Do you agree that causation is the natural form of shape-shifting within the our phenomenal world of material things? — ucarr

I believe causation is the factual reality of some entity X which explains why some entity Y exists. Thus a first cause would be a Y with no other X entity as its cause for existence.

...a first cause would be a Y with no other X entity as its cause for existence. — Philosophim

Why do you not say a first cause is Y & ~Y in superposition? I ask this particular question with the assumption that a first cause must instantiate motion.

If motion is essential to a first cause no less so than to its effects, then said first cause must be self-transcendent. If self-transcendence entails change of position, then first cause must paradoxically encompass itself and the negation of itself in a state of superposition placing the contradictions in two places at once. Superposition is then, by my argument here, the means by which a first cause (presumably a single) effects essential motion.

A question is whether a self-transcendent cause in superposition is paradoxically a first cause and not a first cause due to the bi-directional, paradoxical causation of the two iterations of a single self vis-a-vis itself.

Why do you not say a first cause is Y & ~Y in superposition? I ask this particular question with the assumption that a first cause must instantiate motion. — ucarr

A first cause does not have to instantiate motion. A first cause may be already in motion, with again, no prior cause as to what it is in motion. As an example, a photon can appear without any velocity, or with velocity. A first cause has no restrictions on how it can or must exist. If it did, there would be something else which caused those restrictions, which is impossible.

...a photon can appear without any velocity — Philosophim

Do you dispute that a photon with rest mass entails infinite quantities, and that equations describing practical situations break down upon approach to functions with infinite input/output values?

A first cause may be already in motion.. — Philosophim

Why is it not the case that if a first cause instantiates already in motion, then spacetime, mass_energy, velocity and a host of other physical fundamentals (spin, charge, up/down quarkiness, color, charm, etc.) co-exist with it, thus stripping it of being "first?"

More generally, how can something be first cause if its essential makeup entails differentiable constituent components co-equal in primary status?

Does this thought suggest to you a first cause as abstract concept must be a pure singularity and, as such, exists as a conceptual limit approachable only through mind via imagination?

Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates?

Dealt with.

I think he missed the "prior" part as well. — Philosophim

Not quite right. For me, a cause must be prior to its effect (except when it is part of a causal analysis) and a distinct entity. So I interpreted "prior cause" as a pleonasm. But I see that I misunderstood.

Mostly because I've been ingrained to use different words instead of the same one repeatedly in a sentence. :) In this case there was overlap, as if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. But not all reasons are causes just like not all cats are tigers. — Philosophim

Yes, you are not alone. I've seen some very well-known philosophers indulge themselves in that way. I don't think it is particularly helpful and it can be rather misleading. The terms here are very unclear and common usage is no help. In my usage. which I think is also common philosophical usage, a reason is not a cause, because it does not need to be an event or even a spatio-temporal entity.

And, as I explained to Philosophim already, if we move to allow that "cause" of an event includes also the "reason" for the event, as a type of cause, then we must remove the defining feature of a chain, series, or sequence, because this type of cause does not occur in a chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite so.

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue? — Philosophim

As I tried to say earlier, the reason you suggest for the first cause/reason is, to me, not a cause/reason at all, but a rejection of the request to provide one. "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations - a brute fact or a first cause.

And this, so far, is the only weakness I've seen in the argument. It is only a logical argument. A logical argument does not mean empirical truth. — Philosophim

I always thought that the existence of something was always an empirical, not a logical question, so I'm treating your first cause as a possibility, not a certainty.
There was a time when it was thought that there must be a foundation for the earth and that seemed logically necessary. But it turned out, empirically, that it was not the case. That required new thinking, and the new thinking was forced on us by various empirical truths. Check out Five ways to prove the earth is a globe. That's why I regard a first cause as an opportunity for new thinking.

Spicy thread, lots of soap opera.

I think Hume hit the nail on the head with his criticisms. Ultimately, to me causation is a word that exists to account for a human intuition, without referencing an external fact.

Perhaps a physically reductionist causation is something worthy looking into. Surely, it does push the issue further and does not solve the problem of induction (what could?), but at least it allows us to clear up our language.

I know where the information can be found. You have not demonstrated any specific type of other cause, only vague, "maybes". So far the main point is that a "first cause" means there can be no prior cause by definition. Since you cannot give me a concrete example that gets past this, I see no evidence of any refutation. — Philosophim

My discussion of intention, free will, final cause, did not consist of vague maybes.

Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason. — Philosophim

That, as I demonstrated is a faulty conclusion. The conclusion is that there cannot be an event prior to the first cause as the cause of it. The conclusion "there is not a prior reason" is unsupported.

Just like I told him, there is overlap because if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. — Philosophim

You have no premise to draw this conclusion. A "cause" as described by your "chain of events", is an "event". We might say that a cause, or an event suffices as "the reason" in some instances, but it does not in all instances. This implies that "reason " is the broader term, with a wider range of meaning. If the inverse was the case, if all reasons were causes, then "no prior cause" would imply "no prior reason". But that is not the case, so "no priior cause" does not imply "no prior reason". Conversely, "no prior reason" would imply "no prior cause" as "reason" has logical priority over "cause", "cause" being included within "reason".

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue? — Philosophim

Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions.

This is not an empirical argument. This is a logical argument. When Einstein constructed his theory of relativity in regards to large bodies, logically, it was sound. It was only after they observed and measured an eclipse that they could empirically confirm it to be true. I make no empirical arguments here. I simply note that logically, if we continue to examine any chain of causality, whether that be finite or infinitely regressive, we will eventually run into a first cause. So no, there is no empirical observation as of yet that refutes this claim, nor any empirical observation that confirms this claim. This discussion is not an attempt at empirical proof, but a logical proof. As such, unless you can logically refute it, it stands.

And this, so far, is the only weakness I've seen in the argument. It is only a logical argument. A logical argument does not mean empirical truth. By the way, Bob Ross is the only other poster to my mind who understood and communicated this right off the bat. Well done, I consider him one of the best philosophers on these boards. :) So, if you wish to say, "I don't care about what logic says, I only care about empirical proof" then I will simply nod my head and state, "That's fine." But that in itself does not show it is a false logical argument. — Philosophim

My reference to empirical evidence was simply to show that your definition of "cause" is not consistent with empirical evidence, it is therefore a false premise. And this inconsistency, false representation, is why it is difficult to understand the nature of "the first cause" which is necessitated by your argument. Your definition of "cause" is false, and as I've explained many times to you already, you need to broaden your understanding of what a "cause" is. Otherwise you're just stuck with an unsound argument, based on a false definition of "cause", produced by a misunderstanding.

.

I think Hume hit the nail on the head. Causation is a word that exists to account for a human intuition. — Lionino

I hope I'm not being too pedantic, but I think that's not quite what Hume says. He accepts the sceptical argument against the scholastic notion of a "power" that a cause exerts to produce its effect, but then says that we will continue to think and speak of causation based on a custom or habit arising from the association of our idea of the cause with our idea of the effect (not an intuition).

The conclusion "there is not a prior reason" is unsupported. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the case of the Big Bang, time and space are created by it and do not exist before it. So nothing can be prior to it, whether cause or reason. But, it seems to me that a cause cannot exist outside time, whereas a reason can. So there is reason to think that there might be a reason for the Big Bang. But I don't see that there could be a cause for it. (I have no idea what the reason might be, but there seem to be some interesting speculations around.)

Perhaps a physically reductionist causation is something worthy looking into.....but at least it allows us to clear up our language. — Lionino

Anything that cleans up our language is worth looking in to.

I hope I'm not being too pedantic — Ludwig V

You are not, I was just unclear :-P fixed now

In the case of the Big Bang, time and space are created by it and do not exist before it. — Ludwig V

Time and space are conceptions we apply toward the understanding of our surroundings. Kant calls them pure a priori intuitions. It does not make sense to say that they are a part of the things which surround us, just like it doesn't make sense to say that numbers and geometric shapes are a part of our surroundings.

If you see a ball for example, and say "that is a sphere", this is a description, and "sphere" refers to the concept used to describe the ball. You are not saying that there is a conceptual sphere there in your environment, rather you are saying that there is an object there which is representative of the concept, so that "sphere" is the acceptable concept to describe it.

Likewise with time and space, these are concepts we use to describe the world around us, so it doesn't make sense to say that time and space were created by the Big Bang. It is more appropriate to say that the universe, which we understand through the concepts of time and space was created by the Big Bang. However, it is acceptable in common vernacular to say "time and space are created by it", just like it is acceptable to say, when pointing to a ball, "that is a sphere".

