:up:

Knowing what will happen does not mean we know why it will happen — RussellA

Indeed, that is the case. But philosophy might be considered as an attempt to understand why we can know what will happen (if at all). Newton's laws of gravitation describe what will happen to an apple falling to the ground. But the connection between mathematics and natural science is not part of his formulas.

Does this mean that transcendental idealism is in the end unavoidable and there is no realistic alternative to this world-view? And is the possibility and success of science proof, that Kant was rightfully claiming that we can never attain to a knowledge of things surrounding us per se i.e. independent of us? — Pez

I'm not a Kant scholar. But my understanding of his Transcendental Idealism*1 is that it's merely an admonition to idea-mongering philosophers, not to confuse our artificial worldviews with absolute Reality. This is not exactly claiming, like Berkeley, that our perception of the world sees only "appearances" that represent the Ideal world as-if objects (ding an sich) ultimately exist in the mind of God. But merely to note that humans see only superficial Properties, that are meaningful to our space-time physical needs, instead of essential eternal Qualities.

Quantum Physics (QP) is another reminder that our 5 senses are attuned only to appearances, and our mental images represent only a fraction of reality. Heisenberg even echoed Kant to say that the "appearances" we call Reality, don't exist until observed. So, the quantum pioneers developed a new (non-mechanical) statistical worldview, to artificially sharpen the fuzziness of sub-atomic reality into a practical alternative to unrealistic Platonic Idealism.

In other words, QP is an attempt to make such abstract digital mathematical information useful to us coarse concrete analog organisms. As you suggested, the "success" of Quantum Physics, so alien to Classical Physics, allows us to adapt our way of dealing with the "transcendental" aspects of the world to a novel counter-intuitive "knowledge of things" that are not really things, such as non-local waves that can also behave like particles .

Whatever the Real World is, it is much more than our limited senses can cope with. So, we condense the incomprehensible behaviors of the Cosmos into mathematical symbols, and call them "natural laws". But Nature doesn't "comply" with our definitions ; instead, our formal laws are attempts to conform with Nature's regularities, symmetries, harmonies & proportions. :smile:


Transcendental Idealism :
In Kant’s view, human cognition is limited to objects that somehow depend on our minds (namely, appearances), whereas the mind-independent world (things in themselves) lies beyond the limits of our experience and cognition.
https://iep.utm.edu/kant-transcendental-idealism/

QUANTUM REALITY makes no sense to our senses

Well I disagree with this antirealist suggestion, Pez – "concepts" do not "change" themselves, we change our concepts in order to adapt. Turning on house lights at night in an unfamiliar house does not change the house, rather you change only your capability for orienting yourself within that unfamiliar house. Likewise, given that we inhabit the world, the 'models (i.e. pictures, maps, simulations) of the world' which we make conform with varying degrees of fidelity to the world and thereby inform our expectations of how we can adapt to the world. For instance, GR & QM were as true about the physical world in Aristotle's day and in Newton's day as they are today even though Aristotle, Newton and their contemporaries, respectively, were completely ignorant of them. Thus, changing our concepts of reality, in effect, only changes us and not reality itself. — 180 Proof

That's very elegantly put. Thanks.

:cool: yw.

What makes nature comply to laws — Pez

Not sure if anyone has already answered this in the same way and I don't have time today to read the whole tread.

Nature does not comply to any laws, simply because nature is the laws.

But philosophy might be considered as an attempt to understand why we can know what will happen (if at all). — Pez

The most that philosopher Kant claimed about our knowledge of what exists outside us is in his Refutation of Idealism in B275 of the Critique of Pure Reason. He concludes "I am conscious of things outside me". IE, he can neither know what these things are or even why these things are as they are.

Well I disagree with this antirealist suggestion, — 180 Proof

Sorry, if my remarks have led You to think I am antirealist. If being a realist means to believe in the objective reality of the world surrounding us, I am no antirealist at all. Still conscious experience is our only means of getting in contact to this world. The question, if we can infer from this experience to something outside of consciousness, has been a long dispute among philosophers.

My position is: we cannot. The paradox situation here is, though, speaking of a world of conscious experience automatically implies the notion of something beyond this experience. In Kant's terminology this something is called “noumenon”, a necessary concept, but “like an empty space” without any trace of structure. If You are interested in Buddhist philosophy a comparison to the term “shunyata” might be of interest.

