Here are two possible worlds:

1. It is immoral to harm others
2. It is not immoral to harm others — Michael

It is unclear what you mean by "immoral" and therefore that these are "possible worlds".

Are you saying that if I were to harm others in world (1) then I would be miserable but that if I were to harm others in world (2) then I wouldn't be miserable?

No.

How does that work?

Your false dichotomy doesn't work.

Also the OP is directed at categorical imperatives, not the kind of hypothetical/pragmatic imperatives that you’re describing.

I see. My bad, I should have read the first page of this thread at least. A naturalistic hybrid of 'eudaimonism and disutilitarianism' is my position, not deontologism.

It is unclear what you mean by "immoral" and therefore that these are "possible worlds". — 180 Proof

Assuming ethical non-naturalism, whatever "immoral" means the sentence "it is not immoral to harm others" is not a logical contradiction, and so "it is immoral to harm others" is not necessarily true. If "it is immoral to harm others" is not necessarily true then "it is immoral to harm others" is possibly false.

So if ethical non-naturalism is true then these are two possible worlds:

1. It is immoral to harm others
2. It is not immoral to harm others

Assuming that in either case we believe that it is immoral to harm others, does it even matter which world we're in?

Assuming ethical non-naturalism — Michael

Ah, okay, I assume ethical naturalism (as suggested by my reference to 'eusociality' and 'culture' in my old post linked above).

Just seeing this thread, and only read the first post. Hopefully not annoying everyone with stuff that's been discussed to death.

But what if what is right is what we find reprehensible? What if we ought to kill babies for fun? — Michael

How would it have been determined that it is right?

1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies. — Michael

I hadn't paid this much attention.

Why not insist that if one ought not kill babies, then one ought not kill babies in every possible world? That such moral truth is necessarily true.

Can you rule this out, @Michael? That world 3 is impossible.

See here.

Assuming ethical non-naturalism, whatever "immoral" means the sentence "it is not immoral to harm others" is not a logical contradiction, — Michael

That's just reasserting that it's not a contradiction. Presumably a harm is immoral regardless of where it takes place - in any possible world.

Again, that's what harm is.

Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!"

Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!" — Banno

:up:

That's just reasserting that it's not a contradiction. — Banno

If ethical non-naturalism is true then “immoral” doesn’t mean “harmful”.

If “immoral” doesn’t mean “harmful” then “this is harmful” doesn’t mean “this is immoral”.

If “this is harmful” doesn’t mean “this is immoral” then “if this is harmful then this is immoral” is not a tautology.

If “if this is harmful then this is immoral” is not a tautology then “this is harmful and this is not immoral” is not a contradiction.

If “this is harmful and this is not immoral” is not a contradiction then it is possible that something is harmful but not immoral.

Therefore, if ethical non-naturalism is true then it is possible that something is harmful but not immoral.

Again, "Why be moral?" is an infelicitous question - being moral is what you ought to do. Hence the answer to "ought you be moral?" is "yes!" — Banno

These are two different questions:

1. Ought I be moral?
2. Why would I be moral?

“Ought I” and “why would I” mean different things.

The answer to the first is, presumably, “yes”. The answer to the second isn’t “yes”.

And it doesn’t prima facie follow that if the answer to the first is “yes” then the answer to the second is “because I ought to”. Or at the very least it’s not the only answer. Other answers may be more compelling.

harm, n.
Evil (physical or otherwise) as done to or suffered by some person or thing; hurt, injury, damage, mischief. Often in the set phrase ‘to do more harm… — OED

:wink: My bolding.

That’s ethical naturalism. I’m talking about ethical non-naturalism.

That’s ethical naturalism — Michael

Sorry - the OED is ethically naturalist? Can you explain that?

Sorry - the OED is ethically naturalist? Can you explain that? — Banno

It’s defining evil as harm.

Well, no, it isn't. It's defining "harm" as doing evil. The reverse.

Not seeing why this is significant.

When I'm using the term "harm" I'm using it in the sense of "physical or emotional injury".

Hmm.
Might come back to this later. Looks like word play. As if "physical or emotional injury" were not evil.

As if "physical or emotional injury" were not evil. — Banno

If ethical non-naturalism is true then "if X causes physical or emotional injury then X is evil" is not a tautology.

But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't the case, you wouldn't kill babies. Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make? — Michael

I say none because for me the ontology of morality is a field that arises from overcomplication of otherwise straightforward things. What is morality but the rules we develop as a society? That is the definition of morality even. "Abstract object which sprawl from the universals of good and evil" (or whatever) is not the definition.

There is a possible world in which the rules we develop as a society includes "kill babies" (Hello, Incas and Canaanites!), and that would be then moral.

The fact that morality is relative does not make it worthless. I would argue in fact that the relativity of morals makes it even more important in the sociological sense.

:up:

If ethical non-naturalism is true then... — Michael

:roll:

Besides misquoting me, rationality =/= "to rationalize", lil troll.

As if "physical or emotional injury" were not evil. — Banno

Most societies identify circumstances in which it's good to do physical and emotional injury. Plenty of moral codes identify actions as evil even if there's no associated harm.

