Here's my proof:

Let G be the claim that Goldbachs Conjecture is true.
Furthermore, we add as a premise that G is not proven, and also ~G is not proven.
Let P be the claim that an unproven truth is true.
G is true or it's not true
G v ~G (law of excluded middle)
G -> P (because G is unproven, if it's true, P must be true)
~G -> P (because ~G is unproven, if it's true, P must be true)
assume ~P
....... ~P implies ~G (by applying contraposition to G -> P)
....... ~G
....... ~P implies G (by applying contraposition to ~G -> P)
....... G
....... G ^ ~G is a contradiction, so we can conclude that
P



There's my proof that there's an unproven truth.

There's my proof that there's an unproven truth. — flannel jesus

OK you win! :up:
Now if only you could apply this formula to your house example within the limits on epistemology...

How would that look?

How would that look? — flannel jesus

I don't know but I admit that philosophy is such an interesting field of study.
I learned from other members here that philosophical discussions should be a "fodder" for everyone to take a little and make up for something rather than just proving our own points.

How do you not love Nietzsche. Great starting point for these questions. — Fire Ologist

Brilliant.

there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. — Fire Ologist

May I ask what you think:

1. How do you suppose Nietzsche "defines" knowing (besides the quote provided)? That is what (ontology(?) if I am using the word properly) does he "ascribe" to human knowledge? It is clearly not a thing inherent in the universe which our superior brains can uncover? Is it, to N, a fiction, an illusion?

2. How would N. characterize the conclusions about Being (as ontology(?)) made by Heidegger and Sartre, for e.g.? As "arrogant and mendacious"? Or meaningfully nonetheless, and if meaningful, then how?

Sure, knowledge is a rigorously arrived at belief in JTB theories of truth. — Bylaw

Yes, that's the way JTB is conceived. The problem is that we may not always know that what we (think we) know is true or be that clear about just how what we consider to be justification really is justification.



Right, in practice what is judged to be knowledge counts as knowledge, and what is judged to be true counts as truth. Objectivity is a chimera or is reducible to intersubjective agreement.

I don't think I've seen a propositional knowledge out in the wild though. I have seen the others I referenced. I can perhaps see a propositional knowledge out in the wild if I put a particular kind of retrospective goggles on. But if you insist... — fdrake

I haven't seen any kind of knowledge out in the wild, except know-how. I have seen all kinds of claims to knowledge, including claims to know that this or that proposition is true, claims to know this or that person or place, claims to know God or the Absolute Truth, and so on. I agree with you that the idea of knowledge and its modes of expression are many-faceted. I also agree that JTB is a limited conception.

As I said in the OP, my motivation for this thread was a response to a request by @Chet Hawkins to create a thread if I wanted him to explain his reasons for claiming that there is no knowledge, but only belief. So far, he has not come to the party and seems to have dipped out.

All knowledge requires belief. — ENOAH

That's true, but the OP asks if knowledge is merely belief. Apparently, it's implying that the difference between knowing and believing is empirical verification or rational justification. And so, we argue about shades of truth. :smile:

Knowing Facts :
knowledge requires belief
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/

All knowledge requires belief.
— ENOAH
That's true, but the OP asks if knowledge is merely belief. Apparently, it's implying that the difference between knowing and believing is empirical verification or rational justification. And so, we argue about shades of truth. :smile: — Gnomon

I question whether all knowledge does require belief. I know how to ride a bike, plane a board, paint a picture, write a poem, play the piano and so on, and I don't see how any of that requires belief.

These threads often get interesting.

We're fallible creatures. It doesn't follow from that that we're always mistaken.

Objectivity is fraught with archaic baggage. A muddler's pig pen. The muddlers are not fans.

When a belief statement is true, it is so independently of the user's certainty. That is an objective truth if there ever was one.

We are fallible creatures. I agree we are not always mistaken. I think we do know some things, even many things. I agree that the common idea of objectivity is archaic, unexamined. I agree that propositional statements are either true or false, regardless of opinion.

