It's not clear to me if the universe contains things that are causations mixed with things that are not causations. Is it the case that whatever is not a causation is a first cause? — ucarr

I have been over this numerous times at this point. Its been answered already several posts up, please review. We had a lengthy discussion about first causes and how they enter into causality once formed. Please look for that again. — Philosophim

What I remember pertinent to first causes within the context of causality is that after inception, a first cause is henceforth subject to the laws of physics in application to all things inhabiting the natural world.

Here's a question I think unaddressed and important that arises: With the exception of first causes, is it true that -- within the everyday world of things material and otherwise -- all things are part of a causal chain that inevitably arrives at a first cause?

My issue with contingency is that we don’t know enough about reality to know if all things are contingent. — Tom Storm

You respond to Tom Storm's uncertainty about universal contingency with "correct." Is it the case your thesis posits universal contingency abstractly while, in fact, empirically you're uncertain about it being true? Is it the case your uncertainty -- if it exists -- stems from a lack of empirical verification? If so, your uncertainty might be tied to deep and complex questions about the veracity of knowledge a priori with respect to phenomena supposedly amenable to empirical verification. You've addressed the issue of empirical verification by saying it's a nearly impossible standard to meet. To my thinking this throws doubt upon the probativity of your thought experiment.

For a parallel, consider Einstein and his theories of General and Special Relativity. He developed them abstractly as thought experiments employing calculations. Subsequent to the publication of his papers, empirical verifications of their claims were established. The logical and the empirical are sometimes two halves of one whole.

This is not an empirical proof, but a logical proof based on what we know today. — Philosophim

Your implied dismissal of any crosstalk between the logical and the empirical herein notwithstanding, the two modes of inquiry are indeed herein inter-dependent because, as I've learned from Gnomon, causation is believed but not yet proven.

I write the above paragraph in reference back to the importance of: "It's not clear to me if the universe contains things that are causations mixed with things not causations."

I know you think I'm pettifogging your thesis with irrelevant blather; I hope my questions are piquant.

You asked about sources I use for information theory. Actually this is becoming an almost mainstream approach for trying to unify gravity and quantum mechanics. Quantum information theory gives a way to model some of the events in quantum mechanics that are outside the traditional notion of what is physical - the "Bell's inequality effects." A starting point might be: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Does-gravity-come-from-quantum-information-Qi/3be29be26eff01e1c2b182fca716180c11031ebd

What I presented comes from Deacon. — ucarr

The phrase --- "Do you reject the belief causation resides within dynamical systems of self-organization phase-shifted across ascending levels of organization towards effects?" --- is over my head. So I can't agree or deny. If you say so, I'll assume it makes sense to Deacon. :smile:

Is it correct to say you see causation -- structurally speaking -- as a generalization in parallel with the specific energy-and-change relationship with respect to an invisible agent that causes transformation from one state-of-being to another state-of-being? — ucarr

Again, above my pay grade. But yes, as I understand Causation, the agent of "transformation" is invisible, and is knowable only by inference from observations of state A (before) and state B (after) the physical changes noted. The "invisible agent" is called by various names by scientists : energy, inertia, mass, photon, potential, etc. When a cue ball hits a stack of billiard balls, some unseen something seems to have been transferred from the moving cue ball to the stationary eight ball. We still don't know what-it-is, in material terms, but we do know a lot about what it does, its physical actions & reactions.

In my personal thesis, I follow the implications of cutting-edge physics --- which is also over my head --- to draw philosophical inferences about Causation, Transformation, and Information. The term "information" originally applied only to ideas in a human mind. But now it is being used to describe all kinds of Transformations*1. Physicists tend to think of physical Energy as fundamental, but some philosophers view Information as the primitive of Causation*2. Studies of complex systems, such as biological entities, have been enhanced by treating Information as an analog of Energy*3. So you can call that "invisible agent of transformation" Energy or Causation or Information or Spirit, depending on the context, and your own proclivities. :nerd:


*1. Does Energy = Information? :
Energy is a mysterious force that causes things to move. Energy is not information but it is required to transfer information
https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-nature-of-energy-a-philosophical-perspective.122587/

*2. What is information? :
Information philosophy extends that study to the communication of information content between material objects, including how it is changed by energetic interactions with the rest of the universe.
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/

*3. Complexity, Entropy & the Physics of Information :
They connect the natural sciences to the science of computation, and they characterize the emergence of classical physics from the quantum realm in the early universe.
https://www.sfipress.org/news/complexity-entropy-and-the-physics-of-information

What I remember pertinent to first causes within the context of causality is that after inception, a first cause is henceforth subject to the laws of physics in application to all things inhabiting the natural world. — ucarr

Correct. More accurately, it exists in the way it exists, and interacts with others in a resultant manner that can be codified into rules and laws.

Here's a question I think unaddressed and important that arises: With the exception of first causes, is it true that -- within the everyday world of things material and otherwise -- all things are part of a causal chain that inevitably arrives at a first cause? — ucarr

Yes. To not be would be complete and utter chaos that could never be understood, codified, or made into any sort of law.

My issue with contingency is that we don’t know enough about reality to know if all things are contingent.
— Tom Storm

You respond to Tom Storm's uncertainty about universal contingency with "correct." Is it the case your thesis posits universal contingency abstractly while, in fact, empirically you're uncertain about it being true? — ucarr

Correct. An empirical verification would only occur if we examined everything in the universe and came to a scientifically concluded result. Arguably, this is beyond empirical verification. So in any empirical test, we look for contingency. So far no one has ever established in any empirical test that contingency does not exist.

Is it the case your uncertainty -- if it exists -- stems from a lack of empirical verification? — ucarr

It is not uncertainty in the logical sense. It is the correct and logical conclusion to draw in the empirical sense. There are many conclusions that we cannot make when referring to the empirical that are largely accepted in the purely logical sense.

You've addressed the issue of empirical verification by saying it's a nearly impossible standard to meet. To my thinking this throws doubt upon the probativity of your thought experiment. — ucarr

A fair doubt to have, but when we cannot explore things empirically, logic based on what we currently know is all we can do. Can I empirically verify that pie can exist in reality as an irrational number? No. Pi's irrational measurement extends beyond our tools. However, we can estimate using significant digits and use it. Pi as a logical number is irrational and infinite. Pi as an empirical number is finite.

For a parallel, consider Einstein and his theories of General and Special Relativity. He developed them abstractly as thought experiments employing calculations. Subsequent to the publication of his papers, empirical verifications of their claims were established. The logical and the empirical are sometimes two halves of one whole. — ucarr

Correct, and I believe I've used this example before. Logically, the theory worked. But it still had to be tested empirically to confirm it as empirically true. Prior to the empirical test, did it mean it wasn't logically true? No, it was logically true with what was known at the time. This is why it was even attempted as an empirical application to begin with.

The logical layout of the necessity of a first cause, and its logical consequences, have a clear map to lay out in an empirical test. In most instances, its impossible as no one can predict when a first cause will happen. But, it could be an accident one day in a lab setting that a first cause happens. That's extremely unlikely of course.

The more important aspect of the logical nature of a first cause is to ensure that people don't throw around empirical claims like "The big bang or God" is a first cause. Because a big bang or God could potentially be first causes in potential, but to claim they are in actual requires empirical proof. We can no longer say, "The big bang is logically a first cause." No, its not. Any question of any specified claim of a first cause is no longer in the realm of the logical, but the empirical.

because, as I've learned from Gnomon, causation is believed but not yet proven. — ucarr

I would question what you mean by 'not proven'. Without causation all of science and reason goes out the window. If causation is gone, then I can't say you typed your reply to me. "You" didn't cause it. And that's absurd.

