It is "logically necessary" to "begin counting" somewhere in a beginning-less sequence just as it is to be standing somewhere on the Earth's surface — 180 Proof

I don’t think this is an apt analogy. Counting is a process, standing isn’t.

Obviously someone can simply speak a single number without having spoken any smaller number first.

I’m specifically addressing the case of saying that, as of right now, I have already counted all the negative integers in order.

Counting is a process, standing isn’t. — Michael

Silly semantics. :roll:

I’ll be clearer then.

To stand where I am now I don’t have to have stood in every adjacent space behind me first. I am simply born at a particular place (the start) and travel from there.

This is very unlike having counted every negative integer in order, which strikes me as being nonsensical.

Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary" in ontology (topology or cosmology) though, of course, they are possible. — 180 Proof

Let me word it another way. We don't know if the universe has infinite causality or not, that's not what I'm claiming. Lets look at it in sets.

A. The set of all causes from point A until a finite beginning.
B. The set of all causes from Point A infinitely regressive.
C. The set of all causes from Point A until it loops to Point A again.

The question is not, "Which set is correct?" The question is, "Do we find a finite limit to prior causality?"

And we do. What caused the set? Put in set A, B, C, or any other crazy idea someone comes up with. What caused that set to be instead of some other set? If we look for a prior explanation, by our sets, there is none. There is no prior reason why the universe would be finitely or infinitely regressive.

A first cause is simply defined as "That which exists without any prior causality for its existence." All sets come to this point. Meaning that all sets do not have a prior cause for their existence. Meaning they simply exist, there is no prior reason why the set is besides the fact that it is. This is ontologically necessary.

To avoid any implications you believe I'm going with this, this is all I'm claiming here. There is no requirement that anything be designed by a consciousness or with intent. I'm just noting that it is logically concluded that no matter what, the ultimate causality of the universe will always result in the answer that there is no prior explanation for its existence.

Correct. Which is why when we reach a point in any chain of causality where there is no prior causality for its existence, 'it simply is', that we've reached the first cause from which the rest of the chain or set follows
— Philosophim

I'm not sure you're even reading what I'm writing. — Michael

My apologies if I'm not understanding your point. What did I miss?

My apologies if I'm not understanding your point. What did I miss? — Philosophim

These are the options you gave:

a. There is always a X for every Y. (infinite prior causality).
b. The X/Y causal chain eventually wraps back to Y/X (infinitely looped causality)
c. There comes a time within a causal chain when there is only Y, and nothing prior to Y. This Y is Alpha. (first cause)

You then ask:

"Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence?"

I am suggesting that perhaps there is no answer. Perhaps it is simply a brute fact that there is always a X for every Y, or simply a brute fact that the X/Y causal chain eventually wraps back to Y/X. This is simply where the explanation ends.

So it is simply a brute fact that there is no first cause.

c. There comes a time within a causal chain when there is only Y, and nothing prior to Y. This Y is Alpha. (first cause)

You then ask:

"Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence?"

I am suggesting that perhaps there is no answer. — Michael

That is exactly what I'm agreeing with. And if there is no prior cause for its existence, point c notes that this is the first cause. It exists without prior explanation for its being.

That is exactly what I'm agreeing with. And if there is no prior cause for its existence, point c notes that this is the first cause. It exists without prior explanation for its being. — Philosophim

You're saying that if either a) or b) is true then c) is true. This makes no sense. If either a) or b) is true then c) is false.

You're saying that id either a) or b) is true then c) is true. This makes no sense. If either a) or b) is true then c) is false. — Michael

Take the set of all regressive causality, A.
What prior existence caused A to be?
There is nothing, A is A because it exists. Thus it exists without a prior explanation for its being, and is thus a first cause.

Take the set of all regressive causality, A.
What prior existence caused A to be?
There is nothing, A is A because it exists. Thus it exists without a prior explanation for its being, and is thus a first cause. — Philosophim

You're saying that the set of all causes is itself a cause. This is a category error. The set itself doesn't cause anything and so isn't a cause. The term "cause" refers to the members of the set, not the set itself.

Your argument is akin to saying that the set of all integers is the first number. It makes no sense.

You're saying that the set of all causes is itself a cause. This is a category error. The set itself doesn't cause anything and so isn't a cause. The term "cause" refers to the members of the set, not the set itself. — Michael

No, I'm saying when you examine the entire set of regressive causality and ask, "What caused everything to be infinitely regressive?" there is no prior cause. It exactly the same as taking a set of finite regressive causality and asking, "What caused everything to be finitely regressive?"

The answer is the same. There is no prior reason for its being, therefore, it just is. This is the first cause for all chains of causality.

