We can revisit this later. For now, I do not believe that one should be rational is a subjective moral judgement. But we have to get the base down first before we build to that. :)

I don’t see how this would be the case, as your argument for ‘there should be something’ (which we are currently discussing) is not more fundamental than your claim that ‘one should be rational’ is objective: the former actively presupposes the former. So I don’t see how you can build off of the argument we are discussing to get there, but we will see (:

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

It is false that if a reason exists that it should exist, which is what you said in this point 2. When I convert, to try to be charitable (as shown in bold and strikeout), it becomes a mere tautology that informs us of nothing: if there is a reason <...>, then there is a reason <...>.

7. if A should exist, then it claims that A should not exist.
…
9 But if A should not exist, then it cannot assert that it should exist.

A doesn’t claim that A should exist, it claims that A should not exist. I think you are trying to infer this from point 2 (as far as I can tell), and 2 is just false or, when converted, a mere tautology that cannot be used to support the antecedent of point 7 (being that it is also false).

A contradiction is clear if the assumption of X assumption leads to its own negation

So, I would say, this is different than your claim in point 2: point 2 claims that A entails that A should exist and that it shouldn’t, whereas A negating itself, in the most loose sense of that terminology, just implies that A demands its own annihilation—which is not a contradiction. If I obligate myself to kill myself, I have not conceded that I should and should not exist: which is what you seem to be saying about A (although, of course, you are not referring to people killing themselves: just an analogy).

If you still don't see it, can you point out why A does not negate itself?

If you just mean that A is the obligation to A not existing, and consequently A ‘negates itself’ in the sense that it implies its own annihilation, then I completely agree; but this isn’t a contradiction: the negation of existence is not a contradiction. A contradiction is, in its most basic sense, when two ‘things’ oppose each other so strongly that they can’t both be true. More specifically, logically contradictory when a proposition is both true and false; metaphysically contradictory when a proposition strongly opposes (or is incongruent with) one’s metaphysics; and actually contradictory when a proposition strongly opposes (or is incongruent with) natural laws.

According to your definition of subjective, everything is subjective Bob.

Not at all; and I am talking about the standard definitions, not my specific ones. I am just noting, although you can use the definitions however you would like, that your using ‘objectivity’ in a way that is obviously ‘subjectivity’ to everyone else.

Please use the definition I've put forward for now. It doesn't mean I'm right, it just makes sure we're on the same page. We can discuss which definition should be used after we get through the meat of the argument first.

Fair enough.

What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view? — Bob Ross

If you can prove that it is so, then yes. Rationality and logic are the best reflective tools we have about reality. It is in my view, the only way we can meaningfully assess it. Meaning if you have an argument that is air tight rationally and logically, which means it cannot be contradicted by reality in any way, you have an objective moral judgement.

Just food for thought, then:

P1: If one should eat babies, then they should find babies to eat. [p → q]
P2: One should eat babies. [p]
C: One should find babies to eat. [q] {Modus Ponens}

This is a logically sound and valid argument, and according to your own concession the contents of which are then objective. Likewise, we can all rationally agree that the logic is sound, but clearly the moral judgments are not thereby objective. Big problem for your semantics I would say…

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

It is false that if a reason exists that it should exist, which is what you said in this point 2. When I convert, to try to be charitable — Bob Ross

Feel free to cross out or amend the statement to what you feel fits, its no problem for me and can help convey your point easily. Also, full agreement. That's a much better way to write the statement! Lets simplify this then to "There must be a reason that everything should not exist".

7. if A should exist, then it claims that A should not exist.
…
9 But if A should not exist, then it cannot assert that it should exist.

A doesn’t claim that A should exist, it claims that A should not exist. I think you are trying to infer this from point 2 (as far as I can tell), and 2 is just false or, when converted, a mere tautology that cannot be used to support the antecedent of point 7 (being that it is also false). — Bob Ross

No, I was not relying on P2 having the word 'should', just me poorly mixing up 'should' with 'must' in 2 which I can see made it confusing. With the amended point 2, the following points still hold.

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist
...
7. If A exists, then it claims A should not exist.
8. But if A should not exist, then "Everything should not exist" should not be.
9. Because A cannot assert the truth of its own premise, or contradicts itself, it cannot exist.
Therefore 2 is contradicted, and there cannot be a reason for why everything should not exist.

P1: If one should eat babies, then they should find babies to eat. [p → q]
P2: One should eat babies. [p]
C: One should find babies to eat. [q] {Modus Ponens}

This is a logically sound and valid argument, and according to your own concession the contents of which are then objective. — Bob Ross

I see no problem with this. You did not prove that one should eat babies. All you did was prove that if P2 was true, then you can make the conclusion based on P1. That's fine.

We'll come back to subjectivity and objectivity after/if we resolve these points Bob. :)

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist

This is still incorrect: the claim is that if there is a reason that everything should not exist, then there is a reason that everything should not exist. “There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue.

If you wanted to assert there is a reason, which is different than asserting there should or must be a reason, then you would have to word it as “there is a reason that everything should not exist”. Or if you wanted, then you could say “if there is a reason <...>, then there must be that reason <...> [because it is exists]”, which is not equivalent to “there must be a reason <...>”: the latter is making a normative “moral” claim, which is not about what is but what should be, and the former is just noting that if there is a reason then there is a reason. I think we should use “there is a reason that everything should not exist” to avoid any normative “moral” vs. indicative/descriptive confusion.

So, the rewritten argument would be:


2. There is a reason, A, that everything should not exist.
7. If A exists, then it claims A should not exist. [ this should be an assertion not a hypothetical: ‘A implies A should not exist’.

And I think it is clear now that 9 is completely false:

9. Because A cannot assert the truth of its own premise, or contradicts itself, it cannot exist.
Therefore 2 is contradicted, and there cannot be a reason for why everything should not exist.

The truth of its own premise is that it shouldn’t exist, not that it should and should not exist. 2 & 7 do not imply nor claim that a part of its truth is that it should exist.

This is still incorrect: the claim is that if there is a reason that everything should not exist, then there is a reason that everything should not exist. — Bob Ross

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

“There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue. — Bob Ross

Now I'm confused. Didn't you just have an issue with me swapping 'should' and 'must' earlier? I agree you had that right. What should exist is not the same as what must exist.

9. Because A cannot assert the truth of its own premise, or contradicts itself, it cannot exist. Therefore 2 is contradicted, and there cannot be a reason for why everything should not exist. — Bob Ross

Correct.

The truth of its own premise is that it shouldn’t exist, not that it should and should not exist. — Bob Ross

Also correct.

So if the truth of its own premise is that it shouldn't exist, but it must exist if it is to claim that it shouldn't exist, we're left with a contradiction. It means we cannot claim that "Everything should not exist." What this means is that the reason why there should be no existence, should not be. Remember, we're finding a foundational reason. A foundational reason must not be a contradiction.

The best we can do is alter the statement. "Everything should not exist, except the reason that everything should not exist." Why? That's not a foundation, that just leaves more questions and confusion. This can also be translated to, "At least one thing should exist." The reason? Because without a reason existing to indicate what should or should not be, there is no should or should not be. Meaning that once again, we cannot claim that 'everything should not exist'.

Does that clear it up?

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', [then] there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

“There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue. — Bob Ross

Now I'm confused. Didn't you just have an issue with me swapping 'should' and 'must' earlier? I agree you had that right. What should exist is not the same as what must exist.

These two claims are not equivalent. The hypothetical in the top quote is just using ‘must’ in a non-normative ‘moral’ sense to indicate that if there is a reason, then there is a reason (i.e., it is a tautology); whereas the assertion in the second to top quote is that there simply must/should be a reason, not that if it were to exist, then it would exist.

