It is defined as otherwise. So thats incoherent.

If you accept the existence of the Kantian Thing-in-itself in Noumena,
— Corvus

The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding.

So perhaps it (the argument of Kant) is not being adequately outlined. — AmadeusD

I have various commentaries on Kant by different authors, but the one I accept and follow is the commentary books by Graham Bird. His 2x books on Kant are my favourite, which are "Kant's Theory of Knowledge" and "The Revolutionary Kant".

I wonder what books and commentaries you are using for your readings or studies on Kant. But this issue in TI can be contentious and a new thread on its own.

Anyhow Graham Bird says there have been different interpretations on Noumena and Thing-in-itself in Kant, and he propounds the both concepts are same entities, which is opposite views of yours. But if you could present your arguments for your points with the source information, that would be helpful.

For example, what are they? What are the things that you find in your mind whose origin you don't know?
— Corvus

For example, perceptions, hunger, pain. — Lionino

Aren't they the obvious sensations from your biological bodily workings telling your senses, that it needs food and something is pinching you, or why are you using your hair dryer too close to the skin? :grin:

….various commentaries….. — Corvus

Did you read the “Multi-Layered Conception….” paper linked on the previous page?

Did you read the “Multi-Layered Conception….” paper linked on the previous page? — Mww

Not the paper itself (Is there a link for the full paper?). Just the quote. The following is the point I used to agree with, and still do. What is your own point?

Yet he goes on to note that we do not have to conceive of the ‘something’ that underlies appearances as a material object. It might as well be considered as something that is immaterial and can only be thought. — Kant’s Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves

What is your own point? — Corvus

Didn’t have one; just curious.

The following is the point I used to agree with, and still do. — Corvus

That’s fine, provided proper account is taken for it.

But would you say that your claim is the officially accepted interpretation of Nounmena and Thing-in-itself in Kant? — Corvus

I'm unsure what an 'officially accepted' interpretation is, but it seems to be the most common.

Ding-en-sich = The thing, simpliciter
Noumena = that same thing as perceived by something other than Human, spatio-temporal perception
Phenomena(of something) = the same thing in human perception only.

at any rate, the above conceptions work for reading the Critique. Most don't.

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Noumena this page contains a fairly good overview of the disagreement around the concepts - but within Kant, they are kept separate**. Particularly, Palmquist, as a secondary source, I would take, but largely because (as discussed in this article) it is essentially aligned with Kant's actual writing. Not that that's the be-all-end-all, but I tend not to take much secondary material which expressly alters the plain meaning of the OG text on board. Might be something I'll get over. Very much smoething i've learned reading law.

** From CPR:
"if, however, I suppose that there be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali), then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia). (A249)"

and

"But if we understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be the noumenon in a positive sense. (B307)"
(from the SEP Article )

I'm unsure what an 'officially accepted' interpretation is, but it seems to be the most common. — AmadeusD

Indeed. That was what I meant. When you said that my post was not adequately outlined, I was wondering then what is the right outline on the topic? Was there the officially accepted and verified outline on noumenon and thing-in-itself? No. There is not, and you agreed with that. In that case, every interpretation is more plausible, plausible or less plausible. No interpretation is wrong. If it was felt as wrong in someone's mind, that doesn't mean it is objectively wrong. It is not a matter of an analytic judgement. It is a matter of belief, understanding and opinion.

I have around 20 different books on Kant, and they all have somewhat different interpretations on the topic, but I found Graham Bird's books were more plausible, and were agreeing with my ideas, hence I kept on sticking with the books as the bible of understanding Kant's CPR. I don't have the book by Palmquist by the way.

Bird clearly says Thing-in-itself and Noumena are the same concept, and I agree with the point. Kant makes various different remarks on the concepts in CPR in various different places in the book depending on the context, hence it would be difficult to say, this or that is the correct definition of them. It really depends on what you are talking them with in what context and what arguments you are presenting with, which makes either more plausible, plausible or less plausible.

And whatever definition one comes up with, there will be someone who will disagree with it, and prove the definition is illogical, or come up with quotes from the CPR which says exactly the opposite.