I write the above paragraph in reference back to the importance of: "It's not clear to me if the universe contains things that are causations mixed with things not causations." — ucarr

According to the thesis I've put forward, its logically possible. First causes would not be causations, but everything after their inception would be.

I know you think I'm pettifogging your thesis with irrelevant blather; I hope my questions are piquant. — ucarr

I did not think this, I was just tired of one sided 20 questions without feedback or further interactions. :)

David Hume addressed the philosophical Causation Problem by noting that, in Physics there is no Causation, only Change*1. Yet, the human mind attributes the Power of Causation (potential) to some unseen force. By the same reasoning, there are no Laws or Logic in the physical world. But the human mind seems to inherently "conceive" of consecutive Change as the effect of some prior physical input of Energy. It's a Belief, not a Fact. — Gnomon

...as I've learned from Gnomon, causation is believed but not yet proven. — ucarr

I would question what you mean by 'not proven'. Without causation all of science and reason goes out the window. If causation is gone, then I can't say you typed your reply to me. "You" didn't cause it. And that's absurd. — Philosophim

Perhaps Gnomon can elaborate so rules of inference governing formal proofs not yet satisfied by reasoning about causation.

It's not clear to me if the universe contains things that are causations mixed with things not causations. — ucarr

First causes would not be causations, but everything after their inception would be. — Philosophim

Regarding causal chains, you define two types of things in the world: first causes and causations.

What I remember pertinent to first causes within the context of causality is that after inception, a first cause is henceforth subject to the laws of physics in application to all things inhabiting the natural world. — ucarr

More accurately, it exists in the way it exists, and interacts with others in a resultant manner that can be codified into rules and laws. — Philosophim

What you say above is a re-wording of some of your earlier statements. What you're saying is generally clear, but now I want to take a closer look at some details. You say a first cause is not part of its causal chain. After inception, when the first cause is in the world existing as it exists, how is it physically related to its causal chain?

Let's imagine a new type of bacterium incepts into our world. Empirical examination leads medical science to believe it causes a new type of disease with unique symptoms. During its lifetime, the first cause bacterium reproduces. As the first cause, is the first cause bacterium distinguishable from its offspring? Is it indistinguishable from its offspring? Does nature provide any means by which a first cause is known as such? If it doesn't, don't we have to doubt there's any way to isolate a first cause beyond the domain of abstract reasoning? Does this raise a question about the practical value of isolating a first cause in abstraction?

If an effective treatment for the new type of bacterium is developed, does any knowledge of the first cause bacterium, whether abstract or empirical, amount to anything more than an academic exercise in thought experimentation?

What you say above is a re-wording of some of your earlier statements. What you're saying is generally clear, but now I want to take a closer look at some details. You say a first cause is not part of its causal chain. After inception, when the first cause is in the world existing as it exists, how is it physically related to its causal chain? — ucarr

That's definitely not what I intended. The first cause is the start of the causal chain.

Let's imagine a new type of bacterium incepts into our world. Empirical examination leads medical science to believe it causes a new type of disease with unique symptoms. During its lifetime, the first cause bacterium reproduces. As the first cause, is the first cause bacterium distinguishable from its offspring? — ucarr

It is distinct in the fact that if we were to trace the bacteria back to the first, we would find there was no evidence of there being a prior bacterium.

Does this raise a question about the practical value of isolating a first cause in abstraction? — ucarr

What do you think? Ucarr, I've told you the value already in understanding the idea. What do you think about that?

If an effective treatment for the new type of bacterium is developed, does any knowledge of the first cause bacterium, whether abstract or empirical, amount to anything more than an academic exercise in thought experimentation? — ucarr

If you cure cancer for one person, that doesn't require us to learn the full ancestry of the person. The logic is about prior causation, so its use is in questions about prior and ultimate causation.

After inception, when the first cause is in the world existing as it exists, how is it physically related to its causal chain? — ucarr

That's definitely not what I intended. The first cause is the start of the causal chain. — Philosophim

My first impulse is to deem your non-response a blatant evasion. Could it be you have nothing to say about a first cause and its followers? Let me examine your thoughts a bit further. If a first cause is not part of its causal chain, is not connected to its causations, what meaning does first cause possess? Merely repeating over and over that its a necessary first means nothing real and practical if you can't elaborate details of first cause active in our daily world. Merely being necessary to the inception of a descendent translates to a man who sires a child and then abandons both the child and its mother. Why is a thought experiment to such a conclusion worth your time and effort?

As the first cause, is the first cause bacterium distinguishable from its offspring? — ucarr

It is distinct in the fact that if we were to trace the bacteria back to the first, we would find there was no evidence of there being a prior bacterium. — Philosophim

So, first cause possesses the distinction of prior nothingness? Such an emergence would be stupendous if coupled with playing the role of an on-sight parent nurturing children, but you say, with pique, first cause is not party to its descendants.

Does this raise a question about the practical value of isolating a first cause in abstraction? — ucarr

What do you think? Ucarr, I've told you the value already in understanding the idea. What do you think about that? — Philosophim

I think in your mind you've journeyed to a lonely place defined by the absoluteness of its isolation. Moreover, the solitary denizen of that yawning emptiness flails about, haunted by unbreakable seclusion. Might this be where Nietzsche landed finally, with the last, dimming glow of twilight absorbing into the darkness of his transcendent idols?

The logic is about prior causation, so its use is in questions about prior and ultimate causation. — Philosophim

What sort of questions about nothing cry out for answers? Let's suppose our world has nothing for its ancestor. How does nothing animate and uplift human nature? Perhaps more important is the question how does our first material ancestor, first cause -- no more connected to us than nothing -- impact our lives? At least the God of antiquity has thrown a Tanakh our way. First cause has no truck with us? How dismal.

...as I've learned from Gnomon, causation is believed but not yet proven. — ucarr

I would questionwhat you mean by 'not proven'. Without causation all of science and reason goes out the window. If causation is gone, then I can't say you typed your reply to me. "You" didn't cause it. And that's absurd. — Philosophim

Perhaps Gnomon can elaborate so rules of inference governing formal proofs not yet satisfied by reasoning about causation. — ucarr

Hey, I'm just accepting David Hume's reasoning, about the universality of cause & effect. I'm not an expert in these matters, so you can argue with him.

Today, we associate the word "Energy" with physical changes in the world. Yet it is defined, not as a physical thing, but as an "ability" or "capacity" or "efficacy" or "potential" which are no more empirically provable than "causation". Personally, I take predictable physical determinism for granted, for pragmatic reasons, and make no attempt to prove it, logically or empirically. I assume that's what Hume meant by "certitude". :smile:

David Hume & the Theory of Causation :
Causation describes a cause-and-effect relationship, where one thing causes another to occur. However, Hume argued that causation is not always empirically sound because it cannot be proven because experiences are subjective and flawed.
https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-metaphysics-of-causation-humes-theory.html

David Hume: Causation
Once more, all we can come up with is an experienced constant conjunction. Of the common understanding of causality, Hume points out that we never have an impression of efficacy. Because of this, our notion of causal law seems to be a mere presentiment that the constant conjunction will continue to be constant, some certainty that this mysterious union will persist. Hume argues that we cannot conceive of any other connection between cause and effect, because there simply is no other impression to which our idea may be traced. This certitude is all that remains.
https://iep.utm.edu/hume-causation/

Is it ever possible to actually 'prove' causation? :
You can prove 'causation' with respect to one context and one event but never on a universal canvas of time where you can explain all things at the same time. You will necessarily make some assumptions. So proof of 'causation' will come with that baggage of unexplained assumptions.
https://www.quora.com/Is-it-ever-possible-to-actually-prove-causation

My first impulse is to deem your non-response a blatant evasion. Could it be you have nothing to say about a first cause and its followers? — ucarr

Look at this again Ucarr. A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. A is a first cause. I don't see me evading anything, you seem to be overcomplicating the issue or seeing something there that I don't.

