Objects make up the substance of the world.

Do you agree? If so what do you think this means?

Objects are necessary. Facts are contingent.

Do you agree? If so what do you think this means?

I don't think there is much point in taking up the discussion. It's too far gone.

But I insist on giving more weight to 1.1 over the first half of 2.021, misconstrued.

Consider also

2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented—only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.

Facts set out the configuration of objects. Nothing can be said about objects apart from how they are configured - the facts; Attempting to say something about objects apart from their configuration is attempting to say what instead must be shown. There is nothing much that can be said about objects per se; they are instead shown in their configuration and presumed by the facts.

It has also to be understood that the Argument for Substance is rejected in PI. See especially §60-64.

In the place of some ultimate analysis of substance, or of logical atoms, or of ultimate simples, is left the various games we might play, and what we are doing in each case. What is foundational depends on the task at hand - forget about meaning, and look to use.

To understand Wittgenstein with any depth one must read the Tractatus and the PI side by side.

I'll leave you to it. But the answer to the OP is that from the perspective of the Tractatus, nothing can be said about substance or atomic objects; one can speak only of their configuration. And yes, this doesn't work, hence the Investigations.

The order of the statements in the text begins with conceptions before introducing propositions. Is that order important to understanding what is presented?
— Paine

I don't believe so. I think that, perhaps, Wittgenstein started with what was most accessible to him during the war, namely his thoughts. So he begins by deconstruction thoughts in logical space before moving to propositions. — 013zen

I read the order to be important regarding what is intended.

It is interesting how much the meaning of text turns upon such readings.

Facts set out the configuration of objects. — Banno

They do not. You have got it backwards. The objects are self-determining. The facts are the result of their combining as they do.

There is nothing much that can be said about objects per se; — Banno

He says quite a few things about them:

Objects make up the substance of the world. (2.021)
— Fooloso4

It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it.

(2.022)

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.

(2.023)

The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

(2.024)

It is form and content.

(2.025)

There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form.

(2.026)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.

(2.027)

Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable.

(2.0271)

It has also to be understood that the Argument for Substance is rejected in PI. — Banno

You might think it gives you reason to dismiss it without understanding it, that is on you. There is to this day plenty of attention being paid to the Tractatus and the problem of objects.

He doesn't. — Fooloso4

4.122 is saying that propositions cannot describe properties and relations, but can only show them. This is the difference between what is said and what is shown.

It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain: rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects.

4.022 – A proposition shows its sense.

FH Bradley treats relations as objects, and if relations were objects, this would lead into an infinite regress problem. This is why Bradley concludes that relations don't ontologically exist.

Anscombe believes that relations are not objects, and therefore cannot be nameable. 3.1432 should be read that in aRb, it is not the case that a stands in relation to b, where R is an object, but rather that a stands in a certain relation to b.

However in a picture of a and b, as a relation is not an object, the relation between a and b cannot be shown.

For the Tracatus, relations are just objects coming together. This relation cannot be described in a proposition but can only be shown by the proposition itself. However, remembering to avoid any infinite regress by thinking that the proposition shows a relation by showing a relation by showing a relation, etc.

The Tractatus is not about universal concepts describing a world, but about particular propositions (which are particular thoughts) showing particular states of affairs.
===============================================================================

Every object in the world is composed of simple objects. These simple objects are in this sense universal. — Fooloso4

In the Tractatus, in the world are logical objects in logical configurations. These logical objects are simples, indivisible. There are many of them.

A Platonic Form is a universal of which each particular object is an instantiation.

The Tractatus is not a proponent of Platonic Forms, but treats each object as a particular, even if there are many of them.

One can perhaps understand Wittgenstein as a coherentist and not a correspondent theorist — schopenhauer1

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein was trying to avoid a pure Coherentism, where one proposition gets its meaning from another proposition etc, by ultimately founding propositions on states of affairs that exist in a world outside these propositions.

4.122 is saying that propositions cannot describe properties and relations, but can only show them. This is the difference between what is said and what is shown. — RussellA

Your claim was that about his removal of relations and properties from his ontology. If ontology is about what exists, and properties and relations are shown, then even if they cannot be described they exist.

The Tractatus is not about universal concepts describing a world, but about particular propositions (which are particular thoughts) showing particular states of affairs. — RussellA

The first part is true. The second part is false.

A picture is a model of reality.

(2.12)

He is not interested in the particular state of affairs that are modeled, but the possibility that is can be modeled.

