Your analogies are all about things that aren't *experience itself*. A TV isn't experience itself. A baseball game isn't experience itself. I think you misunderstood the words you quoted from me.

Your account is akin to saying: I'm not watching pixels activate on my television screen, I'm watching Joe Biden's inauguration. — Michael

Are the pixels the perception or the cause of the perception? In your previous example you said that the odour molecules were the cause of the smell. Here you appear to imply that the perception and its cause are equivalent.

This "semantic" directness is so far divorced from the phenomenological directness that concerns the epistemological problem of perception and the dispute between naive and indirect realists that it seems entirely misplaced in these discussions. — Michael

It's odd, then, that Intentionalism was included in the SEP article you were quoting. Is the article only relevant for the parts of interest to you?

That it's "as direct as it can be" isn't that it's direct. The point made by indirect realists is that you can't smell the cake directly. Direct perception of a cake would require naive realism to be true, which it never is. This non-naive sense of "directness" is a misnomer. — Michael

I think I am using language in an ordinary way when I say that you can smell the cake directly. I agree that naive realism isn't true (and is very strange), but you can oppose naive realism without also making the mistake of saying that we always perceive the world indirectly, which only follows the errors and assumptions of naive realism.

Are the pixels the perception or the cause of the perception? In your previous example you said that the odour molecules were the cause of the smell. Here you appear to imply that the perception and its cause are equivalent. — Luke

I'm simply explaining that the "semantic" approach seems to miss the point. You say you smell a cake. I say I'm watching Joe Biden's inauguration. These are both perfectly ordinary ways to describe what happens. But this ordinary way of describing what happens does not entail direct realist perception.

Even though I describe what I'm doing as "watching Joe Biden's inauguration" (rather than, say, "watching pixels" or "watching light"), my perception of Joe Biden's inauguration isn't direct. Even though you describe what you're doing as "smelling a cake" (rather than, say, "smelling odour molecules"), your perception of the cake isn't direct.

I think I am using language in an ordinary way when I say that you can smell the cake directly. — Luke

The ordinary way of speaking is not an accurate account of the ontology of perception. The ordinary way of speaking developed according to our naive, pre-scientific understanding of the world.

It's odd, then, that Intentionalism was included in the SEP article you were quoting. — Luke

Even the SEP article adds:

Thus, like sense-datum theorists and adverbialists, intentionalists reject Direct Realist Presentation, and admit that we are not ever directly presented with ordinary objects, not even in veridical experience.

It's not clear to me what the intentionalist means by "we directly perceive ordinary objects that are not directly presented to us". It seems hopelessly confused. At best they're equivocating and mean two different things by "direct", at worst they are straight up contradicting themselves.

And I'll refer once again to Semantic Direct Realism:

The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.

If Jodie had told you herself, instead of hearing it from Bob, or if you went to the baseball game and saw it live, instead of watching it on TV, then these would be direct perceptions, right? — Luke

I would experience Jodie's words directly, instead of via Bob, and the game directly, instead of via the TV. But these events would still be experienced by me via my phenomenal experience of them, so in that sense they are experienced indirectly.

In the cases of hearing about Jodie from Bob, and watching the game on TV, there are (at least) two levels of indirection: the explicit one of the examples, and the implicit one that indirect realism points out.

Your analogies are all about things that aren't *experience itself*. A TV isn't experience itself. A baseball game isn't experience itself. I think you misunderstood the words you quoted from me. — flannel jesus

You seem to be using the word "experience" and "experience itself" as if they only meant "phenomenal experience". There are other kind of experience, right?

When I say "experience itself", yeah it's either synonymous with or at least close to phenomenal experience. It's the most immediate thing you're aware of in your existence - it's qualia, it's what a baby who doesn't know anything experiences the first time they open their eyes - it doesn't require knowledge or analysis, it's just your experience.

So then I agree that there is no such thing as "indirect phenomenal experience", "indirect qualia", but there is "indirect experience", right?

but there is "indirect experience", right? — hypericin

I don't know, I'd have to figure out what sort of thing you might mean by that before I can answer.

An experience had via a more direct experience.

These words are too abstract for me, an example might help.

