The Necessity of Genetic Components in Personal Identity

schopenhauer1

This is from a breakaway of a Ryle thread in his lecture on fatalism:

I am making a claim that if the gametes are different than the one that was your set of gametes, whatever the case may be (whether they are similar to you or not), THAT person who was conceived a second before or after with different gametes is NOT you. I really want to establish THIS point, at the least. That THIS point is not a matter of debate or interpretation, but just a fact that that person born from a different set of gametes is not you.

The reason this is important, is that it then establishes some other more interpretive things. That is to say, you cannot in reality have a person born under different circumstances (prior to the point of conception) because those circumstances would almost certainly result in a different set of gametes, and hence a different person than the one that is reflecting back on the altered history. If a matter of seconds matters to whether it being a different person, then all the other circumstances that led to the conception would also be different and almost certainly would be a different person. So you can only IMAGINE after the fact that you could be different, but not ever in fact be different. If you were born at such and such time, in such and such place, at such and such moment, any minor difference that would impede those gametes at that time getting together, would mean that the person born would not be YOU (the person reflecting back on their possible alternate history).

After the above has been agreed upon as a matter of fact, then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.? You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity.

That being said, a TON of counterfactual ideas about "being you" are discounted if you at least admit that prior to conception, there is no way any other set of circumstances would have been the YOU who is reflecting back on their counterfactual history because any slight change in the antecedent causes would have ~~affected~~ effected the set of gametes that would have been conceived, if they were to even be conceived at all.

schopenhauer1

@Ludwig V here's your separate thread on the topic of identity and conception.

Bella fekete

“ That being said, a TON of counterfactual ideas about "being you" are discounted if you at least admit that prior to conception, there is no way any other set of circumstances would have been the YOU who is reflecting back on their counterfactual history because any slight change in the antecedent causes would have affected effected the set of gametes that would have been conceived, if they were to even be conceived at all.”.

-schopenhauer

How is it that ‘in no way that ton of ideas about who you are done affected antecedent causes to the degree that it would have disaffected an unintended formative identity?

Bella fekete

Sorry the above reply in haste was mis written. It should read, that the absolute certainty of proofs to that effect are , even if , a shade below expectations, may make a huge difference , in a retrospective effort to change the way things may have turned out.

schopenhauer1

Sorry the above reply in haste was mis written. It should read, that the absolute certainty of proofs to that effect are , even if , a shade below expectations, may make a huge difference , in a retrospective effort to change the way things may have turned out. — Bella fekete

Not quite sure what you are saying but if you are asking why this discounts a lot of counterfactuals about things like, "What if I was born a...".. The reason is, that any circumstance that led to a different circumstance of conception between a specific sperm and egg would have led to a different person, one that was not the sperm and egg that was to gestate and develop into YOU.

schopenhauer1

I'm just waiting for @Ludwig V to have some sort of counter to this seemingly factual understanding of how identity works.

unenlightened

I would suggest that this is a gross misunderstanding of personal identity. Identical twins are not the same person, and if someone undergoes gene therapy they do not become someone else, in the sense that a sober person is likewise the same person when drunk or that the same person can be happy at one time and sad at another, or young at one time and old at another. Wrt. social identity, we can stipulate a genetic absolute in this sort of way, but in such case I am identifiable by my genetic code or equally by my fingerprints, but not as them.

Ludwig V

So does this mean that the idea that I might have been a musician, or an accountant, or a Roman Catholic, are all nonsense? Odd, don't you think? Might have I had fair hair or blue eyes? Could I have married someone else? Might my children have turned out to be criminals or saints? It's all very peculiar.

DNA matching is indeed the gold standard of identity, but only in the way that fingerprints are a silver standard and facial recognition a bit unreliable. That is, DNA was identified and installed as an empirical criterion, not a conceptual criterion.