The most that philosopher Kant claimed about our knowledge of what exists outside us is in his Refutation of Idealism in B275 of the Critique of Pure Reason. He concludes "I am conscious of things outside me". IE, he can neither know what these things are or even why these things are as they are. — RussellA

I am glad You mentioned this. It might be considered weird, that someone describing his philosophy as “transcendental idealism” writes a paragraph called “Refutation of Idealism”. The sole point of interest here hinges around the notion “outside”. Kant's ambiguous use of the term leads to many mis-interpretations. Here “outside” can only mean “outside in space” because otherwise it would be a contradiction to the rest of his philosophical system. Space however is one of the intuitive conceptions and therefore in consciousness.

It might be considered weird, that someone describing his philosophy as “transcendental idealism” writes a paragraph called “Refutation of Idealism”. — Pez

The word "idealism" has more than one meaning (Merriam Webster - Idealism)

The term "transcendental idealism" should be thought of as a name rather than a description, as the Champs-Élysées is a name and not a description.

In fact, he proposed renaming his transcendental idealism with the more informative name of "formal" or "critical idealism," (Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason)
===============================================================================

The sole point of interest here hinges around the notion “outside” — Pez

In B275, Kant wrote "I am conscious of things outside me".

In the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason is the paragraph:

In the second edition, however, Kant inserted a new argument, the "Refutation of Idealism" (B 2 74-9), which attempts to show that the very possibility of our consciousness of ourselves presupposes the existence of an external world of objects that are not only represented as spatially outside us but are also conceived to exist independently of our subjective representations of them.

I may have the concept of an apple sitting on a table, and it may well be the thing outside me bears no relation to my concept of it.

Kant attempts to prove in the Refutation of Idealism that I can be conscious of things outside me.

Even if the thing outside me bears no relation to my concept of an apple sitting on a table, this doesn't detract from the fact that I am conscious of a thing outside me.

Perhaps discovery and invention are not so opposed as common belief would have it? — Moliere

I quite agree to Your interesting contribution. In the German language "to invent" translates into "erfinden". "Finden" i.e. "to find" is actually part of this word.

The question, if we can infer from this experience to something outside of consciousness, has been a long dispute among philosophers. — Pez

Only some (idealist) philosophers ... most of whom argue from rather than towards their conclusion. Anyway, at least since Democritus in the 5th century BCE, many philosophers have inferred and then modern natural scientists have demonstrated that nature is, in fact, vastly "outside of consciousness" and that "consciousness" is therefore nature-dependent (i.e. reality-dependent) rather than the other way around. In other words, Pez, it's reasonable to infer that it is also a (meta) "law of nature" that intelligent minds can abstract "laws of nature" from (modeling) nature.

Btw, I understand the concept of noumena (Kant mostly uses the plural form whereas Schopenhauer critically uses the singular "noumenon'") to denote the asymptote-like limits of phenomena – limits of ap/perception – and not a posited "beyond" or "behind" phenomena (i.e. "transcendental illusion"? pace Hegel et al). IMHO, Buddhist "shunyata" is completely different from – opposite of – Kantian noumena insofar as, so to speak, (1) 'we can think but not experience' the latter whereas 'we can experience but not think' the former and (2) Kantianism posits things-in-themselves (we just cannot 'know' them) and Buddhism denies things-in-themselves (there are only 'transient illusions').

The term "transcendental idealism" should be thought of as a name rather than a description, as the Champs-Élysées is a name and not a description.
In fact, he proposed renaming his transcendental idealism with the more informative name of "formal" or "critical idealism," (Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason) — RussellA

I'm not a Kant scholar, and have never read any of his works. But, "Transcendence" is inherently a debatable term, since it is based on subjective imagination instead of objective observation. Some critics seem to assume that Kant's "transcendental" referred to a religious heavenly realm of perfection isolated from the imperfect physical world. But others, such as the 19th century Transcendentalists, apparently believed in a parallel "spiritual" realm within this world, perceivable via intuition. For example, as depicted in movies : innocent children, guided by feelings instead of reason, can "see" dead people, or demons, or disguised alien monsters.

Yet I'm getting the impression that Kant may have been merely making a pragmatic philosophical distinction between concrete physical Reality (actuality) and abstract mental Ideality (possibility), as a way to discuss metal phenomena (i.e. noumena), without the baggage of habitual physical preconceptions. But his choice of "Transcendence" as a label may sound absurd to those of a Materialist worldview, in which nothing could possibly transcend the apparent reality of the 5 senses --- as confirmed by empirical science. Unfortunately, his support for Christian doctrine would make his objectivity suspect.