No, I'm saying when you examine the entire set of regressive causality and ask, "What caused everything to be infinitely regressive?" there is no prior cause. It exactly the same as taking a set of finite regressive causality and asking, "What caused everything to be finitely regressive?"

The answer is the same. There is no prior reason for its being, therefore, it just is. This is the first cause for all chains of causality. — Philosophim

So you're saying that there is both an infinite regress of causes and that there is a first cause. Do you not see the contradiction?

So you're saying that there is both an infinite regress of causes and that there is a first cause. Do you not see the contradiction? — Michael

No. But maybe I'm wrong. Can you answer this question: "What caused there to be infinite regressive causality?" Remember the answer that I gave to finite causality. "It just is, there is no prior explanation for its being." Is your answer different?

This is very ambiguous.

There is a distance between the base of a mountain and its peak even if we never measure it. — Michael

It is you who is being ambiguous, with your use of "distance". If the word is meant to signify that there is a separation between the base of the mountain and the peak, that is self-evident. But if the word is meant to signify that this separation has a specific value, number of feet, meters, or whatever, without being measured, then this cannot be true. How do you think it is possible that there is a specific value attached to this separation if no one has actually done the work of assigning that value?

Unless you want to argue that space itself is some sort of "mental fabrication"? An idealist might agree with you. A materialist (or dualist) won't. — Michael

Obviously, "space" is a "mental fabrication". What do you think space is, something we can stick a tape measure beside and say how long it is, or that we can weigh and say how heavy it is? I am dualist, and that space is a mental fabrication is indubitable. Also, a materialist would have to say the same, because "space" could not refer to any type of material, and the materialist thinks that any thing which is not imaginary is material. So your statement makes no sense.

It is "logically necessary" to "begin counting" somewhere in a beginning-less sequence just as it is to be standing somewhere on the Earth's surface. Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary" in ontology (topology or cosmology) though, of course, they are possible. — 180 Proof

How is this not contradictory to your mind? You say first, a beginning is necessary, it is logically necessary to begin somewhere, but then you proceed to say that beginnings are not logically necessary, they are possible. Can you explain to me what you mean, in a way which would make the apparent contradiction between 'it is logically necessary to begin somewhere', and 'beginnings are not logically necessary' disappear?

You say first, a beginning is necessary, it is logically necessary to begin somewhere, but then you proceed to say that beginnings are not logically necessary, they are possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

This sloppy misquotation, MU, shows why you (willfully) misunderstand my position.

Sorry, but there is no willful misunderstanding. What you said simply makes not sense.

It is "logically necessary" to "begin counting" somewhere...

Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary".... — 180 Proof

I ask you, how can you demonstrate that beginnings are not logically necessary, when you start from the premise that it is logically necessary to begin counting somewhere? Counting is an activity. If this activity requires a beginning, then by what premise do you conclude that other activities might occur without a beginning?

You have absolutely no logic which supports your stated conclusion ("Thus, beginnings, or "first causes", are demonstrably not "logically necessary" in ontology [topology or cosmology] though, of course, they are possible.). In fact, your premise contradicts your conclusion.

:roll: If you say do ...

If the past is infinite then the present is the end of an infinite sequence of events. An infinite sequence of events has no end. Therefore, the past is not infinite. — Michael

As a counterexample see my mathematical example. It has a front end but no past end.

It is you who is being ambiguous, with your use of "distance". If the word is meant to signify that there is a separation between the base of the mountain and the peak, that is self-evident. But if the word is meant to signify that this separation has a specific value, number of feet, meters, or whatever, without being measured, then this cannot be true. How do you think it is possible that there is a specific value attached to this separation if no one has actually done the work of assigning that value? — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you read the next part of my comment where I said "that the distance of one mountain is given the label '8,849 m' is a consequence of our measurement"?

Obviously, "space" is a "mental fabrication". — Metaphysician Undercover

It's certainly not "obvious". Space is often thought of as being mind-independent, notably by scientific realists, and I suspect also most laymen. Idealists, scientific instrumentalists, and Kantians may think differently, but such positions are not self-evident.

Also, a materialist would have to say the same, because "space" could not refer to any type of material. — Metaphysician Undercover

I should note that I use "materialism" and "physicalism" interchangeably, and that physicalism "encompasses matter, but also energy, physical laws, space, time, structure, physical processes, information, state, and forces, among other things."

No. But maybe I'm wrong. Can you answer this question: "What caused there to be infinite regressive causality?" Remember the answer that I gave to finite causality. "It just is, there is no prior explanation for its being." Is your answer different? — Philosophim

The answer is the same: "it just is; there is no prior explanation for why causation is an infinite regress".

What I take issue with is your claim that this then entails that there is a first cause. That is clearly a contradiction, as it cannot be both that causation is an infinite regress and that there is a first cause.

You appear to conflate "brute fact" and "first cause". As I mentioned in my first comment, that explanations end isn't that causation starts.

