It is simply that that substrate of substance is that substrate and not another. — schopenhauer1

Now you have lost me completely. What is the substrate of a substance?

No, at birth one is just that which has the potential to experience, the arrival has no memories which constitute identity. — boagie

I find that a rather surprising claim. Don't babies experience things from the moment they are born, if not before?
A baby is experiencing things as soon as it is conscious, so it is acquiring memories from the moment it is conscious. In fact, we could say that being born is the moment when experience - and memory - begin, but I'm not sure that there is a sharp division between conscious and non-conscious.
But we are talking about physical continuity as an element in personal identity - at least, I think we are. I wouldn't deny for a moment that consciousness (including memory) is also necessary. But that doesn't raise the same problems.

Now you have lost me completely. What is the substrate of a substance? — Ludwig V

That individual substance is bracketed as its own thing and not another instance of similar substance.
OR
That set of gametes is its own thing and not another instance of a set of gametes.

The fact that it is that set of gametes is the crucial aspect of the matter, is what I am saying by "causal historical".

The fetus in the womb is a functional part of the mother, its environment like other aspects of the mother's biology is relative to the whole/ the mother. The fetus is not an independent entity, it's experience is being part of the mother and being nurtured as part of the mother. Do the organs of the mothers body have identity, perhaps, in which case so would the fetus, but what would that identity be, if not in its context, the mother? You stated, an infant experiences as soon as it is born, true, but what is it experiencing, it is experiencing its context, and context defines, experience of context gives identity. The distinction of consciousness and the state of it before birth is just a different context, the mother, and again context defines, what it was before birth, is its mother.

I have myself experienced life without identity/memory for brief but repeated intervals; which only means the absence of the knowledge of context. There is something, however, in just the experience of being alive, one is vitally alive, and one is a naked I, that which experiences, there is a brief sense of relief in not knowing who you are, that you do not realize until the memory thus the context and definition of you comes flooding back into your consciousness. Being without memory simply restarts a process of identity formation if the previous life experience is lost forever, what is the song, " We are the world?", for the world is our greater context.

But a symbol is always a symbol of something and a representation is always a representation of something. But in the case of mental states, we have no access to the "something" in either case — Ludwig V

Yes, I think the causes of sensation are inherently underdetermined, indeterminate. There is no inherent fact of the matter of what they mean or represent in reference to some external context.


""

The problem with taking this as conveying information about the specific physical structures of stimuli beyond the organism's sensory boundary is that the only thing sufficient for this process is the receptor perturbation, regardless of what caused that perturbation. All that is required is the presence of something sufficiently stimulating and eventually this results in action potentials that communicate information to the brain through action potentials: membrane depolarizations with stereotyped amplitudes and time-courses. Effectively, the only information the brain can receive are one-dimensional signals denoting the presence of some stimuli as distinct from the presence of others. By having different neurons whose firings are statistically independent, in the sense that they have been specialized to receive signals from some stimuli independently of others, signals do not get confused. However, given that all of the different types of receptor cells use the same form of membrane potential signaling, neither we nor the brain can in principle identify the cause of membrane activation by just looking at the nature of the membrane activation.

We have real life examples of this underdetermination. In nature, spurious signaling has been known to occur such that thermal fluctuations in the retina can cause perceptions that are indistinguishable from flashes of light in the dark. Rhodopsin which is used for detecting light in human retinal rod cells is in fact used as a means for light-independent thermosensation in fruit flies. Therefore, not only could an unidentified receptor cell's membrane activation be conceivably caused by any type of receptor interaction, the change at a given type of receptor could be caused by alternative possibilities. It's well documented how neuroscientists can even stimulate sensory receptors or downstream neurons to artificially produce sensations. In one radical case:


Paper - Embedding a Panoramic Representation of Infrared Light in the Adult Rat Somatosensory Cortex through a Sensory Neuroprosthesis; 2016.


Rats were fitted with prosthetic infrared sensors that sent signals directly into the whisker parts of the somatosensory cortex, allowing them to distinguish sources of infrared light in their environment. While the rats eventually learned to be able to discriminate between sources of infrared light and touch, they initially seemed to perceive infrared light sources as somatic whisker sensations. It is clear that given the initial confusion, the downstream neuronal architectures are incapable of discriminating the stimuli purely in virtue of the nature of the external causes of stimulation, whether from somatic vibrations or infrared light. Whether communicated through organic somatosensory afferents rooted in vibrations, electrodes from prosthetic infrared sensors or even re-routing of other modalities into the somatosensory cortex, all information is communicated via the same manner of membrane stimulation. What distinguishes the different sources of information is not anything inherent about their physical causes, but the statistical properties of the patterns of the homogeneous one-dimensional signals which are generated by those causes. These are in some sense incidental to those causes; neurons can perform blind-source separation on these signals but in theory those signals can be artificially mimicked like in a brain-in-vat type scenario. Given that the physical causes of signaling are underdetermined and the way that these signals can only convey a one-dimensional signal about the presence of something, we might see the information communicated as having no explicit notion of representational content beyond their binary states ("bits") of activation or silence. In a sense, the possible repertoire of states that can be generated by these "bits" is what actually gives the possible contents of experiences, independent of and irreducible to the extrinsic causes of those states. Insofar as different patterns or combinations of these states can directly cause distinct downstream responses, these contents then become actionable or usable and might be considered to have meaning in the context of other states.