So nothing can be prior to it, whether cause or reason. — Ludwig V

Based on what I said above, this is not a sound conclusion. It appears like the intuitions and concepts which we use to understand our world, and our universe, would not be applicable toward understanding the reality of whatever the conditions were prior to the Big Bang, but this does not imply nothing can be prior to it, in any absolute sense. What it is that was prior to the Big Bang would most likely require a completely different conceptual structure to understand it.

But, it seems to me that a cause cannot exist outside time, whereas a reason can. So there is reason to think that there might be a reason for the Big Bang. But I don't see that there could be a cause for it. (I have no idea what the reason might be, but there seem to be some interesting speculations around.) — Ludwig V

If you adopt a separation between the world around us, and the conceptions employed by us to understand that world, as I explained above, this provides the premises required for logic to extend beyond the world of empirical evidence. This is what we find in pure mathematics for example, logic which goes beyond the empirical world. I suggest that in this way we can find the principles required to understand statements like "prior to the Big Bang". It's simply a matter of recognizing that concepts naturally conform to the things which they are applied to, and if we want to understand what is outside of those things, like cause of and prior to them, we need to provide the concepts which can do this.

Time and space are conceptions we apply toward the understanding of our surroundings. Kant calls them pure a priori intuitions. It does not make sense to say that they are a part of the things which surround us, just like it doesn't make sense to say that numbers and geometric shapes are a part of our surroundings. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does not mean that Kant is correct. Scientists showed us in the 20th century that time and space are affected by physical facts.

It does not mean that Kant is correct. Scientists showed us in the 20th century that time and space are affected by physical facts. — Lionino

Do you mean, scientists show us that they adapt their conceptions of time and space according to the different problems which arise, and the new evidence?

...a photon can appear without any velocity
— Philosophim

Do you dispute that a photon with rest mass entails infinite quantities, and that equations describing practical situations break down upon approach to functions with infinite input/output values? — ucarr

I will clarify with more care. I'm simply using this as an example, not trying to say such a thing actually exists. My point is that there is no way to predict when or how a first cause would form or exist. To say a first cause must form a particular way or is likely to form at a particular time would require a cause outside of itself. A thing which has no causality outside of itself thus can have no restrictions as to what it could be upon existing. I am not sure where you are getting the infinite qualities though. Could you give an example?

More generally, how can something be first cause if its essential makeup entails differentiable constituent components co-equal in primary status? — ucarr

Great question. Lets keep it extremely simple so its clear. Lets imagine that we first spy a hydrogen atom that forms with apparently no prior cause. Any time tick before this, the atom is not there. Once it is there, we know an atom is composed of particular parts. Lets pretend, for simplicities sake, that protons, neutrons, and electrons are fundamental particles. We say, "What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general.

Once we get to the fundamental particles, there is no other cause for those particles in terms of parts, or prior time. Meaning that they are the first causes. So what caused the atom? The combination of fundamental parts of the atom formed without prior cause at the same time.

Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates? — ucarr

Could you clarify this with an example? You definitely make good points ucarr, I'm just not quite getting it here.

n my usage. which I think is also common philosophical usage, a reason is not a cause, because it does not need to be an event or even a spatio-temporal entity. — Ludwig V

I have not been intending to use reason as a cause, but as an explanation. Of why "X" is a cause. I think the problem some people have been having is this is not a universal, and that sometimes reason can be substituted for cause. Part of the reason why some people may have problems with cause is people are having a difficult time grasping what a reason is.

And, as I explained to Philosophim already, if we move to allow that "cause" of an event includes also the "reason" for the event, as a type of cause, then we must remove the defining feature of a chain, series, or sequence, because this type of cause does not occur in a chain.
— Metaphysician Undercover
Quite so. — Ludwig V

I also agree this would be a problem. But I am not using the term reason to explain another cause. That would clearly contradict my notion that a first cause is absolute, so I think even a moderately charitable reading of what I've been expressing would conclude I'm not attempting to blatantly contradict myself.

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue?
— Philosophim

Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have noted many times why this must be, but it might have been missed. First, I'm using 'reason' as an explanation. "Why is this a first cause?" Reason: Because it has no prior cause which caused it. Pretty simple.

As I tried to say earlier, the reason you suggest for the first cause/reason is, to me, not a cause/reason at all, but a rejection of the request to provide one. "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations - a brute fact or a first cause. — Ludwig V

And I'll note again, "reason" is not being used as "cause", but explanation. So to your point, "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations, yes.

