Perceptual experience may be… — flannel jesus

Be that as it may, when I observe the statement “perception sometimes distorts reality” I have but two conceptions and a copula relating one to the other to work with, entirely dependent on my understanding of them, neither of which has to do with experience, both being methodologically antecedent to it.

The rejoinder should have been understood as affirming the notion perception cannot be causal with respect to reality, when it is necessarily the case all that belongs to reality alone, is all that can have an effect on it. That which is affected cannot at the same time be causal regarding the very thing by which it is affected.

Perception gives the undistorted reality manifest in the relations of material substances; mere convention, re: the path of least linguistic resistance, translates that into broken sticks and other various and sundry misconceptions.

Consciousness doesn’t extend beyond the body, so objects outside the body are not present in my consciousness.

That suffices as indirect realism for me.

We can take any adjective describing human bodies and apply the suffix “-ness” to it and create a quality out of thin air. But because a human can be silly or happy or sad does not imply a substance or domain called silliness, happiness, or sadness. It’s the same with consciousness.

So objects are neither present in your body, nor in some domain called “consciousness”, and for the same reasons—“Conscious” is a description of a state of the body, therefor “consciousness” is an abstraction of the body. This suffices to eliminate indirect realism for me.

It's what direct realism always was, e.g. going back to Aristotle. Direct realists believed in things like A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour/primitivism, whereas indirect realists believed that colour is a mental phenomenon (which may be reducible to brain states).

Now that the science shows that the indirect realists are right, it seems that direct realists have retreated to a completely different position, consistent with indirect realism, but insist on calling themselves direct realists anyway. — Michael

Not sure if “science” is much of a friend of indirect realism. When we observe light passing through a prism that reveals multi-colors, scientists were not unraveling its secrets by studying “mental phenomena” or “brain states.” Scientists are studying light, prisms, and colors to see if they fit current scientific theories, or needing new theories. Or, if they notice some folk do not judge colors like most of us, scientists do not study “mental phenomena” to discover what the issues are but maybe examine what physiological differences are between normal and abnormal cases in humans.

Maybe the only utility I could see in imagining “mental phenomena” is to get the scientist to consider human physiology first, and not other factors external to the human body. But, at the end of the day, this construct of “mental phenomena” is only a grammatical fiction.

And what does "more primary" mean? We are talking about experiential indirection... — hypericin

You claim that there is a primacy of the sound over the word or the story, but is this what is happening when we hear a word? For example, if someone is watching a film it is not at all clear that the sounds are more direct than the story.

and your position would not have been called realism at all, because it terminates in perception and not in the real. — Leontiskos

No, there is no termination in my view. We can know things though as many layers of indirection as we like (but never with certainty). — hypericin

If you say the base level is the sensory experience then that is where the stack of layers terminates, is it not? Or are you viewing sensory experience as a window through which we come into contact with something else?

what are you on about?

For the Rays, to speak properly, have no Colour. In them there is nothing else than a certain power and disposition to stir up a sensation of this Colour or that. — Isaac Newton

This is what physics, neurology, and psychology recognise.

The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective surfaces) using the name of the sensation ordinarily caused by such wavelengths is leading you and others to equivocate.

The sensation is distinct from and different to the stimulus. This is easier to understand with other senses such as smell and taste and is why I think the almost exclusive focus on sight is unproductive.

The sensation is distinct from and different to the stimulus. This is easier to understand with other senses such as smell and taste — Michael

Fully agreed, though there are people in this thread who have disagreed about smell, which I find... peculiar. Like, really? You don't think the sensation you have when you smell perfectly seared beef, or maple syrup, or a pile of shit, is entirely arbitrary? You think those smells just -smell- like that in reality?

I can't relate.

The argument has nothing to do with the status of so-called 'secondary qualities' or particle physics and you seem to be conflating naive realism with direct realism, so I am a loss as to how to respond.

For no particular reason….

”perception sometimes distorts reality. We know this to be so because mostly, it doesn't".
— Janus

How do we go about proving whatever distortion there may or may not have been, is caused by perception? — Mww

I agree with you, the phrasing is clumsy. It should have been put better. I was referring to things that proponents of IR usually cite such as sticks appearing bent when partly submerged in water. We perceive the stick as bent when it is really straight. It would have been better to say that we sometimes have distorted perceptions of reality (what is the case). The bent stick phenomenon is really no different than the kinds of things we see when we look into a convex or concave or badly distorted mirror.