To put it another way, DNA is part of the story about how I came to be - a cause. So perhaps you are picking up on causal determinism? But it is not the whole story. What happens to me while I am growing plays just as important a role as DNA. Compare an oak tree. It starts from DNA, but the tree that it becomes depends also on how it grows in the environment that it happens to be in. If the acorn had landed elsewhere, it would have been a different tree. Perhaps we can agree that DNA is a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of a new person being created, thus recognizing that other factors play their crucial parts.

And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. — schopenhauer1

This is very helpful. It indicates that the foundation of personal identity, for you, is spatio-temporal continuity in the narrative of a life. If that's right, then you are denying that people who undergo changes that they think they have become a different person are simply wrong. I admit that is a bit problematic, but I don't see how you can dogmatically rule that out. Perhaps we need to think more carefully about what being a person is, and how it is something different from being a human being.

But if people can change in the course of their life, without those changes being so radical that they become a different person, what makes the gametes so important and sensitive that ANY change in them produces a different person. It seems absurd to suppose that if I was conceived 5 minutes earlier or later, the resulting person would not be me.

wonderer1

Copied from the other thread:

I could have fair hair and still be me. I could be six inches shorter than I am and still be me. I could have musical talent as opposed to competence and still be me. Minor changes don't matter. — Ludwig V

I'd think you can only imagine being yourself with such supeficial changes, but what about less obvious, but more profound differences? Suppose the genes this 'alternate you' got resulted in a person with an IQ 40 points lower than yours? Suppose the genes alternate you got resulted in schizophrenia? Would
you think the alternate you to be you in that case?

Bella fekete

Sorry, comment meant for wonderer1.

schopenhauer1

I would suggest that this is a gross misunderstanding of personal identity. Identical twins are not the same person, and if someone undergoes gene therapy they do not become someone else, in the sense that a sober person is likewise the same person when drunk or that the same person can be happy at one time and sad at another, or young at one time and old at another. Wrt. social identity, we can stipulate a genetic absolute in this sort of way, but in such case I am identifiable by my genetic code or equally by my fingerprints, but not as them. — unenlightened

So, I see you didn't pay close attention to some of my OP. I said here:

After the above has been agreed upon as a matter of fact, then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.? You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1

wonderer1

↪Bella fekete

Like many others here, I can't make much sense of the things you say, and I would have to recommend that you talk to a neuropsycholgist about that.

schopenhauer1

I'd think you can only imagine being yourself with such supeficial changes, but what about less obvious, but more profound differences? Suppose the genes this 'alternate you' got resulted in a person with an IQ 40 points lower than yours? Suppose the genes alternate you got resulted in schizophrenia? Would
you think the alternate you to be you in that case? — wonderer1

You don't even need to speculate about that. Psychosomatic diseases can already impair someone this way so that at one point they are lucid and at another, they cannot access their thoughts as clearly...

schopenhauer1

↪Ludwig V

So all of this is not addressing my point which is that genetic identity (same sperm and egg made you who you are) is NECESSARY even if NOT sufficient...

unenlightened

↪schopenhauer1

I read it, but i decided it would be a cold day in hell before your nonsense achieved much agreement. So I decided not to wait.

schopenhauer1

I read it, but i decided it would be a cold day in hell before your nonsense achieved much agreement. So I decided not to wait. — unenlightened

Why say it's nonsense? Why can't what I say achieve agreement? This is perplexing. And why the overall vitriolic response? This is poisoning the well, no?

schopenhauer1

I realize one can go on a wacky crusade of exceptions and give me some interesting sci-fi scenarios along the lines of a Ship of Theseus whereby someone's genetic code was replaced from its initial code to a different code, so would that then be a different person? Indeed, how much genetic engineering would the "person" then be a different "person" than the starting point? I could concede that it might be different. I would not know at what point. But certainly, if a different set of gametes were used, even by the same parent in artificial insemination, it would still be a different person. Each sperm cell has a different combination of genetic information that gets reshuffled in meiosis.

