One can anticipate negative outcomes, or think that "the worst" will more likely happen than not, without making a general judgment regarding life or the world. I don't question whether there's such a thing as "philosophical pessimism." — Ciceronianus

Right, but I guess I am perplexed because no one (Ligotti or I at least) is saying that you can't make a "the worst" anticipation of a negative outcome without "making a general judgement regarding life or the world"... So I am not sure what it is this straw man you are arguing against, as no one as I see it, is claiming thus.

Agree.

Just curious, political and moral arguments for various sides are constantly defended and presented- why do you suppose there are still arguments made for various sides rather than people leaving it to “simply dispositions”?
@Tom Storm

Probably it's often a case of thinking: There is no human problem which could not be solved if people would simply do as I advise.

I have come to consider that the matter of 'gods or not gods' is one of personal preference, a bit like sexual orientation. We are attracted to certain ideas aesthetically and because they fit in with our general sense making of the world. If stuff doesn't fit it is discarded and sometimes feared or resented. A lot of the more formal arguments seem to come post hoc. Which does not mean that they aren't important, just that they aren't primary.

Just curious, political and moral arguments for various sides are constantly defended and presented- why do you suppose there are still arguments made for various sides rather than people leaving it to “simply dispositions”? — schopenhauer1

I suppose one significant factor is that the dispositions of others are fairly invisible to us on superficial observation. I'd think most of us tend to assume that others share our dispositions until shown evidence to the contrary.

There is no human problem which could not be solved if people would simply do as I advise. — Tom Storm

True enough

I have come to consider that the matter of 'gods or not gods' is one of personal preference, a bit like sexual orientation. We are attracted to certain ideas aesthetically and because they fit in with our general sense making of the world. If stuff doesn't fit it is discarded and sometimes feared or resented. A lot of the more formal arguments seem to come post hoc. Which does not mean that they aren't important, just that they aren't primary. — Tom Storm

I think aesthetic fit is huge, sometimes upbringing, social groups or reaction against those social influences. However, my point was rather why it is we give people the benefit of the doubt that they are at least trying to make a logically valid/sound case when making a political or moral argument but not so if it is a pessimistic claim? In other words I think the question of pessimism should not be bad faith dismissed as simply disposition, unless your view is that every claim should be dismissed for such reasons.

I suppose one significant factor is that the dispositions of others are fairly invisible to us on superficial observation. I'd think most of us tend to assume that others share our dispositions until shown evidence to to the contrary. — wonderer1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/876676

Same answer.

I remember seeing an interview with Gore Vidal (who had an extraordinary life), he said that there were plenty of golden moments over his long and successful life (he was round 70 then) but he would never want relive a single one of them. I found this fascinating and immediately understood. — Tom Storm

I would want to relive my best moments, which I have generally enjoyed, just as I want to listen to music or poems, view artworks and sometimes books or movies that I like over and over, I would expect , although the events in the relived life might be the same each time, that my sensual, emotional and intellectual responses would be subtly different, just as I see and feel new things in artworks at each occasion of viewing, reading or hearing.

Even if my life were to be exactly the same on each recurrence, I would still choose it, provided I was unable to remember past iterations.

I think it really is a matter of disposition, and that globally pessimistic and optimistic dispositions may even simply be driven by different brain chemistries. It is common enough for humans to rationalize their own experiences and mind-sets after the fact.

However, I think I'm just biologically disposed to appreciate the long strange trip humanity is on. — wonderer1

:up: I'll second that!

I think it really is a matter of disposition, and that globally pessimistic and optimistic dispositions may even simply be driven by different brain chemistries. It is common enough for humans to rationalize their own experiences and mind-sets after the fact. — Janus

I tend to agree. I hasten to add that while I am a pessimist I am not someone who complains or is constantly negative. I hate that shit. I tend to be cheerful. Another genetic contribution, perhaps.

:up:

I think it really is a matter of disposition, and that globally pessimistic and optimistic dispositions may even simply be driven by different brain chemistries. It is common enough for humans to rationalize their own experiences and mind-sets after the fact. — Janus

Again, why can Philosophical Pessimism be dismissed as temperament based, but any other axiological debates like ethics and politics are fair game?

In other words I think the question of pessimism should not be bad faith dismissed as simply disposition, unless your view is that every claim should be dismissed for such reasons. — schopenhauer1

I don't see myself as dismissing claims as simply disposition, and I certainly hope not in bad faith. To me it just seems there is an awfully well evidenced case to be made for people having varying deeply ingrained dispositions.