I was arguing against the IR claim that perception always distorts reality. Our only access to reality, and hence where we derive the very notion of reality, is perception.

And to answer your question I don't want to try to prove that any distortion has been caused by distortion, because I think such perceptual distortions are caused by special circumstances.

Yeah, a species in which half the population sees the world upside down doesn't seem scientifically plausible. — wonderer1

Yep. What we see is not an upside-down sense-impression created by the brain, but the things in the world.

But Michael now thinks there isn't an upside down and a right way up anyway, so the point is moot, so far as the thread goes. One can't nail jelly to the wall, the discussion hereabouts being the jelly.

The argument has nothing to do with the status of so-called 'secondary qualities' or particle physics and you seem to be conflating naive realism with direct realism, so I am a loss as to how to respond. — Janus

Once you accept that “secondary qualities” are not mind-independent properties of external world objects then you have to ask what are secondary qualities? Perhaps something like sense data/qualia? But once you accept that parts of vision are just sense data, and once you understand how vision works, it should be obvious that all of vision (and other modes of sensory experience) is sense data, even if the “primary qualities” in sense data are a mostly accurate representation of the mind-independent properties of external world objects. That’s indirect realism.

And even with “primary qualities” it isn’t so clear cut, e.g with the example here.

But on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, what are the primary qualities with respect to hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling?

Secondary qualities are the result of interactions between the body and the objects that display them. For example, of course colour considered as a visual phenomenon, cannot manifest as such except as seen. I see no puzzle in that.

Secondary qualities are the result of interactions between the body and the objects that display them. For example, of course colour considered as a visual phenomenon, cannot manifest as such except as seen. I see no puzzle in that. — Janus

The entirety of vision and other senses is the result of interactions between the body and the forces (e.g. light and sound and chemicals in the air) that stimulate its sense receptors, and it is that sensory result that is processed by our intellect and with which we infer the existence and nature of objects at a distance to our body. The distant objects quite clearly aren’t present in sensory experience given that sensory experience doesn’t extend beyond the body.

How anyone can either reject this or think it anything other than indirect realism is what puzzles me.

I don't think changes in logic affect the larger issue, which is that, upon close inspection, relations don't end up being some sort of special case of properties, or somehow more ephemeral, they end up being the only type of property. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not sure what to make of this.

Properties are set out in single placed predicates - f(a). "f" is the predicate, "a" an individual - that is, a thing or an item in the world of discourse.

Relations in many-placed predicates - f(a,b), or f(a,b,c) or f(a,b,c,d) and so on, as many places as you want.

f(a,b) does not reduce to f(a). Relations are not properties.

But in first-order logic the number of places a predicate has is

Epistemicly, there is no way to discover a non-relational property. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Seems to me that all you have said here is that epistemic notions like knowing are relations between an individual and a proposition.

I don't think we "infer the existence and nature of objects at a distance from the body" I think we see (if we are close enough to identify them) what the distant objects are. The way you are putting it seems confused to me, and liable, if taken seriously, to breed further confusion, and this may be the reason you cannot understand why others don't think about this the way you do.

There's a very odd use of "inference" in @Michael's account.

- In theory scientism should not be a problem on a philosophy forum, but it always seems to be creeping in.

It is an unusual use. I seem to remember coming across it before somewhere in a context where perceptions were being treated as inferences, but I can't recall the name of the philosopher.

, . Scientism sees only scientific explanations as cogent. Scientific explanations are understood as inferences from the evidence. So scientism might well be tempted to understand perception as an inference from evidence.

Just a conjecture.

First….thanks for the response. I’m not singling you out, honest.

…..I think such perceptual distortions are caused by special circumstances. — Janus

….while I have a hard time accepting, given physiologically proper operations, that there are any. Distortions, yes; perceptual distortions, nope. Mother Nature wouldn’t saddle us with such arbitrarily inconsistent devices.

I mean, think about it. That bent stick? Are we not perceiving reality explicitly in accordance with natural relations? I can’t justify receiving the lawful effects of light refraction while at the same time blaming my eyes for giving me blatant distortions.

It is easier and simpler, though, gotta admit to that.

Seems to me that all you have said here is that epistemic notions like knowing are relations between an individual and a proposition

I don't see how this is the case. What would be an example of a property that is known without interaction? Moreover, what would be a property that exists "in-itself," i.e., exists in a way that doesn't make any reference to how a thing interacts with other things or parts of itself?

