That's the problem. How can a human know objective facts about a world that exists outside their subjective experiences. — RussellA

By applying the correct reasoning.

Kant said it isn't possible. — RussellA

Where did he say that?

I agree. All language is more figurative than literal. — RussellA

Some, not all, or doesn't have to be, and depends.

Though perhaps the cat can also see the mouse in its imagination. — RussellA

Only the cat would know it for sure.

I knew you were engaging in some sort of language games.
— Corvus

Isn't everyone. — RussellA

Inadequate reasonings try to keep on going around the circles eternally, but the correct reasoning calls it a game. :D

I would say that "seeing objects" and being "mediated by the indirection of representation" are one and the same thing. If you eliminate the mediation (that indirect realists complain about), then you eliminate the seeing. — Luke

So in other words, seeing is inherently indirect.

It’s a bit odd, but maybe just shows that indirect realism on the forum is often not thought through (not all of them think this way)...Thus Luke is right on the mark in accusing some indirect realists of a failure to let go of the mythical view from nowhere. — Jamal

Which direct realists? By not quoting anyone, and just projecting this distorted view onto all direct realists in general, he is totally off base.

So in other words, seeing is inherently indirect. — hypericin

I wouldn’t say that seeing is indirect. But if I did, then I suppose that seeing representations would be doubly indirect..?

Otherwise, seeing real objects is direct and seeing representations of real objects is indirect.

Direct realists can hold the view that seeing/perception involves representations in our visual system without also holding the view that all we can see are representations.

The human visual system may also involve the movement of our eyes. It does not follow that all we can see is the movement of our eyes.

Representation is constitutive of seeing/perception. It doesn’t also need to be the thing seen.

I'm not sure that I would even describe seeing a hand in a mirror as seeing it indirectly. — Luke

It's intended as an example; one might differentiate seeing the hand in the mirror as indirect, in contrast to seeing it without the mirror - directly.

Austin, especially in Other Minds, addresses "real".

But is it a real one? When you ask if it is real, what are you sugesting? No, it's a fake; it's an illusion; it's a forgery; it's a phoney, a counterfeit, a mirage... What is real and what isn't is decided in each case by contrast; there is no single criteria.

The wile of the metaphysician consists in asking 'Is it a real table?' (a kind of object which has no obvious way of being phoney) and not specifying or limiting what may be wrong with it, so that I feel at a loss 'how to prove' it is a real one.' It is the use of the word 'real' in this manner that leads us on to the supposition that 'real' has a single meaning ('the real world' 'material objects'), and that a highly profound and puzzling one. Instead, we should insist always on specifying with what 'real' is being contrasted - not what I shall have to show it is, in order to show it is 'real': and then usually we shall find some specific, less fatal, word, appropriate to the particular case, to substitute for 'real'
— Austin — Banno

"Direct" and "indirect" relate in a similar way - You don't see it directly, you see a picture, a reflection, or through a telescope or video screen.

It is the use of the word 'indirect' in this manner that leads us on to the supposition that 'direct' has a single meaning.

Some words get their sense from an almost Hegelian juxtaposition against their opposite.

So when someone claims to see that the hand before them indirectly, it is reasonable to ask what it would mean here to see it directly? And their answer might well be "as it is in itself" - but this is of course a nonsense, since the hand is aways already an interpretation... Or they might say "we see only the metal model (qualia, sense datum...) directly" and so commit themselves to being forever segregated from the world or to solipsism.

and so commit themselves to being forever segregated from the world — Banno

This doesn't follow at all.

The fact that I cannot see an object directly doesn't mean I can't interact with it. The idea that a blind person is somehow 'forever segregated' is to use your term "of course, a nonsense". Whereas:

And their answer might well be "as it is in itself" - but this is of course a nonsense, since the hand is aways already an interpretation — Banno

Is not, in any way at all a nonsense, unless you just plum don't like the idea that objects are beyond direct access via the eyes. Which they are. Even by your own lights.
You're just quibbling with words here. Our vision system s indirect. You have to ignore this fact and assign the property of 'directness' for reasons of comfort, or ease, to an indirect process. Fine. But that's not what the attempt to delineate between the two is assessing, as best I can tell. This is, patently, also Austin's problem. We're not trying make sensible sentences about sight. We're trying to figure out what the heck to say about vision which is inherently mediated. If we can't directly see objects, so be it. My emotional state has precisely nothing to do with that.

Representation is constitutive of seeing/perception. It doesn’t also need to be the thing seen. — Luke

Nobody is saying that representation is the thing seen. Following language usage, objects are the things seen. But seeing is indirect. The only thing we experience directly is the representation.