A friend, colleague, and in many ways mentor of mine is highly pessimistic. His pessimism plays a big role (and he and I both recognize this) in him coming up with outstandingly high quality electronic designs, because he can't help considering every conceivable thing that might feasibly go wrong. I've learned a lot from him that has improved my design work far beyond the level it would be at, without him playing a role in my career.

I certainly don't dismiss the claims of a person, just on the basis of that person being disposed to pessimism. On the other hand, a claim that I should see the world, with the same emotional shadings as someone I am not, would sound like crazy talk to me.

On the other hand, a claim that I should see the world, with the same emotional shadings as someone I am not, would sound like crazy talk to me. — wonderer1

Is it about emotional shadings or things like suffering, and what is to be our response to it? As I see it, Philosophical Pessimism is less to do about emotional disposition and what one does in response to various negative aspects of life and specifically the human condition of self-knowledge amidst known forms if suffering. Yes it’s about value (just like political arguments say) but not so much about temperaments. One can be quite happy Philosophical Pessimist.

Again, why can Philosophical Pessimism be dismissed as temperament based, but any other axiological debates like ethics and politics are fair game? — schopenhauer1

Pessimism is a choice, and I think, for you, the right one. You are exactly as you should be, right where you're needed.

That is what optimism sounds like.

I don't think it's all about disposition. You can be a pessimist or an optimist. That's just how great the world is. Freedom.

Pessimism is a choice, and I think, for you, the right one. You are exactly as you should be, right where you're needed.

That is what optimism sounds like.

I don't think it's all about disposition. You can be a pessimist or an optimist. That's just how great the world is. Freedom. — Hanover

But why is political ideology something to be debated, but Philosophical Pessimism is something you just choose, like a favorite band or some such? Why is Realism or Idealism a debate bit not Philosophical Pessimism?

Again, why can Philosophical Pessimism be dismissed as temperament based, but any other axiological debates like ethics and politics are fair game? — schopenhauer1

Well, I would say that preferences in ethics and politics are significantly about disposition too. I would not say this to dismiss them, I would say this to highlight the role of personal sense-making factors like personality, upbringing, culture and all those contingent influences that make us who we are. I also think that people gravitate towards arguments that support their preferences. These arguments can certainly be debated and explored. I think this is about all we have - a conversation that coalesces around personal experience, preferences and the values and beliefs which result from these.

I also think that people gravitate towards arguments that support their preferences. These arguments can certainly be debated and explored. I think this is about all we have - a conversation that coalesces around personal experience, preferences and the values and beliefs which result from these. — Tom Storm

:up: :up:

Yeah, reasoning be damned. Unfortunately, even tragicomically, your insight is quite true.

Happy warrior! :strong:

But why is political ideology something to be debated, but Philosophical Pessimism is something you just choose, like a favorite band or some such? Why is Realism or Idealism a debate bit not Philosophical Pessimism? — schopenhauer1

How do you propose it be done? Is it a moral argument, as in, the greater good comes from being negative in perspective? That would be odd, considering happiness is often posited as the goal of the good.

Is it an epistemological goal, as in truth is found by being negative?

Present your thesis. Pessimism is a correct perspective because it does what better than optimism?

I also don't think we debate political ideology here. We argue current events, choosing our facts and conclusions to fit our narrative. Political debate would argue the nuances of a political theory without the personal commentary. It's rare to see capitalism or Marxism argued from a emotionally neutral perspective. It's why the Trump and Israel threads are dumpster fires.

It's why the Trump and Israel threads are dumpster fires. — Hanover

:smirk: :up:

How do you propose it be done? Is it a moral argument, as in, the greater good comes from being negative in perspective? That would be odd, considering happiness is often posited as the goal of the good.



Is it an epistemological goal, as in truth is found by being negative?

Present your thesis. Pessimism is a correct perspective because it does what better than optimism?

I also don't think we debate political ideology here. We argue current events, choosing our facts and conclusions to fit our narrative. Political debate would argue the nuances of a political theory without the personal commentary. It's rare to see capitalism or Marxism argued from a emotionally neutral perspective. It's why the Trump and Israel threads are dumpster fires. — Hanover

@Tom Storm

So what I mean by the fact that Philosophical Pessimism is debatable not just something someone has based on the whims of temperament is that it is a worldview based on "what is the case".

Let me give you an analogy. In certain political or ethical formulations, "human rights" are considered to exist in some way. It is somehow considered "what is the case". However, someone who might be a skeptic of human rights, might debate this and claim that at best, its a pragmatic fiction designed for desired societal results.