Why is a thought experiment to such a conclusion worth your time and effort? — ucarr

I have listed this repeatedly. Please go back and re-read where I mention the value of realizing what a first cause is and its consequences. I would relist this if it were once or twice, but I've already mentioned this at least 3 times.

So, first cause possesses the distinction of prior nothingness? — ucarr

Yes. This has been said numerous times as well Ucarr. Please stop asking the same questions again and again and just start asserting your thoughts. I will correct you if you make a mistake. My current correction is your mistake in asking the same question again and again. :)

Such an emergence would be stupendous if coupled with playing the role of an on-sight parent nurturing children, but you say, with pique, first cause is not party to its descendants. — ucarr

It would be stupendous. But such an empirical claim must be empircally proven. If you claimed, "This pregnant woman incepted out of nowhere with a biological age of 23," you better have airtight proof that your claim matches reality.

I think in your mind you've journeyed to a lonely place defined by the absoluteness of its isolation. Moreover, the solitary denizen of that yawning emptiness flails about, haunted by unbreakable seclusion. — ucarr

Yeah...that's an opinion about me not about the theory. Maybe you've just reached the end of exploring this Ucarr. We've gone over it numerous times, it still stands, and maybe its time to accept that. Admitting it works for now doesn't mean you have to like it, or that it can't be disproven in the future. But if we're descending into insults about the creator of the idea, it seems like the idea is pretty solid and there's nothing more to be said for now.

What sort of questions about nothing cry out for answers? Let's suppose our world has nothing for its ancestor. How does nothing animate and uplift human nature? — ucarr

Why do you need something else to do that? If there was something out there that intended humanity to be inanimate and hated human nature, wouldn't you give it the metaphorical finger and uplift humanity anyway? Purpose is not found from without. It is found from within us.

First cause has no truck with us? How dismal. — ucarr

Lets say there is a God Ucarr. It would know its a first cause. Meaning it would be in the same boat you're talking about. "Why am I hear? There's no outside reason for me, a God, to exist. Oh woe is me!" The God would need to make the same decision we do. They must find value and purpose in their own existence. So Ucarr, there is no escaping the reality that even a God has no prior cause, no prior purpose, no sanctioned greater purpose than what they are. That doesn't mean we can't decide to make purpose. To enjoy our humanity. To live life in a way that creates a world that satisfies us and those around us.

...as I've learned from Gnomon, causation is believed but not yet proven — ucarr

Hey, I'm just accepting David Hume's reasoning, about the universality of cause & effect. I'm not an expert in these matters, so you can argue with him. — Gnomon

Hume points out that we never have an impression of efficacy. Because of this, our notion of causal law seems to be a mere presentiment that the constant conjunction will continue to be constant, some certainty that this mysterious union will persist. — edu/hume-causation/

For an explanation supporting the reality of causation, I'm inclined to cite the second law of conservation: matter and energy are neither created nor destroyed. In conjunction with this, I'm inclined to propose that matter and energy are continually changing form and position via self-organizing dynamical systems across time and space. In a complicated way, causation is about shape-shifting. So, causation tells us our world is thoroughly networked.

My first impulse is to deem your non-response a blatant evasion. Could it be you have nothing to say about a first cause and its followers? — ucarr

Look at this again Ucarr. A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. A is a first cause. I don't see me evading anything, you seem to be overcomplicating the issue or seeing something there that I don't. — Philosophim

So, A→C. Okay, you've shown me the transitive property via implication. No dispute from me, but the transitive property by implication is not what I'm focusing on when I accuse you of evasion.

After inception, when the first cause is in the world existing as it exists, how is it physically related to its causal chain? — ucarr

That's definitely not what I intended. The first cause is the start of the causal chain. — Philosophim

My first impulse is to deem your non-response a blatant evasion. — ucarr

As you can see, I ask you about the physical connection between first cause and the members of its causal chain. This is a particularly important question for you to answer because you say first cause is not a member of the set of its causations. You're apparently talking about causation without physical connection between first cause and its set of causations. You say you're only concerned with a logical argument while leaving an empirical argument to other thinkers. Well, causation -- whether viewed logically or empirically -- entails by definition a physical relationship between cause and effect, or am I mistaken?

If I'm mistaken, and you're ready to demonstrate how your logical truth directly impacts our material world, then you're opening a big can of worms regarding top-down causation from mind directly to physical effect. Whether or not this is possible is an unresolved debate. This issue is too large for you to ignore completely.

If I'm not mistaken, then your proposition: "Every causal chain traces back to a first cause," needs to explain how it is that material causal chains trace back to origins from which they're materially disconnected.

These two big and unresolved issues motivate me to charge you with evasion.

I have listed this repeatedly. Please go back and re-read where I mention the value of realizing what a first cause is and its consequences. I would relist this if it were once or twice, but I've already mentioned this at least 3 times. — Philosophim

Again, I'm not herein focused on the simple transitive property you keep repeating.

So, first cause possesses the distinction of prior nothingness? — ucarr

Yes. This has been said numerous times as well Ucarr. Please stop asking the same questions again and again and just start asserting your thoughts. I will correct you if you make a mistake. My current correction is your mistake in asking the same question again and again. — Philosophim

No. You fail to note the importance of "distinction" in context here. I'm specifically talking about what sets off first cause from its causations. The emphasis here is on the physical relationship between first cause and its causations, not on the definition of first cause. If I were muddled about the definition of first cause, I would've asked: "What's the definition of first cause?"

Now the question arises: "How is the second law of conservation preserved?" You must answer this question about one of the foundational planks upon which physics stands.

Such an emergence would be stupendous if coupled with playing the role of an on-sight parent nurturing children, but you say, with pique, first cause is not party to its descendants. — ucarr

It would be stupendous. But such an empirical claim must be empircally proven. If you claimed, "This pregnant woman incepted out of nowhere with a biological age of 23," you better have airtight proof that your claim matches reality. — Philosophim

For this reason, you must explain and justify the partition you posit between a first cause and the set of its causations. It is clear to you that partitioning first cause from its causal chain implies a citation from empirical evidence, right? Since causation is specifically concerned with how one thing causes another thing, it follows that claiming first cause is not directly connected to its set of causations results from direct observation of this disjunction.

I make this argument, in part, because we don't say "causation" when we talk about a chain of reasoning evaluating to a conclusion.

If you do have a logical proof first causes are separate from their sets of causations, I wonder why you don't present it. It's reasonable to think it essential to your proposition.

I think in your mind you've journeyed to a lonely place defined by the absoluteness of its isolation. Moreover, the solitary denizen of that yawning emptiness flails about, haunted by unbreakable seclusion. — ucarr

Yeah...that's an opinion about me not about the theory. Maybe you've just reached the end of exploring this Ucarr. We've gone over it numerous times, it still stands, and maybe its time to accept that. Admitting it works for now doesn't mean you have to like it, or that it can't be disproven in the future. But if we're descending into insults about the creator of the idea, it seems like the idea is pretty solid and there's nothing more to be said for now. — Philosophim

You charge me with attacking you instead of attacking your thinking supporting the proposition. Is it not possible for a living organism to be a first cause? If so, I've misunderstood what you've been telling me about a first cause: "There are no limitations on the inception of a first cause."