The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.

(2.15)

Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as
the elements of the picture.

(2.151)

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein was trying to avoid a pure Coherentism, where one proposition gets its meaning from another proposition etc, by ultimately founding propositions on states of affairs that exist in a world outside these propositions. — RussellA

It is the substance of the world not the facts in the world that prevents this:

If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.

(2.0211)

Your claim was that about his removal of relations and properties from his ontology. If ontology is about what exists, and properties and relations are shown, then even if they cannot be described they exist. — Fooloso4

Just because a picture can show a relation doesn't mean that the relation ontologically exists. A picture can show that the Empire States Building is 113m taller than the Eiffel Tower, but this does not mean that a difference in height of 113m ontologically exists in the world.
===============================================================================

He is not interested in the particular state of affairs that are modeled, but the possibility that is can be modeled. — Fooloso4

He is interested in possible elementary propositions, such as "grass is red", "grass is green", "grass is purple" and "grass is orange", showing possible states of affairs, such as grass is red, grass is green, grass is purple and grass is orange.

But this of necessity means that he is also interested in particular elementary propositions, such as "grass is purple", showing a particular state of affairs, such as grass is purple.
===============================================================================

It is the substance of the world not the facts in the world that prevents this: — Fooloso4

Yes, the world wouldn't exist without substance (ie, unalterable objects, simples) and there would be no propositions.

But on the other hand, as a proposition is not a single world, such as "grass", but words in combination, such as "grass is red", a proposition can only show in the world objects in combination (ie, states of affairs) such as grass is red.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein was trying to avoid a pure Coherentism, where one proposition gets its meaning from another proposition etc, by ultimately founding propositions on states of affairs that exist in a world outside these propositions. — RussellA

The problem here is Wittgenstein's muddling of epistemological and metaphysical concepts without clear distinction or marking what is what. That is because he wants to do epistemology and metaphysics and yet castigate the pursuit at the same time (""Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"). You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

So there are metaphysical claims- objects, substance, states of affairs (arrangements of objects)

There are epistemological claims- facts, atomic facts, true and false propositions.

None of this is really elaborated on and so we get what we get. I suppose if he did, he would think he would be engaging in "nonsense" (or rather, the peculiar positivist use of this word). Unlike a Kant or Aa Schopenhauer where theory is communicated through paragraphs and paragraphs of explication (i.e. explanation), it just looks like axiomatic assertions without much explanation that one must either accept or not.

But because of the poor explanatory communication-style of the terse text of Tractatus, the ideas become anemic on their own (without the reader doing the heavy-lifting). So, we get this weirdness of constant debates on "What the Prophet from Austria really meant".

Either way, because he is muddling epistemology and metaphysics, objects seem half-baked in his philosophy. Are objects actual entities or are they simply functional as a role? In some instances he seems to be defining them a role, a functional thing, and not an actual entity in the world.

as @Banno pointed out, his major point is right at the top:

The world is the totality of facts, not of things. — 1.1

That is to say, Wittgenstein is using circular reasoning, and "double-dipping" his idea of logical structure (picture) in covertly hiding his idea of atomic facts in the idea of objects. If objects are simply possibilities of arrangements (2.0272 The configuration of the objects forms the atomic fact), then

You get this more definitively "real" version of objects here, yet at the same time "functional" version of objects:

If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had
sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.
2.0212 It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true
or false).
2.022 It is clear that however dierent from the real one an imagined
world may be, it must have somethinga formin common
with the real world.
2.023 This xed form consists of the objects. — Tractatus

But then you have this more "functional" and less "concrete" role of objects as entities..

That is to say, objects seem to be the functional role of we can say something about them. That's it. "Objects being arranged" allows for ----> States of Affairs.

State of affairs now becomes some intermediary. Is it "States of Affairs" of the World, or is it Atomic Facts of the World? One is a "realism" whereby the world exists independently of facts, and the other is an idealism of sorts whereby the world is simply the logical coherence of the world.

Now, we do call Wittgenstein's theory a "picture theory", which indicates that it is indeed "real" and we are just re-presenting it in facts and furthermore, into propositions. However, my main overall point here, is because objects are so vague, and so little is said about them, they simply become a functional role for the possibility of forming atomic facts (an epistemological endeavor), with little to no reality outside this use. Objects become denuded of any of its usual attributions, other than its function to support atomic facts. It's not a robust or a compelling picture of objects. It is unconvincing that objects even exist other than it needs to be there to support atomic facts. Atomic facts have to be "about" something, or so he claims.