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

It was identity in your point 2:

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist

When reformulated, this just tautological:

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

If you are conveying, instead, that “if everything should not exist, then there must be a reason” then that is not taulogical, but that is not equivalent to point 2 (you made).

Anyways, here’s the crux though:

So if the truth of its own premise is that it shouldn't exist, but it must exist if it is to claim that it shouldn't exist, we're left with a contradiction

There’s no contradiction here. If I must exist to obligate myself to kill myself, then it does not follow that I am contradicting myself.

Since you seem to think there is, I would like to offer a suggestion, to move the conversation forward, that you provide a valid syllogism for it. If it is a logical contradiction, then explicate clearly that the form of the argument leads to p ^ !p; if it is an actual contradiction, then explicate how positing A is incoherent with natural laws; and if it is a metaphysical contradiction, then explicate how positing A is incoherent with your metaphysics; or if it is none of those, then please explicate what you mean by ‘contradiction’ and demonstrate it with syllogisms.

On my side, I am not sure how to demonstrate how this is not a contradiction anymore than reiterating that a reason entailing its own annihilation is not a contradiction and offering some analogies:

1. A thought that I have which claims “I should not have any thoughts” is perfectly coherent, but also requires that it must have existed in order for me to have the thought and that itself should no longer exist if it still does.
2. An AI can be programmed to seek nothing other than its own death, such that it must exist to have the obligation to kill itself—I see nothing incoherent with this.
3. A bomb that is set to blow itself up is setup such that it ought to blow its self up and it has to exist in order for that to be true—ditto.

I think you are trying to do a paradox move, like “all statements are false” which would entail a contradiction if it were true; but this is not analogous to a thing which must exist in order to claim that it should not itself exist.

The hypothetical in the top quote is just using ‘must’ in a non-normative ‘moral’ sense to indicate that if there is a reason, then there is a reason — Bob Ross

Agreed.

whereas the assertion in the second to top quote is that there simply must/should be a reason, not that if it were to exist, then it would exist. — Bob Ross

This is the part I'm not understanding. Can you clarify? What does must/should mean?

It was identity in your point 2:

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist — Bob Ross

An identity is A = A. I'm not seeing how I'm doing that here.

When reformulated, this just tautological:

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist]. — Bob Ross

This is true, but that's why I condensed it down into the revised version above.

If you are conveying, instead, that “if everything should not exist, then there must be a reason” then that is not taulogical, but that is not equivalent to point 2 (you made). — Bob Ross

Correct, that's not the same as what point 2 is saying. Its an odd thing that I agree with practically everything you're stating yet I can't understand the overall point you're trying to make. :) We're almost there I feel though, so please keep trying.

So if the truth of its own premise is that it shouldn't exist, but it must exist if it is to claim that it shouldn't exist, we're left with a contradiction

I agree, but that's not my conclusion. The contradiction is not in the fact that there must be a reason that exists if its the case that 'existence should not be.' The contradiction is in what it claims if this reason exists. The reason itself must be coherent. This is pointing to my language leading to ambiguity, so let me see if I can clarify.

For A to be, there must exist a B for it to exist, does not mean that "B must exist". After all, we don't know if A is true. Now if it is the case that A is true, then B must also be true. But we cannot prove that A is true, so this is an If 'A <-> B' statement, not a 'A is' statement. I feel like we've mixed up 'must' with true, so maybe this is where the confusion is coming from. Let me see if I can write this more cleanly then to avoid this unintentional ambiguity.

Remember, what is true or false is whether it 'should' be or not.

1. It is unknown whether, A, 'everything should not exist' is true. A = T/F
2. If A is true, then there must be a reason, B, and B must be true. A <-> B
3. If B is true, then B should not exist. B -> !B
4. But if B is true, then B is false by contradiction B = B = !B
5. If B should is false, then A is false. !B <-> !A
Therefore 'everything should not exist' cannot be true, because the reason itself notes that itself should not exist. The reason would note that its own existence is immoral, and should not be. Meaning what should be, is that the reason, and thus the initial moral claim, should not exist. And if there should not be a reason for 'nothing should exist', the only conclusion in the binary is that 'something should exist'.

This is good Bob, keep going please.

This is the part I'm not understanding. Can you clarify? What does must/should mean?

Let’s skip this for now.

Correct, that's not the same as what point 2 is saying. Its an odd thing that I agree with practically everything you're stating yet I can't understand the overall point you're trying to make. :) We're almost there I feel though, so please keep trying.

We are definitely getting closer! (:

Thank you for the exposition of your logic for the argument, because I see exactly where (I think) it goes wrong:

3. If B is true, then B should not exist. B -> !B

B != “B should not exist”, so there is no contradiction.

A := “everything should not exist”
B := “reason that A”
C := “B should not exist”

Now, we see:

A ↔ B
B ↔ C

P1: A ↔ B
P2: A
C: B

P3: B ↔ C
P4: B
C: C

No contradiction. You conflated B with “B should not exist”. Those are separate propositions.

Any measure you could speak of is a meaning, and all meaning is created and the property of a conscious subject, and/or collectives of conscious subjects. Measures and meanings are not lying around on the ground of an orchard like so many fallen apples. The source is subjective consciousness in its individual form or its collective. Perhaps, I am missing something here in your objection, please enlighten me.

No contradiction. You conflated B with “B should not exist”. Those are separate propositions. — Bob Ross

No, I missed writing a step like you noted. I also think I see now what your issue is. I'm not conflating that B is the same as B should not exist, but the language SURE comes close. I'm noting that if B should not exist, then B cannot be true. I too have felt that the previous iteration didn't quite hit the mark, but this may finalize it.

First, we have to understand that for A to exist, it must have a reason. But this doesn't mean the reason exists. We still have to demonstrate we can have a true reason. To be a true reason, it must not contradict itself.

1. It is unknown whether, A, 'everything should not exist' is true. A = T/F
2. If A is true, then there must be a reason, B, and B must be true. A <-> B
3. It is unknown if B is true = T/F
4. For B to be true, it must not contradict itself B = B && B != !B
5. B is the reason that 'nothing should exist'
6. Because it is moral that 'nothing should exist' the reason should also not exist.
7. But for 'Everything should not exist' we have a reason that does exist, that should not exist.
8. But if the reason should not exist, then it is immoral for the reason to exist. Thus B is false. !B
9. if the reason should not exist, then 'Existence should not exist' should not exist either. !B <-> !A

The problem I'm having is fitting in 5,6, and 7 with propositional logic alone, I wonder if I need predicate logic. I can definitely see the trickiness of the language here in what I'm doing, and I'm not certain if its correct. I think the weirdness is that we have to prove that the reason doesn't contradict itself. Its a simple matter of "Can't have 1 and 2, but 2 is needed to prove you can't have 1 and 2", but does it actually work or am I getting caught up in a language game? See if you can poke some holes in it again.

Any measure you could speak of is a meaning, and all meaning is created and the property of a conscious subject, and/or collectives of conscious subjects. Measures and meanings are not lying around on the ground of an orchard like so many fallen apples. The source is subjective consciousness in its individual form or its collective. Perhaps, I am missing something here in your objection, please enlighten me. — boagie

Hi Boagie, I really appreciate your contribution to the thread, but Bob Ross is currently doing me the favor of either discounting or helping me refine what I'm trying to say here to a much more refined level. If you want to follow a long a bit in the conversation feel free, but it might be hard to spring board into right now. I think when he and I get through some more I'll likely write up the addendum, or note that it didn't work.

I think I am beginning to understand what you are trying to go for, which is, if I am not mistaken, that morality itself contains a ‘moral’ judgment that ‘the reason must/should exist’ if it is to have ‘moral’ signification and then you are trying to demonstrate that this contradicts B. Is that sort of right?