Okay so, the content of the human rights debate doesn't matter for this discourse, but you notice that there is a dialectic that can be had here. That is to say, it would be bad faith arguing to say to the human rights person, "Well of course you believe in human rights, that is just your temperament to believe so! My temperament says otherwise!". Well, philosophy as a field or debate on anything, would simply collapse as we now somehow assert "temperament!" as the reason for anything and thus no debate is to be had. There are no real claims then, no real positions, nothing to debate, it's just "You have your X, and I have my X". But then, of course, we don't assume this for almost every argument in philosophical discourse. And I am saying, that is the same for Philosophical Pessimistic stance.

I think rather, what is going on is that people are confusing the common use of the term "pessimism" with its historical rootedness in philosophical ideas (like Schopenhauer's pessimism, for example). That is to say, there is a point of view to be made yay or nay for the stance. Surely, one's temperament my affect one's view of what is the case, but it doesn't dictate what is the case, nor one's belief in what is the case. That is to say, a person with "slight depression", may very well be more inclined to be a Philosophical Pessimist, but that isn't necessarily the case. Just as you may have "happy-go-lucky" adherents of Buddha's Four Noble Truths (including that Life is Suffering), you can have "happy-go-lucky" people that hold Philosophical Pessimist ideas.

That being said, "What" is Philosophical Pessimism? Well, there's actually whole books written on this, including these somewhat recent ones in philosophical academic literature:

https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691141121/pessimism

https://global.oup.com/academic/product/weltschmerz-9780198822653?cc=us&lang=en&

From the Pessimism site it says:

Pessimism claims an impressive following — from Rousseau, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, to Freud, Camus, and Foucault. Yet “pessimist” remains a term of abuse — an accusation of a bad attitude — or the diagnosis of an unhappy psychological state. Pessimism is thought of as an exclusively negative stance that inevitably leads to resignation or despair. Even when pessimism looks like utter truth, we are told that it makes the worst of a bad situation. Bad for the individual, worse for the species — who would actually counsel pessimism? — Pessimism- Joshua Foa Dienstag

On the Wiki site it even says of Phil. Pessimism:

Philosophical pessimism is a family of philosophical views that assign a negative value to life or existence. Philosophical pessimists commonly argue that the world contains an empirical prevalence of pains over pleasures, that existence is ontologically or metaphysically adverse to living beings, and that life is fundamentally meaningless or without purpose. Philosophical pessimism is not a single coherent movement, but rather a loosely associated group of thinkers with similar ideas and a resemblance to each other.[1]: 7  Their responses to the condition of life are widely varied. Philosophical pessimists usually do not advocate for suicide as a solution to the human predicament; many favour the adoption of antinatalism, that is, non-procreation. — Wiki on Pessimism

And here are some common positions in defense of Phil. Pessimism:

Pleasure doesn't add anything positive to our experience
A number of philosophers have put forward criticisms of pleasure, essentially denying that it adds anything positive to our well-being above the neutral state.

Pleasure as the mere removal of pain
A particular strand of criticism of pleasure goes as far back as to Plato, who said that most of the pleasures we experience are forms of relief from pain, and that the unwise confuse the neutral painless state with happiness.[28]: 286–287  Epicurus pushed this idea to its limit and claimed that, "[t]he limit of the greatness of the pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain".[21]: 474  As such, according to Epicureans, one can not be better off than being free from pain, anxiety, distress, fear, irritation, regret, worry, etc. — in the state of tranquillity.[29][30]: 117–121 

According to Knutsson, there are a couple of reasons why we might think that. Firstly, we can say that one experience is better than another by recognizing that the first one lacks a particular discomfort. And we can do that with any number of experiences, thus explaining what it means to feel better, all that just with relying on taking away disturbances. Secondly, it's difficult to find a particular quality of experience that would make it better than a completely undisturbed state.[29]

Thirdly, we can explain behavior without invoking positive pleasures. Fourthly, it's easy to understand what it means for an experience to have certain imperfections (aversive qualities), while it's not clear what it would mean for an experience to be genuinely better than neutral. And lastly, a model with only negative and neutral states is theoretically simpler than one containing an additional class of positive experiences.[29]

No genuine positive states
A stronger version of this view is that there may be no states that are undisturbed or neutral. It's at least plausible that in every state we could notice some dissatisfactory quality such as tiredness, irritation, boredom, worry, feeling uncomfortable, etc. Instead of neutral states, there may simply be "default" states — states with recurrent but minor frustrations and discomforts that, over time, we got used to and learned not to do anything about.[29][31]: 255 [9]: 71–73 