I always thought that the existence of something was always an empirical, not a logical question, so I'm treating your first cause as a possibility, not a certainty. — Ludwig V

What is logically necessary may not be empirically certain, this is true. No disagreement from me!

My discussion of intention, free will, final cause, did not consist of vague maybes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your point has largely been, "Maybe there's a prior cause to the first cause." This is what I'm addressing. I have not seen a concrete example that demonstrates a situation in which there is a first cause, then you show that logically, there is actually a prior cause to that. If we had a concrete example, we could look at that. And if you have and I've missed it, don't get mad, just repost it.

Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason.
— Philosophim

That, as I demonstrated is a faulty conclusion. The conclusion is that there cannot be an event prior to the first cause as the cause of it. The conclusion "there is not a prior reason" is unsupported. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just a repeat of a belief you have, you're not demonstrating why the point I gave you is incorrect. Look, if there's no prior cause for something, there's no prior reason for something either. Give me a concrete example of what you mean by a first cause having a prior reason without that prior reason being the cause of the first cause.

You have no premise to draw this conclusion. A "cause" as described by your "chain of events", is an "event". We might say that a cause, or an event suffices as "the reason" in some instances, but it does not in all instances. This implies that "reason " is the broader term, with a wider range of meaning. If the inverse was the case, if all reasons were causes, then "no prior cause" would imply "no prior reason". But that is not the case, so "no priior cause" does not imply "no prior reason". Conversely, "no prior reason" would imply "no prior cause" as "reason" has logical priority over "cause", "cause" being included within "reason". — Metaphysician Undercover

Give me an example.

Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I just typed out the definition of reason and noted I'm using it as a synonym to 'explanation'. I'm uninterested in your opinions that I have no logic, I'm interested in if you can take the logic I've noted, and give a good example of counter object that would demonstrate that my logic is wrong.

My reference to empirical evidence was simply to show that your definition of "cause" is not consistent with empirical evidence, it is therefore a false premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Incorrect. You only have empirical evidence of things which have prior causality. As I've noted, we do not have empirical evidence of things which do not. This does not negate the logic that there necessarily must be a first cause.

Your definition of "cause" is false, and as I've explained many times to you already, you need to broaden your understanding of what a "cause" is. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't need to do anything. I've clearly laid out what a cause and first cause is as defined here. You need to demonstrate with some concrete examples why this definition is either impossible, contradictory, or doesn't make sense. If you simply don't like it, that's not my problem. Its on you to demonstrate how one of the most basic logical statements you can construct, "There can be no cause prior to a first cause" is somehow illogical. To my mind where I have given you every benefit of the doubt I can, you have not done so.

So nothing can be prior to it, whether cause or reason.
— Ludwig V

Based on what I said above, this is not a sound conclusion. It appears like the intuitions and concepts which we use to understand our world, and our universe, would not be applicable toward understanding the reality of whatever the conditions were prior to the Big Bang, but this does not imply nothing can be prior to it, in any absolute sense. What it is that was prior to the Big Bang would most likely require a completely different conceptual structure to understand it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you understand that if there is something which caused the Big Bang, then the Big Bang is not a first cause? A first cause is not an opinion or belief. It is a reality that we either know about, or do not know about.

"What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general. — Philosophim

This is a common sense answer. Let's consider details. A proton is not an atom. Likewise, a neutron is not an atom and, etc. Also, we know that elementary particles combine, split apart into other particles, change orbital shells and, etc. Furthermore, we know atoms combine to form compounds and they combine to form radicals and, etc. All of these phenomena are differentiable. Pretty soon, you've got the entire phenomenal universe as you and I know it today popping into existence as the first cause. But the phenomenal processes I've been describing happen in time. If you remove the time element for an atom, or for a universe, either way the primacy of being first becomes meaningless.

Let's suppose the entire universe is the first cause. If everything has always existed co-temporally, then first cause is meaningless.

Why do you not think the logical necessity of a first cause positions it as an antecedent to the first cause it necessitates?
— ucarr

Could you clarify this with an example? You definitely make good points ucarr, I'm just not quite getting it here. — Philosophim

In this example, logical necessity is, by definition, logically prior to the ontic status of the first cause it necessitates. It is the logical cause of the "first" cause. This is what you're implying with the wording of you OP title: "A First Cause Is Logically Necessary."