This "brute" existence of an infinite regress isn't itself a cause, let alone a first cause. Again, it's like saying that the set of all integers is itself an integer.

As a counterexample see my mathematical example. — jgill

Where?

But note that I specifically said that "an infinite sequence of events has no end". I didn't say that "an infinite series has no end".

And as I also mentioned in that previous comment, there's a difference between saying that there is no first number and saying that there is no first counted number.

The actual act of counting the integers has to start somewhere, and each second of passed time (at least assuming an A series concept of time) is an act of counting.

Did you read the next part of my comment where I said "that the distance of one mountain is given the label '8,849 m' is a consequence of our measurement"? — Michael

Yes I read that, and it is why I accused you of being ambiguous with "distance". In the first sentence you said there is a distance "even if we never measure it". In the following statement you gave the distance a number. The number you designate as the "label" of the "distance", but this is only produced as a consequence of measurement, as you agree. The ambiguity is that in the first sentence "distance" as referring to something which exists independent of measurement, refers to something extremely vague and general. In the second use, the "label" refers to a specific value, which requires measurement. The thing labeled as the "distance" is a specific value, whereas the "distance" in the first instance is a general unspecified separation. This ambiguity invites equivocation, such that one might think that "distance" is used in the same way both times, so that "distance" as the specific value which is dependent on measurement is the same as "distance" in the sense of the vague and general separation between the two things which is supposed to be independent from measurement.

It's certainly not "obvious". Space is often thought of as being mind-independent, notably by scientific realists, and I suspect also most laymen. Idealists, scientific instrumentalists, and Kantians may think differently, but such positions are not self-evident. — Michael

I have to disagree with this. I believe the idea that "space" as independent came about from the union of space and time, in the concept of space-time. So the mind-independent substance believed in by scientific realists is not "space" per se, but "space-time".

This is an important distinction to make, because classically "space" was a static medium designated by the coordinate system employed by geometers. Since it was logically necessarily to think of space as static, to prevent the principles of geometry from changing randomly, it was known by geometers to be separate, distinct from the real world within which things are continually changing. It was an eternal ideal. So it was clear and obvious to the scientifically minded, that space was a mind-dependent ideal.

However, extending way back to ancient times there was significant difficulty in understanding the reality of motion. Ancient Greeks, I believe the atomists, demonstrated logically that unless there was some sort of empty space, "void", motion would be impossible. Every piece of matter would be contiguous with other matter and nothing could move anywhere. This produced the need to assume an independent "space". But since this "space" is independent of the mental constructs which describe the "space" that makes up the volume of an object, describing instead the space between objects, an incompatibility between the two senses of "space" was created. The "space" of an object which accounted for the static unchangingness of the object, and the "space" between an object which accounted for the activities of things.

The conclusion we can draw, is that what is referred to as "space-time", as the supposedly real and independent substance, (the concept which supports the real motion of objects), is fundamentally incompatible with our conceptions of "space", which is an ideal constructed and used in coordinate systems. This is why fundamental axioms of "space", like Euclid's parallel postulate are found to be inconsistent with the concept of "space-time", and those realists you refer to turn to non-Euclidian space. "Space-time" is what is supposed to be real, not "space".

I should note that I use "materialism" and "physicalism" interchangeably, and that physicalism "encompasses matter, but also energy, physical laws, space, time, structure, physical processes, information, state, and forces, among other things." — Michael

Notice, that by including "energy" "time", "physical processes", you are no longer talking about "space". You are talking about "space-time" which is fundamentally different, and as explained above, incompatible with "space". So when you make an argument concerning "space", and you allow that "space" refers to what is known as space-time, you produce significant ambiguity, most likely resulting in an equivocal conclusion.

Yes I read that, and it is why I accused you of being ambiguous with "distance". In the first sentence you said there is a distance "even if we never measure it". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, which is to say that the base and the peak do not occupy the same position in space. The space between them is called distance.

That there is distance between the base and the peak is measurement-independent. It's certainly not the case that the base and the peak are touching until we look at the mountain.

That this distance is described as being "8,000m" or as being "26,246.72 feet" is measurement- and language-dependent.

I'm not sure why you felt the need to explain the latter fact. I'm not sure how it's exactly relevant.

The answer is the same: "it just is; there is no prior explanation for why causation is an infinite regress". — Michael

That is the entire point of the OP. As long as we agree on that, we're all good.

