No, I'm just asking a question of non-naturalists: why be moral? It seems to me that if non-naturalism is true then moral facts are of no practical import and so I wonder why they'd be motivated to be moral. — Michael

I'm trying to understand what you're getting at I guess.

A divine command theorist would believe it's wrong to murder for some over-riding reason, which would be that the universe would be better in some meaningful way if the rule were followed. That they might tell you they don't know in what way because it's a mystery doesn't make them a non-naturalist because it is nature that is improved by the act.

And even with divine command theory there is the whole argument about whether God can do evil, which means the good is the good regardless of what God says, so it's not like God can decree baby killing God good and so you'd be right to reject such a decree.

I just think non-naturalism is untenable because I don't think it logically works. Is it to mean that baby murdering might be good even if all physical evidence is to the contrary and there's no way to disprove it by looking at outcome?

With your Muslim friend, I must assume she thinks her lesbianism is immoral because it is disrupting something in the universe, right?

I didn't say nothing morally bad will happen. I said that nothing non-morally bad will happen. — Michael

Yes. Nothing non-morally bad will happen.

But you have only ruled out moral deficiency by fiat.

It remains that if vegetarianism is true, then eating meat is bad.

I'm trying to understand what you're getting at I guess. — Hanover

Assume that it is immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. What are the practical consequences?
Assume that it is not immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. What are the practical consequences?

Any practical consequences in the first case are the same as any practical consequences in the second case. As such, whether or not it is immoral to eat meat makes no practical difference.

Compare with:

Assume that the water is boiling. I put my hand in the water. What are the practical consequences?
Assume that the water is not boiling. I put my hand in the water. What are the practical consequences?

There are practical consequences in the first case that differ from the practical consequences in the second case. As such, whether or not the water is boiling makes a practical difference.

So I can see why it matters if the water is boiling. But I can't see why it matters if it's immoral to eat meat.

It remains that if vegetarianism is true, then eating meat is bad. — Banno

I haven't claimed otherwise.

:roll:

Assume that it is immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. What are the practical consequences?
Assume that it is not immoral to eat meat. I eat meat. What are the practical consequences?

Any practical consequences in the first case are the same as any practical consequences in the second case. As such, whether or not it is immoral to eat meat makes no practical difference. — Michael

Change the word "moral" to "legal." Now does it matter? One would expect more people to eat meat if it were legal (or moral) and the consequence would as to how many animals were killed and eaten.

Morality affects people's behaviors and it affects people's responses to you. So, if you it were legal to kill babies, it would change all sorts of things than if it were illegal. Why is it different with morality just because the penalties for violations are not formalized as they are in legal systems?

The idea of seperating the ethical from the legal isn't universal.

I haven't claimed otherwise. — Michael

Indeed

Change the word "moral" to "legal." Now does it matter? — Hanover

Yes, because there are consequences to the breaking the law.

Morality affects people's behaviors and it affects people's responses to you. — Hanover

Moral beliefs affect people's behaviours. If you believe that it is immoral to eat meat then it makes no difference if your belief is true or false. Either way you're going to bitch at me for eating meat.

If you believe that it is immoral to eat meat then it makes no difference if your belief is true or false. — Michael

The same holds true regarding the law. If I believe it's illegal to eat meat and it's not, but everyone acts like it is, and so you sit in a jail cell for having eaten meat, it becomes illegal by our response. That is just to say that legality is based upon people's beliefs, and it's not necessary for a law to be written for reference, but just because it is written and that is what assures one of it's illegality, it is not the writing that makes it illegal. It is our belief that does that.

If you want to say that the law is a seperate entity that exists outside our belief, as if it is a thing in reality that gains substance by its acceptance, the same can be said of morality. That would be the way to describe a moral realism.

All of this is to say (1) there are consequences to breaking moral codes, (2) the distinction between moral codes and legal codes is idiosyncratic to secular societies and not some metaphysical distinction, and (3) the truth value of a claim can be based upon a social norm that is reducible to nothing more than an idea or belief.