That is to say, objects are given short-shrift. — schopenhauer1

To the contrary:

Objects contain the possibility of all situations.

(2.014)

To me it's just a place holder for "go pound sand and don't look behind the curtain cause I just want to move forward with my argument and not go further into those pesky philosophical metaphysical things". — schopenhauer1

Metaphysics deals with the arche, the source or origin of things and what is first or primary. His view, like all others, is speculative. It takes as its principles the existence of simples as primary. These objects have within themselves the ability to combine to form more complex objects and states of affairs. The order of the universe is thus bottom up.

He doesn't define them other than they exist and facts are about them. — schopenhauer1

He says:

Objects make up the substance of the world.

(2.021)

Objects are just what constitute the unalterable form of the world.

(2.023)

A definition occurs within a proposition. Elementary propositions consist of names. (4.22) A name means an object. (3.203) We cannot use a proposition to define a name because the proposition is a nexus, a concatenation, of names. (4.22) We cannot then define an object beyond defining its role as the substance of facts. As the substance of the world.

A definition occurs within a proposition. Elementary propositions consist of names. (4.22) A name means an object. (3.203) We cannot use a proposition to define a name because the proposition is a nexus, a concatenation, of names. (4.22) We cannot then define an object beyond defining its role as the substance of facts. As the substance of the world. — Fooloso4

Right, so where is this assertion coming from that objects must exist as a "substance of facts"? Why must this be the case? "Otherwise, the world is about nothing or anything", is pretty trivially true. The problem is that it would take some delving into topics he doesn't want to talk about, but even the claim itself "objects exist" is a metaphysical commitment. However, it needs explanation, even if that means use of propositions to do so, because that's all that we have to communicate. Simply saying "objects exist because my philosophy about atomic facts won't hold up unless it's "about" something" is not a convincing (nor even really actually an) argument.

He doesn't explain anything. He just zooms on forward without doing the heavy lifting of explaining his metaphysics. He asserts a few lines about it being the substance of facts or whatnot, but anyone can do that, and I don't find it compelling. Quite the opposite, I find it obnoxiously self-referential.

In the attempt to not be like the 19th century writers whereby many volumes of metaphysical and epistemological explanatory systems are worked out, it seems he went too far in the other direction of thrift. Some people like it though, because it's endlessly interpretable.

One can perhaps understand Wittgenstein as a coherentist and not a correspondent theorist (although this view is contrary to popular opinion). — schopenhauer1

I take 2.0211 and 2.061 to speak against this:


“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true” (2.0211).

“Atomic facts are independent of one another” (2.061)

if Wittgenstein forfeits defining what objects are beyond vague notions, then the tower of babel is simply axiomatic and self-referential and points to nothing. — schopenhauer1

As Russell and Whitehead point out in the Principia Mathematica (An idea they adopted from the Italian mathematician Peano):

“Since all definitions of terms are effected by means of other terms, every system of definitions which is not circular must start from a certain apparatus of undefined terms” (PM, 95)

Frege, a mathematician working on similar problems, around the same time expressed a similar idea as Peano, Russell, and Whitehead:

"On the introduction of a name for something logically simple, a definition is not possible." (CO, 1).

Russell re-articulates the point later in his work “The Principles of Mathematics” when he says:

“...the indefinables are obtained primarily as the necessary residue in a process of analysis, it is often easier to know that there must be such entities than actually to perceive them” (The Principles of Mathematics).

Wittgenstein is a logician, and a mathematician, and his analysis of propositions into eventual simple, indefinable, objects comes from a tradition of doing so. As he stated to Malcolm:

"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try and decide whether this thing or that thing was a simple matter or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter" (A Memoir, p. 70). — 013zen

I think Robinson puts it well here:

“To a non-mathematician it often comes as a surprise that it is impossible to define explicitly all the terms which are used. This is not a superficial problem but lies at the root of all knowledge.” (Foundations of Geometry, 8)

His definition is like one in computer programming it seems — schopenhauer1

I think that, perhaps, you are on the right track thinking of it in this manner. An object seems to be a kind of logical place holder for a distinct logical category which can be taken as input within a function.


-----

This is the worst thread so far on Wittgenstein. Quite an accomplishment. — Banno

I’m very sorry that seeing others attempting to work through a text is so distressing to you; I can only wonder what a wearing process it has been for you to be present within a philosophy community for all these years.