Nobody is saying that representation is the thing seen. — hypericin

Ayer sometimes appeared to be doing just that. But as Austin shows, there is little consistency in his account. Trouble here is, without citations there are only straw men to discus.

Nobody is saying that representation is the thing seen. — hypericin

I actually take quite a number of statements throughout the thread, on the indirect side, to be attempting this claim. Banno nailed me on it some time ago, and i've tried to work through it.

The "seeing seeings" comment from (i think) Janus was addressing this. I ran into the same wall Banno is pointing out, linguistically, and it required a better use of terms to make any sense.
If "see" is the act of one's eye falling on/turning to an object, then "perception" must be the further event (i.e experiencing a representation). Otherwise, nothing occurs in consciousness.

But, if "to look" is used for the physical act of turning one's eye to an object, then "to see" is free to symbolize the experience of a representation in the mind. This reduces the problem to whether or not its reasonable to consider "seeing" as a direct experience of a representation (which is not the object), or an indirect experience of an object via that same representation in consciousness. Ooof.

I actually take quite a number of statements throughout the thread, on the indirect side, to be attempting this claim. — AmadeusD

Yes, of course. :up: Schemes which emphasize representations or phantasms always come up against this problem. In my opinion Kant's positing of the "noumenal" is more than just historical contingency. That sort of move is always relevant to strongly representational schemes.

,

What happens if you reconsider these issues in terms of touch or smell?

It becomes harder to insert a "representation" in those cases.

You could be right.
I think it may be harder to describe, simply because we've had far less experience trying to nut out those problems with other senses.

But, using sound as an example, you're right in that 'sound' consists in the sound waves which enter the ears and physically affect parts of the head resulting in an experience. Objects don't consist in the light bouncing off them, on any accounts i've seen.

How do you touch something indirectly? What to make of an indirect realist account that has one feeling a representation of the sandpaper, not the sandpaper itself?

For example, as an Indirect Realist, I can say "I see a green apple", using the word "green" in a figurative rather than literal sense. — RussellA

Saying that an Indirect Realist is using the word "green" figuratively is a bit odd.

With the help of Chat Smith, let's take a look at some phases that are used figuratively:

1. "Green with envy":Espressing jealously
2. "Green thumb": referring to someone who has natural talent for gardening
3. "Green Light": Signifying permission to proceed or approval
4. "Green around the gills": Describing someone who looks pale or sick
5. "Green-eye monster" Referring to jealously or envy often in the context of romance
6. "Greenback": Informal term for currency
7. "Green with laughter": Describing someone who is extremely amused or entertained

Can we add "Green Apple" to this list? Is this not what is meant by "literal" anyway so we can set-up the contrast with these figurative uses?

I think so.

How do you touch something indirectly? What to make of an indirect realist account that has one feeling a representation of the sandpaper, not the sandpaper itself? — Banno

Through a glove hehe. That said, again, there are two bodily physical events there, which isn't the case with sight, in the same way. The physical interaction (finger touches sandpaper "out in the world"), and the experience of, lets just use, texture, which is an experience in mind. .

I don't think it's right to say you 'feel' the sandpaper itself, anyway. You feel it's impression on your nervous system, shunted through your nerves, into your brain where it is constructed into an experience.

If "see" is the act of one's eye falling on/turning to an object, then "perception" must be the further event (i.e experiencing a representation). Otherwise, nothing occurs in consciousness. — AmadeusD

I see "seeing" as indicating the whole process: from light entering the pupil, to the experiential representation. If at any point this process is interrupted then seeing does not happen.

"Perception" is just a more general term, including all the senses, but otherwise similar to "seeing". "Experiencing" is the most apt general language term that points to the subjective representation component of perception.

"Experiencing" is the most apt general language term that points to the subjective representation component of perception — hypericin

Definitely. That much seems clear on either account, if one is to be honest with themselves.

I think using the term 'seeing' that way (that you describe) is misleading. If 'seeing' is defined as the entire process, then it's a useless term in this discussion because there's no difference between a 'direct' and 'indirect' version of 'seeing'. The difference between the accounts would be lost in the process. Though, I would understand this 'version' as a direct realist conception because it assumes that any process getting from light reflection to experience is by its result direct, instead of by its process. UNless im not groking you entirely.

What happens if you reconsider these issues in terms of touch or smell?

It becomes harder to insert a "representation" in those cases. — Banno

Not at all. The feel of sand through your fingers and the smell of a rose are exactly as representational as their visual appearances. They are all ways that your brain presents sense data to you, the conscious decision maker, so that you can then act on it if you decide it's necessary.