If there's truth in my defense here, then the accusation of a personal attack flies back in your direction: you're hurling at me a derogatory opinion about my frustration with your perceived endurance of the veracity of your proposition.

What sort of questions about nothing cry out for answers? Let's suppose our world has nothing for its ancestor. How does nothing animate and uplift human nature? — ucarr

Why do you need something else to do that? If there was something out there that intended humanity to be inanimate and hated human nature, wouldn't you give it the metaphorical finger and uplift humanity anyway? Purpose is not found from without. It is found from within us. — Philosophim

You seem to be forgetting we're talking about first causes. First causes, by your definition, are the inescapable sources of the many causations that populate our world. Causations always trace back to them. Well, that includes the human population. There's no doubt of it; you're first causes hold the position of God. Inescapable God needs to be inspirational, or is the universe really that cruel?

First cause has no truck with us? How dismal. — ucarr

Lets say there is a God Ucarr. It would know its a first cause. Meaning it would be in the same boat you're talking about. "Why am I hear? There's no outside reason for me, a God, to exist. Oh woe is me!" The God would need to make the same decision we do. They must find value and purpose in their own existence. So Ucarr, there is no escaping the reality that even a God has no prior cause, no prior purpose, no sanctioned greater purpose than what they are. — Philosophim

This is an argument not for causation -- first or otherwise -- but against it. It's a recognition and endorsement of self-actualization. Well, first cause and self-actualization being twins, you've inadvertently supported the denial first cause and its set of causations are separate. After all, humans and gods alike, we're all in the same boat.

Ironically, this endorsement -- meant to exalt God and humanity together -- trivializes the logical dimensions of first cause in isolation. The interweave of God and humanity self-actualizing together -- an existential project -- dwarfs the importance of logical isolation.

So, A→C. Okay, you've shown me the transitive property via implication. No dispute from me, but the transitive property by implication is not what I'm focusing on when I accuse you of evasion. — ucarr

Then please be more clear. When you just throw a sentence with a question I have very little to go on. You need to give more context to your question. What are you intending? What are you trying to say? Are you asking the question as a challenge, or as a means for clarification? I don't know half the time and its frustrating when I'm trying to engage with you honestly when you do this.

As you can see, I ask you about the physical connection between first cause and the members of its causal chain. This is a particularly important question for you to answer because you say first cause is not a member of the set of its causations. — ucarr

Now this is much clearer. Try to give context and examples like this to your questions in the future Ucarr and we'll both have a better time. Yes, its not a member of the set of causations that involve time. But that set is a portion of the entire chain of causality. Lets say that there was an answer. A -> 2T + infinity = Y. In other words, the infinite universe was caused by something else. Now you can see the set is not the entire causal chain, but a part. Did A cause that specific eternal universe? Yes or no. And if nothing caused that eternal universe, then the final answer to the causal chain of why that eternal universe existed is that it was not caused by anything else.

Another way to see it is look at it as a finite universe, 2T + 1 = Y where the limit of T is 1. Or a finite universe with infinite sets of causality on its inception 2T + infinity = Y where the limit of T is 1. Or a universe with finite causality but infinite time 2T + 1 = y where the limit of Y is 0 but T has no limits. In all cases there's still the question, what caused it to be? And in all these potential cases, there is nothing else that caused this to be. The set is just a representation of a part of the causal chain Ucarr, not the entirety of the causal chain itself. The first cause is always part of the causal chain, as it is the start of the chain.

No. You fail to note the importance of "distinction" in context here. — ucarr

So that's an indicator to please add more context to your questions. Explain your thinking behind them. Otherwise I'm just guessing or assuming what you're meaning, and it may not be what you intended.

I'm specifically talking about what sets off first cause from its causations. The emphasis here is on the physical relationship between first cause and its causations, not on the definition of first cause. — ucarr

The physical relationship? I don't know, this is not an empirical assessment. This is an examination of a causal chain which is a question of, "What necessarily prior lead to this state of existence". We can capture a state of existence in as much or as little time as needed. "What happened 5 second ago to cause the current state of affairs? Ten seconds. 1 million seconds. What if we just examine what lead to the state result after all of the seconds? Why do we exist today? The big bang. What caused the big bang? Nothing. Lets take all of the seconds if they are infinite. What lead to the state of all of this existing? Nothing.

Now the question arises: "How is the second law of conservation preserved?" You must answer this question about one of the foundational planks upon which physics stands. — ucarr

I thought we already covered this on the idea that the first cause's inception is not bound by laws of causation. If you intend something else, please give an example of what you mean to this question.

Since causation is specifically concerned with how one thing causes another thing, it follows that claiming first cause is not directly connected to its set of causations results from direct observation of this disjunction. — ucarr

Again, I've never claimed this. You are confusing a set as the entire causal chain instead of a part of the causal chain.

You charge me with attacking you instead of attacking your thinking supporting the proposition. — ucarr

When i asked what you thought about this:

Does this raise a question about the practical value of isolating a first cause in abstraction? — ucarr

You didn't answer the question. You made it about me.

I think in your mind you've journeyed to a lonely place defined by the absoluteness of its isolation. Moreover, the solitary denizen of that yawning emptiness flails about, haunted by unbreakable seclusion. — ucarr

How else am I to interpret this? I wasn't attacking you, I was pointing out not to give your opinion about what you think of me, and just keep to the question about the theory.

you're hurling at me a derogatory opinion about my frustration with your perceived endurance of the veracity of your proposition. — ucarr

No, the only things I've been frustrated with are one sided questions without further explanation or not answering my question by giving an opinion on what you think about me. You are allowed to have your frustrations with me as well, I'm not perfect. Noting them helps each of us learn to give the other better communication and intent.

Well, causation -- whether viewed logically or empirically -- entails by definition a physical relationship between cause and effect, or am I mistaken? — ucarr

By physical I definitely mean existent. I can't tell you the exact mechanism between every cause. But causality can be simplified to, A exists which leads to B existing. So again, A -> B -> C. If there is no A, B is the first cause. If there is nothing that exists which causes A, then A is the first cause.

Is it not possible for a living organism to be a first cause? — ucarr

Yes. We went over this in depth with the idea of a first cause as an atom remember? We talked about all the parts, and how they would need to incept all at the same time, which technically means each part is a first cause that just happened to line up with the other first causes? We can shorten that specification to anything like 'a living thing'. This one has been a while and we've only gone over it once. If you need more than the reminder, feel free to ask.

There's no doubt of it; you're first causes hold the position of God. Inescapable God needs to be inspirational, or is the universe really that cruel? — ucarr

For the universe to be cruel there would need to be intent. There's no intent. Its not cruel or kind. It simply is. We as conscious beings can make the universe cruel or kind. My point is even if there existed a conscious God that had a plan, that plan would be completely made up by God with no higher purpose behind that God itself. Its the same boat no matter what. So smile, treat others well, and live a good life. :)

This is an argument not for causation -- first or otherwise -- but against it. It's a recognition and endorsement of self-actualization. — ucarr

I don't understand how self-actualization is against the idea of a first cause. They're two separate things in my book. I think a logical realization that ultimately, the reason for the universe is no higher than its uncaused inception, helps us to realize how important it is that we make something good out of what's here. Mud in the ground has no use on its own, but with some care you can make a house right? Take what's in the universe, enjoy it, and make it better than what it is in itself. Give it the meaning only you can.