It is not something that anyone could prove logically right or wrong, hence they are in the category of the antinomies. They are still very useful concepts, if one had some thoughts on epistemic, ontological or metaphysical ideas, and those concepts fit nicely for explaining or positing something which would be difficult otherwise to do due to the abstract nature of the arguments or ideas.

That’s fine, provided proper account is taken for it. — Mww

What would be the proper account in your opinion?

I think the Ding an sich is an epistemological being, not an ontological one. — Lionino

I was thinking about this today, and this idea came to my mind. If something is an existence, how can it be without ontology or epistemology? They go together. Without perception, ontology is not seen and not known. Without ontology, there is nothing to perceive. If something is an ontological being, then it must be also epistemological being for it to be qualified as an existence. If something is an epistemic being, then it must be also ontological being. If not, then it would be unknowable even whether it exists or not. No?

…..proper account….. — Corvus

Because the point was…..

“….we do not have to conceive of the ‘something’ that underlies appearances as a material object. It might as well be considered as something that is immaterial and can only be thought….”

….and because to conceive is a logical function of understanding, it follows that the something that underlies appearances, if considered as merely something immaterial and can only be thought, whatever that conception might be, cannot be phenomenon. And if not phenomenon, it is impossible for that conceived something to be an experience or a possible experience, which means there will be no empirical knowledge of it.

“….. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears, which is absurd….”
(Bxxvii)

My opinion on that account: the use of transcendental conceptions of reason, re: that which underlies appearances as immaterial or simply conceived as something, is what the critique was all about, that is, an exposition on what not to do. Or, technically, what reason has no warrant or entitlement to do, in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, which is all that appearances concern.

I don’t agree with much of this.

I have provided where, in Kant, the two concepts are objectively removed from one another. Not sure what else to say, but I very much respect your dedication here.

I understand what you’re getting at, but I’m not able to see secondary sources who disagree with direct statements in the source as valuable personally.

The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding. — AmadeusD

From what I have heard there is no scholarly agreement on the (in)equality of noumenon and Ding an sich. Some are confident in their interpretation that they are absolutely distinct. But being that the problematic of Kant's language is that you don't know when something is being used as a synonym of a word or of another, as is the case with "object", I don't think we will ever know. Ecce maledictio linguarum naturalium.

The writer of Kant's Transcendetal Idealism on the SEP thinks they are clearly distinct:

Putting these pieces together we can see that “things in themselves” [Dinge an sich selbst] and (negative) “noumena” are concepts that belong to two different distinctions: “thing in itself” is one half of the appearance/thing in itself distinction, which Kant originally defined at A491/B519 in terms of their existence: appearances have no existence “grounded in themselves” while things in themselves do. “Noumena” is one half of the distinction phenomena/noumena which Kant characterizes at B307 as the distinction between what can be an object of our sensible spatiotemporal intuition and what cannot be an object of sensible intuition.

It is possible some scholars merge the two because of:

However, we can make a connection between them: things in themselves, the objects whose existence is “ground in itself”, and which appear to us in space and time, cannot be objects of any sensible intuition, so they are negative noumena. Whether, additionally, they are also objects of an intuitive intellect, is a separate matter.

And logically, if a noumenon was proven to be existent, then would it be still a noumenon? Or a phenomenon? — Corvus

Using the terminology above and taking this:

All objects of empirical intuition are appearances, but only those that are “thought in accordance with the unity of the categories” are phenomena. For instance, if I have a visual after-image or highly disunified visual hallucination, that perception may not represent its object as standing in cause-effect relations, or being an alteration in an absolutely permanent substance. These would be appearances but not phenomena.

into consideration, Kant proves the outside world by showing that some appearances are indeed phenomenons, and due to their causal relationship, phenomenons imply real world objects.

Aren't they the obvious sensations from your biological bodily workings telling your senses — Corvus

Here we have things outside of my mind, at least a brain.

or why are you using your hair dryer too close to the skin? — Corvus

I am trying to achieve natural curls.

