Has your position on this remained the same over the intervening years? — Leontiskos

Yes.

- I think there are a number of different interrelated questions at play, but I will try to stick to the course you chart on the first page of the thread.

Sure, but are moral facts the sort of facts that can lead to measurable consequences if we act in light of false moral beliefs? For example, if I falsely believe that killing babies is (im)moral then what sort of outcome could I expect?

[...]

Is there any empirical difference between a world in which killing babies is moral and a world in which killing babies is immoral? If you found out that killing babies is moral then would you kill babies, or would you act immorally and not kill babies? — Michael

I'd say that the consequences of false moral belief will depend on the moral system in question. For example, if a consequentialist holds that killing babies is evil on account of inflicting pain, then the possible world in which the killing of babies is permissible would be a world where babies feel no pain (or where one can kill painlessly). For this consequentialist, the negative consequence of false belief is an increase in pain, or unnecessary pain, or the pain of innocents, or something like that.

The more a moral system is either empirically derived or rooted in consequences, the easier will be its task in answering your question. Someone like Kant would have the hardest task, for he seems to avoid empirical derivation and consequence-reasoning as far as possible. More generally, though, if morality pertains to living well, then false moral beliefs will be bound up with impoverished living.

World 3 would would pretty quickly stop being a world. With no morality there is more of a chance people would kill babies but maybe not to the extent that the species would cease to exist.

World 3 would would pretty quickly stop being a world. With no morality there is more of a chance people would kill babies but maybe not to the extent that the species would cease to exist. — I like sushi

I don't think that this is accurate. Consider the possible worlds again:

1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
2. It is immoral to kill babies and everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
3. It is moral to kill babies but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies

What is the practical difference between these worlds?

It seems to me that only moral beliefs matter. Whether or not the beliefs are true has no practical relevance.

I'd say that the consequences of false moral belief will depend on the moral system in question. For example, if a consequentialist holds that killing babies is evil on account of inflicting pain, then the possible world in which the killing of babies is permissible would be a world where babies feel no pain (or where one can kill painlessly). For this consequentialist, the negative consequence of false belief is an increase in pain, or unnecessary pain, or the pain of innocents, or something like that. — Leontiskos

Perhaps a more suitable question for the consequentialist is to explain the difference between these worlds:

1. Causing pain has no moral value
2. Causing pain is morally good
3. Causing pain is morally bad

A possible response is that "causing pain is morally bad" is true by definition, and so (1) and (2) are not possible worlds, but the question stands for any consequentialist who doesn't think consequentialism true by definition.

I was merely assuming that such a truth could exist and that some peole would be able to figure it out eventually.

order of pain

2, 1 then 3 most probably. I guess it could be argued that trying to to cause pain may actually cause more pain that scenario 1 thoough.

Perhaps a more suitable question for the consequentialist is to explain the difference between these worlds:

1. Causing pain has no moral value
2. Causing pain is morally good
3. Causing pain is morally bad

A possible response is that "causing pain is morally bad" is true by definition, and so (1) and (2) are not possible worlds, but the question stands for any consequentialist who doesn't think consequentialism true by definition. — Michael

I think such a consequentialist would say that (3) is self-evidently true, because to feel pain is to suffer; suffering is undesirable; and what is undesirable should—ceteris paribus—be avoided. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction.

One of the deeper problems that I perceive is the separation between oughtness and motivation, as noted in the other thread (). Along the same lines, as long as the consequentialist (or anyone) has a reason to ground their moral claim, they will have a response to your questions, for the possible worlds will differ vis-à-vis that reason. By pushing further, you are effectively saying, "But what if there is no reason for your moral claim?" Or, "But what if there are no 'brute moral facts'?" If there were no reason then the possible worlds could not differ, and the morality in question would be otiose. But there always is a reason. "X is moral/immoral for no reason at all," is not a coherent claim. I don't think moral claims can be stipulated in the way you are stipulating them.