No measurements are inherently capable of identifying what is being measured without the external observer having prior knowledge about what is being measured or how to interpret the outcomes; without something like an external observer role who assigns meaning to the membrane potential signals and then uses them appropriately, reducibility to the physical causes of sensory activation as we know them is not a given. Such semantic ambivalence is even implied in information theory, as stated by its most preeminent founder, Claude Shannon:

"The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages. The system must be designed to operate for each possible selection, not just the one which will actually be chosen since this is unknown at the time of design."

""

(Taken very out of context from https://hl99hl99.blogspot.com/2023/06/the-impossibility-of-reduction.html?m=1 which looking back on it I regard as unfinished and in need of lots of editing.)


'Meaning' is a superficial but maybe useful/intuitive idealization that does not fully reflect how cognition and brains work - purely mechanistic enaction or transformation between brain states (not representations). It is about predictive mechanisms in neurons from which sensori-motor loops emerge, about cause and effect. I would say experiences are like a coarse-graining of the structure of brain dynamics.

Nice article:

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30714889/

Nice quote:

"Knowing is the process of dynamic assembly across multileveled systems in the service of a task. We do not need to invoke represented constructs such as “object” or “extended in space and time” outside the moment of knowing. Knowing, just like action, is the momentary product of a dynamic system, not a dissociable cause of action.... We think to act. Thus, knowing may begin as and always be an inherently sensorimotor act."

(quote from Dynamic Systems Theories - Esther Thelen, Linda Smith - Handbook of Child Psychology, Sixth Edition, Volume One: Theoretical Models of Human Development; 2006)

Important to recognize is that any input-output configuration relating one (set of) neuron(s) can be seen as a sensori-motor configuration in itself. There is a nesting of sensori-motor loops on different scales. We might consider even eco-systems as behaving as if it were a big sensori-motor loop in some ways. Then we have individual humans, brains, neuronal systems inside a brain at different scales. It even gets smaller than a neuron, on the scale of the dendrite where signals propagate and interact along the membrane in terms of excitation/inhibition/modulation.

Efficient coding should be syllopsistic and action-oriented -

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4010728/

https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.09063

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0006899321004352#b0340

https://direct.mit.edu/isal/proceedings/isal2020/32/121/98428

That's very interesting. The causal theory of perception is obviously simplistic, just for the reasons you give here. But equally, it's obvious that organisms can learn to differentiate signals by the "sensori-motor loop". At least, I think that's what you are saying.

But here's where I find I'm tempted - the rats who have their whiskers enhanced are getting a new signal and unsurprisingly assume it is something familiar. But then they learn to distinguish the new signals and what they mean from the old signals and what they mean. Fine. But what's that like?

I've heard of people who have grafted new or enhanced sensory capacities into their nervous system. If I've remembered right, the most that they say is that they do get a recognizably new signal, which they describe as tingling or itching. I've not seen a detailed account of how they learn to interpret the signal and experience it directly as - what?

But thank you very much for the post.

What do you mean by "syllopsistic"?

But equally, it's obvious that organisms can learn to differentiate signals by the "sensori-motor loop". — Ludwig V

Yes, just that representations and symbols are not fundamental nor necessary to this picture.

But what's that like? — Ludwig V

Yup, thats the big mystery. I just fall on the position that that kind of thing is just outside the realm of explanation, description, anything. I can only assume that my experiences are what it's like to be certain kinds of structure in the world around the vicinity of the brain. Our models don't capture phenomenal experience but they are just that - models, not reality - I don't think they capture intrinsic ontology at all, nor do they carve out objective boundaries for ontologies. As you say, we prod and nature prods back, and all the proding can be done in various different purviews or perspectives.

What do you mean by "syllopsistic"? — Ludwig V

Often the way that it is looked at is that Brains are doing inference so that their models optimally match what it's like in the outside world. But obviously a non-representational view isn't about that nor does the brain ever have access to that to know if it is right or not and it cannot know in principle. I guess I just mean talking about things like efficient coding without needing to explicitly refer to objects outside the head (in the sense that the brain is trying to match some kind of representations to something it doesn't have access to).

I'm sorry I didn't notice your reply for so lon

nor does the brain ever have access to that to know if it is right or not and it cannot know in principle — Apustimelogist

Maybe we can say that it works on the reward principle, not on some reality principle. (But reward has to be interpreted generously - I mean that avoidance of pain is a reward, as well as the gaining of pleasure - in a generous sense of pleasure.

I guess I just mean talking about things like efficient coding without needing to explicitly refer to objects outside the head — Apustimelogist

One would need to construct a criterion of efficiency that was "internal" to the way that coding works - i.e. with as little wasted effort as possible. No doubt it would have to link to the reward cycle.

I just fall on the position that that kind of thing is just outside the realm of explanation, description, anything — Apustimelogist

That's what many people seem to do. But (and perhaps I should have mentioned this before) that seems to me to be a reason for saying that the question is malformed; it suggests something to us which turns out to be impossible. In other words, it is mystery-mongering - an illusion.