How do you interpret his usage of "transcendence"? Specifically, in his view, what limits are being surpassed? Was he denigrating mythical Pure Reason in favor of mundane non-magical Practical Intuition? :smile:


Practical Intuition :
Practical Intuition provides the tools you need to develop your intuitive potential to its fullest.
https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/1242635

Non-Magical Intuition :
Intuition is a form of knowledge that appears in consciousness without obvious deliberation. It is not magical but rather a faculty in which hunches are generated by the unconscious mind rapidly sifting through past experience and cumulative knowledge.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/intuition

PS___ In Philosophy Now magazine #158, editor Grant Bartley discusses the cover question : Freewill vs Determinism. In answer to "what freewill involves", he refers to Kant's notion of going beyond physical limits : "Kant calls the will 'transcendental' --- by which he means that for it to operate, will must not be part of the causal system of the physical world". In other words, "Transcendental" means Supernatural.

Is that a valid interpretation of Kant? I'm sure even to mention such an "outrageous" possibility on TPF would cause to do his best ballistic Trump imitation : red face, sneering & blustering. But I'm seriously seeking to understand what Kant was talking about, because he's "one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy". https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/

I'm not a Kant scholar, and have never read any of his works. But, "Transcendence" ... — Gnomon

... you vapidly conflate with Kant's use of transcendental (which you further confuse with "Transcendentalism"). Apparently, it never occurs to you, Gnomon, to first read, let alone study, what you wantonly bloviate about. More shameless sophistry. :sparkle: :sweat:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/881651

:ok:

The reason I don't talk about Kant is that I studied it about 30 years ago and I can barely remember anything about it, apart from that I thought it was probably nonsense. I don't want to inflict my vague recollections on the good TPF readers, and certainly don't want to give the impressionable among us the idea that I know what I'm talking about.

Non-Magical Intuition :
Intuition is a form of knowledge that appears in consciousness without obvious deliberation. It is not magical but rather a faculty in which hunches are generated by the unconscious mind rapidly sifting through past experience and cumulative knowledge.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/intuition — Gnomon

Did you read the last paragraph?

It is possible to hone your powers of intuition. To some degree, intuition stems from expertise, which relies on tacit knowledge. Strengthening intuition requires making use of feedback, comparing the real-life outcomes of situations with the intuitive decisions you made. Even so, being highly intuitive in one domain of experience doesn’t guarantee reliability in every area.

our knowledge comes to a certain extent before the object, making our concept of „objects“ and the inference to future occurrences from past ones possible — Pez

This reminds of Heidegger's notion that being is that upon which beings are already understood. There is no being in the absence of at least a "vague and average" understanding of beings. So even if we grant for the sake of argument the irrefutability of Hume's logic, the rigor of logic is not the primary basis upon which we make our way about in the world. Instead, we make our way about the world from within our already existing "vague and average" understanding of the world. The number of actions submitted to the rigors of logic are few and far between.

Nature does not conform to Laws.
Nature does whatever the fuck she wants, and laws have to learn to conform to her, if they know what's good for them.

I don't know if you mean that literally or not, but if you do then I pretty much agree with you. Physical models predict her behaviour as best they can, but she does what she does because she wants to. It just happens to be regular and predictable from our perspective.

"Transcendence" is inherently a debatable term — Gnomon

Definitions

What is Kant's "Transcendental Idealism" about, taking the term "Transcendental Idealism" more as a name than a description, as even Kant considered finding a better term.

Based on the Merriam Webster Dictionary, "Transcendence" in Kantian philosophy means the state of being beyond the limits of all possible experience and knowledge. "Transcendental" in Kantian Philosophy means going beyond the limits of all possible experience but not going beyond the limits of human reason.

Note that it is ""Transcendental Idealism" not "Transcendent Idealism". The CPR is not about "Transcendent Idealism", as this would lie beyond what the human can cognitively grasp and would move into the realm of the unknowable. Not only beyond human experience but also beyond human reason, because beyond the scope of empirical investigation. Included would be such concepts as God and the soul.

The CPR is about "Transcendental Idealism", which is about our prior intuitions of time and space and a priori concepts of the Categories. Necessary conditions for the possibility of experiencing and understanding the world, and which predetermine our understanding of the world.

The CPR is not about religion or the spiritual realism, but is about what we can practically know about the world using reason and observation. Kant wrote:

A 369 I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.