The pixels are the distal cause of the sensation. You can describe this event as "watching Joe Biden's inauguration" if you like, or you can describe it as "watching pixels" if you like. The latter is certainly an unusual way to describe it, but strictly speaking it's factually correct.

The odour molecules are the distal cause of the sensation. You can describe this event as "smelling a cake in the oven" if you like, or you can describe it as "smelling odour molecules" if you like. The latter is certainly an unusual way to describe it, but strictly speaking it's factually correct. — Michael

The causal chain of odour molecules entering the nose, interacting with the olfactory system, converting to brain signals, etc. can explain its effect: our smelling cake. But molecules entering the nose is not equivalent to smelling molecules, and molecules entering the nose, by itself, is insufficient to cause us to smell anything. Therefore, we don't smell odour molecules. The effect of this causal chain (the sensation of smell) cannot be its own cause. Moreover, it doesn't work the other way: the sensation is not an explanation for its distal cause. That is, smelling cake isn't an explanation for why odour molecules enter the nose, etc. So, I don't believe these are equivalent.

The "ordinary way of speaking" is not an accurate account of the ontology of perception. The "ordinary way of speaking" developed according to our naive, pre-scientific understanding of the world. — Michael

It's not just a semantic difference, then?

Even the SEP article adds:

Thus, like sense-datum theorists and adverbialists, intentionalists reject Direct Realist Presentation, and admit that we are not ever directly presented with ordinary objects, not even in veridical experience.

It's not clear to me what the intentionalist means by "we directly perceive ordinary objects that are not directly presented to us". It seems hopelessly confused. At best they're equivocating and mean two different things by "direct". — Michael

It means that we don't perceive things directly in the naive realist sense of taking physical objects directly into one's mind (somehow). It is just as I am describing: a perception (including representation) is the end result of a causal chain; for example, taking odour molecules into the olfactory system and converting them into brain signals, etc. The output of this causal chain is a perception such as a smell, which is directly of an ordinary object, such as a cake. That's what I would call a perception.

The causal chain of odour molecules entering the nose, interacting with the olfactory system, converting to brain signals, etc. can explain its effect: our smelling cake. But molecules entering the nose is not equivalent to smelling molecules, and molecules entering the nose, by itself, is insufficient to cause us to smell anything. Therefore, we don't smell odour molecules. The effect of this causal chain (the sensation of smell) cannot be its own cause. Moreover, it doesn't work the other way: the sensation is not an explanation for its distal cause. That is, smelling cake isn't an explanation for why odour molecules enter the nose, etc. So, I don't believe these are equivalent. — Luke

It means that we don't perceive things directly in the naive realist sense of taking physical objects directly into one's mind (somehow). It is just as I am describing: a perception (including representation) is the end result of a causal chain; for example, taking odour molecules into the olfactory system and converting them into brain signals, etc. The output of this causal chain is a perception such as a smell... — Luke

Everything you say here is consistent with indirect realism. Sensations/sense-data/qualia are (usually) caused by stimulation by some distal object. These sensations/sense-data/qualia are (at best) mental representations of that distal object. That distal object and its properties are not directly present in experience and so the epistemological problem of perception remains.

The semantic argument over whether we should describe perception as "seeing a distal object" or "seeing a mental representation" is as irrelevant as arguing over whether we should describe what I do as "watching TV" or "watching Joe Biden's inauguration".

Everything you say here is consistent with indirect realism. — Michael

I don't believe so. I directly smell the cake. I do not smell an intermediary.

I don't believe so. I directly smell the cake. I do not smell an intermediary. — Luke

You're just reasserting the irrelevant argument about grammar.

The indirect realist says that the painting is just paint. The intentionalist says that the painting is of a flower. There's no disagreement.

You're just reasserting the irrelevant argument about grammar. — Michael

I disagree we are saying the same thing. I don't think you read this properly:

The causal chain of odour molecules entering the nose, interacting with the olfactory system, converting to brain signals, etc. can explain its effect: our smelling cake. But molecules entering the nose is not equivalent to smelling molecules, and molecules entering the nose, by itself, is insufficient to cause us to smell anything. Therefore, we don't smell odour molecules. The effect of this causal chain (the sensation of smell) cannot be its own cause. Moreover, it doesn't work the other way: the sensation is not an explanation for its distal cause. That is, smelling cake isn't an explanation for why odour molecules enter the nose, etc. So, I don't believe these are equivalent. — Luke

You're saying we smell the odour molecules, an intermediary, which is an indirect realist view. I'm saying we don't smell the molecules, we only smell the cake.