My issue with contingency is that we don’t know enough about reality to know if all things are contingent. — Tom Storm

Well if so, name at least one non-contingent, or impossible to change or be changed (i.e. necessary), fact. :chin:

A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. A is a first cause[effect] — Philosophim

With all due respect, Philo, I think you are mistaken: nothing causes A, etc (re: random vacuum fluctuations).

Well if so, name at least one non-contingent, or impossible to change or be changed (i.e. necessary), fact. :chin: — 180 Proof

You're exactly the person to ask this of in relation to the old, something from nothing trope. My question is: as far as we know everything in our universe is contingent - but what of potential realities outside of this, outside of our knowledge? Or before the singularity, etc? Do we know enough about reality to know if contingency is a necessary phenomenon?

My question is: as far as we know everything in our universe is contingent- — Tom Storm

and also that "our universe" itself – a fact – is contingent

-but what of potential realities outside of this, outside of our knowledge?

What of "them"? Whether or not "they" are (or consist in) non-contingencies, such "potential realities" would be both astronomically remote from and fundamentally unrelated to "our universe" (and its, as Witty says, totality of facts.)

Or before the singularity, etc?

"Before" (a temporal relation) spacetime does not makes sense ... and accounting for QG (rather than just GR), Hartle-Hawking hypothesizes that the BBT does not require an initial "singularity".

Do we know enough about reality to know if contingency is a necessary phenomenon?

I don't think "we know" anything at all about "reality" except that it constrains reasoning and thereby whatever is/can be known. When I wrote

... [an] impossible to change or be changed (i.e. necessary), fact — 180 Proof

I'd assumed facts (only) as constituents of "our universe" and meant for you / someone to posit either a concrete (i.e. known) or a conceivable (i.e. rationally understood) fact that is impossible to change or be changed.

For an explanation supporting the reality of causation, I'm inclined to cite the second law of conservation: matter and energy are neither created nor destroyed. In conjunction with this, I'm inclined to propose that matter and energy are continually changing form and position via self-organizing dynamical systems across time and space. In a complicated way, causation is about shape-shifting. So, causation tells us our world is thoroughly networked. — ucarr

Your description of Causation sounds similar to my own thesis of Enformationism. It takes the Power to Transform (EnFormAction : energy + form + action) as the fundamental fact of the world. Physicists tend to refer to it as a Universal Quantum Field, from which all kinds of Matter may emerge. Like Energy though, EFA is not a material thing, but a dynamic Potential to cause changes in physical constitution and in metaphysical form : "changing form" ; "shape-shifting".

My unconventional notion of Causal Information can be traced back to quantum physicist J. A. Wheeler's "It from Bit" postulation. It's also indirectly related to Tegmark's Mathematical Universe hypothesis. In my blog posts, I often refer to EnFormAction (power to transform) as a "shape-shifter". And that concept of "changing form" is exemplified in Einstein's E=MC^2 equation of causal Energy with sensible mathematical Mass, which we experience as real tangible Matter.

This unorthodox mash-up of physics & metaphysics is hard to grasp, but once you get-it, that understanding of how the world is "net-worked" by Causation will explain a lot of philosophical mysteries. :smile:

Self Organization :
It is as though, as the universe gradually unfolds from its featureless origin, matter and energy are continually being presented with alternative pathways of development: the passive pathway that leads to simple, static, inert substance, well described by the Newtonian of thermodynamic paradigms, and the active pathway that transcends these paradigms and leads to unpredictable, evolving complexity and variety.
https://bothandblog3.enformationism.info/page23.html

The many forms of Information :
But the universal substance of reality might be called an Information Field, analogous to a Quantum field as an immaterial pool of potential.
http://bothandblog4.enformationism.info/page29.html

The EnFormAction Hypothesis :
That neologism is an analysis and re-synthesis of the common word for the latent power of mental contents : “Information”. “En” stands for energy, the physical power to cause change; “Form” refers to Platonic Ideals that become real; “Action” is the meta-physical power of transformation, as exemplified in the amazing metamorphoses of physics, whereby one kind of thing becomes a new kind of thing, with novel properties.
https://bothandblog3.enformationism.info/page23.html

:up:

A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. A is a first cause[effect]
— Philosophim
With all due respect, Philo, I think you are mistaken: nothing causes A, etc (re: random vacuum fluctuations). — 180 Proof

No worry, challenge away! You have a lot of experience and a keen mind, I definitely want to hear what you think.

I don't think we're in disagreement here. A "first cause" as I define it is the beginning of a causal chain. Meaning a first cause is not a 'first caused', but something which exists as the start of every chain of causal questioning. A first cause 'is'. Which means that yes, nothing causes A. But A is the start. In your case, the universe has no start, but has always existed. There is nothing which caused the universe to always exist. There is nothing which caused a 'start'.

And that's the beginning of the causal chain which explains our universe. If we were to take all the causal history of our universe and place it into a set, there would still be the question, "What caused the universe to be infinite and have always existed?" The answer is: "Nothing". There was nothing which caused our universe to exist in this way, it simply does. There are now no more questions of prior causality to explore. Thus the start of the causal chain, or the first cause.

My goal is to nuance the following premise: “Logically, an infinite causal chain cannot exist that does not inevitably arrive at a first cause."

I will argue that given an eternal universe – which can be construed as an infinite causal chain – a precisely determinable first cause is not possible.

I will show why an infinite causal chain cannot inevitably and precisely arrive at a first cause.

Question – Has pi been situated on the number line? Answer – Yes, but asymptotically.

Philosophim, you’re establishing a set containing an infinite series and then counting back to its start point and asserting no prior member to the start point can exist.

Can an infinite series be counted? Yes, but there are rules for doing this type of counting.

Your domain of operations for this premise is set theory.

For the math representation of your premise, you need an equation that computes toward the limits bounding your infinite series. In other words, you must treat the volume of your infinite set as an approximation forever approaching a limit.

Structurally speaking, you’re concerned with infinite volume of membership juxtaposed with limited extent.

Your input values need to all be finite and configured with math operators that compute for approximation towards the limits bounding your infinite series.

• You should immediately discard your current would-be equations that use infinity as one
  of your input values. Using infinity as an input value is a violation of math form. It’s like trying to start a combustion engine with water instead of gasoline. Fundamentally wrong. If, however, you have your own math that rationally discards proper math form, that’s another matter. Do you have your own system of math?

Your language for your premise needs to draw a parallel: Infinite causal chains are infinite series made empirical and bounded by eternal existence instead of by limits.

My Argument – Infinity is not a discrete number. It therefore cannot be precisely situated on the number line. It therefore cannot be precisely sequenced in a series populated with numbers. For these reasons, infinite values cannot be computed directly.

In order to compute an infinite value, you must treat it as if it’s a discrete number; this is achieved through approximation to a number. In its calculation with infinite values, calculus establishes limits toward which infinite series approximate; it’s as if they’re discrete numbers situated on the number line.

A parallel to these calculations of calculus are sequences of reasoning towards axioms. An axiom is a limit for logical reasoning. It cannot be precisely sequenced within a chain of logical reasoning. Logic approximates toward its axioms just as calculus approximates toward infinite values, i.e., toward limits.

The Crux: QM Governs Cosmology – an infinite causal chain cannot have a precise first cause because it amounts to putting the whole number line – infinite in volume – within itself. Infinite values can be bounded (as argued above) but they cannot be definitively sequenced.

Claiming an infinite series has a precise first cause is an irrational attempt to sequence an infinite value within itself. Put another way, it’s the attempt to make something – a number sequence – greater than itself. This is a paradox. The compatibility of an infinite value with sequencing must be asymptotically approached as an infinite progression towards a limit.