Pleasure as the mere relief from striving
Schopenhauer maintained that only pain is positive. That is, only pain is actually felt, it's being experienced as something added to our consciousness. On the other hand, pleasure is only ever negative, which means it only takes away something already present in our experience. He put forward his negativity thesis — that pleasure is only ever a relief from pain.[5]: 50 [26][32][4] Later German pessimists — Julius Bahnsen, Eduard von Hartmann, and Philipp Mainländer — held very similar views.[5]: 154, 208, 268 

Pain can be removed in one of two ways. One way is to satisfy a desire. Since to strive is to suffer, once desire is satisfied, suffering stops. The second way is through distraction. When we're not paying attention to what we lack — and hence, desire — we are temporarily at peace. This happens in cases of intellectual and aesthetic experiences.[32]

A craving may arise when we direct our attention towards some external object, or when we notice something unwanted about our current situation. It's being experienced as a visceral need to change something about the current state. When we do not feel any such cravings, we are content or tranquil — we feel no urgency or need to change anything about our experience.[33][31]: 254–255 

No genuine counterpart to suffering
Alternatively, it can be argued that, for any purported pleasant state, we never find — under closer inspection — anything that would make it a positive or genuine counterpart to suffering. For an experience to be genuinely positive it would have to be an experiential opposite to suffering. However, it's difficult to understand what it would take for an experience to be an opposite of another experience — there just seem to be separate axes of experiences (hot and cold, loud and silent), which are noticed as contrasting. And even if we granted that the idea of an experiential opposite makes sense, it's difficult — if not impossible — to actually find a clear example of such an experience that would survive scrutiny.[34] There is some neuroscientific evidence that positive and negative experiences are not laid on the same axis, but rather comprise two distinct — albeit interacting — systems.[10][35]

Life contains uncompensated evils
One argument for the negative view on life is the recognition that evils are unconditionally unacceptable. A good life is not possible with evils in it. This line of thinking is based on Schopenhauer's statement that "the ill and evil in the world... even if they stood in the most just relation to each other, indeed even if they were far outweighed by the good, are nevertheless things that should absolutely never exist in any way, shape or form" in The World as Will and Representation.[36]: 181  The idea here is that no good can ever erase the experienced evils, because they are of a different quality or kind of importance.

Schopenhauer elaborates on the vital difference between the good and the bad, saying that, "it is fundamentally beside the point to argue whether there is more good or evil in the world: for the very existence of evil already decides the matter since it can never be cancelled out by any good that might exist alongside or after it, and cannot therefore be counterbalanced", and adding that, "even if thousands had lived in happiness and delight, this would never annul the anxiety and tortured death of a single person; and my present wellbeing does just as little to undo my earlier suffering."[36]: 591 

One way of interpreting the argument is by focusing on how one thing could compensate another. The goods can only compensate the evils, when they a) happen to the same subject, and b) happen at the same time. The reason why the good has to happen to the same subject is because the miserable cannot feel the happiness of the joyful, and hence it has no effect on him. The reason why the good has to happen at the same time is because the future joy does not act backwards in time, and so it has no effect on the present state of the suffering individual. But these conditions are not being met, and hence life is not worth living. Here, it doesn't matter whether there are any genuine positive pleasures, because since pleasures and pains are experientially separated, the evils are left unrepaid.[4][26]

Another interpretation of the negativity thesis — that goods are merely negative in character — uses metaphors of debt and repayment, and crime and punishment. Here, merely ceasing an evil does not count as paying it off, just like stopping committing a crime does not amount to making amends for it. The bad can only be compensated by something positively good, just like a crime has to be answered for by some punishment, or a debt has to be paid off by something valuable. If the good is merely taking away an evil, then it cannot compensate for the bad since it's not of the appropriate kind — it's not a positive thing that could "repay the debt" of the bad.[37]

Suffering is essential to life because of perpetual striving
Arthur Schopenhauer introduces an a priori argument for pessimism. The basis of the argument is the recognition that sentient organisms—animals—are embodied and inhabit specific niches in the environment. They struggle for their self-preservation. Striving to satisfy wants is the essence of all organic life.

Schopenhauer posits that striving is the essence of life. All striving, he argues, involves suffering. Thus, he concludes that suffering is unavoidable and inherent to existence. Given this, he says that the balance of good and bad is on the whole negative.