You yourself are doing exactly what you say below must not be done:

My point is that there is no way to predict when or how a first cause would form or exist. To say a first cause must form a particular way (e.g. via logical necessity) or is likely to form at a particular time would require a cause outside of itself. — Philosophim

Does any type of priority negate first cause? Is it only temporal priority that negates first cause?

Pretty soon, you've got the entire phenomenal universe as you and I know it today popping into existence as the first cause. But the phenomenal processes I've been describing happen in time. If you remove the time element for an atom, or for a universe, either way the primacy of being first becomes meaningless. — ucarr

Exactly. Which is why a first cause is a cause which has no prior cause for its own existence.

Let's suppose the entire universe is the first cause. If everything has always existed co-temporally, then first cause is meaningless. — ucarr

The universe cannot always have existed co-temporally as a first cause. The first cause is only in the first time tick. In the second time tick, the state of existence is caused by the first cause.

In this example, logical necessity is, by definition, logically prior to the ontic status of the first cause it necessitates. It is the logical cause of the "first" cause. — ucarr

By example, I mean give me an imaginary concrete. I need something less abstract to understand what you're trying to convey here. No cause can come before a first cause. Logic can lead us to conclude what a first cause is. Reason can explain what it is. But there is no prior cause that can cause a first cause.

The first cause is only in the first time tick. — Philosophim

From this I conclude you're grounding the primacy of first cause within temporal sequence. So, the first cause is first in time before all other things existing in time.

The universe cannot always have existed co-temporally as a first cause. The first cause is only in the first time tick. — Philosophim

Let's revisit something you said earlier:

Lets imagine that we first spy a hydrogen atom that forms with apparently no prior cause. Any time tick before this, the atom is not there. — Philosophim

Sidebar 1 - Notice I've made "forms" bold. If there's a "forms" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "forms" (i.e. physical processes) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom.

Sidebar 2 - Notice I've made "there" bold. If there's a "there" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "there" (i.e. spacetime) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom.

Main focus:

Once it is there, we know an atom is composed of particular parts. Lets pretend, for simplicities sake, that protons, neutrons, and electrons are fundamental particles. We say, "What causes this atom to exist?" We note the protons, neutrons, and electrons in a particular order. But this is not a prior cause, just the inner causal make up of the atom in general. — Philosophim

If you can posit theoretically the popping into existence of an atom as first cause, why cannot you posit theoretically the popping into existence of a universe as first cause?

In either case, when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence.

If there's no reason to partition atom and universe with respect to which collective can be first cause temporally, then first cause in terms of temporal sequencing is meaningless. In other words, existence in general, being first cause, makes the notion of a first cause in terms of temporal sequencing meaningless. Everything that can and does exist popped into existence at the same time.

If, on the other hand, you posit an innate temporal sequence of existing things, with some things not existing in any conceivable way prior to a specific point in one-directional time, then you must ask yourself if positing any first existing thing generates an infinite regress of prior existing things because: a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. In sum, all of this draws a circle back to saying temporal primacy of existence is meaningless.

The first cause is only in the first time tick.
— Philosophim

From this I conclude you're grounding the primacy of first cause within temporal sequence. So, the first cause is first in time before all other things existing in time. — ucarr

No, and I made a slight mistake in my wording here. "A" first cause. Because there is no prior cause for a first cause, there is no limitation on what a first cause could be. As such, there's also no limit to how many first causes could be. The key to being a first cause is that it is not caused by something prior. That does not mean that other things prior to a first cause cannot exist like other first causes.

For example, a photon appears with no prior causality here. Five minutes later and thousands of miles away, a big bang appears uncaused as well. The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains.

Sidebar 1 - Notice I've made "forms" bold. If there's a "forms" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "forms" (i.e. physical processes) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom. — ucarr

To clarify again, there could have been other first causes and their resultant causality before any one particular first cause and its resultant causality. The important note is that nothing within the prior chain of causality caused the second first cause to exist.

Sidebar 2 - Notice I've made "there" bold. If there's a "there" before the first time tick of existence of the hydrogen atom, then this preceding "there" (i.e. spacetime) exists before the first time tick of the hydrogen atom. — ucarr

If a first cause appears in nothing, its not that nothing caused the first cause to be. Absolute nothingness is also not a thing, but the absence of all things.