Anyways, I see many worries with this; but I will refrain until I confirm whether that is what you are saying or not.

I would like to suggest that you write out all 9 (or what not) points with their logic to the right of them so that I can see exactly what’s going on. You have introduced new points without their logic explicated, and, given the confusion in the past, I don’t want to make any assumptions. Whether it is proposition, predicate, or some other logic; I don’t really care as long as it demonstrates a logical contradiction: then I at least understand where the contradiction is and we can move on from there.

4. For B to be true, it must not contradict itself B = B && B != !B

I would just like to note that I think your logic here is not what you intended (if I am understanding correctly). ‘B != !B’ is, even when conjoined with ‘B = B’, a tautology that is not equivalent to the law of non-contradiction, which is ‘!(B && !B)’. Just a side note, I am going to move on assuming you just mean the LNC here.

6. Because it is moral that 'nothing should exist' the reason should also not exist

This one is more of a question than a critique: is ‘moral’ signifying anything special here? To me, this point would lose none of its substance if that word were left out, because it just notes that the reason ‘nothing should exist’ entail that that very reason doesn’t exist. The ‘because it is moral’ is just throwing me off a tad bit, and wanted to make sure I am not missing something.

7. But for 'Everything should not exist' we have a reason that does exist, that should not exist.
8. But if the reason should not exist, then it is immoral for the reason to exist. Thus B is false. !B
9. if the reason should not exist, then 'Existence should not exist' should not exist either. !B <-> !A

Firstly, I don’t see a contradiction here in the logical form: could you please explicate it?

Secondly, 8 seems to just claim that B is false, not that it both B and !B are true.

Thirdly, I don’t understand the difference between 7 and 6: they seem to be a reiteration of the same claim.

Fourthly, 8 making a new claim altogether that I don’t know: namely, that it is immoral for the reason to exist and that thereby makes it false. Why? It is immoral for it exist in the sense that it should not exist, but that doesn’t entail that B is false: that entails that B entails C. Remember, for B to be false, it must be false that “everything should not exist” and NOT “B should exist”: I think you just may have made the same conflationary move again that I explicated with B vs. C.

Lastly, 9 is just another reiteration, as far as I can tell, of 7 and 6: you just repeat that if a reason entails its own non-existence, then it should not exist. However, I would like to add that the logic is wrong here, as it should be ‘B ↔ C’. ‘!B ↔ !A’ would be, as expressed in a colloquial sentence, “if the reason that ‘everything should not exist’ (or that statement as a reason itself) is false, then it is false that ‘everything should not exist’. Also, 1 and 5 are the same claim, techinically, as A = B at this point: if B is the reason ‘nothing should exist’ then it is A, since you defined in 1 A as ‘everything should not exist’--although I understand what you are getting at, I would suggest making A the claim ‘nothing should exist’ and B whatever reason it is for that (which could be technically anything for the sake of the argument, since you are trying to prove a contradiction with just assuming B’s relationship to A).


To me, it seems like you have just come up with different words to conflate B with C, and added extra points that reiterate the same thing. To me, you are just claiming the following:

P1: If the claim ‘nothing should exist’, A, is true, then there is a reason, B, for why A is true. [A ↔ B]
P2: The claim ‘nothing should exist’ is true. [A]
C1: TF, there is a reason for why A is true. \[B\]

P3: If there is a reason for why A is true {and A is true}, then that reason should not exist. [ (B {&& A}) → C ]
P4: There is a reason for why A is true {and A is true}. <C1> [ B {&& A} ]
C2: TF, that reason should not exist. [ C ]

So there’s not contradiction, but you seem to be trying to argue with 8 that:

P5: If B should not exist {C}, then B is false. [ C → !B ]
P6: B should not exist {C}. <C2>[ C ]
C3: TF, B is false. [ !B ]

P7: One should abide by LNC. [ N ]
P8: C1 and C3 contradict each other. [ B && !B ]
C4: TF, one should not accept A {because it leads to a contradiction}. [ {N → !(B && !B)} → !A ]

But, crucially, I contend P5. I don’t see how that implication is true at all.

I think I am beginning to understand what you are trying to go for, which is, if I am not mistaken, that morality itself contains a ‘moral’ judgment that ‘the reason must/should exist’ if it is to have ‘moral’ signification and then you are trying to demonstrate that this contradicts B. Is that sort of right? — Bob Ross

Yes, that's about it. Essentially a reason must exist for any moral judgement. But if it exists, then according to it, it should not exist. Morality is the analysis of what 'should' be. Meaning that according to the the claim, "Everything should not exist", even a reason for this moral claim should not exist.

‘B != !B’ is, even when conjoined with ‘B = B’, a tautology that is not equivalent to the law of non-contradiction — Bob Ross

Its not the law of non-contradiction, just pointing out a contradiction.

This one is more of a question than a critique: is ‘moral’ signifying anything special here? — Bob Ross

Yes. I think I realized that I was putting the emphasis on the wrong point. I was putting emphasis on the reason, B, instead of the moral proposal itself, A. Its not that B makes A false, its that A makes B false. The moral claim notes that its reason should not exist, which means that the moral claim, "Everything should not exist,' should not exist either.

Its making me wonder if I'm introducing an extra variable into the equation, the reason. I'm looking for the foundation as it is, and the reason is what we're trying to discover. At the end, I'm essentially stating that the reason why it 'should or should not' is because there is a contradiction in 'should not exist' itself, not a contradiction in the reason. So yes, if I simplify this down a bit, I think it will be much more clear.

An objective morality is not necessarily dependent on human judgement. So we're claiming its possible that it would exist on its own. If an objective morality exists, then it boils down to one binary question as its foundation: "Should existence be, or not?" Instead of looking for a reason, what we're really looking for is the logical consequence of the solution.

So if it were true that an objective morality existed and its conclusion is that "Existence should not be." then its claiming its own existence shouldn't be either. Meaning an objective morality that states 'Existence should not be,' shouldn't exist. This also means nothing should exist. Not us, not the reasoning to find an objective morality, and not morality itself.

Its definitely not a classical contradiction, but it is something. It would mean there should be the cessation of everything, and yet existence persists. It would also fly in the face of every moral theory ever concocted. It doesn't contradict its own ontology, but it is in perpetual conflict with it. For something to have a 'should' it means if reality could make that state, it should. Which means that if reality could, it would eliminate the objective reality that states, "Existence should not be'. But if we eliminated that objective morality, we don't eliminate the question. Which means at the end of the day, what should be, is that there should exist an objective morality that concludes, "Existence should be".

So then, its not an ontological necessity that if an objective morality exists, that it conclude 'Existence should be.' Its more that such a morality seems so at odds with itself and with our general sense, that it doesn't fit. If it were the case, its time to put on the clown mask, whip up some bombs, and destroy the world and oneself with a bang! :D

So then I can't ontologically prove that if an objective morality exists, its not "Existence should not be". However, we can still look at the idea that such a morality would still insist that it should not exist, and I am inclined to agree with it! Meaning I still think that it is reasonable to conclude that if there is an objective morality, at its foundation it should be "Existence should be".

If you agree with this portion, then we can move onto other aspects of the discussion. We can go back to the objective/subjective setup, the idea that '2b or not 2b' is the fundamental moral argument that all moral questions chain down to, or we can move onto the fun thought experiments I had with the idea that "Existence is good" would lead to. Thank you for sticking with this portion until this point at my request, the choice is yours going forward.

I think we both agree now that there is no incoherence or contradiction with positing A, so let me move on.

So then, its not an ontological necessity that if an objective morality exists, that it conclude 'Existence should be.' Its more that such a morality seems so at odds with itself and with our general sense, that it doesn't fit

We need to revisit metaethics, because I can already anticipate how this is going to go if I point out my contentions without us diving into what you think the nature of objectivity and morality is (:

For example, I don’t see how morality, if it were ‘objective’, would be ‘at odds with itself’ or that it ‘doesn’t fit’, in principle, if A were true. In principle, what is morally right or wrong is determined by the morally relevant facts under moral realism “objective morality theories”, so if there is a moral fact such that “nothing should exist”, then that would be a true moral judgment which expresses something objective—full stop: it doesn’t matter if that doesn’t coincide with the general consensus or what not.

BUT, if by ‘objective’ you just mean ‘what rational agents can agree upon’, then it depends on what you mean by “rationality” (what is implied by it exactly) whether or not, within your terms, my contention matters.

So, let me ask you again:

1. What is the nature of moral properties? I am assuming, based off of our previous discussion, that you hold that moral judgments express something objective, that they are truth-apt, and that some of them are true.

2. What is the nature of objectivity? I am assuming you mean “that which can be rationally agreed upon”.

3. What is the nature of an “objective moral judgment” or a “moral fact” to you? What is a fact?

Without understanding what you think the nature of objectivity and morality is, then I cannot adequately assess your position in light of your own terms.

I will say, to be totally honest, I think your position is a form of moral subjectivism (; You are a comrade in disguise....

For example, I don’t see how morality, if it were ‘objective’, would be ‘at odds with itself’ or that it ‘doesn’t fit’, in principle, if A were true. — Bob Ross

Let me separate out two points so you can see where I'm coming from.

If the objective morality that exists is "Existence should not be," it doesn't matter, that's what it is. I'm not debating that. Just like if the real morality is "Contradictions should be encouraged in life". If that's what it is, that's what it is.

What I'm noting is that if it is, according to itself, it shouldn't be. If such a morality exists, it would be immoral for it to exist. Just like if it was objectively true that "Contradictions should be encouraged in life" that we should contradict that.

That's the odd thing about speculation on what's objective without proof. Technically, you can invent anything as objective, and its plausible. Of course, its equally as plausible that objective morality is, "Existence should be," When we're in a state in which we have two options without evidence, we take the stance that seems more reasonable and likely to be based on the evidence we do have, as well as whether such an option would directly or indirectly lead to a contradiction of some sort. Just like "Contradictions should be encouraged," leads to a line off logic that means you should contradict it, so to does the idea of a morality that exists that says it shouldn't exist.

1. What is the nature of moral properties? — Bob Ross

For now? Morality is the analysis of what should or should not happen. Keeping to what should or should not be is moral, while going against the precepts is immoral.

2. What is the nature of objectivity? I am assuming you mean “that which can be rationally agreed upon”. — Bob Ross

The nature of objectivity is a rational deduction that persists despite differences in subjective experience. The nature of subjectivity is a rational or irrational conclusion that relies on one specific subjective experience. These have never been precise nor perfectly divided definitions. They are more what I'll call "guidance" definitions.

The guidance of objectivity is the understanding that there are certain conclusions which are apart from our desires or personal viewpoints. Meaning an objective conclusion has the potential to violate everything we wish and stand for. It is the understanding that there are forces beyond ourselves that will contradict ourselves.

The guidance of subjectivity is to understand that you have a personal viewpoint of reality that may not be the same as others. The default child-like state is to believe that one's perspective is unalienably correct, and reflective of reality. Objectivity is meant to raise a person's thinking beyond this, while subjectivity is its contrast and reminder to be conscious of our own limitiations.

I am assuming you mean “that which can be rationally agreed upon”. — Bob Ross

This requires me to answer, "What is rational?" What is rational is to connect information together in such a way that is reflective of reality. This is usually known by avoiding being contradicted by reality. Logic and tools of reasoning are time tested methods that help one avoid being contradicted by reality.
The ultimate measuring stick that trumps all is if reality contradicts you. If so, all tools which have lead to this contradiction should be re-examined to find its flaws.

3. What is the nature of an “objective moral judgment” or a “moral fact” to you? — Bob Ross

It is a judgement that accurately reflects reality. If A should exist over B in reality, then this is a fact. Deciding to shape reality so that A happens is a correct moral decision. Concluding that A should exist over B in reality through rationality, is a correct moral judgement.

I will say, to be totally honest, I think your position is a form of moral subjectivism (; You are a comrade in disguise.... — Bob Ross

Ha ha! The way you define subjectivism, I am. The way I define subjectivism? Not so much. At the end of the day, I honestly don't care about what the specific words are to different people. I care about the guidance. If a moral objectivism exists, then we can be contradicted in reality by our moral choices and finding out what the objective morality is will allow us to construct objective moral judgements.

If the objective morality that exists is "Existence should not be," it doesn't matter, that's what it is. I'm not debating that. Just like if the real morality is "Contradictions should be encouraged in life". If that's what it is, that's what it is.

Agreed.

What I'm noting is that if it is, according to itself, it shouldn't be.

What’s really wrong with this, in principle, though? It doesn’t even seem incoherent to me.

For now? Morality is the analysis of what should or should not happen. Keeping to what should or should not be is moral, while going against the precepts is immoral.

This is too vague. For example, if you are a moral non-cognitivst, then what should or should not happen has not truth-aptness: they are not propositional. Literally anyone will agree with your definition here of morality, but I want to dive deeper: what are the properties themselves? Not what is morality, but what are the nature of moral properties? E.g., is the property of ‘goodness’ reducible to something natural? Or are you a non-naturalist?

The nature of objectivity is a rational deduction that persists despite differences in subjective experience.

What is a “rational deduction”? It can’t just be something that is deduced, because, again, I can give you a perfectly sound deduction for almost anything and certainly things that are immoral (like eating babies).

The nature of subjectivity is a rational or irrational conclusion that relies on one specific subjective experience.

So how many convergent subjective analysis constitute an objective one then, in your terms? Is that how it works?

The guidance of objectivity is the understanding that there are certain conclusions which are apart from our desires or personal viewpoints. Meaning an objective conclusion has the potential to violate everything we wish and stand for.

I can get on board with that, but why do you think there are moral judgments that exhibit this kind of objectivity (viz., that there are moral conclusions which are despite our desires or viewpoints)?

Which leads me to: what states-of-affairs in reality are morally relevant, then? What out there are we able to access that is of moral signification?

The default child-like state is to believe that one's perspective is unalienably correct, and reflective of reality. Objectivity is meant to raise a person's thinking beyond this, while subjectivity is its contrast and reminder to be conscious of our own limitiations.

Sure, that’s fine. But I wouldn’t say that subjectivity is solely people’s perspectives being unblameworthy.

What is rational is to connect information together in such a way that is reflective of reality.

Fair enough. This entails that when you affirm that morality is objective that there are moral judgments which are made true in virtue of reality, and are not made true in virtue of our pyschology—so what is it, then? Platonic forms, naturalistic empirical inquiries, etc.?

I don’t think there is anything in reality that tells us what we ought to do, so it does not matter how much a rational agent reflects accurately about reality: the normative or morally relevant information comes from within, not without.

It is a judgement that accurately reflects reality.

This is fine, and good.

I can get on board with, more or less, your terminology here because we basically use them the same way; and I would say that I don’t think there is anything about reality that makes moral judgments true—so no moral facts. You disagree: so why do you think otherwise?

What I'm noting is that if it is, according to itself, it shouldn't be.

What’s really wrong with this, in principle, though? It doesn’t even seem incoherent to me. — Bob Ross

If you mean its not incoherent that it leads to this result, I agree. I mean its incoherent, and therefore likely not going to be the objective morality if it exists. I'm switching between "Assume it exists" to then "Show it exists". I can invent a lot of ideas that would be incoherent or lead to contradictions, but that usually lends weight to them not being real.

If I don't know if "Contradictions should be encouraged" is real, I can follow the logic to realize it contradictions itself, so then in conclude contradictions should probably not be encouraged. A morality that exists that states it shouldn't exist is contradictory by this measure, so likely does not exist. Is this a certainty? Of course. But since we don't know either way yet, we go by what seems most rational.

Literally anyone will agree with your definition here of morality, but I want to dive deeper: what are the properties themselves? Not what is morality, but what are the nature of moral properties? — Bob Ross

Oh, yes. That was the purpose of the original question. To find what rationally 'should' be at a foundational level. The conclusion is, "Existence should be." You may want to read the OP from that point to see what I say from there. That's where I go over what we can conclude from this. I most certainly do not think "I have it", but this is a fun part where we get to brain storm and see where this goes.

So how many convergent subjective analysis constitute an objective one then, in your terms? Is that how it works? — Bob Ross

Not quite. The point is to remember that your opinions and beliefs do not make reality. A subjective viewpoint is typically associated with a belief or outlook that makes claims about reality that are not sufficiently tested.

I can get on board with that, but why do you think there are moral judgments that exhibit this kind of objectivity (viz., that there are moral conclusions which are despite our desires or viewpoints)? — Bob Ross

A very good question. That's a combination of many factors over the years. I've done some basic study into morality and come to a couple of conclusions.

1. There are universal moral decisions across cultures. Why? What's the underling fundamental that causes that?

2. We are moral to animals. Some animals even show signs of morality. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6404642/#:~:text=The%20empirical%20evidence%20gathered%20until,or%20even%20a%20direct%20loss.
This is in contrast to the ideas of morality being subjective, selfish, or even cultural.

3. There are various other contradictions and debated issues with many versions of subjective morality. That tells me that over the eons we've spent studying it, we haven't come up with an acceptable solution.

4. There is great value to having an objective morality. Such an understanding can bridge cultures, religions, and further the understanding and progress of humanity.

5. Humans are made out of matter. I do not see us as separate from the universe, but very much a part of it. I find it odd that suddenly morality pops up and its only a human condition. I believe there is something underlying this beyond just evolution that allows morality to express itself through us.

None of these reasons mean that there is an objective morality, but they are reasons I think its worthwhile to search for one.

Which leads me to: what states-of-affairs in reality are morally relevant, then? What out there are we able to access that is of moral signification? — Bob Ross

That which we can have control over. There are a couple of things we can get into later such as cost and capability. But first we have to build up what morality actually is when it gets to the human level.

This entails that when you affirm that morality is objective that there are moral judgments which are made true in virtue of reality, and are not made true in virtue of our pyschology—so what is it, then? Platonic forms, naturalistic empirical inquiries, etc.? — Bob Ross

So far? "Existence should be" As I noted earlier, its time to read the rest of the OP.

I don’t think there is anything in reality that tells us what we ought to do, so it does not matter how much a rational agent reflects accurately about reality: the normative or morally relevant information comes from within, not without. — Bob Ross

There is nothing preventing you from believing this opinion as we discuss. My point is to see if I can demonstrate that morality could be a logical consequence of rationality and existence. Its about considering and thinking on new ideas. Hopefully you'll find it fun. :)

I mean its incoherent, and therefore likely not going to be the objective morality if it exists.

Why is it incoherent? I think we both agree it isn’t internally incoherent, but why is it externally incoherent? Are you just saying it is incoherent with what most people consider to be moral/immoral? Because I can agree with that.

If I don't know if "Contradictions should be encouraged" is real, I can follow the logic to realize it contradictions itself, so then in conclude contradictions should probably not be encouraged.

This is circular...but, then again, so is all fundamental reason and logic.

The conclusion is, "Existence should be."

So, the original argument doesn’t work, because you were saying it is due to a contradiction—which we both agree now doesn’t exist. So what is the new argument for “existence should be”? Is it that it doesn’t coincide with our moral intuitions?

None of these reasons mean that there is an objective morality, but they are reasons I think its worthwhile to search for one.

I understand that it can be very compelling that [human] morality is something objective of which we are grasping, as opposed to projecting; and I’ve even flirted with moral non-naturalist views, like moral intuitionism, to try and get there...all to no avail.

1. There are universal moral decisions across cultures. Why? What's the underling fundamental that causes that?

Because the human species is a standard deviation curve, and, just like intelligence, there are certain moral intuitions which tend to be biologically baked into our species.

2. We are moral to animals. Some animals even show signs of morality

Again, something being biologically motivated doesn’t make it objective itself. With evolution, I would expect that other species, like intelligence, will have bits and pieces of what we do...we are the more complex biproduct of all those tiny steps evolution took and they are also a part of that.

3. There are various other contradictions and debated issues with many versions of subjective morality. That tells me that over the eons we've spent studying it, we haven't come up with an acceptable solution.

Doesn’t entail that moral realism is true.

4. There is great value to having an objective morality. Such an understanding can bridge cultures, religions, and further the understanding and progress of humanity.

I would say there’s great value in having an agreed upon moral standard, not that it is ultimately objective.

5. Humans are made out of matter. I do not see us as separate from the universe, but very much a part of it.

Agreed.

I find it odd that suddenly morality pops up and its only a human condition. I believe there is something underlying this beyond just evolution that allows morality to express itself through us.

And this is where I started flirting with moral intuitionism (; I don’t think there is anything underlying it other than biological motivation.

None of these reasons mean that there is an objective morality, but they are reasons I think its worthwhile to search for one.

Fair enough. I do think that there are many reasons (that are compelling) to be a moral realist but, at the end of the day, it is false; and this is why I really like my counter-argument to moral judgments expressing something objective:

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.

P2: Moral facts are ways reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.

C: TF, moral facts cannot exist.

It cuts right to the chase...sure, you can initially find it intuitive that morality is objective, but if you accept P1 then there’s not way they do.

But first we have to build up what morality actually is when it gets to the human level.

I don’t understand quite yet, within your view, what the moral facts are true in virtue of and so this makes no sense to me. “existence should be” is a claim, a reason, a statement, which is subjective: it’s that it corresponds to something objective that makes it true in the case of objective morality.

This entails that when you affirm that morality is objective that there are moral judgments which are made true in virtue of reality, and are not made true in virtue of our pyschology—so what is it, then? Platonic forms, naturalistic empirical inquiries, etc.? — Bob Ross

So far? "Existence should be" As I noted earlier, its time to read the rest of the OP.

Two things:

1. Your proof no longer works for “existence should be”, because there is no contradiction.

2. That is a claim: what is the underlying state-of-affairs in reality that makes it true? Or what makes it objectively true in your view?

Your OP doesn’t explain at all why it is objective, just that it is allegedly true because its negation leads to a contradiction.

Hey Bob, for some reason I completely missed that you had replied to this. Came in to review it and saw it luckily!

Why is it incoherent? I think we both agree it isn’t internally incoherent, but why is it externally incoherent? — Bob Ross

Its just not internally coherent. That's evidence that something isn't real.

If I don't know if "Contradictions should be encouraged" is real, I can follow the logic to realize it contradictions itself, so then in conclude contradictions should probably not be encouraged.

This is circular...but, then again, so is all fundamental reason and logic. — Bob Ross

Circular logic is self-confirming. This is self-contradicting.

I won't go into my reasons, they're just my reason why. Lets get back to the discussion!

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.

P2: Moral facts are ways reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be. — Bob Ross

I pointed this out in our last discussion and I think it merits pointing out in detail again. Morality is a choice between two potential realities. Of course reality as it is right now does not tell us how it should be, because we're not evaluating a change in reality by either comparing to the past, or evaluating a change for the future. Only when we think, "Well, what if we change reality to include X, would that be better?" are we discussing morality. P1 only regards the present therefore does not regard morality.