As a point of curiosity, noumenon is the neutral noun out of the middle-passive present particle of this verb:



It does have the meaning of 'having through the senses', which is contrary to how Kant uses it, but it also shows "given by the spirit", which is how some dictionaries define the (modern) word noumenon.

My opinion on that account: the use of transcendental conceptions of reason, re: that which underlies appearances as immaterial or simply conceived as something, is what the critique was all about, that is, an exposition on what not to do. Or, technically, what reason has no warrant or entitlement to do, in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, which is all that appearances concern. — Mww

This sounds like the point I was getting across to RussellA in the other thread. But I am not sure if reason has no warrant or entitlement to do in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, because it is all that appearance concern. Reason still does warrant on all the appearances coming in via sensibility - in the case of the bent stick in the glass of water, some people think the stick is bent. But reason when applied to the appearance, tells them no it is the refracted light by the water which makes it look bent. It is not really bent.

In the cases of perception with appearance, but the perceiver still thinks or intuits on the unobservable objects, Kant tells us that is the limit of our reason. We then have to transcend reason, and employ some other mental faculties such as imagination, beliefs and faith to deal with the perception.

The cases of the unobservable physical objects exist in Scientific enquiries in reality. I think I have written about it before somewhere in the TPF. It is a planet called Vulcan. It is not observable in physical form in the sky, but with all the calculations of the movements based on the gravities of the other planets, there must exist this planet called Vulcan. This unobservable planet had been in existence for many years in the scientists calculated conjectures and imagination.

I am not sure if they have actually confirmed the existence of the planet Vulcan yet. But even the scientists don't rule out the existence of unobservable physical objects just because it is invisible. I am sure it is the rational induction of reasoning which has been applied in this case of believing in the existence of the object which has no appearance by the scientists.

I don’t agree with much of this. — AmadeusD

Ok, we agree to disagree. That is fine.

I have provided where, in Kant, the two concepts are objectively removed from one another. Not sure what else to say, but I very much respect your dedication here. — AmadeusD

Thanks. I thought this thread had ended when it had around 600 posts. It disappeared for a while, but then it reemerged with the new points continuing the discussions. I wasn't following the batman brain stuff as I know nothing about it, but when Kant was being mentioned, I thought I could join again for a wee reading and discussing.

From what I have heard there is no scholarly agreement on the (in)equality of noumenon and Ding an sich. Some are confident in their interpretation that they are absolutely distinct. But being that the problematic of Kant's language is that you don't know when something is being used as a synonym of a word or of another, as is the case with "object", I don't think we will ever know. Ecce maledictio linguarum naturalium. — Lionino

I agree with this. There is no such a thing as the officially accepted definition or interpretation of Ding-An-Sich and Noumenon even in the academic communities. Insisting that the one in SEP or some other internet site definitions are right, and the casual readers or students definitions and points are wrong, just because they are hobby readers and students has no logical ground for the argument.

Kant proves the outside world by showing that some appearances are indeed phenomenons, and due to their causal relationship, phenomenons imply real world objects. — Lionino

I think this is a good point. I could go with that. However, G E Moore proved the existence of the external world by waving his two hands - saying, "Here is one hand, and here is another hand." Seeing the hands and being able to wave them proves that there exists the external world.

It does have the meaning of 'having through the senses', which is contrary to how Kant uses it, but it also shows "given by the spirit", which is how some dictionaries define the (modern) word noumenon. — Lionino

I was reading "A Kant Dictionary" by H. Caygill last night, and it says, Noumenon is not a being or existence in Kant. But it is a boundary of human knowledge and pure reason for the limitation. Phenomenon presents us with the appearance to our sensibility, but not in full. It does so only to a certain degree, then there is a boundary that reason cannot handle due to the non appearance of phenomenon. The boundary and beyond of phenomenon is called Noumenon. In that case, it sounds like Noumenon is just part of Phenomenon where the appearance ends and beyond.

It is a planet called Vulcan. It is not observable in physical form in the sky, — Corvus

I am not sure if reason has no warrant or entitlement to do in the pursuit of empirical knowledge…. — Corvus

Given that empirical knowledge just is experience**….
(“… to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience…”)
**translator-dependent, as we are all so familiar.