If you can posit theoretically the popping into existence of an atom as first cause, why cannot you posit theoretically the popping into existence of a universe as first cause? — ucarr

You can. I've noted this several times through this massive discussion. I'm not expecting you to have read it all, just noting this has long been stated from my end.

In either case, when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence. — ucarr

True.

If there's no reason to partition atom and universe with respect to which collective can be first cause temporally, then first cause in terms of temporal sequencing is meaningless. In other words, existence in general, being first cause, makes the notion of a first cause in terms of temporal sequencing meaningless — ucarr

So it is possible, like anything else, that there was only one first cause and that's all of existence. It has the same meaning as any other kind of first or set of first causes we could have. There would be no prior causation for its existence.

If, on the other hand, you posit an innate temporal sequence of existing things, with some things not existing in any conceivable way prior to a specific point in one-directional time, then you must ask yourself if positing any existing thing generates an infinite regress of prior existing things because: a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. — ucarr

I don't believe so if my point has been clarified.

a. No existing thing exists in isolation

To clarify, there's a reason I call it a first cause. Because immediately after its existence it enters into causality. Meaning one time tick after, its has its own reference at a prior time tick to explain why it state of existence is as it is at the second tick of time. Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. Nothing I'm noting is negating the universe as it is today, and we clearly have a lot of things. :)

b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement)

Once a first cause exists, it is within causality within its own temporal changes, or if there are other resulting chains of causal existence from other first causes.

c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. True. Though as you mentioned earlier, " when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence."

Really great questions ucarr!

You seem to be conflating change with difference. The image is static, not changing, but all points in the image are not the same as each other. This is almost always the case with the visual field. When I look at the visual field when nothing is moving, then nothing is changing, but there is difference across the whole field.

dx/dy.

QED.

The first cause is only in the first time tick. In the second time tick, the state of existence is caused by the first cause. — Philosophim

Although causal chains seem to be aligned with a passage of time for each link, one has to be cautious about saying "first tick" or something similar. Then you move into relativity of time measurements and if one makes them smaller and smaller the dynamical system described by the chain tends to a continuous process, with associated philosophical interpretations.

I thought my examples of composition chains might have been a little too much math, so I did a search for other mathematical interpretations of causalities. What I found is more formal and harder to understand. As idealized chains my approach is the simplest analogue, I think. Admittedly, I move in a rarefied atmosphere distinct from physical realities.

Because there is no prior cause for a first cause, there is no limitation on what a first cause could be. — Philosophim

Regarding no limitation, what about the selfhood of the first cause? If selfhood establishes a boundary between self and other, and the first cause is a self, then: a) it's limited by the boundaries of its selfhood; b) the necessary network of self/other, upon which first cause depends for its existence as a self, prevents the solitary, temporal primacy of that said self.

The key to being a first cause is that it is not caused by something prior. — Philosophim

That does not mean that other things prior to a first cause cannot exist like other first causes. — Philosophim

The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains. — Philosophim

You're saying a particular first cause can have a non-causal relationship with other things prior to it?

Moreover, you're saying the attribute of first cause generally allows for a multiplicity of independent first causes temporally sequenced across a positive interval of time?

Does this not imply that a particular first cause has a bounded domain of first causal influence upon a sub-set of the totality of existing things?

For example, a photon appears with no prior causality here. Five minutes later and thousands of miles away, a big bang appears uncaused as well. The photon did not cause the big bang; they are both first causes of their respective causality chains. — Philosophim

Your above quote answers my question directly above it in the affirmative.

Is this not a description of everyday causes such as: a) a virus causes pneumonia; b) a cloud saturated with water causes rain?

Why is it not the case your argument now is merely a description of causation in the everyday world replete with many causes not casually linked to each other? You advance your argument by lopping off "first" and thereby turning first cause into everyday cause.

Am I mistaken in my understanding of your purpose as being an examination of the first cause of all existing things, including existence itself?

...a) no existing thing exists in isolation; b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement); c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. — ucarr

I don't believe so if my point has been clarified.

a. No existing thing exists in isolation

To clarify, there's a reason I call it a first cause. Because immediately after its existence it enters into causality. Meaning one time tick after, its has its own reference at a prior time tick to explain why it state of existence is as it is at the second tick of time. Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. Nothing I'm noting is negating the universe as it is today, and we clearly have a lot of things. :) — Philosophim

If first cause passes through time from its first tick to its second tick, time is co-equal with it.