I don't think there is much point in taking up the discussion — Banno

I can only imagine what a Socratic dialogue would have been like with you as the interlocutor.

“Since all definitions of terms are effected by means of other terms, every system of definitions which is not circular must start from a certain apparatus of undefined terms” (PM, 95)

Frege, a mathematician working on similar problems, around the same time expressed a similar idea as Peano, Russell, and Whitehead:

"On the introduction of a name for something logically simple, a definition is not possible." (CO, 1). — 013zen

You've only explained how these particular people thought of it, not if it's correct or not. Whitehead, by proof of his later writings in metaphysics, seemed to disagree with this idea of "undefined terms". He seems to go full-force in the other direction of speculation, full-throated and enthusiastically, even. A breath of fresh air, perhaps? I don't mean that one can "actually show" the metaphysics of the world in some explanatory volume, but one can speculate using the communication known as "language", regarding some metaphysical speculations and such. This whole, "I'm a logician, and don't dabble in such speculations or inquiries", means that he is simply writing a system without a foundation to speak of. And since he is all for "not speaking whereof. et al", he puts himself in a gordian knot of his own devices.

I think that, perhaps, you are on the right track thinking of it in this manner. An object seems to be a kind of logical place holder for a distinct logical category which can be taken as input within a function. — 013zen

:up:

I can only imagine what a Socratic dialogue would have been like with you as the interlocutor. — 013zen

:snicker:

The problem here is Wittgenstein's muddling of epistemological and metaphysical concepts without clear distinction or marking what is what. — schopenhauer1

There are many philosophical questions:

How does language and thought relate to the world?
How does language relate to thought?
Does the world we experience only exist in the mind, or does it also exist outside the mind, and if it does exist outside the mind, how does the world we experience in our mind relate to the world outside the mind?
Is Neutral Monism correct, that apples only exist as concepts in the mind and outside the mind are only elementary particles and elementary forces in space and time?
Do tables exist outside the mind?

Perhaps it doesn't matter, as you say:

The problem here is Wittgenstein's muddling of epistemological and metaphysical concepts
It just looks like axiomatic assertions without much explanation that one must either accept or not.
Are objects actual entities or are they simply functional as a role?
One is a "realism" whereby the world exists independently of facts, and the other is an idealism of sorts whereby the world is simply the logical coherence of the world.
Objects become denuded of any of its usual attributions, other than its function to support atomic facts.

Perhaps all that matters, as you say:

The ideas become anemic on their own (without the reader doing the heavy-lifting).

Perhaps the Tractatus is like a paper weight. As long as it does the job of keeping the papers from flying away it has done its job, in that as long as it has got people to think it has done its job.

Perhaps the Tractatus is like a paper weight. As long as it does the job of keeping the papers from flying away it has done its job, in that as long as it has got people to think it has done its job. — RussellA

Well, I guess so, but by way of criticism of what is missing- or lacking.

You've only explained how these particular people thought of it, not if it's correct or not. — schopenhauer1

Correct. I merely wanted to try and remind you that Wittgenstein wrote the work during a time when it was, actually, quite normal to consider logically simple entities as indefinable, and those he respected most at the time - Frege and Russell - were guilty of the same thing.

Whether or not they are right about there being logically simple entities is another question entirely, but you can't circumvent the discussion by saying:

"Well, he didn't define 'x' so its all moot." He didn't define 'x' for a reason, and he gives his reasoning.

We can still attempt to approach an understanding of why and how Wittgenstein is using these terms.

We can still attempt to approach an understanding of why and how Wittgenstein is using these terms. — 013zen

No I get it. I think it's valuable what you're doing- putting this into context of what was the spirit of the time (logical positivistic thinking and the logical atomism of Frege and Russell), but I am criticizing this approach en totale, as exemplified in the Tractatus' view.

There seems to be a subtle subtext that Wittgenstein, Russell, et al. want you, the audience to accept beyond just their reasoning, their view of "What philosophy should be about (only logical propositions)".

Well, if you don't accept that subtext, then this represents a greater rift than simply the reasoning. Rather, it is straight away dismissing philosophy as writing on metaphysics and epistemology in more than vague notions of some "there-but-not-there" that is simply a logical marker for facts.

