as that of being and non-being, which is essentially self-referential, but can still be analyzed in the context of other concepts, and is not arbitrary. So I guess I disagree that they are unanalyzable, but also disagree that they must be non-circular. I thus conclude the answer is D, none of the above :grin:

By the way, I did read some of the responses, but not all, so if I missed anything that you may have responded to that's relevant to my ideas, please let me know.

I think we know exactly what being is: I just don't think we can properly explicate it. Knowledge isn't just the sphere if explicable information. — Bob Ross

That smells like contradiction.

But this seems like you are agreeing now with me that you cannot define being. — Bob Ross

Not that you cannot, you can, but perhaps not properly, as in like you define other concepts.

??? — Bob Ross

:roll:

You just tried to prove 'being' is vague because 'to be or not to be' doesn't refer to Hamlet's existence: why would Hamlet not existing have anything to do with it? — Bob Ross

It was not a proof. It was an example, so that you could understand the points better.

I would say the property is less fundamental than the concept it refers to; because it presupposes it. — Bob Ross

What is the difference between property and concept? Isn't it the same general/universal entity?

The interesting thing with 'being', is that it isn't really a property: that opens up the discussion to absurd ideas, like beings which themselves contain being in their essence and other beings which do not (e.g., Spinoza's view). — Bob Ross

Why would "being" not be a property? "Being", or "existence", seems to be something general/universal that is instantiated in all existing entities, including in itself. Why would some entities have being in their essence and others not?

Concepts have their own meaning despite how they relate to concepts. The concept of the number 3 is obviously distinct from the number 2, and they don't rely on how they relate to each other to be defined. — Bob Ross

Again the point was the atomic concepts don't tell you much just by themselves apart from being objects of conjectures, confusion, intuition or poetry. They need to be supplied with clear and concrete data in complete and grammatically correct sentences to give you solid meaningful information or ideas about the world.

Hence my suggestion was to throw out the atomic concepts contained in incomplete sentence as meaningless expressions, which was one of your options for conclusion of the OP.

I don't think that space and time are proper substances…. — Bob Ross

Cool. That’s what I understood by your space and time in a “cosmic” sense.

I think physics demonstrates quite sufficiently that space and time are valid 'entities' in our calculations….. — Bob Ross

True enough, insofar as physics is nothing more than human intelligence at work in the specific domain where the physicist investigates the conditions by which things relate to himself or to each other. If the fundamental relation between things is the where and/or the when of one with respect to the other, space and time are necessary conditions……or in your terms I suppose, valid entities…..in calculating that relation.

……and not in the sense that they are merely our modes of intuition. — Bob Ross

I would argue that they are in that very sense, insofar as the physicist still has to intuit the things** to which his calculations are applicable. He knows a priori one thing is in a different space and a different time than another thing, which would be the most certain when the other thing is himself; his calculations merely determine how much space and time are between one and the other. He also knows a priori one thing can be of two times in one space but never two spaces at one time. None of such a priori intuition is possible without the conceptions to which any and all things must relate, from which follows necessarily that space and time, as those conceptions are represented, and that by which the physicist intuits the relation of things as determinable, must reside in the physicist himself.
(**the theoretical physicist, when concerned only with possible things, still must treat them as if their reality is given, iff he subjects them to the same natural law as he subjects the real things of his experience)

Anyway….for whatever that’s worth.

You are confusing what it means to exist, with the relationship existent things have with each other: you are expounding an ontology in the sense of the structure of what exists and NOT in the sense of the structure of 'being' itself.

'beingness' is a property, 'being' is a concept: the former is 'to have "being"'. Properties are attributes a 'thing' can have or possess; a concept is an idea of something that could be possessed.

The property of redness is 'to be red'; and so it presupposes a concept of 'red' in its definition. If one doesn't understand the concept which the property refers to (e.g., 'red'), then one can only understand that the property expounds a concept that is possessable, but not anything more than that.

So you think that the concept 'triangle' doesn't make any sense in itself?

It seems like you are taking a scientific anti-realism approach; whereas I think that what we scientifically know, is a rough estimation of what is really there in-itself.

The peculiarity with space and time, is that positing them scientifically doesn't itself lend support to there being space nor time per se; but that we have to posit them in a way incongruent with our modes of intuition does.

Without taking an anti-realist position, I don't see how you can explain the observable phenomena of 'time dilation', for example, by appeal to "phenomenal", a priori, time.

So you think that the concept 'triangle' doesn't make any sense in itself? — Bob Ross

Of course it does, but nothing more than it is a triangle with the standard definition. But if you say, something like "I think therefore I triangle", then it would be a poetry. Or if you said out of the blue "Triangle", then one would wonder what you were trying to say or express.

That would just be ungrammatical. I am unsure, then, what contention you are making with the OP: I am not claiming that ungrammatical sentences make sense.

That would just be ungrammatical. I am unsure, then, what contention you are making with the OP: I am not claiming that ungrammatical sentences make sense. — Bob Ross

It is ungrammatical but also incomplete. If it is incomplete, then listener will add their inference into the sentence trying to make a meaning out of it. The point is that, the axiomatic concepts don't have more meaning than the dictionary meanings on their own. To make meaningful use of them, you must use them in grammatically and contextually correct sentence.

Another point from the OP is that, if "be" is correct to say it means "exist". You could confirm on this. If you say "I am a member.", can it mean, "I exist a member."? It is nonsense.

"Be" is a linking verb. It needs something after it in the form of noun or adjective to make the sentence correct. "I am happy." "I am a member." "She is at the pub."

"I am" or "She is" itself doesn't sound clear or complete, unless it was used to replicate the previous sentence in the meaning, and the objects are inferred or omitted. For example, "Are you happy?" "Yes I am.", or "Is she in the pub now?" "Yes she is."

In other words, using "to be" "be" as same meaning to "to exist" "exist" seems debatable if it is correct in syntax and logic.