What I take issue with is your claim that this then entails that there is a first cause. That is clearly a contradiction, as it cannot be both that causation is an infinite regress and that there is a first cause. — Michael

I'll tell you a secret. I wrote this over two years with an intended purpose: to get the atheists and theists in here to think. If I remember at the time, there were a rash of 'proof of God' posts. I found that some atheists would go in very disrespectfully and mock the theists. Then I found some atheists would go in gently and respectfully, but be mocked by some theists. The point was, people stopped thinking. This was to make a place where theists and atheists could be disarmed for a second. Instead of being concerned about proving or not proving God, I wanted them to really think about the origins of the universe for a second to see if they could come to a logical conclusion.

I use the phrase "first cause", but its just a phrase to get people into the discussion. The phrase isn't all that important honestly, its the underlying logic and lesson that I wanted you to learn. Call it whatever you want, I don't care. The phrase 'first cause' sure got some passions up though didn't it? It got clicks and people discussing. It was something I learned back on the internet to make sure my conversations didn't die without being seen.

Would I have written it the same way today? Maybe, maybe not. I can't argue with the results, and I wonder how many people would have never stepped into the conversation had I not phrased it that way.

You appear to conflate "brute fact" and "first cause". As I mentioned in my first comment, that explanations end isn't that causation starts. — Michael

A better word that's probably more palatable than the emotionally laden and anxiety inducing, 'first cause', is 'origin'. The origin of the universe is unexplained. It had no rules for why it should or should not have form. "It simply is". But, something to consider. If there is no prior reason for the way the universe is now, there were no rules as to what could or could have formed. You can't say there were rules, as that would mean there was some prior limitation. Which means we've proven that "something can form within nothing'.

What does this mean? Without knowing the origins of the universe, anything could have happened. I actually tried to rope in the odds of a God one time. Its possible, but pretty low. Long story short, there's no cardinality so its 1 infinity out of an infinity of infinities. Its no more likely to happen than any other crazy thing you can think of. What's fascinating to me about this is that there is no reason why 'anything could happen' could not happen again. There's a little bit of math that we might be able to show cardinality for that would demonstrate it magnitudes more likely that incredibly small and simple things would randomly appear instead of larger and more complex things. But I believe that we can logically embrace a cosmology where things can be without a prior reason for their existence, and start thinking about the consequences of this. Its not even simply a possibility, its a logical necessity.

I'll tell you a secret. I wrote this over two years with an intended purpose: to get the atheists and theists in here to think. — Philosophim

I had assumed that this was what it was. Of course, it's a non sequitur to go from "there is a first cause" to "this first cause is an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, intelligent designer who gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life". But as you didn't make the claim I didn't bring it up. If you want to make this claim now then, well, it's a non sequitur.

Any supposed "first cause" might simply be an initial singularity of infinite temperature and density that then expanded.

Of course, it's a non sequitur to go from "there is a first cause" to "this first cause is an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, intelligent designer who gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life". — Michael

Absolutely. Not that its not possible, but the chance would be so low that its statistically insignificant. Also, its just as equally statistically insignificant that an 'All-bad, dumb designer who snatched his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should perish, and have eternal death." formed instead. The reality is that we cannot look to the idea that everything is possible and say that any one thing, "Must have formed". The only way to tell what must have formed is to look at the results. Evidence is the only thing that can tell us how the universe formed.

Any supposed "first cause" might simply be an initial singularity of infinite temperature and density that then expanded. — Michael

It very well could be! The idea that I'm putting forward should never stop us from exploring the universe's origins, even if there may come a time when there really is nothing prior.

Is this a correct paraphrase of your response to Philosophim’s thesis: spacetime, an unbounded, finite, beginning-less phenomenon, requires an arbitrary starting point re: sequential processes. It can be considered a “working” starting point, but there’s no logical necessity guiding the choice of a particular starting point.

Is this a correct paraphrase of your response to Philosophim’s thesis: spacetime, an unbounded, finite, beginning-less phenomenon, requires an arbitrary starting point re: sequential processes. It can be considered a “working” starting point, but there’s no logical necessity guiding the choice of a particular starting point. — ucarr

Okay, more or less. Dynamic models "require" initial conditions but what they model (e.g. the univerde) does not. In other words, wouldn't you agree we ought not mistake the maps we make for the territory itself?

…we ought not mistake the maps we make for the territory itself? — 180 Proof

You’re citing the sign/referent relationship?

If you say so. Epistemology, not semiotics ... but whatever floats your boat.

…requires an arbitrary starting point re: sequential processes. It can be considered a “working” starting point, but there’s no logical — 180 Proof

Why do you line out “an arbitrary starting point for a sequential process”?

A starting point not logically necessary = a starting point arbitrary. Agree or disagree?

Logic is rooted in sequentiality, thus arbitrary starting points, such as the axioms of the scientific method, being pre-sequential, are also pre-logical. Agree or disagree?

Axioms have no logical support. Agree or disagree?

Referents without beginnings have models without beginnings. This is a simplification of saying: Referents without beginnings have models no less arbitrary than themselves. Agree or disagree?