But it was said here:

But if people can change in the course of their life, without those changes being so radical that they become a different person, what makes the gametes so important and sensitive that ANY change in them produces a different person. It seems absurd to suppose that if I was conceived 5 minutes earlier or later, the resulting person would not be me. — Ludwig V

So that's my point. There would be no YOU conceived. That person is someone else. You keep taking the POV of someone who can transpose their current personhood onto a different person. I contend, even if that person was conceived five minutes earlier, and had the same life experiences, that would be a different person. That would not be you, but someone else.

Janus

↪schopenhauer1

I think what you say is right, at least in the sense that we are all unique organisms. If a different sperm had fertilized the ovum that grew to became you then it would not be you but someone else...unless the theory of the soul as self were true. In the latter case it would be you in a different body. So to speculate about possible worlds in which you were born to do different parents and so on, would always be to invoke such a theory of the soul, else the speculations be nonsense.

schopenhauer1

I think what you say is right, at least in the sense that we are all unique organisms. If a different sperm had fertilized the ovum that grew to became you then it would not be you but someone else... — Janus

:up:

unless the theory of the soul as self were true. In the latter case it would be you in a different body. — Janus

Indeed. But I suspect people who don't necessarily believe in a theory of a transposable "soul" into different physical bodies, STILL TALK AS IF that is the case because they are not keeping in mind the necessity of genetic origin for a person to have been the same person when providing counterfactual scenarios.

Janus

↪schopenhauer1

I added to my post as you were replying, making much the same point as your latter paragraph.

schopenhauer1

↪Janus

:up:

In the latter case it would be you in a different body. So to speculate about possible worlds in which you were born to do different parents and so on, would always be to invoke such a theory of the soul, else the speculations be nonsense. — Janus

Yes, I think it's actually quite easy to do to say, "Oh wouldn't be weird if I grew up in this or that place, time, or otherwise." And it can be entertained in hindsight via imagination. But never (in any modern conceivable way) would that actually have been YOU.

Janus

↪schopenhauer1

:up: Yep, we agree on that.

schopenhauer1

I do apologize, for breaking rules, with the assurance of admitting to be a slow lerner. On account of a rare but not unusual genetic trait, that neuropsychologists have been trumped by, but compelled to stay the course, and raise the impending necessity of accelerating said such learning.

Such uninspired damage control is quite similar and relative to the level of expected ‘internal’ change. — Bella fekete

Not quite catching what you are saying, but it may have been addressed in my post here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/861568

Moliere

I am making a claim that if the gametes are different than the one that was your set of gametes, whatever the case may be (whether they are similar to you or not), THAT person who was conceived a second before or after with different gametes is NOT you. I really want to establish THIS point, at the least. That THIS point is not a matter of debate or interpretation, but just a fact that that person born from a different set of gametes is not you. — schopenhauer1

That may be the claim -- but why believe it?

I think far too much emphasis is put upon DNA when it comes to identity. DNA doesn't relate to who you are in some kind of easily explicable relationship. Just imagine that your own DNA has been mapped, as can be done, and you look at the map: a series of letters consisting of A G T and C. Which part of them causes you to type what you type here? None, of course. But if you cannot establish a relationship between the genetic code of an individual and what they do then I'd say you're mistaken that the genetic code is a necessary identifier. At least existentially what we do is who we are. And @unenlightened has already pointed out how identical twins have identical DNA, but not identical identities. (though it's worth noting here that DNA morphs, too -- so just how identical the DNA is is up for dispute -- 99.99% matching between code is very similar, but not identical identical, and biological processes have a way of finding difference)

I think the real reason DNA is highlighted is because it helped courts. Finally, a marker of identity to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this blood was theirs!