I don’t know how you could smell the cake more directly. Would it be without the causes? — Luke

The way this all makes the most sense, is if the point of the query here…..

In what sense is an olfactory sensation caused by odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose the "direct" perception of a cake in the oven? — Michael

….is that you can’t get to “cake in the oven” from the mere effect of molecules on the receptor neurons, insofar as this is the direct causality for the sense of smell, but there is as yet still nothing given from this sensation alone, that justifies an experience. You’d be better off, I think, if you’d just said, “how you could smell more directly”, leaving the as-yet undetermined thing sensed by means of the olfactor process, out of it.

I mean….lots of times we come into a room, take in an odor, and have no idea what object the smell represents, right? Same with all the other senses, some to a greater degree than others.

Anyway….just sayin’.

I read it, and nothing about it conflicts with indirect realism.

If the causal chain of odour molecules, olfactory system, etc. is equivalent to the perception of smelling cake, then what’s the intermediary? The causal chain can’t be both the perception and the intermediary. What’s between the perception and the cake?

If the causal chain of odour molecules, olfactory system, etc. is equivalent to the perception of smelling cake, then what’s the intermarry? The causal chain can’t be both the perception and the intermediary. What’s between the perception and the cake? — Luke

Sensations are the intermediary that sit between rational awareness and distal objects. A sweet smell is not a property of some distal object but an olfactory sensation. I am directly aware of a sweet smell and through that smell indirectly aware of some food stuff that contains caramel. Hence the epistemological problem of perception.

Your intentionalism seems to accept the existence of such sensations but nonetheless wants to say that we are directly aware of the distal object, and even though something like odour molecules are the more proximal cause of the sensation. I can't make sense of what you mean by "direct". Grammar notwithstanding, with respect to the ontology of perception it seems like indirect realism to me (and to Robinson).

Sensations are the intermediary that sit between rational awareness and distal objects. — Michael

The relevant issue is whether perceptions are direct or indirect, not whether awareness is direct or indirect. What is indirect awareness?

The colour red is not a property of some distal object but a visual sensation. I am directly aware of the colour red and indirectly aware of a surface that reflects light with a wavelength of ~700nm. — Michael

The smell of cake is not a property of the cake either; it’s an interaction between the cake and the perceiver. That doesn’t mean the perception is not of the cake.

It sounds like you are directly aware of your perception of colour and “indirectly aware” of the causes of the perception. Are the causes the same or different from the perception?

Your intentionalism seems to accept that existence of such sensations but nonetheless wants to say that we are directly aware of the distal object, and even though something like odour molecules are the more proximal cause of the sensation. — Michael

Is the perception of smelling cake equivalent to the cause of the perception?

The relevant issue is whether perceptions are direct or indirect, not whether awareness is direct or indirect. — Luke

If we are directly aware of sensations and not directly aware of distal objects then we do not directly perceive distal objects.

The smell of cake is not a property of the cake either; it’s an interaction between the cake and the perceiver. That doesn’t mean the perception is not of the cake. — Luke

The odour molecules in the air are the more proximal cause. So why is it that the interaction between the odour molecules in the air and the sense receptors in my nose is the (direct) perception of a cake in the oven? What does it even mean to say that the interaction between the odour molecules in the air and the sense receptors in my nose is the (direct) perception of a cake in the oven?

Is the perception of smelling cake equivalent to the cause of the perception? — Luke

No. The cause of the sensation is odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose. The perception is (the rational awareness of) the subsequent sensation.

What's the connection between either of these things and the cake in the oven?

You provide an accurate account of the mechanics of perception (odour molecules stimulating the sense receptors in my nose, leading to a sensation) but then just throw in the non sequitur "therefore it's the direct perception of a cake in the oven" at the end with no explanation.

And what if, say, the cake has since been taken away and eaten, but the smell lingered. What am I (directly) smelling now? Nothing? The contents of my family's stomachs? Odour molecules in the air?