And this subtextual disagreement is more than trivial. Because the other view might see these logical atomists/positivists as totally devoid of what is important in philosophy- that is an explanation of what is epistemologically and metaphysically the foundations of the world, truth, and so on. If you can't even discuss them, then the philosophy is incomplete, and thus suspect in terms of whether it should even matter if it lacks this crucial foundation.

In other words, @RussellA quotes matter above:

How does language and thought relate to the world?
How does language relate to thought?
Does the world we experience only exist in the mind, or does it also exist outside the mind, and if it does exist outside the mind, how does the world we experience in our mind relate to the world outside the mind?
Is Neutral Monism correct, that apples only exist as concepts in the mind and outside the mind are only elementary particles and elementary forces in space and time?
Do tables exist outside the mind? — RussellA

No I get it. I think it's valuable what you're doing- putting this into context of what was the spirit of the time (logical positivistic thinking and the logical atomism of Frege and Russell), but I am criticizing this approach en totale, as exemplified in the Tractatus' view.

There seems to be a subtle subtext that Wittgenstein, Russell, et al. want you, the audience to accept beyond just their reasoning, their view of "What philosophy should be about (only logical propositions)". — schopenhauer1

Here, I think we should be careful.

The logical positivism of someone like Carnap or Neurath, and the logical atomism of someone like Russell was developed in response to Positivism, and in part the writing of the Tractatus.

The anti-metaphysical agenda of these movements, I don’t take to be exemplified by the Tractatus necessarily. I take the Tractatus to be influenced by these movements, and responding to them, not ascribing to them. There is a reason that after the Tractatus was written, and positivism became logical positivism, that Wittgenstein was dismissive of the anti-metaphyscial interpretation the latter ascribed to the work, and why despite Russell developing his logical atomism in response to Witt, that Witt still considered Russell to misunderstand his point.

In other words, RussellA quotes matter above:

How does language and thought relate to the world?
How does language relate to thought?
Does the world we experience only exist in the mind, or does it also exist outside the mind, and if it does exist outside the mind, how does the world we experience in our mind relate to the world outside the mind?
Is Neutral Monism correct, that apples only exist as concepts in the mind and outside the mind are only elementary particles and elementary forces in space and time?
Do tables exist outside the mind? — schopenhauer1

These are all excellent questions, and ones that I look forward to being able to work out together as we work out the basics.

The anti-metaphysical agenda of these movements, I don’t take to be exemplified by the Tractatus necessarily. I take the Tractatus to be influenced by these movements, and responding to them, not ascribing to them. There is a reason that after the Tractatus was written, and positivism became logical positivism, that Wittgenstein was dismissive of the anti-metaphyscial interpretation the latter ascribed to the work, and why despite Russell developing his logical atomism in response to Witt, that Witt still considered Russell to misunderstand his point. — 013zen

I mean, Wittgenstein didn't explain any more about metaphysics and epistemology per se in response to the responses. Rather, he doubled down on anti-metaphysics with his later writings, as shown in the PI (in a completely different way though, not in the same way as his earlier approach). So, I don't think this really disputes my point that the logical atomists (and broader positivists) were in the main anti-metaphysical in tenor. Because of this, the focus was heavy on logic and language, but all the interesting questions that are the prelude to this, are missing. And thus:

These are all excellent questions, and ones that I look forward to being able to work out together as we work out the basics. — 013zen

Yes, these questions (which are missing in these early analytics attempt to keep it at the level of propositions, and symbolic logic) are given short-shrift, if any. And yes, that is basically what the Tractutus is doing with "objects". Compare this approach to someone from the Kantian, Platonic, or Aristotlean traditions. I don't mean simply the content, but rather, What they allow themselves to explicate on (Hint: a lot more than the analytics of the early 20th century).

So there are metaphysical claims- objects, substance, states of affairs (arrangements of objects)

There are epistemological claims- facts, atomic facts, true and false propositions. — schopenhauer1

The problem is not that Wittgenstein muddles things, you do.

A state of affairs is a fact.

without the reader doing the heavy-lifting — schopenhauer1

Given that the stated goal of the text is to draw the limits of thought or its expression in language, the need to think in order to understand the text is in service of that goal.

as Banno pointed out, his major point is right at the top:
The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
— 1.1 — schopenhauer1

The facts are contingent. Objects are necessary. Facts are changeable. Objects are unchangeable. Wittgenstein's concern is not with the facts of the world but with what underlies both the possibility of facts and the possibility of propositions. With what underlies and connects them.