OK. Forget the business about DNA. There are many people in my life who I meet only sporadically. I don't know what happens to them when I'm not there; I may or may not have sporadic second-hand information about what has happened to them. When I meet them, how do I know they are the same person? (You can stipulate, if you like, that I assume that there is, in fact, a continuous causal history covering the time when I was not there. I will stipulate that I don't know what that history is.) — Ludwig V

Do you recognize them as being the same person? You might assume a "causal history", even without (obviously) being able to know the details—but does that matter? Surely if there has been a causal history, then there has been a causal history and that fact is not dependent on your knowing it, knowing its details, or on you assuming it .

Of course, you could be mistaken, there might have been no causal history, but that would mean they are not the person you thought they were, merely someone who resembles them. That would probably be pretty unlikely, though, if they were able to recount details about your shared past that you had good reason to believe only the person you thought they were could know.

@Ludwig V

I have not fully kept up with the most recent posts/discussions in here, but I saw the word "supervenience" and thought it might help in this case convey my point better.

That is to say, a particular person's identity is not equivalent to the gametes, but it must by necessity supervene onto the set of gametes. Why?

In causo-historical terms, there was this set of gametes that are the terminus when looking back at how far back one may go before any actualized version of you would have changed if prior circumstances had changed. After this event, if everything happened as it had, YOU would be the person you are. However, if ANYTHING had changed related to the meeting of those gametes, YOU would not even exist, even if there was a person created by a similar set of gametes and had a life that was quite similar.

Surely if there has been a causal history, then there has been a causal history and that fact is not dependent on your knowing it, knowing its details, or on you assuming it . — Janus

Wouldn't that be a metaphysical or ontological identity? It's no help when I bump into a long-lost friend. My point is that how I know is also an important question. I have a feeling that I usually assume that there is a causal thread, but very rarely know what it is. Perhaps it's not really relevant to my life.

In causo-historical terms, there was this set of gametes that are the terminus when looking back at how far back one may go before any actualized version of you would have changed if prior circumstances had changed. — schopenhauer1

You are assuming that the individual who grows from the DNA will be the same individual no matter what happens. But, in the first place, it doesn't follow that any individual will grow from that specific DNA, and it certainly doesn't follow that any particular individual will grow from that DNA. If my mother had suffered a deficiency of folic acid while that DNA was growing inside her, the resulting baby would have been born with spina bifida. I cannot imagine that. Therefore that person would not have been me. My family were middle class. If they had been working class, their children would have developed differently. Would they have been the same people? No clear answer.

You are assuming that the individual who grows from the DNA will be the same individual no matter what happens. But, in the first place, it doesn't follow that any individual will grow from that specific DNA, and it certainly doesn't follow that any particular individual will grow from that DNA. If my mother had suffered a deficiency of folic acid while that DNA was growing inside her, the resulting baby would have been born with spina bifida. I cannot imagine that. Therefore that person would not have been me. My family were middle class. If they had been working class, their children would have developed differently. Would they have been the same people? No clear answer. — Ludwig V

So that's not necessarily the case. I think the interesting feature of my argument is that all that has to matter is the case that you actually have a causal-history (which we all do), and that actualized causal-history represents your life currently. Your current life supervenes on a pair of gametes, and no other. Any other pair of gametes would not even have lead to the possibility of this actualized existence, therefore, your identity necessitates the supervenience onto this and causal-historical circumstances and set of gametes.

I think the interesting feature of my argument is that all that has to matter is the case that you actually have a causal-history (which we all do), and that actualized causal-history represents your life currently. — schopenhauer1

I agree that does matter. But it does not mean that my life began my DNA was formed. I've tried endlessly to make a discussion with you, but you endlessly repeat the same doctrine, as you did in the message you sent to me on the Ryle thread. So I don't know what to say to you. But I do know that this non-discussion is getting boring. I don't have anything more to say about this, so we'll have to agree to disagree.

Very few philosophical discussions achieve agreement, so that shouldn't be surprising. But it is disappointing. Thank you for your time and attention.

I agree that does matter. But it does not mean that my life began my DNA was formed. I've tried endlessly to make a discussion with you, but you endlessly repeat the same doctrine, as you did in the message you sent to me on the Ryle thread. So I don't know what to say to you. But I do know that this non-discussion is getting boring. I don't have anything more to say about this, so we'll have to agree to disagree.

Very few philosophical discussions achieve agreement, so that shouldn't be surprising. But it is disappointing. Thank you for your time and attention. — Ludwig V

I'm making sure to clarify what the position is. As long as we know what we agree to disagree about. And even now this is not my position (not about personal identity despite the title as I stated before):

But it does not mean that my life began my DNA was formed. — Ludwig V

Rather, it's about the causal-history being this set of gametes and no other. This set of gametes is necessary, if not sufficient for you to be you. And that can only start at that point in time with that substantive set of gametes.

I'm making sure to clarify what the position is. — schopenhauer1

I'm sure that's your intention. However, I'm afraid that all you can do is to clarify what your position is.