If we are directly aware of sensations and not directly aware of distal objects then we do not directly perceive distal objects. — Michael

The relevant issue is whether perceptions of objects is direct or indirect, not whether awareness of perceptions/sensations is direct or indirect.

The odour molecules in the air are the more proximal cause. So why is it that the interaction between the odour molecules in the air and the sense receptors in my nose is the (direct) perception of a cake in the oven? — Michael

Because it's not a perception until the odour molecules in the air have entered your nose and olfactory system and have been converted into brain signals to produce the perception of the smell of cake. And the cake produces the odour molecules.

The cause of the sensation is odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose. The perception is (the rational awareness of) the sensation. — Michael

Earlier you seemed to be saying that smelling a cake and "smelling" odour molecules were equivalent, just like watching pixels/light and watching Joe Biden on television.

What's the connection between either of these things and the cake in the oven? — Michael

The cake emits the odour molecules, presumably.

You provide an accurate account of the mechanics of perception (odour molecules stimulating the sense receptors in my nose, leading to a sensation) but then just throw in the non sequitur "therefore it's the direct perception of a cake in the oven" at the end with no explanation — Michael

FIrstly, you are confused about direct perception of objects and direct awareness of perceptions/sensations. If the issue were about a direct or indirect awareness of perceptions, then what is the intermediary between your awareness and your perceptions? But that's not the issue.

Secondly, if perceptions are not equivalent to their causes, then we can ignore the causes, which are irrelevant to the question of whether or not our perceptions are directly of objects or not. If perceptions are equivalent to their causes, then you need to identify the intermediary between a perception and its object.

The relevant issue is whether perceptions of objects is direct or indirect, not whether awareness of perceptions/sensations is direct or indirect. — Luke

If awareness of sensations is direct and awareness of objects is indirect then perception of objects is indirect.

The cake emits the odour molecules, presumably. — Luke

So? Why is the object of perception not the specific thing that stimulates the sense receptors? Why do you get to go back a step in the causal chain and say that it's the cake?

Earlier you seemed to be saying that smelling a cake and "smelling" odour molecules were equivalent, just like watching pixels/light and watching Joe Biden on television. — Luke

Yes, you can describe what happens as "smelling cake" or you can describe it as "smelling odour molecules", much like you can describe it as "seeing fireworks" or you can describe it as "seeing coloured light".

That's not the same as saying that "perceptions are equal to their causes" (which I can't even make sense of), so your prior question is misguided.

Secondly, if perceptions are not equivalent to their causes, then we can ignore the causes, which are irrelevant to the question of whether or not our perceptions are directly of objects or not. — Luke

Okay, let's ignore causes. What does it mean to say that some sensation is the "direct" perception of some distal object? What conditions must be satisfied for some distal object to be the "direct" object of perception? By your own remarks you cannot defer to some causal explanation.

@Luke Also, you missed something I added in:

What if, say, the cake has since been taken away and eaten, but the smell lingered. What am I (directly) smelling now? Nothing? The contents of my family's stomachs in the other room? Odour molecules in the air?

If awareness of sensations is direct and awareness of objects is indirect then perception of objects is indirect. — Michael

The relevant issue is about perceptions of objects, not awareness of sensations. The directness or indirectness of awareness is irrelevant.

So? Why is the object of perception not the specific thing that stimulates the sense receptors? Why do you get to go back a step in the causal chain and say that it's the cake? — Michael

Is the causal chain the perception or not? If so, then it cannot also be the intermediary. If not, then it is irrelevant to the question of whether our perceptions of objects are direct.

Yes, you can describe what happens as "smelling cake" or you can describe it as "smelling odour molecules", much like you can describe it as "seeing fireworks" or you can describe it as "seeing lights in the sky". — Michael

As I said earlier, "smelling" odour molecules (i.e. odour molecules entering the nose) is, by itself, insufficient for smelling cake. There is more to the causal chain that results in smelling cake.

That's not the same as saying that "perceptions are equal to their causes", so you prior question is misguided. — Michael

The question is whether our perceptions of objects are direct or not. How do the causes of a perception act as an intermediary between the perception and its object?

What does it mean to say that some sensation is the "direct" perception of some distal object? What conditions must be satisfied for some distal object X to be the "direct" object of perception? — Michael

When there is no intermediary between the perception and its object. We can speak of an indirect intermediary such as a mirror, a television broadcast or a drawing.

What if, say, the cake has since been taken away and eaten, but the smell lingered. What am I (directly) smelling now? Nothing? The contents of my family's stomachs? Odour molecules in the air? — Michael

You are still smelling the cake that emitted the odour molecules.

The relevant issue is about perceptions of objects, not awareness of sensations. The directness or indirectness of awareness is irrelevant. — Luke

The directness or indirectness of awareness is the very issue under discussion. I don't understand what you think "perception" or "awareness" mean.

Let's take Direct Perception: The View from Here as a starting point:

The view that perception is direct holds that a perceiver is aware of or in contact with ordinary mind-independent objects, rather than mind-dependent surrogates thereof.

...

The position that perception is direct begins with the common sense intuition that everyday perceiving involves an awareness of ordinary environmental situations.

...

The indirect position, in contrast, argues that the common sense intuition of perception as the direct awareness of environmental objects is naïve. Upon closer examination, a perceiver is actually only in direct contact with the proximal stimulation that reaches the receptors, or with sense-data, or with the sensations or internal images they elicit - but not with the distal object itself.

...

The perceiver is directly aware only of some mind-dependent proxy— the sense-data, internal image, or representation - and only indirectly aware of the mind-independent world.

How do the causes of a perception act as an intermediary between the perception and its object? — Luke

In the very literal sense that light is the literal physical intermediary between my eyes and some distal object, "carrying" whatever "information" it can about that distal object into my eyes. If the lights are turned off then I don't see anything.

So, sensations are an intermediary between rational awareness and the proximal stimulus and the proximal stimulus is an intermediary between the sense receptors and the distal object. Given this, there is no meaningful sense in which we are directly aware of the distal object. Therefore, perception is not direct.

At this point I don't know if we're just speaking different languages. You seem to have a very different understanding of the meanings of the words "awareness", "perception", "direct", and "intermediary".

Would be nice if everyone wrote down what they thought a a perceptual intermediary was and why it matters!

Would be nice if everyone wrote down what they thought a a perceptual intermediary was and why it matters! — fdrake

I think this and this clearly set out my position.

Would be nice if everyone wrote down what they thought a a perceptual intermediary was and why it matters!

Questions arise regarding all the nouns of indirect realism, what places and things the indirect realist believes he is interacting with when it comes to perception: who or what perceives, what he is perceiving, where he is perceiving it, and what are the mechanisms and structures through which he is able to do so.

As to the question of "what perceives", a common-sense approach would be to point to an animal, for instance a human being, and say "there is a perceiver". He has the biology of a perceiver and acts like a perceiver, and he can confirm that he perceives if I were to ask him. Since most of his senses point outward one would assume he mostly perceives in an outward direction, and his perceptual relationship is with the objects and mediums his senses interact with.

But indirect realism undermines this relationship. It claims that even though the senses point outward, and interact directly with the rest of the world, his perception remains inward.

Rather than the rest of the world, Indirect realism proposes that the perceiver perceives something else, a “perceptual intermediary”. Nominally, the perceptual relationship is with some noun-without-a-referent, like “sense-data”, "qualia", "experience", "phenomena", "representation", "consciousness". The problem is, if we were to tie a string from any of these words to what in the world they may correspond to, it's difficult to ascertain where we might affix the other end of the string.

One might suppose the string would return to the body, perhaps somewhere behind the eyes, in the nose, or at some point in the nervous system, but this would be to affix the string to the perceiver. Could the perceiver and the perceived be one and the same? The answer is not easy to come by, because instead of “body”, and affixing to the biology therein, other spaces and other entities are proffered and maintained in argument. "Experience", for example, is treated as if it was a space within which events occur, and it is also treated as its own thing. A menagerie of objects "arise" in this and other spaces, as if the sun in the morning sky. These include "sensations", "perceptions", "images", and so on.

In any case, until the intermediary can be pinpointed, the string invariably strings from the noun-phrase to another word or series of words.