That is to say, Wittgenstein is using circular reasoning, and "double-dipping" his idea of logical structure (picture) in covertly hiding his idea of atomic facts in the idea of objects. — schopenhauer1

Logical structure underlies both the facts of the world and propositions. Atomic facts are objects in configuration. And this is what you go on to say.

"Objects being arranged" allows for ----> States of Affairs. — schopenhauer1

Objects are not being arranged. They arrange themselves.

Is it "States of Affairs" of the World, or is it Atomic Facts of the World? — schopenhauer1

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

(2)

One is a "realism" whereby the world exists independently of facts, and the other is an idealism of sorts whereby the world is simply the logical coherence of the world. — schopenhauer1

Both are wrong. No facts no world. Logic deals with possibilities and necessities.

Whether or not they are right about there being logically simple entities is another question entirely, — 013zen

I was going to say the same thing.

We know that:

1. “The object is simple” (2.02)

Wittgenstein’s claim that objects must be simple stems from 2.021 when he says:

2. “Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound” (2.021).

So, Wittgenstein’s belief that (1) objects are simple is because (2) [they] form the substance of the world.

Understanding (1) requires understanding (2) then.

Regarding “substance”, Wittgenstein says:

“The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties” (2.0231).

This is echoed in 2.024-2.025, when Witt says:

“Substance is what exists independently of what is the case. It is form and content” (2.024-2.025).

So, we know of substance:

1. Substance is a form and content that subsists between possible worlds.
2. Since material properties are accidental, they are not what subsists between possible worlds.

Since, from 2.021, we know that:

“Objects form the substance of the world” (2.021)

We can infer:

1. Objects are what subsist between possible worlds
2. Objects are devoid of material properties

We see (1) in:

“Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs” (2.014).

and we see (2) in:

“Roughly speaking: objects are colourless” (2.0232).

The problem is not that Wittgenstein muddles things, you do. — Fooloso4

Unlike you, just because I have a philosopher in my name, doesn't mean I'm a blind adherent. Not everything these people say is accurate, correct, etc. That is because

a) Philosophy itself is always an ellipses, and not a period anyways... and
b) These are just humans grappling with stuff like you and me.
c) Being that the kind of content philosophy covers are things that are inherently debatable, it is a question of how it can be that someone doesn't muddle things.

Thus it could be only said that the ways Wittgenstein is "wrong" and muddling, is the way I am using it, which is to say, that he seems to be incomplete and the validity can be questioned, since the foundations of his argument are not well grounded, to my estimation. You can disagree with that, but that is a disagreement which can't be resolved to pointing to some piece of definitive information.

Given that the stated goal of the text is to draw the limits of thought or its expression in language, the need to think in order to understand the text is in service of that goal. — Fooloso4

That's any text, so I don't buy him as exempt from explaining his own ideas more thoroughly than what is written on the page. If it needs supplemental materials, he should provide them to clarify, not acolytes and fan-boys and girls.

Objects are unchangeable. Wittgenstein's concern is not with the facts of the world but with what underlies both the possibility of facts and the possibility of propositions. With what underlies and connects them. — Fooloso4

I mean, great start! I agree with this mission, if that so be it his mission. However, he has several asserted axiomatic messages about it with little explanation and then zooms forward, as I states previously.

Logical structure underlies both the facts of the world and propositions. Atomic facts are objects in configuration. And this is what you go on to say. — Fooloso4

Who definitively knows this? How? In what epistemological and metaphysical sense? It's all taken for granted. Incomplete information.

Both are wrong. No facts no world. Logic deals with possibilities and necessities. — Fooloso4

Objects need to exist for the logic to be about something, and not an empty set or imaginary things. Objects stand for the contents of the world. This is just very abbreviated speculative philosophy. It's so abbreviated, you might miss it. But it is speculative, and so open to be questioned as to what and how this is true. Why isn't it all process (process philosophy)? What kind of things count as objects? Why must it be an object and not a unified whole?

What he is saying is that in order for atomic facts be about something, there must be a logical marker for which facts are about. And then he gives descriptions of simples and enduring, and has basic properties that they all share. But this needs to be explicated. He needs to thoroughly weigh this against the literature, what others might say, with some counter-theories, etc. etc. Otherwise, it is unjustified belief. It's simply following what one asserts and not considering all the possibilities of other theories, counter-theories, rebuttals to the counter-theories, etc. etc. It's incomplete in it's defense and assertion.