Further, there is nothing that forbids one thing existing in isolation in theory. — Philosophim

I'm inclined to think the conservation laws forbid the total isolation of a thing. A truly isolated thing means all of mass_energy, being a singularity, negates equilibrium. If our universe defaults toward equilibrium, as the conservation laws confirm, then absolute singularity is an infinite value never reached.

b) every existing thing is a roadmap to other existing things (i.e. quantum entanglement)

Once a first cause exists, it is within causality within its own temporal changes, or if there are other resulting chains of causal existence from other first causes. — Philosophim

Is self-causation is meaningful, its an attribute shared by all existing things.

c) an existing thing, if divisible, cannot pre-exist that thing's sub-components necessary to its existence. True. Though as you mentioned earlier, " when you categorize the variety of existing things as being unified as one collective thing: a) atom; b) universe, they're all equal (by your own argument above) with respect to temporal primacy of existence." — Philosophim

That takes us back to saying all of existence is its own first cause which is like saying "everything is everything," trivial.

also agree this would be a problem. But I am not using the term reason to explain another cause. That would clearly contradict my notion that a first cause is absolute, so I think even a moderately charitable reading of what I've been expressing would conclude I'm not attempting to blatantly contradict myself. — Philosophim

But you are making unjustified claims about "the reason" for the first cause's existence.

I have noted many times why this must be, but it might have been missed. First, I'm using 'reason' as an explanation. "Why is this a first cause?" Reason: Because it has no prior cause which caused it. Pretty simple. — Philosophim

It's not as simple as you make it sound. The question is not "why is this a first cause" because you have not identified a particular "concrete" cause which you claim is a first cause, and asking why is this a first cause. You have provided an argument which shows the need for a first cause. So the question is the more general, "why is there a first cause?". And you might answer it in a similar way, "because there is necessarily a cause without a prior cause". But this does not suffice because it does not answer the question of what is prior to the first cause, and why whatever it is which is prior to the first cause cannot be called "a cause". That's what makes a first cause a first cause, it is the explanation why a first cause is a first cause, the reason why whatever it is that is prior to the first cause cannot be called a cause.

See, "because it has no prior cause" does not answer the reason why any particular cause is a first cause, because that requires showing the reason why whatever it is which is prior to the first cause cannot be said to be the cause of the first cause. We cannot simply assume that there is nothing prior to the first cause because that is unjustified.

And I'll note again, "reason" is not being used as "cause", but explanation. So to your point, "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations, yes. — Philosophim

"Because it exists" does not suffice as an explanation for anything.

Your point has largely been, "Maybe there's a prior cause to the first cause." This is what I'm addressing. I have not seen a concrete example that demonstrates a situation in which there is a first cause, then you show that logically, there is actually a prior cause to that. If we had a concrete example, we could look at that. And if you have and I've missed it, don't get mad, just repost it. — Philosophim

Since you refused to accept conventional philosophy concerning different types of causation, I've found that I have to approach your argument from the distinction you've made between "cause" and "reason". I realize that it is pointless to try to explain something to someone who has no interest in understanding, because understanding would demonstrate that person to be wrong, so I have given up trying to talk to you about final causes. Going forward I will talk about "reason" instead, because this is a term you used.

Look, if there's no prior cause for something, there's no prior reason for something either. — Philosophim

That is unjustified. To make that claim, you need to demonstrate how all reasons are necessarily causes. But you've already admitted that there are reasons which are not causes. And, you said that the first cause has a reason, but not a cause, so you support that admission in your usage. Furthermore, you have no premise which allows you to conclude that the reason for the first cause is not prior to the first cause, because you have not properly established the reason for the first cause. All you've said is that the reason for the first cause is that there is no prior cause. But that's only the reason why it is "first", it is not the reason why it is "cause". And that is a requirement for the reason for "first cause", that we have the reason for it being called "first", and the reason for it being called "cause".

Give me a concrete example of what you mean by a first cause having a prior reason without that prior reason being the cause of the first cause. — Philosophim

I don't know what you're talking about here. You've excluded the possibility of a prior reason being the cause of the first cause through definition. Therefore a prior reason of the first cause must necessarily be something other than a cause, and what you ask is nonsensical. A concrete example of the prior reason for a first cause is not required until you produce a concrete example of a first cause. I tried giving you concrete examples of first causes already, with free will acts, but you ended up rejecting them because they refuted your argument.

Give me an example. — Philosophim

Example of what?