Where does that leave us?

I know how to ride a bike, plane a board, paint a picture, write a poem, play the piano and so on, and I don't see how any of that requires belief. — Janus

How does one learn to ride a bike without believing that they're doing something while they're learning? Learning involves all sorts of belief. Removing the belief removes the capability.

Avoiding danger requires belief. Learning how to ride a bike involves avoiding danger.

Where does that leave us? — Janus

In both agreement and good standing. Glad to join you, if that's okay?

I don't think belief is required. You see people riding bikes. You see the bike and grasp how it works. You want to learn to ride. You learn to ride. No need to believe anything.

What particular belief that would be necessary in order to learn to ride a bike did you have in mind.

In both agreement and good standing. Glad to join you, if that's okay? — creativesoul

I think we do generally agree and are in good standing too. I always welcome your input.

I think your general approach is correct here, but it would seem that you need to speak to the question of riding, not the question of learning. This is because it would be perfectly possible that one needs to believe while learning, but once they are an adept practitioner that belief ceases. In other words, your argument applies to learning, but there is no reason to believe that your argument will also apply to riding simpliciter.

(Not everything we do when learning to ride a bike is necessarily something that we do when riding a bike.)

. I always welcome your input. — Janus

Sweet. Good to know.

I don't think beleif is required. You see people riding bikes. You see the bike and grasp how it works. You learn to ride it. No need to beleive anything.

What particular belief that would be necessary in order to learn to ride a bike did you have in mind. — Janus

Impossible to learn how to ride a bike that one does not believe is there. Isn't it?

One sees the bike, handles it...no need for belief. I have to go right now...will resume later.

This is because it would be perfectly possible that one needs to believe while learning, but once they are an adept practitioner that belief ceases. In other words, your argument applies to learning, but there is no reason to believe that your argument will also apply to riding simpliciter. — Leontiskos

I cannot make much sense of the idea that learned bike riders no longer believe that they're riding bikes.

The original argument you gave had to do with “avoiding danger,” and because of this it was a good example of the invalidity of the inference from learning to riding. There are a variety of ways in which the experienced rider is not avoiding danger in the way that someone who is learning is avoiding danger.

you may be working with too broad a brush — Janus

Yep. That was the plan.

Know-how involves skills that may not be dependent on knowing anything in a propositional sense. — Janus

Yep. And if know-how were a subset of know-that, that might be a problem. But if knowing-that is a subset of knowing-how, that is not a problem - is it?

I may know that my friend regularly arrives late to appointments, but I need not necessarily do anything with that knowledge. — Janus

Interesting. A good reply. Could you be said to know this if no action at all followed from it - including saying "You are always late!"? I think one could. So know-that extends past know-how, if only marginally.

I may know how to ride a bicycle and that knowledge seems to have nothing necessarily to do with belief. — Janus

Well, it implies belief in Bicycles and riding.

Animals know how to do things, and we commonly attribute knowing-that to them. The cat knows that the bowl is empty, and so on.

The temptation is there to draw a hard line between knowing-how and knowing-that. But they are not as distinct as folk might presume.

The original argument you gave had to do with “avoiding danger,” and because of this it was a good example of the invalidity of the inference from learning to riding. There are a variety of ways in which the experienced rider is not avoiding danger in the way that someone who is learning is avoiding danger. — Leontiskos

Sure. It becomes a series of autonomously enacted unconscious behaviours.

How does that avoid the existential dependency that all experienced riders have upon learning how to ride?

Becoming experienced requires learning how to ride. Learning how to ride requires belief.

Claiming there is no belief necessary for doing things that require belief makes no sense to me.

One sees the bike, handles it...no need for belief. — Janus

1. I know airplanes can fly.
2. I believe airplanes can fly.
3. I know how to ride a bike.
4. I believe I can ride a bike.
5. 1 -> 2
6. 3 -> 4

Do (5) and (6) hold?