Unlike you, just because I have a philosopher in my name, doesn't mean I'm a blind adherent. — schopenhauer1

I am not a blind adherent of Wittgenstein's or anyone else. I disagree with much of what he says about philosophy in both his earlier and later works. I don't buy into his concept of objects, but I don't have to accept it as true in order to attempt to understand it. I like the interpretive challenge.

Who definitively knows this? — schopenhauer1

No one.

Why must it be an object and not a unified whole? — schopenhauer1

An object is a unified whole.

What he is saying is that in order for atomic facts be about something ... — schopenhauer1

A fact is what is the case, a state of affairs. "The book is on the shelf" is a fact. It is not about anything other than the book being on the shelf.

Where does he say that an atomic fact is about something?

An elementary proposition in language is true if the state of affairs in the world it pictures obtains.

Elementary propositions
By elementary proposition, we naturally think of expressions such as "the apple is on the table ", "grass is red". "the Eiffel Tower is in London", "the house is next to the school". I would argue that words expressing concepts are indivisible and simples. I know that "house" may be described as "a roof over a wall over a foundation", but nevertheless, in a sense, all these words expressing concepts are simples, whether "house", "roof", "wall" or "foundation".

Kant's Unity of Apperception

2.0232 - “Roughly speaking: objects are colourless”

A name names a set of properties. A name is no more than a particular set of properties, in that if all the properties were removed from an object then there would be no object. An object doesn't "have" properties, an object "is" its properties.

Even though an object is no more than its set of properties, an object, when thought about as a concept, because of Kant's Unity of Apperception, has no properties. The unity of apperception transcends the parts in favour of the whole.

For example, as an analogy, when eating a New York Cheesecake, the enjoyment doesn't come from knowing anything about its individual ingredients, such as thinking that this flour tastes good, that I like the vanilla extract and the eggs are fresh. The enjoyment comes from the taste of the cheesecake as a unified whole, something that has transcended any particular combination of ingredients.

(Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Necessity and Contingency (Part 1/3) Kyle Banick)

States of affairs
A state of affairs is objects in combinations, where objects make up the substance of the world and are indivisible and simple.

As a Neutral Monist, I think that the substance that makes up the world are elementary particles, such as fermions and bosons, indivisible and simple. But Wittgenstein cannot be referring to fermions as objects, as a proposition such as "grass is green" is certainly not picturing fermions in combination.

However, Wittgenstein is talking about the world as a logical space containing logical objects. So how can grass be thought of as a logical object indivisible and simple?

Understanding Objects within Idealism and Realism
Suppose the Tractatus had been written from the viewpoint of Idealism. Then grass in the world in fact exists in the mind, and if exists in the mind, then must exist in the mind as a concept. As a concept, can be argued to be indivisible and simple, meaning that elementary propositions picturing a state of affairs becomes understandable from the perspective of Idealism.

Suppose the Tractatus had been written from the viewpoint of Realism, then how can grass be understood to be an object indivisible and simple?

On the one hand, the Direct Realist does believe that objects such as apples, tables, grass do exist in the world as objects indivisible and simple. They believe that when we perceive an apple in the world, there is truly an apple existing in the world, and would continue to exist even if there was no mind to observe it. This means that elementary propositions picturing a state of affairs becomes understandable from the perspective of Direct Realism.

On the other hand, the Indirect Realist does not believe that objects such as apples, tables, grass exist in the world as objects indivisible and simple, but only exist in the mind as concepts indivisible and simple. When we perceive an apple in the world, there is no apple existing in the world, but only in the mind of the observer. This means that elementary propositions picturing a state of affairs is not understandable from the perspective of Indirect Realism.

But the Tractatus avoids Idealism and Realism

2.02 - “The object is simple”

However, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus deliberately avoids any reference to Idealism or Realism. This leaves us with the problem of what exactly is the proposition "grass is red" picturing in the world, and how exactly can grass be thought of as an object in the world indivisible and simple?

In order to be indivisible and simple, grass cannot be a physical object in a physical world, but only can be a logical object in a logical world, and logical objects can be indivisible and simple.

If this is the case, and an elementary proposition in language is true if the state of affairs in the world that it pictures obtains, and the state of affairs in the world is not a physical world but a logical world, then language is not picturing a physical world but a logical world.

This supports either Idealism or Indirect Realism but not Direct Realism. Unfortunately, this line of enquiry cannot be developed within the Tractatus, as the Tractatus doesn't engage with ether Idealism or Realism.