I just typed out the definition of reason and noted I'm using it as a synonym to 'explanation'. I'm uninterested in your opinions that I have no logic, I'm interested in if you can take the logic I've noted, and give a good example of counter object that would demonstrate that my logic is wrong. — Philosophim

As said above, "it simply exists" does not qualify as an explanation. So if you are using "reason" as synonymous with "explanation", you'll have to do better.

Incorrect. You only have empirical evidence of things which have prior causality. As I've noted, we do not have empirical evidence of things which do not. This does not negate the logic that there necessarily must be a first cause. — Philosophim

I don't dispute your argument about "there necessarily must be a first cause", I dispute the further unjustified conclusion you make, that the first cause cannot have a prior reason.

No, I don't need to do anything. I've clearly laid out what a cause and first cause is as defined here. You need to demonstrate with some concrete examples why this definition is either impossible, contradictory, or doesn't make sense. — Philosophim

Your request for concrete examples is completely out of place. You have a purely abstract logical argument about an abstract concept "first cause", and you make an unjustified conclusion concerning the first cause, i.e. that it cannot have a prior reason. This is all abstract logic, there is no place for a concrete example.

If you simply don't like it, that's not my problem. Its on you to demonstrate how one of the most basic logical statements you can construct, "There can be no cause prior to a first cause" is somehow illogical. To my mind where I have given you every benefit of the doubt I can, you have not done so. — Philosophim

I've already demonstrated that. How quickly you forget. A "first cause" is "first" in relation to a specific chain. There may be a multitude of different chains. The "first" of one chain may be prior in time to the "first" of another chain. Therefore the assertion "there can be no cause prior to a first cause" is illogical.

Do you understand that if there is something which caused the Big Bang, then the Big Bang is not a first cause? A first cause is not an opinion or belief. It is a reality that we either know about, or do not know about. — Philosophim

As I've explained to you already. Your conception of "first cause" is a product of an unnecessarily restrictive definition of "cause", one which does not provide for all the things which are commonly, in philosophy, known as causes. Therefore it really is an opinion, your opinion. But you got tired of hearing about that, and I got tired of telling you that.

See, "because it has no prior cause" does not answer the reason why any particular cause is a first cause — Metaphysician Undercover

:up: Something circular going on here. It's a feeling I have had for this entire thread.

A "first cause" is "first" in relation to a specific chain. There may be a multitude of different chains. The "first" of one chain may be prior in time to the "first" of another chain. Therefore the assertion "there can be no cause prior to a first cause" is illogical. — Metaphysician Undercover

:up: I was going to write the similar content of the post long before, but yes that is the crucial point.

Something circular going on here. It's a feeling I have had for this entire thread. — jgill

It appears there is a vicious circle. Philosophim removes the infinite regress, or eternal circle of causation, breaking the chain by inserting "reason" instead of "cause" at some unspecified temporal point. The breaking of the chain produces a "first cause". But there is no reason given for why the chain begins at one point in time rather than another point in time, i.e. why X cause is the first ,rather than Y or some other cause being the first, leaving the selection of the point in time at which the first cause appears, as totally random. But random is inconsistent with "reason". So philosophim refers back to causation, saying the reason for the first cause is the first cause itself, and that produces the vicious circle. But a vicious circle does not constitute a reason or explanation.

It's simply a matter of recognizing that concepts naturally conform to the things which they are applied to, and if we want to understand what is outside of those things, like cause of and prior to them, we need to provide the concepts which can do this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite so. It's perhaps worth noting that the same applies to what happens after the heat death of the universe.

So it is possible, like anything else, that there was only one first cause and that's all of existence. It has the same meaning as any other kind of first or set of first causes we could have. — Philosophim

My difficulty here is that you seem to be treating "existence" as if it were a property of the things that exist. I'm sure you are aware that this has been contested ever since Kant and Hume, and with Russell and Frege's treatment of it in the predicate calculus this has been a staple of analytic philosophy ever since. If that's right, pointing to existence as a cause of anything is incomprehensible. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of it qualifying as an non-causal explanation of something, but it can hardly explain why something exists (circularity). If you disagree, then there is scope of a discussion of the point, but you can't expect others to accept what you say on the face of it. In short, I agree with both the quotations below:-

In sum, all of this draws a circle back to saying temporal primacy of existence is meaningless. — ucarr

As said above, "it simply exists" does not qualify as an explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover