However, what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino

A world with no existence is metaphysically impossible because metaphysics deals with existence.
A world with no existence is logically possible because logically there are possible worlds where nothing exists.

Basically, there is nothing controversial about this, things that are logically possible are not always physically possible. For example: "I am flying faster than light". The laws of physics state that is impossible, however, it is not logically impossible, as there is nothing logically necessary about the speed of light.

However, what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino

We can see from the varied responses to the OP that the concept of metaphysics is understood in distinctly different ways within philosophy. My understanding of metaphysics comes from the way the term is employed by postmodern , post structuralist and phenomenological philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger. Whereas your Venn diagram seems to derive from Analytic approaches, if I were to draw up a diagram, metaphysics would be the circle encompassing the physical and the logical. Formal systems of logic, from Aristotle to Frege, presuppose a particular overarching metaphysical framework as their condition of possibility. Metaphysics taken in this sense refers to a gestalt framework constituting a web of interconnected elements of meaning. It is a perspectival worldview or system of values. Logic, as a historically situated cultural construction, doesn’t sit outside value systems but is instead a product of a particular system . What is possible or impossible is defined on the basis of the way a metaphysical system is organized. When we move from one metaphysics to another, the criteria of possibility change along with it, including how we understand the workings of logic.

A world with no existence is metaphysically impossible because metaphysics deals with existence. — Corvus

Isn't the idea of nothingness a purely metaphysical construct? Hence, a world of nothingness would then be a possible metaphysical construct - about which the only thing to be said is that nothing exists in the possible world. Akin to an empty set.

A world with no existence is metaphysically impossible because metaphysics deals with existence.
A world with no existence is logically possible because logically there are possible worlds where nothing exists. — Corvus

Metaphysics can also be taken to mean a perspective, paradigm or worldview within which we make use of and interpret the meaning of such concepts as existence and logic. Without a metaphysics, we wouldn’t be able to makes sense of notions like existence and logic.

Isn't the idea of nothingness a purely metaphysical construct? Hence, a world of nothingness would then be a possible metaphysical construct — javra

But because of the concept "a world" implying the ontological entity, "a world of nothingness" would be contradiction in metaphysics.

Metaphysician can also be taken to mean a perspective, paradigm or worldview within which we make use of and interpret the meaning of such concepts as existence and logic. — Joshs

It would be the sense of metaphysical metaphors rather than the traditional metaphysics as a subject.

But because of the concept "a world" implying the ontological entity, "a world of nothingness" would be contradiction in metaphysics. — Corvus

Yea, I could see that use of semantics, and I for the record tend to agree with it. But I'm thinking of the question which many have philosophically asked of "why is there something rather than nothing". This question makes no sense without the metaphysical understanding of absolute nonexistence as a possibility regarding what might be the case of the world. Again, akin to an empty set ... that happens to be global. So the "ontological entity" here specified would be nothingness of itself.

So the "ontological entity" where specified would be nothingness of itself. — javra

Yeah that is the exact part where the contradiction arises, which voids the metaphysical ground of "a world with nothingness".

Yeah that is the exact part where the contradiction arises, which voids the metaphysical ground of "a world with nothingness". — Corvus

In honesty, I happen to uphold that nothingness is a logical impossibility due to unavoidable contradictions and reifications. But this is contrary to this affirmation:

A world with no existence is logically possible because logically there are possible worlds where nothing exists. — Corvus

So to further in my playing the devil's advocate here, were a world of no existence to be logically possible, then why would nothingness (i.e., a world of no existence) not be metaphysically possible? (As in the possibility of there being nothing rather than something.)

In honesty, I happen to uphold that nothingness is a logical impossibility due to unavoidable contradictions and reifications. But this is contrary to this affirmation: — javra

Without the basic semantic rigour, all science and philosophy would lose their footings for debates, even metaphysics.

So to further in my playing the devil's advocate here, were a world of no existence to be logically possible, then why would nothingness (i.e., a world of no existence) not be metaphysically possible? (As in the possibility of there being nothing rather than something.) — javra

If someone comes along with a concept called "a fullness of emptiness", and insist it has meanings, then we stop and wonder what it is about before even opening the metaphysics or logic books.

Agreed. I'll rephrase: why do you find the concept logically possible to begin with?

then why would nothingness (i.e., a world of no existence) not be metaphysically possible? (As in the possibility of there being nothing rather than something.) — javra

Because Metaphysics is all about existence. If there were no existence, Metaphysics wouldn't exist, and wouldn't have existed at all. That would be impossible for Metaphysics for its own existence.

Laws of thought which facilitate all logic exist as well. Do you then agree that the concept of "a possible world of nothingness" is not logically possible ... this in addition to not being metaphysically possible as well?