(It depends only on our definition of belief, but the definition of belief that supports (5) and (6) is not uncommon or illegitimate.)

I am looking at what happens through time and what we know/think/have access to at any given moment. — Bylaw

Yep, understood. You are interested in the dynamics of belief.

you are still assuming that I think we can't know anything — Bylaw

Not an assumption. You did say, in italics,

All beliefs are the same and what people call knowledge is no better than any other belief — Bylaw

which presumably means that there is no knowledge, just belief.

I find your post confusing. You say we know things, yet the difference between knowledge and belief is at least that the things we know are true; and yet you say " take out the T".

There are true statements.

Becoming experienced requires learning how to ride. Learning how to ride requires belief. — creativesoul

And your tacit conclusion is, “Therefore, riding a bike requires belief.” The question and ambiguity is this: did it merely require belief at some point in the past, or does it require ongoing belief?

Becoming experienced requires learning how to ride. Learning how to ride requires belief.
— creativesoul

And your tacit conclusion is, “Therefore, riding a bike requires belief.” The question and ambiguity is this: did it merely require belief at some point in the past, or does it require ongoing belief? — Leontiskos

Yes.

I may know that my friend regularly arrives late to appointments, but I need not necessarily do anything with that knowledge.
— Janus
Interesting. A good reply. Could you be said to know this if no action at all followed from it - including saying "You are always late!"? I think one could. So know-that extends past know-how, if only marginally. — Banno

I think he claim only extends to instances in the past. Any application to future appointments would be speculation, and couldn't amount to knowledge, I don't think.
You can only know that your friend, has previously consistently arrived late to appointments. You may know that it is likely he/she will do so again.

Well, it implies belief in Bicycles and riding. — Banno

:ok: Agree. I think this is being ignored in many comments here. The belief is actually required for the 'know' part to exist, I think. It's implied, very strongly, that you must hold the belief to know.

This is because it would be perfectly possible that one needs to believe while learning, but once they are an adept practitioner that belief ceases. — Leontiskos

I don't think so. It just becomes a less conscious belief. I don't suddenly not believe the ILAC method of legal writing, simply because I now use it as a pre-recorded framework for writing certain types of advice. I still believe ILAC is credible, that I know how to use it, and that it will fulfill the instruction I've been given (if applicable). Trust might be a better word, as it's been relegated to thre pre-or-sub-conscious at that time (and similarly with the Bike examplar viz. you must still believe that the rotational pressure of your peddling will move the bike forward, to bother with the act).

I think he claim only extends to instances in the past. Any application to future appointments would be speculation, and couldn't amount to knowledge, I don't think.
You can only know that your friend, has previously consistently arrived late to appointments. You may know that it is likely he/she will do so again. — AmadeusD

One can be certain of what's going to happen. Those things can happen as expected. After they happen, one knows.

That doesn't seem right.

One can be certain of what's going to happen. Those things can happen as expected. After they happen, one knows.

That doesn't seem right. — creativesoul

One can have certainty, as an attitude. I don't think it's right to say one can be certain, without a Crystal ball. I don't think it's right to say that the occurrence being in-line with the expectation amounts to knowledge. That couldn't be true for someone convinced they've got the Lottery numbers right, and wins. They didn't know. But they were certain, and right, in the event.

One can have certainty, as an attitude. I don't think it's right to say one can be certain, without a Crystal ball. I don't think it's right to say that the occurrence being in-line with the expectation amounts to knowledge. That could be true or someone convinced they've got the Lottery numbers right. They didn't know. But they were certain, and right, in the event. — AmadeusD

Being right without knowing.

Are you implying that certitude is never warranted?

I don't think it's right to say that the occurrence being in-line with the expectation amounts to knowledge. — AmadeusD

Agree.

Are you implying that certitude is never warranted? — creativesoul

For future events? Depends. In a practical sense, sure it's warranted in that not assuming (to the degree needed) would prevent action.
But I do not think it right that past events can warrant certainty about future events, in the strict sense. Constant conjunction and all..