The Transcendental Argument

Among Immanuel Kant’s most influential contributions to philosophy is his development of the transcendental argument, which he uses to show that we would not be able to understand our sensory experience if we were not able to impose a priori intuitions an a priori concepts on them. Thereby enabling the "conditions of the possibility of experience".

A Transcendental Argument begins with a strong premise, and then reasons to a conclusion that is a necessary condition for the premise. In a sense circular, but justifies its own truth through its own logical coherence.

Kant requires a transcendental argument because of his belief that it is not possible to abstract intuitions and concepts just from empirical experience, but transcendentally deduce them empirical experiences

Kant uses such a Transcendental Argument in his Refutation of Idealism in B275 against the Idealism of Berkeley in order not to prove that things exist independently of the mind, but only the possibility that things exist independently of the mind.

Kant chose a middle ground between Rationalism and Empiricism

Kant wanted to avoid the excesses of both the Rationalist and Empiricists by establishing a middle ground.

The Rationalist, such as Descartes and Plato, argued that humans can use Pure Reason to discover knowledge about the world without having first observed the world. They argued that Pure Reason can transcend experience and discover things like God and the soul.

The Empiricists, such as Hume and Locke, argued that humans can discover knowledge about the world just by observing the world.

Kant in the CPR made the case that on the one hand Pure Reason cannot answer metaphysical problems such as the existence of God or the soul but on the other hand can go beyond sensory experience in order to discover necessary truths about the world.

Summary
"Transcendental Idealism" uses the Transcendental Argument to make sense of the world given our sensory experiences.

(SEP - Kant’s Transcendental Idealism)

The mirror that we look through and observe reality is built on logic.

Thus we shouldn't be surprised that things we see are then logical. And when they are logical, then it's easy for us to say that "nature comply laws".

If something that we observe is paradoxical or doesn't fit in it earlier logic of how things are and behave, like the Michelson-Morley experiment didn't go so well with Newtonian physics, then we try to find a logical model for it. And what do you know, a technical assistant in a Swiss Patent Office got something logical to say about it!


Ahhh...logic restored.

Nature does not comply to any laws, simply because nature is the laws. — Sir2u

But should laws not refer to something? Law itself being nature sounds, for me at least, a bit inconceivable.

Why? Perhaps you're taking the word "law" too literally - is it inconceivable that pieces of reality do what they do as consistently as they do them because those pieces of reality are defined by algorithms which decide their behaviour?

Eg 2 hydrogen atoms consistently bond with 1 oxygen atom when they can because the stuff that makes these atoms up is defined, at it's very core, to behave in a particular way?

If you treat the word "law" as metaphorical, it seems like it gets a lot more conceivable

But should laws not refer to something? Law itself being nature sounds, for me at least, a bit inconceivable. — Pez

Is it inconceivable that there are naturally occurring negatively charged particles called electrons and positively charged particles caller protons that are naturally attracted to each other? Or is it more conceivable that electrons and protons don't actually have such properties, and are just following laws?

Or is it more conceivable that electrons and protons don't actually have such properties, and are just following laws? — wonderer1

What's the difference between them having those properties, and them following laws that produce those properties? They seem like just different phrasings of the same thing to me.

Is it the difference between those laws being internally defined Vs externally defined?

like the Michelson-Morley experiment didn't go so well with Newtonian physics, then we try to find a logical model for it. — ssu

The formulation for this discussion has been chosen to be a bit provocative on purpose. The question which laws are meant has not even been touched. The evolution of (incompatible) scientific theories is a different topic. The general issue then is: are there regularities in nature or are we only imposing them to be able to better plan our lives.

are there regularities in nature or are we only imposing them — Pez

What's your opinion?

I don't know if you mean that literally or not — bert1

I think I mean mainly, that the question is ill-formed, in suggesting that human ideas can dictate reality, when it is the other way round, that reality dictates and ideas must conform. But most, perhaps all of 'our laws' are statistical averages, measures of temperature, and hence melting and boiling points, and gas pressure for examples. So the nearest thing to a sensible answer would be something like: "because particles are very small and very numerous and thus things usually average out the same way by chance."

is there a reason they average out, by chance, to look super consistent in certain realms of inquiry?

Like if I drop a ball from a tower, and I time how long it takes to hit the floor, over and over again, and I keep recording the same time within a very small margin of error over and over again - how do you conceptualise the reason for this consistency? Is there something in reality, independent if human ideas, which underlies this consistency?