Laws of thought which facilitate all logic exist as well. Do you then agree that the concept of "a possible world of nothingness" is not logically possible ... this in addition to not being metaphysically possible as well? — javra

In Modal Logic it is possible to have a possible world that nothing exists. Obviously you must be a modal realist to accept the points. If you are an anti-modalist, then that is fair enough.

In Modal Logic it is possible to have a world that nothing exists. — Corvus

Thanks for the video posting, you. Cute. This Modal Logic, which can diverge into different forms, is itself rooted in metaphysical presuppositions regarding possibility and necessity. (This in addition to conforming to the laws of thought.) So to claim that a possibility emerging from modal logic is not, by its very origin, a metaphysical possibility is to me odd. But so be it, on my part at least.

It's logically possible that the person who is posting as wonderer1 right now is not the same person as posted previously as wonderer1. However it isn't metaphysically possible.
— wonderer1

How so? — Lionino

Let X = "The person who made that post as wonderer1 is the same person as the person who posted previously as wonderer1."

It is the case that X.

Therefore X is metaphysically possible.

If ~X is also metaphysically possible, then it would be the case that a logical contradiction (X and ~X) is metaphysically possible.

It is not the case that the logical contradiction (X and ~X) is metaphysically possible.

Therefore it is not the case that ~X is metaphysically possible.

It's physically possible for superman to murder and rob from those less fortunate than him (in the marvel world). It's even logically possible. But, insofar as such actions are inherently antithetical to supermans identity (any possible world in which superman does possess such traits, in a real way, he ceases to be equitable with superman in some sense). This is a poor example, but I hope you can take my point.

But because of the concept "a world" implying the ontological entity, "a world of nothingness" would be contradiction in metaphysics. — Corvus

Is it metaphysically possible for nothing physical to exist?

if I were to draw up a diagram, metaphysics would be the circle encompassing the physical and the logical. — Joshs

Me too. Logic must be metaphysically possible.

Let X = "The person who made that post as wonderer1 is the same person as the person who posted previously as wonderer1." — wonderer1

If you take the conclusion to be a premise, I can prove that God is in my backpack making waffles too.



Interesting. That would be the case of something physically possible but metaphysically impossible.

Is it metaphysically possible for nothing physical to exist? — Michael

It is possible that nothing physical to exist metaphysically such as mind, spirit, concepts ...etc.

Let X = "The person who made that post as wonderer1 is the same person as the person who posted previously as wonderer1."
— wonderer1

If you take the conclusion to be a premise, I can prove that God is in my backpack making waffles too. — Lionino

Since I am the person who has made all the posts as wonderer1, I know X. How exactly do I get from there to God and waffles? (It is breakfast time.)

If ~X is also metaphysically possible, then it would be the case that a logical contradiction (X and ~X) is metaphysically possible. — wonderer1

(◇p ∧ ◇¬p) → ◇(p∧¬p) is invalid.


https://www.umsu.de/trees/#(~9p~1~9~3p)~5~9(p~1~3p)

(◇p ∧ ◇¬p) → ◇(p∧¬p) is invalid. — Banno

I was wondering how long it would take. :wink:

So to claim that a possibility emerging from modal logic is not, by its very origin, a metaphysical possibility is to me odd. But so be it, on my part at least. But so be it, on my part at least. — javra

Modal Logic is a branch of Logic, not Metaphysics. But logically speaking, if there was nothing existing at all, then Metaphysics wouldn't exist either. Logically it is possible, but from Metaphysical point of view, it is impossible.

Thanks for the video posting, you. Cute. — javra

:cool: :pray:

But logically speaking, if there was nothing existing at all, then Metaphysics wouldn't exist either. Logically it is possible, but from Metaphysical point of view, it is impossible. — Corvus

It is possible to make the hypothetical claim that nothing exists. But you are doing this from the standpoint of existence. i.e. your hypothetical-logical claim of non-existence exists. You cannot hypothesize away existence just by averring the hegemony of logic. The claim is existentially-bound.

It is possible to make the hypothetical claim that nothing exists. But you are doing this from the standpoint of existence. i.e. your hypothetical-logical claim of non-existence exists. You cannot hypothesize away existence just by averring the hegemony of logic. The claim is existentially-bound. — Pantagruel

Your point sound confused in the methodology. Hypothesises are the methods for the scientific enquiries. Metaphysics and Logic do not adopt hypothesis as their methodology.

It is possible that nothing physical to exist metaphysically such as mind, spirit, concepts ...etc. — Corvus

Is it metaphysically possible for something that exists to be destroyed?

Is it metaphysically possible for something that exists to be destroyed? — Michael

It would be possible in the conceptual perspective of the destruction and changes of existences.