He does engage with the issue:

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same time a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise. Whatever we see could be other than it is.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise. Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is.

5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it.

5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit—not a part of the world. The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it. — ibid

The correlation you seek between the 'logical object' and natural phenomena does not approach the 'limit of the world' that Wittgenstein proposes.

Edit to add:

The viewpoint of the Philosophical Investigation does not lay this out as sharply but does say the following about the distinctions:

Whereas we are tempted to say that our way of speaking does not describe the facts as they really are. As if, for example the proposition "he has pains" could be false in some other way than by that man's not having pains. As if the form of expression were saying something false even when the proposition faute de mieux asserted something true. For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look like. The one party attack the normal form of expression as if they were attacking a statement; the others defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. — PI. 402

He does engage with the issue: — Paine

5.634 and 5.641 could refer to either Idealism or Realism.

In 5.64, Wittgenstein says that solipsism coincides with pure realism. However, the term "pure realism" is only used once in the Tractatus.

How does Wittgenstein explain that solipsism coincides with pure realism?

5.634 and 5.641 could refer to either Idealism or Realism. — RussellA

I don't see how saying: "no part of our experience is at the same time a priori" could be an expression of idealism.

The single mention of "pure realism' probably comes from it being a thought experiment appended to saying:

We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.
5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. — ibid

This difference between images built up through thoughts and words and what they show is evident throughout the book. There is a tension between what is sayable and a possibility of experience that messes with how we talk about representation. Wittgenstein places his enterprise in the center of that problem:

4.03 A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense.
A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation.
And the connexion is precisely that it is its logical picture.
A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture.
4.031 In a proposition a situation is, as it were, constructed by way of experiment.
Instead of, ‘This proposition has such and such a sense’, we can simply say, ‘This proposition represents such and such a situation’.
4.0311 One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are combined with one another. In this way the whole group—like a tableau vivant—presents a state of affairs.
4.0312 The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives.
My fundamental idea is that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.
4.032 It is only in so far as a proposition is logically articulated that it is a picture of a situation. — ibid emphasis mine

These limits of what is said versus what is shown are a question for me in how this work is presented as solving particular issues for the future. But I think it puts 'idealism versus realism' into the diagram rejected in 5.6331.

These limits of what is said versus what is shown are a question for me in how this work is presented as solving particular issues for the future. But I think it puts 'idealism versus realism' into the diagram rejected in 5.6331. — Paine

I wrote "Unfortunately, this line of enquiry cannot be developed within the Tractatus, as the Tractatus doesn't engage with ether Idealism or Realism."

Fundamentally, I am sure that the general opinion about the Tractatus is that Wittgenstein does not engage with Theories of Knowledge, such as Idealism and Realism. For Wittgenstein, the importance of philosophy was not about developing Theories of Knowledge but helping clarify one's own thought process.

7 - "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"

IEP – Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951)

Wittgenstein’s view of what philosophy is, or should be, changed little over his life. In the Tractatus he says at 4.111 that “philosophy is not one of the natural sciences,” and at 4.112 “Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.” Philosophy is not descriptive but elucidatory. Its aim is to clear up muddle and confusion.

There is probably no Theory of Knowledge that hasn't been ascribed to Wittgenstein, and I am sure parts of the Tractatus can be read in support of one theory or another.

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I don't see how saying: "no part of our experience is at the same time a priori" could be an expression of idealism. — Paine

My basis understanding of the difference between Idealism and Realism is:
Idealism = the world exists in a mind. Berkeley said in the mind of God, the Solipsist says in the mind of the observer.
Realism = one world exists in the mind and another world exists outside the mind. The Indirect Realist says that these worlds are different. The Direct Realist says that these worlds are the same.

5.633 and 5.634 makes the point that we see a shape in the world, we don't see a representation of a shape in the world. But where is this world. Does this world only exist in a mind as Idealism proposes or does this world also exist outside the mind as Realism proposes. 5.633 and 5.634 says nothing about this .
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The single mention of "pure realism' probably comes from it being a thought experiment appended to saying: — Paine

5.62 "The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language of which I alone understand) mean the limits of my world

As before, he is not saying anything about where this world exists.
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This difference between images built up through thoughts and words and what they show is evident throughout the book. — Paine

I thought the idea of the Tractatus Picture Theory is that there is no logical difference between an elementary proposition in language and a state of affairs in the world

A thought is what it shows.