This is not to say you can't decide that evil and harm are coextensive, it's just that you're not reflecting what social groups usually say. You're just pedaling your own religion.

if ethical non-naturalism is true then these are two possible worlds:

1. It is immoral to harm others
2. It is not immoral to harm others

Assuming that in either case we believe that it is immoral to harm others, does it even matter which world we're in? — Michael

Ethical non-naturalism isn't at all a clear theory, so you'd have to define how you're using it to make sense of this. There seems little consensus on what it means. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/

Regardless, I think we can agree on some fundamental aspects of it: it is a form of realism, meaning morality exists outside of the observer, and morals are not reducible to physical properties.

This leads to certain epistemological issues, namely, how can we know them if they lack physical properties. This leads some to a form of intuitionism, where it is said the observer just recognizes right and wrong. Regardless of why a person believes something moral under non-naturalism, that doesn't change the truth value of the moral proposition.

That is, under moral non-naturalism if I say that murdering babies is ethical and I truly believe it is, the truth of that statement is subject to the non-natural reality (which itself is the most complexing concept in this theory), not my belief.

As to your specific question I quoted above, yes, it matters if we think we shouldn't harm others if we should because we'd be wrong if we didn't.

Your hypothetical is bizarre to be sure in that it hypothesizes what we accept as wrong and assume we're wrong about our wrongness.

Keep in mind as well that under non-naturalism, we're not saying the person dictates the truth, but there must therefore be some underlying non-natural cause resulting in the morality of the event. Just as we might think a flower red in the natural world based upon our eyesight, it is the flower itself that is causing that, not us.

I don't believe non-naturalism suggests no cause and effect, but simply just no natural physicality.

So, if I am in society A and we all believe slavery right, we are all wrong. The naturalist/ non-naturalist issue plays no role in that. If we think slavery wrong and we're wrong, then we'd be wrong not to enslave as well.

As to your specific question I quoted above, yes, it matters if we think we shouldn't harm others if we should because we'd be wrong if we didn't. — Hanover

Why does it matter if we're wrong? It makes no practical difference to our lives.

Why does it matter if we're wrong? It makes no practical difference to our lives. — Michael

This assumes a consequentialist justification is necessary for morality, which means your beef isn't against non-naturalism, but it's with deontolgy.

If the presumption is that we ought be moral as a matter of duty without regard to outcome, then you either assume you are a royal subject subservient to a higher master or you have a view that somehow fidelity to morality results in some very distant alignment of the universe that is of a higher order.

The latter is consequentialist, but it places concern for that consequence beyond the scope of any meaningful control, so just because it doesn't matter to our lives in the here and now isn't critical.

But let us assume consequences ultimately do determine morality, then you ought kill babies if that is moral, regardless of your confusion caused by your inability to see that distantly.

I'm invited to a dinner party.

"Hey, bert1, nice of you to come. Have you had a good day?"
"Yeah, fab. I killed 21 babies. Great day!"
"Oh bert1! That's dreadful. It's morally wrong to kill babies."
"Is it? Let me just check I've understood you. I shouldn't kill babies. It's morally wrong. If I kill babies, I'm evil. I'm obligated not to kill babies. I have no doubt you are right, although I don't understand how you know that. You are all much better at morality than I am. Have I understood?"
"Yes! Oh thank goodness you've finally got the memo."
"Well, I think I'll be off now. There's a few more babies I'l like to finish off before tomorrow."
"What? But you've just agreed that it's wrong!"
"Yes, it is clearly wrong. But I just don't care about that. I like killing babies, and I don't mind being evil at all. I understand i am morally obligated not to kill babies, but I'd much rather just kill them anyway."

Has bert1 understood the concept of moral obligation?

[separate thread perhaps?]

I'm invited to a dinner party.

"Hey, bert1, nice of you to come. Have you had a good day?"
"Yeah, fab. I killed 21 babies. Great day!"

Has bert1 understood the concept of moral obligation? — bert1

.

Perhaps. But I might question bert1’s understanding of proper dinner party etiquette.

This assumes a consequentialist justification is necessary for morality, which means your beef isn't against non-naturalism, but it's with deontolgy. — Hanover

Not exactly.

In one possible world hurting people is wrong because of the consequences.

In another possible world hurting people leads to the same consequences but it isn’t wrong.

Why does it matter which world we’re in?

In one possible world we just have a duty to not hurt people.

In another possible world we don’t have a duty to not hurt people.

Why does it matter which world we’re in?

If ethical non naturalism is true then it seems to be that whether or not our moral beliefs are true has no practical import. Our lives go on the same.

If ethical non naturalism is true then it seems to be that whether or not our moral beliefs are true has no practical import. Our lives go on the same. — Michael

Why would it be different if ethical naturalism were the case? It might just be that murdering babies is moral in such a possible world.

I don't take non-naturalism to mean there is no reason for its immorality, just that whatever reason there is, it's not a natural one.

Why would it be different if ethical naturalism were the case? It might just be that murdering babies is moral in such a possible world. — Hanover

If ethical naturalism is true and "immoral" just means something like "harmful" then a world where nothing is immoral is a world where nothing is harmful. There would be a significant observable difference between living in that world and living in the world we're in now.

It would make a difference to our lives if our beliefs about what is harmful and what is not harmful are wrong.

There would be a significant observable difference between living in that world and living in the world we're in now. — Michael

There would be an observable difference in either world. What would not be observable is the morality of the event.

I could tell if babies were murdered in a non-naturalistic ethical world as well, and I'd feel the same suffering in either. I'd just not link that observation of suffering to morality.

If you told me baby murdering were ethical, I guess I'd have to murder babies even if it made me sad to wrestle them from the hands of their mothers and dash them upon rocks.