1. Your proof no longer works for “existence should be”, because there is no contradiction. — Bob Ross

My proof no longer works ontologically. However, it does work by demonstrating how incoherent it would be if the objective morality were, "Everything should not be." Assuming rationality is our best representation of reality, we will go with the idea that incoherent ideas of morality are likely not to be true.

Or what makes it objectively true in your view? — Bob Ross

If there is an objective morality, this is the only way tor it to be rationally coherent.

Read the rest Bob! Keep an open mind and have fun. Take the idea that if it is true that "Existence should be" is the foundation for an objective morality, lets have fun thinking what that would entail based on the OP.

Hey Bob, for some reason I completely missed that you had replied to this. Came in to review it and saw it luckily!

Absolutely no worries! I was wondering… (;

So, the two major problems I have are:

1. I don’t see why it is internally incoherent for moral realists people who accept there is objective morality to affirm that “there should be nothing” if that particular theory accepts that it is a moral fact that “there should be nothing”.

2. I don’t really understand your idea of morality being objective, and I think a lot of our disagreement is due to the murky waters here. You seem to think that a moral judgment is objective if it doesn’t violate the laws of logic and can be accepted by rational agents, I don’t think this is at all what objectivity is.

I don’t think we are making much headway on the above, so I am just going to continue and see where this goes.

So, let’s say “there should be something”: does this simply mean that “existence is preferable to non-existence” or does it mean that “we must create as many existent things as possible”? I seem to get, from re-reading the OP, that the latter is what you are going for—but, if that is the case, (1) I don’t see how this follows from disaffirming that “nothing should exist” (as I can very well accept that it is false that “nothing should exist” without thereby conceding that “we must create as many existent things as possible”) and (2) this seems to contradict common-sensical moral intuitions (which perhaps isn’t relevant to your point) in the sense that it seems to be a sort of biting of a bullet (e.g., we would have to force people to procreate, etc.).

If I don't know if "Contradictions should be encouraged" is real, I can follow the logic to realize it contradictions itself, so then in conclude contradictions should probably not be encouraged.

This is circular...but, then again, so is all fundamental reason and logic. — Bob Ross

Circular logic is self-confirming. This is self-contradicting.

That’s true, but my point was that you were self-confirming (as you put it): you presupposed that it is false that “contradictions should be encouraged” in order to prove it should not be.

Morality is a choice between two potential realities. Of course reality as it is right now does not tell us how it should be, because we're not evaluating a change in reality by either comparing to the past, or evaluating a change for the future. Only when we think, "Well, what if we change reality to include X, would that be better?" are we discussing morality. P1 only regards the present therefore does not regard morality.

Exactly, this is why I affirm P1 (and it sounds like you do to): which would entail moral facts cannot exist. Again, I still don’t understand what exactly a moral fact is under your view...it seems to just be something rational agents affirm.

If there is an objective morality, this is the only way tor it to be rationally coherent.

Why? There’s nothing internally incoherent with a moral realist claiming that “nothing should exist” because that is a moral fact.

Take the idea that if it is true that "Existence should be" is the foundation for an objective morality, lets have fun thinking what that would entail based on the OP.

I’m trying (: , but I don’t understand what you mean by objective morality at this point. Maybe we can move on to my questions (above) about what exactly is meant by “existence should be”.

1. I don’t see why it is internally incoherent for moral realists people who accept there is objective morality to affirm that “there should be nothing” if that particular theory accepts that it is a moral fact that “there should be nothing”. — Bob Ross

Recall this is not a proof that objective morality exists. This is an attempt to rationally identify what an objective morality would rationally be. While my ontological proof failed, the fact that "Everything should not exist" leads to the fact that, "This statement of morality should not exist" and seems quite irrational, we're going to assume the more rational choice. Could it be that the objective morality is that we should end everything and everyone? Sure. Is it rational to conclude this is what should be done without evidence? No.

I don’t really understand your idea of morality being objective, and I think a lot of our disagreement is due to the murky waters here. — Bob Ross

Then honestly don't worry about it right now. I'm much more interested in the thoughts that can come out of assuming the foundational morality is, "There should be existence." This is where we get to experiment, think and have fun. Your belief in whether there exists an objective or subjective morality is irrelevant to the thought experiment. Just go with the assumption for now. :)

So, let’s say “there should be something”: does this simply mean that “existence is preferable to non-existence” or does it mean that “we must create as many existent things as possible”? — Bob Ross

Yes, this is where I want to discuss next. If it is "preferable to have existence" then it doesn't seem limited to just one existence. For one, that seem arbitrary. If we're going to number it, then what objective number would work? 5 existences? No, that doesn't work. The reason why is then there would need to be a reason why, and also what types of existences should be. But each question of what should exist still comes down to the fundamental that "Existence should be".

So since we have no way of telling what types of existences should or should be at a fundamental level, we go with the idea that existence should be, therefore encouraging and preserving existence should be the fundamental goal.

(2) this seems to contradict common-sensical moral intuitions (which perhaps isn’t relevant to your point) in the sense that it seems to be a sort of biting of a bullet (e.g., we would have to force people to procreate, etc.). — Bob Ross

No, that's a bit far of a jump ahead. It would really help at this point if you avoided any sense of human morality and just went along with the fundamental building up of morality. We'll get to human morality, no worry.

For now, what do you think about my evaluation of expressed existence? Also, did you get to the example of the submarine in the ocean? Let me know what you think Bob.

"Everything should not exist" leads to the fact that, "This statement of morality should not exist" and seems quite irrational, we're going to assume the more rational choice.

You say it is irrational…but I still don’t see why.

therefore encouraging and preserving existence should be the fundamental goal.

Encouraging or mandating? This is what I would like to know. Is it morally permissible in your view to not create more existence when there is an opportunity to?

No, that's a bit far of a jump ahead. It would really help at this point if you avoided any sense of human morality and just went along with the fundamental building up of morality. We'll get to human morality, no worry.

See, this is doesn’t make sense to me. What you do evaluate morally if there is no subject? What if a rock had the ‘opportunity’ to create more exist by interacting in a partular way but ‘chose’ not to? Well, obviously, this makes no sense because the rock doesn’t ‘decide’ anything, so why consider what would be better morally for the rock to do? Instead, it is a question of what should we do to the rock, no?

For now, what do you think about my evaluation of expressed existence? Also, did you get to the example of the submarine in the ocean? Let me know what you think Bob.

I admittedly don’t have a good grasp of the theory yet, but I can take a crack at it! Let me attempt at re-reading the OP:

1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.

This seems to be mandating the creation of more things.

2. Any existence which lowers overall existence is evil.

If I have to kill 20 people in my lifetime in legitimate self-defense and I never contribute to the creation of more life and #2, then wouldn’t it follow that I am evil?

Likewise, if we could calculate out that force castrating 10% of the population, let’s say convicts, would total net increase the amount of people or lives, would this then, under your view, be righteous?

What counts as ‘existence’ here? Just things that are alive? What if I am constantly destroying rocks, is that lowering the overall ‘existences’?

Likewise, I don’t think your ‘material’ vs. ‘expressional’ existence answers my above question.

When existence A collides with existence B, something happens. That something is an existence, but a fleeting one. How each individual material reacts when an interaction happens with another material existence would be the expression of each material existence
…
If more existence is better, than more expressions of existence are also better.

This makes it sound like more collisions equals better: but this is just chaos, pure chaos, then, no?

a. Expressions of existence which can yield more potential expressions of existence are better than those that cannot.