"It is wrong to kill babies" is therefore no different for our analysis here than saying "It is illegal to kill babies," and the truth value of either claim is determined the same way in both, which is to refer to beliefs. And even if you wish to elevate these claims beyond beliefs into a real thing in the actual universe, it's no more or less easy to do that to morality or to laws.

All of this is to say (1) there are consequences to breaking moral codes, (2) the distinction between moral codes and legal codes is idiosyncratic to secular societies and not some metaphysical distinction, and (3) the truth value of a claim can be based upon a social norm that is reducible to nothing more than an idea or belief. — Hanover

This would be something like cultural relativism? That isn't the kind of meta-ethics I'm asking about. As per the OP I'm specifically assuming some kind of robust moral realism (objectivism) – and specifically of the non-naturalist kind.

An interesting article I've just found:

Why Should I Be Moral? Revisited, Kai Nielson (1984)

Some philosophers have resisted the very posing of this question. They have taken it to be a pseudo question. I first want to respond to them in a rather brisk manner. That is, I will respond to those who want to reject the question not because it is immoral to ask it but for the reason that it is – or so they believe – senseless to ask it. It makes about as much sense, they claim, as asking "Why are all scarlet things red?" If we reflect carefully on the occurrence of the word "should" in the putative question "Why should I be moral" we will come to see, the claim goes, that we are trying to ask for the logically impossible: we are asking for a moral reason to accept any moral reasons at all.

That objection evaporates as soon as we reflect on the fact that not all intelligible uses of "should" are moral uses of the term. When I ask, "Should I put a bandage on that cut?" I am not normally asking a moral question and the "should" does not here have a moral use. When I ask, "Why should I be moral?" I am not asking, if I have my wits about me, "What moral reason or reasons have I for being moral?" That indeed is like asking "Why are all scarlet things red?" Rather, I am asking, can I, everything considered, give a reason sufficiently strong – a non-moral reason clearly – for my always giving an overriding weight to moral considerations, when they conflict with other considerations, such that I could be shown to be acting irrationally, or at least less rationally than I otherwise would be acting, if I did not give such pride of place to moral considerations?

So your thread argues that apart from the moral reasons for being moral, there are no other reasons to be moral.

Ha! That's weird.

So your thread argues that apart from the moral reasons for being moral, there are no other reasons to be moral. — Banno

I'm not even sure it makes sense to say that there's a moral reason for being moral. It's like saying that there are pragmatic reasons for being pragmatic. It strikes me as a strange way to talk. Rather we should only say that there's a moral reason to not eat meat or a pragmatic reason to eat meat.

The question of the OP, then, is why we choose to consider moral reasons at all. At least we get something out of being practical. There are prima facie no benefits to being moral. Being moral for the sake of being moral seems pointless.

On the face of it there seems to be multiple reasons:

* Our standing with our fellows, with society at large, and with ourselves is elevated by being moral, and reduced when seen to be immoral.
* Our moral training induces a feeling of guilt when we are immoral, and self-satisfaction when moral
* Empathy causes us pain when we cause harm to others, by literally feeling it. Similarly, when we see others in pain, we feel that pain, and ease our own suffering by easing theirs.

* Our standing with our fellows, with society at large, and with ourselves is elevated by being moral, and reduced when seen to be immoral. — hypericin

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. It is pragmatic to behave in ways that society believes is moral.

* Our moral training induces a feeling of guilt when we are moral immoral, and self-satisfaction when moral — hypericin

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. We feel guilty when we behave in ways that we believe are immoral.

Empathy causes us pain when we cause harm to others, by literally feeling it. Similarly, when we see others in pain, we feel that pain, and ease our own suffering by easing theirs. — hypericin

If ethical non-naturalism is true then it might be that causing harm isn't immoral.

And yet we each must act, and hence each must choose what to do.

And yet we each must act, and hence each must choose what to do. — Banno

Yes, so as the OP asks, why consider morality when choosing what to do? Why not just consider our desires and pragmatism?

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. — Michael

The question "Why should I be moral?" presumably means, "Why should I act in accordance with my moral beliefs?" In any epistemic domain, we only ever have access to our beliefs, not to facts themselves. Morality (presuming non-naturalism) is not somehow unique here.