There are a couple of reasons why suffering is a fundamental aspect of life:

Satisfaction is elusive: organisms strive towards various things all the time. Whenever they satisfy one desire, they want something else and the striving begins anew.
Happiness is negative: while needs come to us seemingly out of themselves, we have to exert ourselves in order to experience some degree of joy. Moreover, pleasure is only ever a satisfaction—or elimination—of a particular desire. Therefore, it is only a negative experience as it temporarily takes away a striving or need.
Striving is suffering: as long as striving is not satisfied, it's being experienced as suffering.
Boredom is suffering: the lack of an object of desire is experienced as a discomforting state.[12][26]
The terminality of human life
According to Julio Cabrera's ontology, human life has a structurally negative value. Under this view, human life does not provoke discomfort in humans due to the particular events that happen in the lives of each individual, but due to the very being or nature of human existence as such. The following characteristics constitute what Cabrera calls the "terminality of being" — in other words, its structurally negative value:[38]: 23–24 

The being acquired by a human at birth is decreasing (or "decaying"), in the sense of a being that begins to end since its very emergence, following a single and irreversible direction of deterioration and decline, of which complete consummation can occur at any moment between some minutes and around one hundred years.
From the moment they come into being, humans are affected by three kinds of frictions: physical pain (in the form of illnesses, accidents, and natural catastrophes to which they are always exposed); discouragement (in the form of "lacking the will", or the "mood" or the "spirit", to continue to act, from mild taedium vitae to serious forms of depression), and finally, exposure to the aggressions of other humans (from gossip and slander to various forms of discrimination, persecution, and injustice); aggressions that we too can inflict on others (who are also submitted, like us, to the three kinds of friction).
To defend themselves against (a) and (b), human beings are equipped with mechanisms of creation of positive values (ethical, aesthetic, religious, entertaining, recreational, as well as values contained in human realizations of all kinds), which humans must keep constantly active. All positive values that appear within human life are reactive and palliative; they do not arise from the structure of life itself, but are introduced by the permanent and anxious struggle against the decaying life and its three kinds of friction, with such struggle however doomed to be defeated, at any moment, by any of the mentioned frictions or by the progressive decline of one's being.
For Cabrera, this situation is further worsened by a phenomenon he calls "moral impediment", that is, the structural impossibility of acting in the world without harming or manipulating someone at some given moment.[38]: 52  According to him, moral impediment happens not necessarily because of a moral fault in us, but due to the structural situation in which we have been placed. The positive values that are created in human life come into being within a narrow and anxious environment.[38]: 54 

Human beings are cornered by the presence of their decaying bodies as well as pain and discouragement, in a complicated and holistic web of actions, in which we are forced to quickly understand diversified social situations and take relevant decisions. It is difficult for our urgent need to build our own positive values, not to end up harming the projects of other humans who are also anxiously trying to do the same, that is, build their own positive values.[38]: 54 

Duḥkha as the mark of existence
Constant dissatisfaction — duḥkha — is an intrinsic mark of all sentient existence. All living creatures have to undergo the sufferings of birth, aging, sickness and death; want what they do not have, avoid what they do not like, and feel loss for the positive things they have lost. All of these types of striving (taṇhā) are sources of suffering, and they are not external but are rather inherent vices (such as greed, lust, envy, self-indulgence) of all living creatures.[39][14][16]: 130 

Since in Buddhism one of the central concepts is that of liberation or nirvana, this highlights the miserable character of existence, as there would be no need to make such a great effort to free oneself from a mere "less than ideal state". Since enlightenment is the goal of Buddhist practices through the Noble Eightfold Path, the value of life itself, under this perspective, appears as doubtful.[40][14][16]: 130 

The asymmetry between harms and benefits
Main article: Benatar's asymmetry argument
David Benatar argues that there is a significant difference between lack/presence of harms and benefits when comparing a situation when a person exists with a situation when said person never exists. The starting point of the argument is the following noncontroversial observation:
1. The presence of pain is bad.
2. The presence of pleasure is good.
However, the symmetry breaks when we consider the absence of pain and pleasure:
3. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

Based on the above, Benatar infers the following:

the absence of pain is better in the case where a person never exists than the presence of pain where a person does exist,
the absence of pleasure is not worse in the case where a person never exists than the presence of pleasure where a person does exists.
In short, the absence of pain is good, while the absence of pleasure is not bad. From this it follows that not coming into existence has advantages over coming into existence for the one who would be affected by coming into the world. This is the cornerstone of his argument for antinatalism — the view that coming into existence is bad.[11]: 28–59 [15]: 100–103 

Empirical differences between the pleasures and pains in life
To support his case for pessimism, Benatar mentions a series of empirical differences between the pleasures and pains in life. In a strictly temporal aspect, the most intense pleasures that can be experienced are short-lived (e.g. orgasms), whereas the most severe pains can be much more enduring, lasting for days, months, and even years.[9]: 77  The worst pains that can be experienced are also worse in quality or magnitude than the best pleasures are good, offering as an example the thought experiment of whether one would accept "an hour of the most delightful pleasures in exchange for an hour of the worst tortures".[9]: 77 