“…. Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and gives to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere of their application has been extended as widely as possible. Reason avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the sole purpose of producing totality in the different series. This totality the understanding does not concern itself with; its only occupation is the connection of experiences, by which series of conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The object of reason is, therefore, the understanding and its proper destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas; as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding….”
(A643/B671)

But reason when applied to the appearance…. — Corvus

Reason has nothing to do with appearances as such, as shown above, inasmuch as immediate relation to an object IS its appearance to sensibility alone.

Illusory or outright mistaken understandings relative to real things, is a function of judgement, not reason.

That reason has for its object understanding, and understanding has for its object experience, it does not follow that reason has to do with experience or empirical knowledge itself.

Illusory or outright mistaken understandings relative to real things, is a function of judgement, not reason. — Mww

How can judgement function for arriving at rational conclusions, if it were severed from reason?

That reason has for its object understanding, and understanding has for its object experience, it does not follow that reason has to do with experience or empirical knowledge itself. — Mww

From Hume to Kant, they all agree on the connection theory that all the mental faculties operate on the basis of the causality between each and every mental functions and events. Reason can serve nothing useful or rational if it stood itself in the mind with no connections to experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement.

This point had been confirmed, upheld and propounded by William James 200 years later for establishing his Psychological Theories of Human Mind. Even this day and age, this perspective has not changed. Without the causal operations between reason and judgement, AI system would have no logical footings for their design ideas and operandi principia.

How can judgement function for rational conclusions — Corvus

Judgement doesn’t conclude, it synthesizes.

“…. Conceptions, then, are based on the spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. (…) All the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements.…”
(A68/B93)

“…. General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are, understanding, judgement, and reason. This science, accordingly, treats in its analytic of conceptions, judgements, and conclusions in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of understanding.…” (A131/B170)

So it is, in merely representing the higher powers of the overall human intellectual program, re: as a means to expose and enable discussions of it, a speculative tripartite logical system in the form of a syllogism, the order or sequential procedure of which understanding is the major, judgement is the minor or assemblage of minors, and reason is the conclusion.
————-

Reason can serve nothing useful or rational if it stood itself in the mind with no connections to the experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement. — Corvus

Just ask yourself….what did Hume say reason couldn’t do? And if the major raison d’etre of CPR was to expose what reason can do, such that Hume’s philosophy was proved incomplete, then it is the case reason has nothing to do with experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement, which Hume’s empirical philosophy covered well enough on its own. It has to do with, not all those, but how the use of those in non-empirical conditions is not only possible but necessary, and they are so only iff it is the case synthetic, and altogether pure a priori cognitions are themselves possible.

THAT….is what reason does, and we call them…..waaiiiitttt for itttttt…..principles!!!!!

Judgement doesn’t conclude, it synthesizes. — Mww

Why does it synthesise? What is synthesis for, if it doesn't offer conclusion?

Just ask yourself….what did Hume say reason couldn’t do? And if the major raison d’etre of CPR was to expose what reason can do, such that Hume’s philosophy was proved incomplete, then it is the case reason has nothing to do with experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement, which Hume’s empirical philosophy covered well enough on its own. It has to do with, not all those, but how all those are possible in the first place, and they are all only possible iff it is the case synthetic, and altogether pure a priori cognitions are themselves possible.

THAT….is what reason does, and we call them…..waaiiiitttt for itttttt…..principles!!!!! — Mww

I have a few AI book here, and all of them talk about the association theory of mental faculties in Hume and Kant. Of course reason has limitations for its capabilities, and that is what Hume and Kant professed. But it doesn't mean that reason has nothing to do with the other mental faculties.

Judgement doesn’t conclude, it synthesizes.
— Mww
Why does it synthesise? What does synthesis do, if it doesn't offer conclusion? — Corvus

Crap, I spoke too fast. Imagination synthesizes; judgement merely represents the synthesis. My badly stated shortcut, sorry. Productive imagination synthesizes conceptions, that is, relates the conception in the subject of a possible cognition, to the conception in the predicate, the unity of that relation is then called judgement.