Then, either our beliefs are (or can be) informed by moral facts, in which case the moral facts matter. Or, they cannot, or the facts do not exist, in which case they don't matter.

She told me that she believes it's wrong and struggles with that belief.

To paraphrase, based on her actions, she means: she's struggling with the fact that her culture tells her it's wrong yet she doesn't (personally, meaning: morally) believe it's wrong. The evidence is that if her moral code was that it's wrong A) it would be in sync with the known cultural/ethical opinion of wrongness, so what would be the source of the "struggle"? In that scenario she would merely be a routine sinner who just had an all too human moment of weakness, ho hum. And B) that (presumably) her actions are her personal lifestyle, ie it's a well agonized-over (moral) decision.

Her comment on her belief of it's wrongness, sounds like a layperson's wording that she's been brought up to believe it's wrong (by her culture's ethics).

Yes, so as the OP asks, why consider morality when choosing how to act? Why not consider wants and desires and pragmatism? — Michael

I'm no fan of the word "morality'.

But choosing expediency is as much a choice as choosing @Bob Ross's latest grand ethical scheme.

Why not choose expediency? Now you are making an ethical decision.

The fact of having to choose remains, and it remains precisely because of the change in direction of fit. We not only observe, we act.

So here's the foundation of ethics: "What to do?"

Crickey, it took a long time to get your exposition clear.

So here's the foundation of ethics: "What to do?" — Banno

I'm not sure what to make of this. Is this even cognitivism?

Is this even cognitivism? — Michael

No, not even that, not yet.

Here's the poverty of empiricism, naturalism and so on, when it comes to ethics: in looking at how the world is, nothing is said about what to do about it.

No, not even that, not yet. — Banno

Well as I've made clear several times I am considering the implications of ethical non-naturalism. If ethical non-naturalism is true then ...

If you want to argue against ethical non-naturalism then that's a topic for a different discussion, and one on which I might be inclined to agree with you.

in looking at how the world is, nothing is said about what to do about it. — Banno

One's desires, preferences, values, goals, visions are part of the world, no?

Well as I've made clear several times I am considering the implications of ethical non-naturalism. — Michael

Yeah, you introduced that only after folk showed the OP wasn't working. And now, after all the hard work of pulling the "isms" off your account to see what was being said, you have reverted to them again.

I was wondering if @Frank was going to show something of his thoughts about propositional attitudes. They still underpin these posts.

Thanks for the chat.

Hello, Bert. What's new?

What do you want to talk about?

No, not even that, not yet.

Here's the poverty of empiricism, naturalism and so on, when it comes to ethics: in looking at how the world is, nothing is said about what to do about it. — Banno

I think you have it backwards. Morality is mostly about looking backward, not forward. You only feel guilt and grief about what's already been done. We only try the criminal for what she did, not what she will do.

Every person starts out innocent and covers themselves with wrongdoing as they grow and learn. This is what redemption is: to stand back up after having fallen and putting foot to path to try again, having learned what every generation learns anew. You can't hear the moral code handed down to you until you've made the mistakes that bring it home to you. Then it becomes a touchstone that you'll pass to the next generation, but they'll make the same mistakes again on their way to learning it. That's how it has to be.

Morality is mostly about looking backward, not forward. — frank

Perhaps. But what about ethics? It's about what to do, and so faces forward.

Every person starts out innocent and covers themselves with wrongdoing as they grow and learn. — frank

Sounds like you really bought in to the Garden of Eden stuff.

Why be moral?


:smile:


That's like asking...

Why be kind?

Why do what's best for most everyone concerned/included?

Why glorify doing good for goodness' sake?

Why ought we make concerted effort to think about how our behaviour effects/affects the world, and subsequently tailor it to help bring forth goodness while causing the least harm?

Why do what one believes is most helpful and least harmful?

Why be virtuous?

Why be admirable?

Why do our best to affect/effect positive change in the world?


So, why be moral?

Hopefully because we care about everyone who/that is affected/effected by our behaviour.