In addition to citing Schopenhauer, who made a similar argument, when asking his readers to "compare the feelings of an animal that is devouring another with those of that other";[41] the amount of time it may take for one's desires to be fulfilled, with some of our desires never being satisfied;[9]: 79  the quickness with which one's body can be injured, damaged, or fall ill, and the comparative slowness of recovery, with full recovery sometimes never being attained;[9]: 77–78  the existence of chronic pain, but the comparative non-existence of chronic pleasure;[9]: 77  the gradual and inevitable physical and mental decline to which every life is subjected through the process of ageing;[9]: 78–79  the effortless way in which the bad things in life naturally come to us, and the efforts one needs to muster in order to ward them off and obtain the good things;[9]: 80  the lack of a cosmic or transcendent meaning to human life as a whole, borrowing a term from Spinoza, according to Benatar our lives lack meaning from the perspective of the universe, that is, sub specie aeternitatis.[9]: 35–36 

Benatar concludes that, even if one argues that the bad things in life are in some sense necessary for human beings to appreciate the good things in life, or at least to appreciate them fully, he asserts that it is not clear that this appreciation requires as much bad as there is, and that our lives are worse than they would be if the bad things were not in such sense necessary.[9]: 85 

Human life would be vastly better if pain were fleeting and pleasure protracted; if the pleasures were much better than the pains were bad; if it were really difficult to be injured or get sick; if recovery were swift when injury or illness did befall us; and if our desires were fulfilled instantly and if they did not give way to new desires. Human life would also be immensely better if we lived for many thousands of years in good health and if we were much wiser, cleverer, and morally better than we are.[9]: 82–83 

*****

Defence mechanisms
Peter Wessel Zapffe viewed humans as animals with an overly developed consciousness who yearn for justice and meaning in a fundamentally meaningless and unjust universe — constantly struggling against feelings of existential dread as well as the knowledge of their own mortality. He identified four defence mechanisms that allow people to cope with disturbing thoughts about the nature of human existence:

Isolation: the troublesome facts of existence are simply repressed — they are not spoken about in public, and are not even thought about in private.

Anchoring: one fixates (anchors) oneself on cultural projects, religious beliefs, ideologies, etc.; and pursue goals appropriate to the objects of one's fixation. By dedicating oneself to a cause, one focuses one's attention on a specific value or ideal, thus achieving a communal or cultural sense of stability and safety from unsettling existential musings.

Distraction: through entertainment, career, status, etc., one distracts oneself from existentially disturbing thoughts. By constantly chasing for new pleasures, new goals, and new things to do, one is able to evade a direct confrontation against mankind's vulnerable and ill-fated situation in the cosmos.

Sublimation: artistic expression may act as a temporary means of respite from feelings of existential angst by transforming them into works of art that can be aesthetically appreciated from a distance.[44][15]: 91–94 

Non-procreation and extinction
See also: Antinatalism
Concern for those who will be coming into this world has been present throughout the history of pessimism. Notably, Arthur Schopenhauer asked:[45]: 318–319 

One should try to imagine that the act of procreation were neither a need, nor accompanied by sexual pleasure, but instead a matter of pure, rational reflection; could the human race even continue to exist? Would not everyone, on the contrary, have so much compassion for the coming generation that he would rather spare it the burden of existence, or at least refuse to take it upon himself to cold-bloodedly impose it on them?

Schopenhauer also compares life to a debt that's being collected through urgent needs and torturing wants. We live by paying off the interests on this debt by constantly satisfying the desires of life; and the entirety of such debt is contracted in procreation: when we come into the world.[36]: 595  — Wiki- Philosophical Pessimism

All that being said, these are stances, or positions, one can create a dialectic around, and not just dismiss as one's temperament.

Right, but I guess I am perplexed because no one (Ligotti or I at least) is saying that you can't make a "the worst" anticipation of a negative outcome without "making a general judgement regarding life or the world"... So I am not sure what it is this straw man you are arguing against, as no one as I see it, is claiming thus. — schopenhauer1

I think the fact a word like "pessimism" means something in ordinary discourse makes its use to describe a philosophical position inadvisable, as confusing, but say no more than that regarding philosophical pessimism at this time. In other words, I think "pessimism" as it's apparently used in philosophy is something of a misnomer. That I'm not a philosophical pessimist should be obvious, and I think I've said why that's the case already.