The empirical parallel to the above argument is the attempt to sequence being – general existence – logically. You cannot precisely sequence general existence logically, that is, you cannot definitively attach a first cause to general existence for the same reason you cannot discretely sequence the whole number line within itself. The attempt to do so involves putting general existence into a logical sequence as if it were rationally compatible with reasoning. You cannot reason definitively with imprecisely sequenceable values, i.e., with infinite values.

Premise – Imprecise sequenceability, an attribute of an infinite value, such as the whole number line or general existence, precludes definitive analysis. Without definitive analysis, infinite values can only be axiomatic. Axioms are the necessary start points of analysis. They can be forever approached as an approximation to a limit, and this is an analytical_logical process, but the asymptote does not equal the limit. So, there can be a logical approach to proof of infinite values, but no complete and final proof of them. Well, analysis_logic is rooted in continuity, and there is a gap in the continuity linking infinite values with analysis_logic.

This gap is the door-ajar entrée for QM into our universe.

Given these limitations, the attempt to sequence an infinite value amounts to claiming a given thing is greater than itself; this irrational claim holds moot sway within QM, as in the instance of superposition; prior to measurement, the cat is neither dead or alive. This points our reasoning mind towards an eternal universe without a discrete first cause being possible.*

My Conclusion - The nuancing of: “Logically, an infinite causal chain cannot exist that does not inevitably arrive at a first cause."leads to "Moot Instead of Necessary." So, at the matrix of 3D+T, an infinite causal chain probabilistically arrives at an ad hoc, QM super-positional first cause towards the next-order matrix of dimensional expansion.

Undefined> 1/0 (nothing-to-something).

Within the objective materialism of modern science, logic and computation assume axiomatically the eternal existence of matter, energy, motion, space, and time. These five fundamentals preclude any direct connection between something and nothing. Therefore, all existing things are mediated through the fundamental five.

Nothing-to-something takes forever when the bounded infinity structure – infinite volume within limited extent – applies.

If we represent the infinite series of nothing-to-something as undefined, or 1/0, and observe that infinitely small approximates to the limit of zero, then infinitely-small-to-zero and its reverse take an infinite amount of time. So, speaking logically and computationally, nothing-to-something is a bounded infinity of undefined.

*Of course, a thing-greater-than-itself is really just the fun-house mirror distortion of higher-dimensional expansion as seen in its collapsed state at our level of perception at 3D+T. In actuality, superposition is the whereness of a material object with more than 3 spatial dimensions. Because whereness beyond 3D is so radically different, it renders QM’s insights into higher dimensional whereness as whacky gross distortions of normal whereness, i.e., common sense perception of material objects at the dimensional expansion of 3D+T.

A first cause 'is'. — Philosophim

And thus, as I've pointed out already , it's not a "first cause" but is the only cause (e.g.) à la Wheeler's one electron postulate.

In your case, the universe has no start, but has always existed.

Not quite. For me, existence itself (i.e. no-thing / vacua (à la atomist void or spinozist substance)), not "the universe" – a random inflationary fluctuation (according to QG), "always exists" (how could it not?)

There are now no more questions of prior causality to explore.

This is so because "prior causality" is as incoherent as "prior existence" or "prior randomness" or "prior spacetime" ...

Thus the start of the causal chain, or the first cause.

Analogously, the number line itself (i.e. infinity) is not the "first" number. Zero is not the "first" number. Logically, there cannot be a "first" number, Philo. Wherever we happen to "start" counting is not necessarily "first" in the sequence of events.

A first cause 'is'.
— Philosophim
And thus, as I've pointed out already ↪180 Proof, it's not a "first cause" but is the only cause (e.g.) à la Wheeler's one electron postulate. — 180 Proof

I personally cannot ascribe to that view of causality. My communication is in terms of causality in the normative sense of "what is necessary for X outcome to exist". However, my view of causality can express itself in a similar way. I've noted earlier that we can set the identity of the 'result' as lumped together as we wish. For example, I can ask, "What caused America to be discovered" is not the same as asking, "What caused the ball to move 1 meter at 90 degrees one second prior?"

Taking the later example to its end, this can go both ways. I could group all the time after an effect and look at the moment right before it all as its cause. So, just like the idea that "Everything in the universe prior to this time caused the ball to move a this second", I can reverse it and say, "Everything in this universe up to this second was caused by what?" With a finite universe this is more apparent. "The big bang caused everything else that followed".

In an infinite universe, the totality of causation that we're looking at is the universe itself. So, in the case of the manifestation of a single entity (Like the electron), I can still ask, "What caused that single entity to be?" Your reply that there is no answer is the answer. Nothing caused it to be. It simply is. So I don't think we're at odds here besides semantics.

In your case, the universe has no start, but has always existed.
Not quite. For me, existence itself (i.e. no-thing / vacua (à la atomist void or spinozist substance)), not "the universe" – a random inflationary fluctuation (according to QG), "always exists" (how could it not?) — 180 Proof

Whether we use 'the universe' or 'existence' its all the same to me. "What caused existence?" is as you noted, an absurd question. Because the answer is nothing. Some existence cannot have caused existence to be. If that's the case then there was no limitation on what could have or not have existed. There is only what is, but to ask "What caused it to be?" has the logical answer, "Nothing". Thus we can state rationally that no matter how the universe incepted, whether it truly is infinite, or truly is finite (empirical claims which no one has proven yet) the logical answer will always be the same to "What caused it to be?"

There are now no more questions of prior causality to explore.
This is so because "prior causality" is as incoherent as "prior existence" or "prior randomness" or "prior spacetime" ... — 180 Proof

The difference here is instead of calling the question incoherent, I simply not the answer. Anything other than "Nothing" devolves into an incoherent argument for sure.

Thus the start of the causal chain, or the first cause.
Analogously, the number line itself (i.e. infinity) is not the "first" number. Zero is not the "first" number. Logically, there cannot be a "first" number, Philo. Wherever we happen to "start" counting is not necessarily "first" in the sequence of events. — 180 Proof

Correct, but we're not talking about the number line. I had to note that earlier to others that I am not talking about a mathematical origin which is customizable. I am talking about a line of questioning, a chain of causation, upon which we meet an end. No matter if the universe is infinite, 'always existed', finite, or any other variation of universe a person wishes to propose, we will always reach an end while navigating its regression. This end, which is "What caused this universe to exist?" is always, "Nothing". It is "0". That is the first cause, not a number on a number line.

"What caused this universe to exist?" is always, "Nothing". It is "0". — Philosophim

"Nothing / O" = beginning-less =/= first (anything). As for "the universe", QG describes it as (in my words) a random inflationary quantum fluctuation, perhaps one out of infintely many; you commit a compositional fallacy, Philo, arguing from the causal structure intrinsic, or dynamics internal, to "the universe" to the conclusion that "the universe" is the effect of a "first cause" that is extrinsic, or external, to it when, in fact, our best science (QG) describes "the universe's" earliest planck diameter as a random event – a-causal. The "BB" didn't happen c13.81 billion years ago – the limit of contemporary cosmological measurements – but is, in fact, still happening ("banging") in the manifest form of the ongoing development – expansion – of the Hubble volume (i.e. observable region of spacetime). Again, neither logic nor physics agrees with your conclusion. Your argument only works, Philo, with pre-modern, non-scientific premises but today is, at best, not sound.

A first cause 'is'. — Philosophim

In your case, the universe has no start, but has always existed. — Philosophim

Not quite. For me, existence itself..."always exists" (how could it not?) — 180 Proof

What if I characterize nothingness as undefined somethingness, and represent it as 1/0, with
no-beginning zero = potential matter-energy-motion-space-time moving infinitely across time towards something. Does this imply a category of something-not-exactly-existential?