This seems, again, like the best world in your theory is one with the most chaos, because that would be what a world would be like with maximal expressions of existence: thing colliding and bombarding other things.

b. Expressions of existence which destroy material existence, or those that lesson the number of possible expressions of existence would be considered evil.

Similarly, it seems to be evil under your view to limit chaos.

Let us take a situation in which a submarine has crashed to the bottom of the ocean. There is no communication with the outside world, no way for the submarine to recover, and everyone on the submarine will die. No one will ever discover what happens on the submarine, as it will be crushed by gravity into a pulp. There are currently 10 people aboard the ship. There is enough air for 1 person to breath for 10 hours. An explosion could happen which would kill 9 people and leave one alive. Which is more moral, 1 person living 10 hours, or 10 people living one hour?
…
Meaning, while the unique life expressions are the same, the potential existence of what those unique life expressions dwarfs that of the single individual. Meaning that it is equal material existence, but more potential existence for ten people to live on hour that 1 person live for ten hours.

But, wouldn’t it be better, if “If more existence is better, than more expressions of existence are also better.” and more existence is better, to cause the submarine’s parts to collide, by way of explosion, with as many things as possible so as to maximize the odds of expressions of existence?

For now, I would like to wait and here your response to these questions before continuing.

Bob

You say it is irrational…but I still don’t see why. — Bob Ross

Lets leave this for now then. I've tried explaining it a few times and I'm not sure how else to at this point. If you understand the statement "You should make contradictions", leads to contradicting the statement itself, thus negating it to 'You should not make contradictions', then that's all there is to it. Let move onto the other things though which I really want to discuss. I really don't have all the answers to this next part and have wanted to bounce these ideas with someone else who can think on this level for a long time.

Encouraging or mandating? This is what I would like to know. Is it morally permissible in your view to not create more existence when there is an opportunity to? — Bob Ross

This isn't an easy answer because we're talking about what people should do. But we're not there yet! I know, its a big change in thinking. That's the point. An objective morality shouldn't need people. If so, then there should be some type of morality that exists apart from them. So we think, we explore, and we see if anything makes sense.

What you do evaluate morally if there is no subject? What if a rock had the ‘opportunity’ to create more exist by interacting in a partular way but ‘chose’ not to? Well, obviously, this makes no sense because the rock doesn’t ‘decide’ anything, so why consider what would be better morally for the rock to do? — Bob Ross

No, a rock can't decide. Its not about a conscious decision. Its about preferable states. Just because something should happen doesn't mean it does happen. But can we take the idea that existence is better and determine which outcome would be best without there needing to be a judge or observer to make it so.

1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.

This seems to be mandating the creation of more things. — Bob Ross

No mandates yet! We aren't to consciousness yet. Just states of existence. Meaning that if we could label actual and expressed existence in two scenarios, we could determine which one would be better by comparing them.

For a very simple start, lets have universe A, and B. A has two atoms (Aristotelian for simplification), while B has 3 atoms. Comparing the two, which is better according to our foundation? Universe B. There is no decision or being which decides this, its just an observation of what's better.

Taken to a more human level for a minute, lets imagine that a world with magical unicorns ends up being the most existence. Preferable right? But impossible to create. When simply evaluating two worlds such as these, we aren't discussing about our decisions, responsibilities, or capabilities, just the difference in outcomes. Alright, back to boring matter. :)

If I have to kill 20 people in my lifetime in legitimate self-defense and I never contribute to the creation of more life and #2, then wouldn’t it follow that I am evil?

Likewise, if we could calculate out that force castrating 10% of the population, let’s say convicts, would total net increase the amount of people or lives, would this then, under your view, be righteous? — Bob Ross

I would love to come back to this after we build up the basics. But for now, that's too complex. We have to get the fundamentals down first.

What counts as ‘existence’ here? Just things that are alive? What if I am constantly destroying rocks, is that lowering the overall ‘existences’?

Likewise, I don’t think your ‘material’ vs. ‘expressional’ existence answers my above question. — Bob Ross

No, we are not talking about life yet. First we're trying to understand the nature of existence and how to evaluate it as good or not. A 'living' thing is simply an arrangement of matter and energy which we'll define after we understand this first part.

Likewise, I don’t think your ‘material’ vs. ‘expressional’ existence answers my above question.

When existence A collides with existence B, something happens. That something is an existence, but a fleeting one. How each individual material reacts when an interaction happens with another material existence would be the expression of each material existence
…
If more existence is better, than more expressions of existence are also better.

This makes it sound like more collisions equals better: but this is just chaos, pure chaos, then, no? — Bob Ross

First, lets define pure chaos. Pure chaos would be a situation without rules, and therefore limitless. Meaning that anything could happen. This is actually pure potential, and perhaps the way our universe works fundamentally. Regarding back to my post, "A first cause is logically necessary", the real conclusion from this is that there is no underlying reason for there to be anything, there simply is. And since there is no reason for there to be anything, there is no limitation on what could be.

This means that one second we could have a universe with 1 atom, then the next a universe with trillions. We could have a section of 'space' where a solar system existed for trillions of years, or one that existed for one second. Within infinite chaos over infinite time, everything, including sections of complete law-like order can happen. Considering infinite time and infinite possibilities would actually be the most moral universe as everything can potentially happen.

Of course, what if we are in a time limited universe with limited existence? At that point, we remove the infinite comparison and go to the finite comparison. In the case in which we have 1 atom vs trillions, the trillions universe is a superior set of existence.

As for our law-like limited universe (all we can assume at this point) things are constantly colliding with each other in concentrated set of matter called planets, suns, and solar systems. Let me simplify the idea down even more.

Lets say that the atoms of our universe are hydrogen. They jumble together to create a hot set of burning plasma called the sun. (Yes, I know a sun is made out of helium as well, its about simplification for the underlying point) We can imagine a universe in which there is only a sun. Or in the case of the hydrogen atoms, a tied together combination that they can never break free of. What do we gain and lose?

Again, we simplify it down to a couple of atoms so we can see the basics. Lets say we have 3 hydrogen atoms compressed together into a 'sun'. This cannot change. Now lets take another universe in which we have 2 hydrogens and a helium. In all respects from flat existence, they are equal. But what about expressed existences?

In the case of the 3 H universe, we have 3 base existences with each atom expressing itself as a connection with another to create a new existence that is different from H, a sun.

So, 3 + 1 sun and this can never change. So a total of 4 existence, zero potential existence.

Compare this to the mixed universe where the 'sun' could also fall apart.

Once again 3 existence. This universe has much more potential existence. Not only can they bump each other, but lets say they can also each create a new existence by combining for a time.

So, 3 + Potential existence (3*2*1 (combination of bumps, no reaction) + 3*2*1 (total combinations, new form) + 3 (1 bump into a 2 combo) = 3 + 15 potential existence. Of course, this also isn't including the existence of their separation from each other, which places the potential existence off the map as in the first universe, there can be no separation.

Back to the submarine now:

But, wouldn’t it be better, if “If more existence is better, than more expressions of existence are also better.” and more existence is better, to cause the submarine’s parts to collide, by way of explosion, with as many things as possible so as to maximize the odds of expressions of existence? — Bob Ross

Remember, we're examining morality in this case within particular constraints. In comparing the two situations with the following constraints, we see it is more more al for the 10 'people' to survive for one hour than 1 person to survive for 10 hours.

I'll let you chew on that for a while as I've already typed enough. Keep the questions coming!

But can we take the idea that existence is better — Philosophim

I don't see how we can do that..

But can we take the idea that existence is better
— Philosophim

I don't see how we can do that.. — AmadeusD

Hi AmadeusD, appreciate the visit to the thread! For thread like this I'm presenting several very specific arguments that lead up to conclusions. I'm very open to criticism, as for me, this is more of a work in progress than a finished project. If you're interested in criticizing or asking questions, please do it in relation to the OP's approach. So for example if you see a bit of logic that doesn't make sense, site it, and why it doesn't make sense within the OP, not simply a personal opinion. That will help keep the conversation focused so that both you and I can easily understand where we're each coming from.