I think the fact a word like "pessimism" means something in ordinary discourse makes its use to describe a philosophical position inadvisable, as confusing, but say no more than that regarding philosophical pessimism at this time. In other words, I think "pessimism" as it's apparently used in philosophy is something of a misnomer. That I'm not a philosophical pessimist should be obvious, and I think I've said why that's the case already. — Ciceronianus

Should we ditch Stoicism or the descriptor of "Stoic" or Epicureanism and the descriptor of "Epicurean" for similar reasons?

Should we ditch Stoicism or the descriptor of "Stoic" or Epicureanism and the descriptor of "Epicurean" for similar reasons? — schopenhauer1

I don't know. It may be too late for that. They seem to be far older than philosophical pessimism. But Stoicism has also been called "Zenoism" or "Zenonism" after the school's founder, Zeno of Citium, and I'm not adverse to calling it either one of those names if it pleases you.

Sort of on topic, when I heard of Zapffe my initial thoughts were:

A. What makes certain things in conciousness "artificial?" What could this even mean? It seems like conciousness must include an ability to focus on some things and not others for it to be consciousness.

B. If human conciousness is such that most people who have it enjoy it, then doesn't that just show that it isn't actually that bad? The charge of "artificial" exclusion of some elements of conciousness doesn't really make sense. I don't get how focusing on what one finds relevant can ever be defined as somehow artificial or alien to consciousness.

This would seem to imply that pessimism of Zapffe's variety is defective conciousness, not that all human conciousness is defective.

A. What makes certain things in conciousness "artificial?" What could this even mean? It seems like conciousness must include an ability to focus on some things and not others for it to be consciousness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, he's not saying consciousness is artificial. Rather, he is saying we have various defense mechanisms to disallow a certain level of angst and inertia. As Ligotti put it:

As adumbrated above, Zapffe arrived at two central determinations
regarding humanity’s “biological predicament.” The first was that
consciousness had overreached the point of being a sufferable property
of our species, and to minimize this problem we must minimize our
consciousness. From the many and various ways this may be done [schop1 note: acknowledgement this is simply a model, not exhaustive],
Zapffe chose to hone in on four principal strategies.
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(1) ISOLATION. So that we may live without going into a free-fall of
trepidation, we isolate the dire facts of being alive by relegating them to a
remote compartment of our minds. They are the lunatic family members in the
attic whose existence we deny in a conspiracy of silence.
(2) ANCHORING. To stabilize our lives in the tempestuous waters of chaos,
we conspire to anchor them in metaphysical and institutional “verities”—God,
Morality, Natural Law, Country, Family—that inebriate us with a sense of
being official, authentic, and safe in our beds.
(3) DISTRACTION. To keep our minds unreflective of a world of horrors,
we distract them with a world of trifling or momentous trash. The most operant
method for furthering the conspiracy, it is in continuous employ and demands
only that people keep their eyes on the ball—or their television sets,
their government’s foreign policy, their science projects, their careers, their
place in society or the universe, etc.
(4) SUBLIMATION. That we might annul a paralyzing stage fright at what
may happen to even the soundest bodies and minds, we sublimate our fears by
making an open display of them. In the Zapffean sense, sublimation is the
rarest technique utilized for conspiring against the human race. Putting into
play both deviousness and skill, this is what thinkers and artistic types do when
they recycle the most demoralizing and unnerving aspects of life as works in
which the worst fortunes of humanity are presented in a stylized and removed
manner as entertainment. In so many words, these thinkers and artistic types
confect products that provide an escape from our suffering by a bogus
simulation of it—a tragic drama or philosophical woolgathering, for instance.
Zapffe uses “The Last Messiah” to showcase how a literary-philosophical
composition cannot perturb its creator or anyone else with the severity of trueto-life horrors but only provide a pale representation of these horrors, just as a
King Lear’s weep-
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ing for his dead daughter Cordelia cannot rend its audience with the throes of
the real thing.
By watchful practice of the above connivances, we may keep ourselves
from scrutinizing too assiduously the startling and dreadful mishaps that
may befall us. These must come as a surprise, for if we expected them
then the conspiracy could not work its magic. Naturally, conspiracy
theories seldom pique the curiosity of “right-minded” individuals and are
met with disbelief and denial when they do. Best to immunize your
consciousness from any thoughts that are startling and dreadful so that
we can all go on conspiring to survive and reproduce as paradoxical
beings—puppets that can walk and talk all by themselves. At worst keep
your startling and dreadful thoughts to yourself. Hearken well: “None of
us wants to hear spoken the exact anxieties we keep locked up inside
ourselves. Smother that urge to go spreading news of your pain and
nightmares around town. Bury your dead but don’t leave a trace. And be
sure to get on with things.[ schop1 note: This is Ligotti playing the optimistic interlocutor again.. to be read with heavy dose of cynicism of course ] — Ligotti- CATHR

So these "connivances" Ligotti, characterizes as "conspiracies" (something humans learn presumably), psychological conceits we must internalize in order we make sure we "get on with things". We couldn't get on with things if we self-reflected on the situation too much.