My attempt at naming something not-exactly-existential is strained and probably fallacious, but I'm trying to honor a metaphysical notion that nature always hedges her bets, even re: the phenomenon of eternal existence.

There are now no more questions of prior causality to explore. — 180 Proof

you commit a compositional fallacy, Philo, arguing from the causal structure intrinsic, or dynamics internal, to "the universe" to the conclusion that "the universe" is the effect of a "first cause" that is extrinsic, or external, to it when, in fact, our best science (QG) describes "the universe's" earliest planck diameter as a random event – a-causal. — 180 Proof

..."prior causality" is as incoherent as "prior existence" or "prior randomness" or "prior spacetime" ... — 180 Proof

I see your commentary here as an elaboration and illumination of my enduring intuition something is fundamentally wrong with separating an existing thing from all other existing things, and also something is fundamentally wrong with partially separating any component of a causal chain from its associate causations.

I don't see how what you've written here is related to what I've written previously in response to Philosophim. I can't grok what you're saying, ucarr, possibly becauae of the way you're saying it.

you commit a compositional fallacy, Philo, arguing from the causal structure intrinsic, or dynamics internal, to "the universe" to the conclusion that "the universe" is the effect of a "first cause" that is extrinsic, or external, to it — 180 Proof

I do not claim that a first cause is extrinsic to the universe. A first cause is merely the point in the chains of causality throughout the universe that lead to the point in which there is nothing prior.

to it when, in fact, our best science (QG) describes "the universe's" earliest planck diameter as a random event – a-causal. — 180 Proof

I agree that a first cause is true randomness. What I'm calling a 'first cause' is acausal in its inception. If the earliest plank diameter is uncaused, or true randomness, then it fits the definition of 'first cause'. Once again, we're not at odds, just taking a different semantic route to get to the same conclusion. One of Ucarr's main contentions with my claim of a first cause is that a first cause is an instance of true randomness. True randomness is the lack of limitations on what could, or could not have been. Not like the constraints of rolling a die which are really just a lack of knowledge which would necessarily lead to the outcome.

The "BB" didn't happen c13.81 billion years ago – the limit of contemporary cosmological measurements – but is, in fact, still happening ("banging") in the manifest form of the ongoing development – expansion – of the Hubble volume (i.e. observable region of spacetime). — 180 Proof

I make no claims that the big bang is, or is not a first cause. The idea that the bang is 'still happening' is the same to me as, "Causality is continuing." to understand what I mean, let me use an example. Pretend that an atom appears uncaused. By this I mean it is a completely true random event. One second, no atom, and the next, an atom. From the moment of the atom's inception, it enters into causality. In your view, the atom would still be 'atoming'. :)

Each tick of time is a step in this chain. So at the moment of inception, it is a first cause. The second moment of its existence is caused by the continual existence of the first moment of its existence. And so on and so forth. So if the atom exists for five minutes, as an example we can break down each second and ask, "What caused the atom to exist at 3:49?" This could be explained anywhere prior in the causal chain. We could simply reference 3:48. Or the set of time between 1 and two minutes. Or the entire five minutes its existed. But eventually we would reach the point of inception, and there would be no further causality. That moment where there is no prior causality, is the moment of first cause. I view the big bang in the same way assuming that it happened to be a first cause.

Taking a universe that is infinite, "The big bang has always existed." for example, results in nothing different. We can take any time within that infinity, and ask what prior causes lead to that moment. We can even take the entire set of causality within the infinite universe that has happened and still ask, "What caused this to happen?" That is the moment of first cause. We have reached the point in which the answer is nothing, which by consequence means its existence is true randomness.

To be clear, I am not claiming any one thing that has been discovered so far is a first cause. I'm just addressing the point that logically, there is a limit to prior causality and that we will eventually reach a point in our causation query in which there is no prior cause for some existence. The causation query should not be confused with the time that has passed, but the point in our query in which there is no other answer.

If you understand, you may be asking what the value is in my proposal.

First, science may change. What is considered the first cause of today, plank diameter, may be found to have been caused by something else as science and technology change. Yet the conclusion I've made here does not.

Second, no one can make a claim that "X is a necessary first cause" without extensive proof. Meaning that a claim of a particular God, Big Bang, or even Plank length formation, must be proven to have had no prior cause. The idea of any of these being necessary first causes by logic is out.

Third, this opens up a very interesting possibility. If a first cause is truly random, what's to prevent another first cause from happening? There isn't any. True randomness cannot be constrained or predicted. Could we examine a spot of nothingness over time and monitor if 'something' happened out of the blue? Even if we discovered something, we would still need to prove it was truly random, but it adds an interesting wrinkle in the examination and possibly even history of your universe.

Finally, I believe its more palatable to a general audience. Causality, like it or not, is still part of the common vernacular in both daily speech, and yes, science. Despite many people's claims that 'science disregards causality', I have found that mostly only philosophers do so. Causality is alive in well in generally practiced science. I believe the concept generates a conclusion that doesn't require a great leap in logic, or a paradigm shift in thinking. Its simple, yet leads to I think a logical conclusion that can be agreed upon. If you remain unconvinced, that's fine, I'm just trying to flesh out the logic a bit to demonstrate we might be on different roads but are reaching a similar conclusion.

If the earliest plan[ck] diameter is uncaused, or true randomness, then it fits the definition of 'first cause' — Philosophim

This is the crux of our disagreement. I understand 'randomness' to mean uncaused, acausal, without cause; you are denying this, claiming the opposite – that randomness itself (as if its an entity rather than a property) is a "first cause". This difference is more than a semantic dispute, sir. One of us is spouting jabberwocky ... :roll:

I will argue that given an eternal universe – which can be construed as an infinite causal chain – a precisely determinable first cause is not possible. — ucarr

Ok, sounds good.

Question – Has pi been situated on the number line? Answer – Yes, but asymptotically.

Philosophim, you’re establishing a set containing an infinite series and then counting back to its start point and asserting no prior member to the start point can exist. — ucarr

I'm grouping all of the causality within an infinite universe in a set which then leads to one final question of causality, "What caused all of that causality?" This is commonly stated as, "What caused the universe?" So I'm not counting back to any start point. I'm noting that the starting point in causality is "What caused the universe?"

For the math representation of your premise, you need an equation that computes toward the limits bounding your infinite series. In other words, you must treat the volume of your infinite set as an approximation forever approaching a limit. — ucarr

Sure, the limit for time in an infinite universe is infinity.

You should immediately discard your current would-be equations that use infinity as one
of your input values. Using infinity as an input value is a violation of math form. It’s like trying to start a combustion engine with water instead of gasoline. Fundamentally wrong. If, however, you have your own math that rationally discards proper math form, that’s another matter. Do you have your own system of math? — ucarr

Incorrect. Infinity is a representation of a set of numbers. Just like 23 represents a set of 23 ones. Read here: https://www.mathnasium.com/math-centers/sherwood/news/what-infinity-sher#:~:text=In%20Math%2C%20%E2%80%9Cinfinity%E2%80%9D%20is,mathematician%20John%20Wallis%20in%201657.

If you want to say I'm wrong, you're going to have to prove I am wrong, not merely say I am.

Your language for your premise needs to draw a parallel: Infinite causal chains are infinite series made empirical and bounded by eternal existence instead of by limits. — ucarr

I don't understand this, can you go a little more in depth?