I think using the term 'seeing' that way (that you describe) is misleading. If 'seeing' is defined as the entire process, then it's a useless term in this discussion because there's no difference between a 'direct' and 'indirect' version of 'seeing'. — AmadeusD

I think this way is faithful to the way we use the word in everyday life. An indirect account of seeing acknowledges the indirection involved in the process, the direct account for whatever reason does not.

I certainly agree on your grounding. I just note that the usage of seeing that way plays right into Banno's hide-the-ball

They are all ways that your brain presents sense data to you, the conscious decision maker, so that you can then act on it if you decide it's necessary. — hypericin

This is a fiction. The sand is not encountered as a report presented by the brain which we then decide whether or not to act on. This is a story that some like to tell, not what is actually experienced. The confluence of the senses ("common sense") and their registering is not preceded by any form of decision-making. Others have pointed to the infinite regress at play in this.

But, using sound as an example, you're right in that 'sound' consists in the sound waves which enter the ears and physically affect parts of the head resulting in an experience. Objects don't consist in the light bouncing off them, on any accounts i've seen. — AmadeusD

A sense which is plausibly more indirect will better support indirect realism, but here you have conflated the medium with the object. Presumably if the eye sees objects, then the ear also hears objects. Or would you say that the eye sees objects and the ear hears sounds? It seems to me that we should be consistent and either talk about media (light/sound) or else mediated objects (the object which is seen/the object which is heard).

If 'seeing' is defined as the entire process, then it's a useless term in this discussion because there's no difference between a 'direct' and 'indirect' version of 'seeing'. — AmadeusD

Distinguishing direct from indirect realism is not a matter of terms, and is instead a counterfactual matter. The two camps tend to see one another's views as incoherent, and I don't see any truly stable neutral ground from which to examine the two views.

The glove is a fine example. Here, indirect touch or feel makes sense.

And yes, touch and feel are different things, which is why we have two words. It's an interesting distinction. Is there something similar for smell or hearing?

I don't think it's right to say you 'feel' the sandpaper itself, anyway. You feel it's impression on your nervous system, shunted through your nerves, into your brain where it is constructed into an experience. — AmadeusD

I don't agree with that at all. Of course you feel the sandpaper - 200 grit is very different to 40 grit; a fact about sandpaper, not about nerves.

They are all ways that your brain presents sense data to you, — hypericin

Your homunculus is showing...

Your homunculus is showing... — Banno

Nope, no homunculus, that's just the conscious part of my brain.

...the conscious part of my brain. — hypericin

...your homunculus. Sitting in there looking at the stuff your brain presents to it, never seeing or touching the stuff around it, not knowing if it is in a vat or a Boltzman coincidence...

I thought you were arguing for representationalism earlier.

yeah, if anything smell seems more acutely to be experienced in a way that's entirely distinct from reality-as-it-is even than sight. Smell is ENTIRELY an experience built up for us by our brains.

Think about how repulsive shit smells to you, and how delicious it must smell to a fly (or even how delicious it is to my naughty dog, who has a taste for cat shit apparently). We can't both be experiencing smells "as they are" considering how viscerally different our experiences are.

Smell is ENTIRELY an experience built up for us by our brains. — flannel jesus

So smells bear no relation whatsoever to the stuff around you? Odd.

No, I didn't say it bears no relation, it's certainly correlated to some subset of the actual chemicals in the air around you (a subset because you obviously aren't sensitive to every chemical). Just like with colour - the way you experience colour is correlated to real facts, but it is not synonymous with those facts.

Do you not think smell is an experience built up by the brain? So who is smelling correctly, you when you feel viscerally repulsed by a pile of shit, or a fly when they feel viscerally drawn to it, appetized by it? Whose experience of that shit is reality-as-it-is?

I didn't say it bears no relation, — flannel jesus

Smell is ENTIRELY an experience built up for us by our brains. — flannel jesus

Hmm. Ok.

Ah, let me rephrase. I meant that second part to not be referring to the entire process of smell, just the part of the process where you're consciously aware of it and having the experience.

Either you're experiencing reality as-it-really-is, OR your experience is something subjective and crafted for you by your brain. I think with smell it's clearly the second one. I think the experience you have when you're smelling things is clearly not just experiencing reality as-it-is.

The process of smelling, or seeing, or whatever, involves physical interactions with real things, and I'm a realist so I think those things are real and those physical interactions really happen. And then I think when that becomes an experience, that experience isn't just raw-reality-as-it-really-is, it's an experience concocted for you by your brain.