But surely we are more than our legal identities, and that those are certainly up for interpretation.

schopenhauer1

I think far too much emphasis is put upon DNA when it comes to identity. DNA doesn't relate to who you are in some kind of easily explicable relationship. Just imagine that your own DNA has been mapped, as can be done, and you look at the map: a series of letters consisting of A G T and C. Which part of them causes you to type what you type here? None, of course. But if you cannot establish a relationship between the genetic code of an individual and what they do then I'd say you're mistaken that the genetic code is a necessary identifier. At least existentially what we do is who we are. And unenlightened has already pointed out how identical twins have identical DNA, but not identical identities. (though it's worth noting here that DNA morphs, too -- so just how identical the DNA is is up for dispute -- 99.99% matching between code is very similar, but not identical identical, and biological processes have a way of finding difference)

I think the real reason DNA is highlighted is because it helped courts. Finally, a marker of identity to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this blood was theirs!

But surely we are more than our legal identities, and that those are certainly up for interpretation. — Moliere

So also like @unenlightened you (willfully?) ignored this:

After the above has been agreed upon as a matter of fact, then we can possibly get into arguments of identity after the conception/birth of the person. If the person born was from the same gametes as you, would that person in fact really "be" you with various changes in their upbringing, etc.? You can even at this point, ask about indiscernibles regarding twins or clones because those are about the same genetics, and same gametes. I think for example, the case of maternal twins (twins from the same cell that splits), proves that identity is not necessarily wrapped up in genetic origin, otherwise twins would be considered the same person, which would seem absurd. In order for a person to be identified as a separate "person" or "being", one would have to take into account that they have their own X to some degree (body, and/or mind). And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". It would be an approximately similar person, however. So being of the same gametes is necessary but perhaps not sufficient to identity. — schopenhauer1

Especially please pay attention to the necessary but not sufficient part. And yeah I also said this if you want to go down the sci-fi scenarios:

realize one can go on a wacky crusade of exceptions and give me some interesting sci-fi scenarios along the lines of a Ship of Theseus whereby someone's genetic code was replaced from its initial code to a different code, so would that then be a different person? Indeed, how much genetic engineering would the "person" then be a different "person" than the starting point? I could concede that it might be different. I would not know at what point. But certainly, if a different set of gametes were used, even by the same parent in artificial insemination, it would still be a different person. Each sperm cell has a different combination of genetic information that gets reshuffled in meiosis.

But it was said here:
But if people can change in the course of their life, without those changes being so radical that they become a different person, what makes the gametes so important and sensitive that ANY change in them produces a different person. It seems absurd to suppose that if I was conceived 5 minutes earlier or later, the resulting person would not be me.
— Ludwig V

So that's my point. There would be no YOU conceived. That person is someone else. You keep taking the POV of someone who can transpose their current personhood onto a different person. I contend, even if that person was conceived five minutes earlier, and had the same life experiences, that would be a different person. That would not be you, but someone else. — schopenhauer1

Moliere

↪schopenhauer1

Just to make sure I read over your OP again. I think the disconnect is between:

And then, that body or mind is subject to changing experiences that could alter the course of their outlook, life, personality, etc. At that point, you can argue identity. But in no way, a person born of different gametes, even given the same set of experiences, would be "you". — schopenhauer1

these two sentences. In a way this reminds me of the free will debate: determinism vs. free will and so forth.

I think that what differs between these two sentences is the notion that if, at the time I was conceived, a different set of DNA, like the sperm nearby, would have started the process of birth then I'd be a different person. But in the second part you're acknowledging that there are processes after conception that can change twins to explain the initial idea that our gametes are necessary parts of our identity.

What I'm saying is that twin studies suggest that gametes aren't up to the level of necessity. So the scenario you're positing is if in the past when I was conceived I was conceived with different gametes, and you're saying that's absurd and I'm saying "Why?"

schopenhauer1

I think that what differs between these two sentences is the notion that if, at the time I was conceived, a different set of DNA, like the sperm nearby, would have started the process of birth then I'd be a different person. But in the second part you're acknowledging that there are processes after conception that can change twins to explain the initial idea that our gametes are necessary parts of our identity.