Infinity is not a discrete number. It therefore cannot be precisely situated on the number line. It therefore cannot be precisely sequenced in a series populated with numbers. For these reasons, infinite values cannot be computed directly. — ucarr

Math is symbolic representation of quantities. You can symbolically represent infinity. You may not have heard of Georg Cantor's work on infinite sets. Here's an intro: https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/science/mathematics/georg-cantor-the-man-who-discovered-different-infinities/

The Crux: QM Governs Cosmology – an infinite causal chain cannot have a precise first cause because it amounts to putting the whole number line – infinite in volume – within itself. Infinite values can be bounded (as argued above) but they cannot be definitively sequenced. — ucarr

Incorrect again. Read Cantor.

Given these limitations, the attempt to sequence an infinite value amounts to claiming a given thing is greater than itself; this irrational claim holds moot sway within QM, as in the instance of superposition; prior to measurement, the cat is neither dead or alive. — ucarr

Ucarr, randomly bringing quantum mechanics into this isn't going to work either. You misunderstand that statement and what it means. I can go into depth on this later if needed, but you need to understand Cantor and infinities first.

Within the objective materialism of modern science, logic and computation assume axiomatically the eternal existence of matter, energy, motion, space, and time. These five fundamentals preclude any direct connection between something and nothing. Therefore, all existing things are mediated through the fundamental five. — ucarr

An assumption does not prove that the assumption is correct. For our current purposes assuming such is fine for calculations, but is not proof itself that it is true.

If we represent the infinite series of nothing-to-something as undefined, or 1/0, and observe that infinitely small approximates to the limit of zero, then infinitely-small-to-zero and its reverse take an infinite amount of time. So, speaking logically and computationally, nothing-to-something is a bounded infinity of undefined. — ucarr

You don't want to go this route Ucarr. I can say it doesn't because when there is nothing, there is no time. On the other hand, if you include time what you're saying is that an infinite amount of time would have to pass to get to this moment. Ucarr, if the universe has existed for infinite time, didn't you just disprove that the universe has always existed?

Read up on Cantor and revisit this.

If the earliest plan[ck] diameter is uncaused, or true randomness, then it fits the definition of 'first cause'
— Philosophim
This is the crux of our disagreement. I understand 'randomness' to mean uncaused, acausal, without cause; you are denying this, claiming the opposite – that randomness itself (as if its an entity rather than a property) is a "first cause". This difference is more than a semantic dispute, sir. One of us is spouting jabberwocky ... :roll: — 180 Proof

Let me clarify. Randomness is not causing anything. "Randomness" does not exist as a thing. Its a concept. Let me word it this way: A big bang (as an example) incepts. Prior to its inception, there was nothing. Since nothing caused it, we conclude it was completely random. But that doesn't mean 'randomness' caused the big bang. We just realize logically that if nothing caused it, it was not constrained to happen or not happen. Proving a logical first cause must exist proves that true randomness has existed and thus could continue to exist.

On the flip side, the claim that a plank length is truly random does not prove that it is truly random.

"So why is the Planck length thought to be the smallest possible length? The simple summary of Mead's answer is that it is impossible, using the known laws of quantum mechanics and the known behavior of gravity, to determine a position to a precision smaller than the Planck length. Pay attention to that repeated word "known." If it turns out that at very small lengths, some other version of quantum mechanics manifests itself or the law of gravity differs from our current theory, the argument falls apart. Since our understanding of subatomic gravity is incomplete, we know that the statement that the Planck length is the smallest possible length is on shaky ground."
https://www.fnal.gov/pub/today/archive/archive_2013/today13-11-01_NutshellReadMore.html

There is always the proposal that we simply can't detect something smaller now, but we will be able to one day. Thus its not logically proven that plank length is truly random, or if true randomness can exist. However, my logical proof of a first cause consequently logically proves that true randomness exists. Because to your point a property of something acausal is that it existence is entirely random.

True randomness cannot be constrained or predicted. — Philosophim

Is true randomness a phenomenon; is inception of first cause an event? These questions are meant to suggest how all things -- including true randomness -- generate networks of connections that contextilize their identites.

Can what could or could not have been lie beyond probability in the case of true randomness? Does the concept of true randomness suggest to you its bond with time forever approaching but never reaching actuality? This question is meant to suggest entropy weakening true randomness to something not authentically random. More specifically, this question is meant to suggest every thing -- because of its existence -- generates entropy. In this particular context, the irony is that entropy -- the measure of increasing randomness -- diminishes the purity (non-randomness) of true randomness. (This also suggests there is no purity because there is no total isolation).

Is probability only possible in the absence of true randomness? This question is meant to suggest the presence of probability generates a measure of determinism regarding the outcome of events.

Not like the constraints of rolling a die which are really just a lack of knowledge which would necessarily lead to the outcome. — Philosophim

Is rolling a die more phenomenal than inception of a first cause? This question is meant to suggest any event -- including inception of a first cause -- by the fact of its existence, prevents true randomness; if something exists, the specificity of its existence as a particular thing with specific dimensions and attributes means that its process of being created is not random; creation cannot carry out a design of creation toward a specific thing by means of true randomness; there's no initial period of a thing's existence when, during its coalescence into a clearly defined thing, its being randomly assembled with the randomness of its assemblage gradually diminishing to zero.

Is inception of a first cause less eventuary than rolling a die? This question is meant to suggest events cannot happen with their determinism at zero.

Is inception of a first cause less presential than rolling of a die? This question is meant to suggest the presence of a specific thing (all things are specific) precludes the pure isolation of from nothing. Moreover, a particular thing-in-itself cannot be a first cause in of itself because -- per QM -- a thing-in-itself cannot only be a thing-in-itself. From Heisenberg we have reason to believe we can't know every essential attribute of a thing simultaneously, and thus we infer that all things are networked and thus we infer that no apparently distinct thing is truly distinctly alone and only unto itself. There is no transitional period when a thing is distinctly alone and unto itself in a process of transformation into existence within the natural universe governed by the laws of physics.

...logically, there is a limit to prior causality and that we will eventually reach a point in our causation query in which there is no prior cause for some existence. — Philosophim

Imagine that each causation within a causal chain -- because of the fact of its existence -- generates a prior (or subsequent) causation. How does the chain of causation reach the point of no prior (or subsequent) causation?

True randomness is the lack of limitations on what could, or could not have been. — Philosophim

Let us suppose true randomness is not a process. Is it still a phenomenon? This question is meant to suggest that if true randomness is to any degree intelligible -- as in the case of it being a phenomenon, even if not a process to a specifiable end, then it must possess a specificity of form and content and this is a curiously ironic entropy-by-presence of a particular thing that diminishes the non-randomness of "pure" randomness (I say non-randomness of "pure" randomness because I equate "true" with "pure." By definition it is something wholly unmixed and that implies absolute isolation (extreme disequilibrium). But if a thing is specific in its form and content, it cannot be wholly isolated because specificity of form and content is naturally connected to prior specificity of form and content by the design of the agency that brought it into being. If this were not so, the particular thing would not have been brought into being. Because of what we know from QM (superposition) we know this applies no less to self-creation. So, the phenomenal thing -- through the agency of its existence as a specific thing -- ironically randomizes the purity of true randomness by agency of the entropy of its presence.

I don't see how what you've written here is related to what I've written previously in response to Philosophim. I can't grok what you're saying, ucarr, possibly becauae of the way you're saying it. — 180 Proof

If existence is eternal, you're metaphysically constraining existence to a binary structure of "to be" or "not to be." Do you feel completely comfortable excluding a grayscale gradient between "to be" or "not to be"?

Suppose you could choose whether or not the universe is binary or complex. Which would you choose?