Reason certifies the relation as logical iff it accords with the corresponding principles, by which we consider ourselves positively certain, re: knowledge, and illogical otherwise, by which we find ourselves negatively certain, re: confused.
————-

But it doesn't mean that reason has nothing to do with the other mental faculties. — Corvus

That each member of a system operates in conjunction with the others, does not make explicit any have to do with the other. Pretty simple, really: the engine in a car has nothing to do with the rear axle, each being specific in itself for purpose and function, but without both, the car goes nowhere.

Crap, I spoke too fast. Imagination synthesizes; judgement merely represents the synthesis. My badly stated shortcut, sorry. Productive imagination synthesizes conceptions, that is, relates the conception in the subject of a possible cognition, to the conception in the predicate, the unity of that relation is then called judgement. — Mww

:ok: Every mental operation is actually synthesis of the other mental operation and the sensibility. And human perception is not all automatic process. They must make efforts to perceive better in the case of perceiving tricky looking objects or the world objects with the scarce data due to the remote distance or the size of the objects which are difficult to observe.

In the case of the bent stick, initially it appears bent when it is not. It is a tricky case. Some folks wonder if the stick is really bent. This is due to reason has not been applied to their visual perception. Or they applied their reasons but not correctly. They synthesise into the wrong conclusions. Synthesis is the process of combining all the data available, but judgement concludes for the best validity or what appears to be truth with the available data with the help of reason.

That each member of a system operates in conjunction with the others, does not make explicit any have to do with the other. Pretty simple, really: the engine in a car has nothing to do with the rear axle, each being specific in itself for purpose and function, but without both, the car goes nowhere. — Mww

The association theory of mind for Hume and Kant doesn't say different mental faculties are the same entities. It means they work together just like the different car parts working together to get the car running example as you presented. But you seem to misunderstand the association theory of mind. It doesn't say different mental faculties are the same. It says that they work together under the principle of causality.

The association theory of mind for Hume and Kant is not that the different mental faculties are the same entities. It means they work together just like the car parts as you presented. But you seem to misunderstand the association theory of mind. — Corvus

What….so the associative theory of mind works like the relation of car parts, I understand the relation of car parts….obviously, since I presented it…..yet I don’t understand the associative theory of mind which is just like it?

Didn’t I mention that each member of a system works in conjunction with the others?

What….so the associative theory of mind works like the relation of car parts, I understand the relation of car parts….obviously, since I presented it…..yet I don’t understand the associative theory of mind which is just like it?

Didn’t I mention that each member of a system works in conjunction with the others? — Mww

Maybe you did. Not sure. Anyway the point is that judgement needs reason for its proper operation.
Without reason, judgement will work. But without support of reason judgement will arrive at irrational conclusions.

….judgement needs reason for its proper operation. — Corvus

Depends on what you think proper operation of judgement entails. Pretty sure I made clear, according to the original transcendental philosophy, it doesn’t need reason.

Judgement needs conceptions for its operation, proper or otherwise, such operation being the functional unity in understanding.

Judgement needs conceptions for its operation, proper or otherwise, such operation being the functional unity in understanding. — Mww

It sounds absurd to say judgements only need conceptions for its operation. It needs more than conception to operate. How can you judge if the apple taste good without having eaten it? Just by conception of apple, it is impossible to judge if the apple tastes good.

How can you judge if the Eiffel tower is taller than the Tokyo tower without measuring the heights and comparing the measurements of them? Can you do that with just the concepts of the towers?

How can you judge if the apple taste good without having eaten it? Just by conception of apple, it is impossible to judge if the apple tastes good. — Corvus

All and each sensation, depending on its mode of intuition, is represented by its own conceptions. The compendium of those conceptions, synthesized in an aggregate series of relations to each other, gives the cognition of the thing as a whole. For those singular sensations, by themselves, not in conjunction with other modes of intuition, only judgements relative to that mode of intuition, that sensation, are possible.

Sufficient to explain why not all possible sensations are necessary to judge an object, and, that each sensation manifests in a possible judgement of its own, in accordance initially with its physiology, henceforth in accordance with the rules implicit in the faculty of understanding.