B. If human conciousness is such that most people who have it enjoy it, then doesn't that just show that it isn't actually that bad? The charge of "artificial" exclusion of some elements of conciousness doesn't really make sense. I don't get how focusing on what one finds relevant can ever be defined as somehow artificial or alien to consciousness.

This would seem to imply that pessimism of Zapffe's variety is defective conciousness, not that all human conciousness is defective. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No rather, he is claiming that various negative feelings that go along with having a human (self-reflective) consciousness, are kept "at bay" by these mechanisms.

Look again at the mechanisms. "How is it that we are NOT doing these things?", is the more appropriate question. Going hand-in-hand with this, is what I said here:

Modern man has made it about as you said "sucking the marrow out of life" by accumulating (and projecting) being at the peak of something (well, when everyone isn't as you say "distracting themselves with social media"). That is to say, if you notice, everyone wants to project the same intense experiences... TRAVEL (the more exotic the better, so better have some obscure African/Asian/South American destination there too), OUTDOORS (better show pictures at X landmark and showed you really struggled to get there in an arduous hike), EVENTS (concerts, political rallies, whatever), EXTREME stuff (fast X.. cars, trains, planes, rides, adventure stuff), or simply playing games (electronic or analog) markers like this. I can try to tie this in to the commodification of human experience, but I am not really trying to do that. Rather, I am just showcasing the struggle for humans to come up with modern ways to inject meaning. Thus, sporting, games, hobbies, travel, and various experiences become the default for modern man to hang their hat on. But, as you said, it doesn't make a difference. As I stated this represents:

and then at the top is supposedly "self-actualization", which I gather to be "peak experiences". One is being true to one's values (Nietzschean-esque).. I imagine the world-travelling, hobbyist, sports-enthusiast, mountain-climbing, civic duty participating, citizen, supposedly reveling in the balance between skill, challenge, preference, and aptitude.. The perfect balancer of personal interests and social interests.. Flow states are had readily and easily. One is able to express one's talents, etc.
— schopenhauer1

They are all doing what Zapffe explained (ignoring, isolating, anchoring, and sublimating). — schopenhauer1

Edit: Look where I bolded Ligotti (commenting on Zapffe), as that addresses your objection, more-or-less.

I'm still finding the OP and attempts to justify it totally nonsensical. I'm really trying here...

I'm still finding the OP and attempts to justify it totally nonsensical. I'm really trying here... — AmadeusD

A momentously unnecessary post then.

And I'm fine with that. Stands to reason, given the thread :smirk:

Isn't this sort of like saying "man's over evolved eyes are a curse upon him. If man didn't constantly constrict his pupils to block out the incoming light, he would be overwhelmed."

...well yeah, the pupil (sublimation/distraction/etc.) is part of the eye (consciousness). They are part of one whole that evolved together. Light is good, it lets us see. Too much light is bad, it hurts and fries your photoreceptors. A pupil is a good thing. It isn't "running away from the truth of how much light is in the room," to have your pupil constrict, just like the release of endorphins isn't some sort of "illusion-making to hide the real levels of pain in the body." The "real level of pain," is determined, in part, by the endorphins.

They are all part of the same whole. There is no "true level" of human misery and suffering that we can discover by "cutting through illusion."

They are all part of the same whole. There is no "true level" of human misery and suffering that we can discover by "cutting through illusion." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Exactly! And it is arguable that pessimism and optimism are both basically dispositional, and as I said earlier, even that they are determined by brain chemistry, which varies from person to person.

Pessimism might better be called something like 'Life Disvalueism', where the basic idea is that life not only has no intrinsic positive value but actually has a negative intrinsic value. I would agree that life has no intrinsic positive value, but I also think it is nonsensical to claim that it has negative intrinsic value.

Some argue that if life has no overarching purpose that it follows that it has a negative intrinsic value, but I think it is arguable that having no overarching purpose is a positive thing, in that it allows us to be free to create our own purposes, rather than submitting to an imposed purpose or else suffer punishment, karmic consequences and so on.

Of course, even so-called overarching purposes are culturally imposed, since they are matters of faith, not something which could be obvious to any unbiased or free minded individual.