I can think of none outside bare posits. For example, I don't get how you can explain the property of having mass with zero reference to how a thing's mass affects other things or how it effects parts of itself.

What sits between the lemon and the creature's smelling?
— creativesoul

A necessary relation, and some means by which it occurs. (??) — Mww

Hey M!

Causal. Biological machinery(physiological sensory perception).

I'm curious how you would fill out your answer.

Yep. What we see is not an upside-down sense-impression created by the brain, but the things in the world.

But Michael now thinks there isn't an upside down and a right way up anyway, so the point is moot, so far as the thread goes. One can't nail jelly to the wall, the discussion hereabouts being the jelly. — Banno

From my perspective, the question of the thread looks like an attempt to address a complex subject (actually a diverse set of subjects) with a false dichotomy. Those arguing for direct realism seeming to have the pragmatic advantage, of being able to acknowledge common ground for discussion.

How anyone can either reject this or think it anything other than indirect realism is what puzzles me. — Michael

Just to give you a little more bang for buck, no one seems to think that the chemicals that 'cause a lemon to smell like a lemon" aren't the lemon(they aren't), or the light particles reflecting off of an antelope are not an antelope(they aren't). Not even the object stimulates the senses. Far be it from me...

. What would be an example of a property that is known without interaction? — Count Timothy von Icarus

See the "known"? That implies an attitude, and hence someone having the attitude. Yep, if something is known, then there is someone who knows.

There are no cases where something is known to have a property, without there being a knower.

That does not rule out there being cases in which something has a property, that no one knows about.

Imagine an organism with a peculiar sex difference; the males' eyes and the females' eyes are, relative to the other, upside down such that what the males see when standing is what the females see when hanging upside down, and vice versa.

The way the males see the world is very different to the way the females see the world (with respect to its orientation).

Imagine also that this organism is intelligent with a language. Both males and females use the same word to describe the direction of the ground and the same word to describe the direction of the sky.

And we can add to this by imagining differences in size (e.g. that one of the sexes has a magnified vision relative to the other) and colour (not to mention smell and taste).

The way they navigate and talk about the world is the same, and yet the way they see (and smell and taste) the world is very different. The appearance of the world is a mental phenomenon. It is the appearance of the world that is the immediate object of their rational consideration. — Michael

The last claim makes no sense to me. It leads to all sorts of nonsense.

Are they seeing Cypress trees or are they seeing the way the Cypress trees appear to them? Are they smelling fresh ground Kona coffee, or the way fresh ground Kona coffee smells to them? Are they tasting cauliflower, or the way cauliflower tastes to them?

creativesoul, excuse my answering a question to you. — Banno

I've not a single issue with that.

I've not a single issue with that. — creativesoul

SO more than one, then?

:wink:

For example, if someone is watching a film it is not at all clear that the sounds are more direct than the story. — Leontiskos

To me it is crystal clear. Only by way of the sounds and sights coming from the viewing device do you experience the on screen action of the film. And only by experiencing and interpreting the on screen action do you construe the story. This seems indisputable.

If you say the base level is the sensory experience then that is where the stack of layers terminates, is it not? Or are you viewing sensory experience as a window through which we come into contact with something else? — Leontiskos

No, not a window.

You said my view is not realism because it terminates at sensory experience, not the real. But rather, the real lies on the other side of the stack. Hence, indirect realism, where the stack of sensory experience, and all the indirection that may lie on top of that, sits between the knower and the known.

See the "known"? That implies an attitude, and hence someone having the attitude. Yep, if something is known, then there is someone who knows.

Right, that was the first question, but you ignored the rest — "what would be a property that exists "in-itself," i.e., exists in a way that doesn't make any reference to how a thing interacts with other things or parts of itself?"

I do not see how such arelational properties can make any difference in the world, even if we were to accept their existence as axiomatic. They aren't just unknown, they are unknowable.

Hence, relational properties are not a special case. Direct knowledge of "things-in-themselves," as opposed to how things relate to other things, is not only unattainable, but completely worthless.

When people hold up knowledge of "things-in-themselves" as some sort of standard of truth and objectivity, what they really mean is "how things other than minds relate to one another." But once this is clarified, I believe it is easier to bring out why the preferencing of relations between mindless things is not based on good reasoning.