For an example, check some of Bob Ross's replies to see how the conversation has evolved. As for your reply, I don't simply say "Existence is better," I lead up through several steps to conclude that. If you think I made a mistake in the steps, please indicate where. This will help me to see that you've read and understood/not understood the OP, and keep the conversation on track.

:ok: Noted

6. Looking at existence, it cannot be destroyed. It simply “is”. There is no “ought” or “should”.
7. Looking at what is, we can come to a conclusion of what “ought” to be. Existence is good. — Philosophim

Im not seeing a connection between (6.) and (7.). We can only conclude that it is from (6.).

8. This conclusion is a choice, not forced. Existence could very well one day “not be”. But since existence “is”, and we are composed of what “is”, we act with the will of existence “to be”. — Philosophim

However, the above is very helpful in terms of supporting why you've made that conclusion. However, i'm unsure how the underlined obtains other than as another choice, not logically necessary. I am an anti-natalist, and so 'being' to me, is not a good thing. The fact is exist is a metaphysical burden i have to mitigate. So, moving to your second set of premises, I reject them all on that basis... I can't get from your first set to your second set.

If the point is that once the choice is made, it all flows, sure. But that butters no bread for meeeee :)

Im not seeing a connection between (6.) and (7.). We can only conclude that it is from (6.). — AmadeusD

True. These points are just summaries. You'll need the full story by reading the typed out details afterwards. However, this has changed a bit from discussing with Bob, so I'll post a revised version for you to check out and poke at. He has his own opinion on it, but I want to see what you determine independently.

The idea is that we don't know if there is an objective morality. If there is though, I find all moral questions boil down to needing the foundation of "Should existence be" or "Should nothing be"? Basically if "Existence should not be" is true, all other moral questions are moot. If there is an objective morality, then only one of these can be right. Either existence should, or should not be. No answer means, no objective morality. Which is fine if you don't believe in one, its about determining what would make the most sense if there was one.

So examine the following:

1. It is unknown whether, A, 'everything should not exist' is true. A = T/F
4. IF A is true, it must not lead to a conclusion which contradicts itself A = A && A != !A
5. Assume 'nothing should exist' is true A = T
6. Because it is moral that 'nothing should exist' the objective claim 'nothing should exist' should also not exist.
8. But if the moral claim, "Existence should not exist" should not exist, then by consequence, "Existence should exist" A -> !A
Therefore, if we are assuming an objective morality exists, the only claim which does not lead to a contradiction to its claims is "Existence should be".

What I'm noting is that if it is, according to itself, it shouldn't be. If such a morality exists, it would be immoral for it to exist. Compare this to the idea of "Contradictions should be encouraged". If that's the case, then we should contradict the point "Contradictions should be encouraged". But if we contradict this, then this necessarily means "Contradictions should not be encouraged". Let me know what you think!

so I'll post a revised version for you to check out and poke at — Philosophim

Ok, fair enough - will keep an eye out.

The idea is that we don't know if there is an objective morality. If there is though, I find all moral questions boil down to needing the foundation of "Should existence be" or "Should nothing be"? — Philosophim

Agree (though i have further thoughts.. heh).

Bold: Cripes; yeah fiar enough. My initial thought was 'that's incoherent' but i reflected a few minutes and I actually think this is very, very reasonable and a problem not-oft dealt with. Thank you for that.

all other moral questions are moot — Philosophim

Do you mean by this, that they are ipso facto immoral given that being is immoral? Or that they just don't matter because there's no possible way to answer accurately?

Your New List
(im not great with any kind of formal logic, so bear with any serious mistakes in my comments here please!)
I would understand the claim 'nothing should exist' as better repped. by "existence shouldn't be". Otherwise, I find room for existence to me moral, but anything existing to be immoral (including the statement). But if existence itself shouldn't be (as an objective moral claim) we are already too far gone to make a comment on it. We exist :)

If it is F that nothing should exist, and something SHOULD exist, how can we get to a moral agent from 'something'?

This isn't an easy answer because we're talking about what people should do. But we're not there yet! I know, its a big change in thinking. That's the point. An objective morality shouldn't need people.
…
Its about preferable states.

I get that moral facts are, well, facts...so they aren’t dependent on subjects; but I would say moral facts are about behavior and thusly are only useful to a subject. Yes, we can say it is bad when a hurricane destroys people’s houses, but the relevance of morality is for subjects—not the hurricane. If you are saying something different than this, then I don’t understand what you mean by “morality shouldn’t need people”.

No mandates yet! We aren't to consciousness yet. Just states of existence.

I just meant by “mandate” that it is obligatory to create more existence, because it is directly implied, nay entailed, by:

1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.

And this lands you, at least prima facie, in a super counter-intuitive moral position. That’s my worry. Sure, it could still be true and be super counter-intuitive; but no one is going to accept that we have create as many things as we can.

For a very simple start, lets have universe A, and B. A has two atoms (Aristotelian for simplification), while B has 3 atoms. Comparing the two, which is better according to our foundation? Universe B

I don’t see how B is better. I get that 3 is better than 2 if #1 (that I quoted above), but this makes me question how you derived that more existence is better from existence is good: could you elaborate?
This may just be the ambiguity in “existence is good”. What does it mean for existence itself to be good? Are you just saying “existence is preferable to non-existence”?

Taken to a more human level for a minute, lets imagine that a world with magical unicorns ends up being the most existence.

Like, in number? What constitutes “most existence”? Number of “material” and “expressive” existent entities?

First, lets define pure chaos.

So this section, I don’t think, answered my worry: isn’t this kind of pure chaos you described the best possible reality in your view? This, again, goes against all moral intuitions I have (: You are advocating for the good being destruction and construction alike.

Remember, we're examining morality in this case within particular constraints. In comparing the two situations with the following constraints, we see it is more more al for the 10 'people' to survive for one hour than 1 person to survive for 10 hours.

My point is that the real elephant in the room, which needs to be addressed before discussion which of the two options you gave is better, is that no one will agree that the best option is to blow up the entire submarine, let alone that it is an option at all. You seem to be saying it is not only a validly morally permissible option, but it is, in fact, the best option.

In terms of having to preserve 10 people over killing all but one, most people, including myself, will agree with that. I am trying to size up how many bullets you are biting though with this theory.

My initial thought was 'that's incoherent' but i reflected a few minutes and I actually think this is very, very reasonable and a problem not-oft dealt with. — AmadeusD

Thanks! I'm less concerned with being right here as getting people to think. I'm glad you got to experience that.

all other moral questions are moot
— Philosophim

Do you mean by this, that they are ipso facto immoral given that being is immoral? — AmadeusD

This right here. If "Existence should not be", then nothing else matters.

I would understand the claim 'nothing should exist' as better repped. by "existence shouldn't be". — AmadeusD

Its equivalent so use whatever is clearer for you.

But if existence itself shouldn't be (as an objective moral claim) we are already too far gone to make a comment on it. We exist :) — AmadeusD

This is another approach to take as well. Even if you don't want to go into all the logic, there does come a point in which it makes a lot more sense to say "Existence should exist" if you of course want to justify your own existence.

If it is F that nothing should exist, and something SHOULD exist, how can we get to a moral agent from 'something'? — AmadeusD

This is where the theory gets a bit weird. I go into the idea of starting to quantify existence and seeing what works out. I recommend going over the OP at the second part to get an idea. If you still don't get it, the post right above your first one I'm replying to Bob about that section. Let me know what you think!