What I'm saying is that twin studies suggest that gametes aren't up to the level of necessity. So the scenario you're positing is if in the past when I was conceived I was conceived with different gametes, and you're saying that's absurd and I'm saying "Why?" — Moliere

No, twin studies don't negate necessity, but sufficiency (perhaps). That person would not be that person at some level without the gametes that they were conceived from. They might be another person that had similar experiences, but not that exact person. You can combine it with causality and points of view and experiences, but it is a large part of it. Generally speaking, no one has the EXACT same experiences as someone else. But let us say there was someone adjacent with a different set of DNA but had a very similar upbringing. Clearly, that's not the same person. It is acknowledged, however, that someone's experiences and epigenetics can affect a person's personality, dispositions, and interactions. This may all go into identity of a person, but it's not like that one can just copy and paste these after-birth experiential aspects onto another person and call it "the same person". One can change in the form of the same genetic person, but one cannot transfer over one's identity to another genetic person, barring some science fiction scenarios perhaps.

Moliere

↪schopenhauer1

Is our identity the same as our experiences? Either way, OK, identity here is a relationship between DNA and experience -- however, would that we could know something like differences in experience! How would we know something like this to be able to assert that DNA yields a difference in experience?

I should have started with this but didn't think of it until this morning, but something that throws a wrench in this idea is the existence of introns and exons. DNA is the stable chemical but RNA is the chemical which codes for proteins. The organism is more than their DNA, and because of introns you can switch out whole parts of some organisms DNA and have it be the same organism: That is, sometimes you can switch out an A for a T or a G and have nothing happen other than this replacement, but the organism will continue to function even though the code is slightly different.

But this is to speak functionally. It's the motives of a court which give DNA priority, but surely our identity is more than what the law sees?

schopenhauer1

↪Moliere

One of the things I hate in these debates is when people don’t acknowledge what was already acknowledged. Please look back to my posts above about sci-fi scenarios and the Ship of Theseus.

That being said, while I acknowledge that while DNA goes under contingent changes after conception, it is the initial combination of gametes that sets the stage for these variations. That is why it is necessary but perhaps not sufficient. By and large, the genetic code provided from the two gametes provides the unique variation that provide the initial individualization, and stays constant while the variations in experience and epigenetics can thus further shape the individual. Also note that these experiences aren't parallel, but in combination WITH these initial genetic instructions that makes the individual. It's not just a vanilla tabula rasa that then takes on any experience. They both shape each other.

And again, twins and clones can be offered as some sort of counterpoint, but it's not if you look at the argument. The argument is about necessity, not sufficiency. Another thing to consider is that you can clearly have the same genetics (like a clone), and it is a different person based on experiences and perhaps even genetic variations in coding, etc. They also take up differences in space. That is to say, two genetically identical people taking up two different bodies/minds are still two different people. However, they certainly wouldn't be their identity as them without that initial DNA combination contributing to their genetic blueprint. It is unique not that it is the only one, but that it is part of them and comprises what makes them them.

Moliere

The argument is about necessity, not sufficiency. — schopenhauer1

Maybe our understanding of necessity differs? To my mind if you can switch a part of the code and have the same results then there is not a necessary relationship between code and an organism's identity. Since you can do that -- not in science fiction but in science -- it just doesn't strike me as something I'd call necessary for personal identity. That is I can see it plausible that if I had a different code I could still be the same person in a counter-factual scenario because I don't think identity is necessitated by code. It would depend upon which part of the code was switched -- I could also have a genetic disease due to this, for instance, and I'd say I'm a different person then. But if one base got switched out in an intron then that is a scenario that seems plausible to me to possibly make no difference in the course of my life, and in relation to the topic, for my personal identity.

schopenhauer1

↪Moliere

You are still starting with the same set of conditions. Your development as a physical being relies on the initial template and the development that ensues. Any changes, still are in relation to this individualized code. It’s not just starting from a tabula rasa.

The Necessity of Genetic Components in Personal Identity

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