To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:

1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies. — Michael

1. In a world without morality, folk would kill babies if they wanted to and not if they didn't want to. There would be no law against it or moral opprobrium attached to it. We would chat down the pub and I would tell you how i had killed next door's baby because I couldn't stand the crying at night, and how upset she had been about it, and you would shrug and say, "women,Eh? They are so attached to their offspring.",
"Yeah, I might have to kill her as well if she keeps making a fuss. But you actually live with them all the time, why do you bother?"
"Oh I rather enjoy them most of the time - I guess I get attached to them too."

2. I would have to keep quiet about killing babies, because you would call the police if I told you - I even had to hide it from my neighbour, the mother and make it seem like a cot death.

3. My neighbour would have to keep her baby secret and find a lonely place to hide if she didn't want the official baby exterminator to call. If I heard crying, I would already have informed the authorities about this disgusting pervert next door having a baby and not killing it. Finding a place to hide would be fairly easy, because the human population would be very small in this world.

1. In a world without morality, folk would kill babies if they wanted to and not if they didn't want to. There would be no law against it or moral opprobrium attached to it. — unenlightened

In a world without moral beliefs this would happen, but I'm not asking about moral beliefs. I clarified that above:

1. No morality but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
2. It is immoral to kill babies and everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies
3. It is moral to kill babies but everyone believes that it is immoral to kill babies

I think that these worlds would be empirically indistinguishable. Whether or not one's moral beliefs are correct seems to have no practical relevance.

In a world without moral beliefs this would happen, but I'm not asking about moral beliefs. I clarified that above: — Michael

Ah right, I missed that. Then I think the question is ineffective. People live according to their beliefs. If everyone believed the world was flat, no one would try and sail round it, whatever shape it actually was.

This does not demonstrate that it has no shape.

This does not demonstrate that it has no shape. — unenlightened

I'm not trying to demonstrate that there are no moral facts, only that moral facts don't matter. It is only our moral beliefs that matter.

Unlike other kinds of beliefs, our moral beliefs being right or wrong has no practical consequences.

I think such a consequentialist would say that (3) is self-evidently true, because to feel pain is to suffer; suffering is undesirable; and what is undesirable should—ceteris paribus—be avoided. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction. — Leontiskos

Is that a moral claim, or merely a pragmatic claim?

I suppose an ethical naturalist could claim that a moral claim is a pragmatic claim, but how would someone who is both a consequentialist and an ethical non-naturalist explain the difference between those worlds?

I'm not trying to demonstrate that there are no moral facts, only that moral facts don't matter. It is only our beliefs that matter. — Michael

Does the shape of the world not matter?

Does the shape of the world not matter? — unenlightened

I address that in my post?

"Unlike other kinds of beliefs, our moral beliefs being right or wrong has no practical consequences."

"Unlike other kinds of beliefs, our moral beliefs being right or wrong has no practical consequences." — Michael

You could have it that rule-based morality represents wisdom about what worked best for our forebears. Since cultures evolve, what works changes over time. In one era, greed is destructive, in another, it's constructive. In this way, you could have a kind of moral realism, it's just that the rules are in flux. The basis for the rules is always the same, though: cultural evolution.

Nietzsche could be seen as complaining about moral rules that have become destructive, so what was good has become bad. He saw the practical consequences of this as a dulling of the spirit and a failure to make the most of life.

"Unlike other kinds of beliefs, our moral beliefs being right or wrong has no practical consequences." — Michael

Yes, I assumed you were saying that, but can you provide an argument for it? It seems rather unlikely. We agree that our moral beliefs have real consequences individually and socially I assume, and it seems likely that having false moral beliefs would be at least limiting and possibly deleterious or even fatal consequences. For example if we all believe it is wrong to kill babies, but we are wrong about that, then there will be more living babies than there ought to be, and hence population overshoot environmental catastrophe, and eventual population crash. All, very practical consequences. On the other hand, it might be that it is wrong to kill babies, but also wrong to be making so many babies. Life is complicated...

Moral beliefs seem to guide our social behaviour, and the factual content of those shared beliefs are the practical consequences in terms of the flourishing of life; particularly our species and its environment. If we were to discover life on another planet, we would have to become less parochial about it, but I stick to planet A for simplicity.

You could have it that rule-based morality represents wisdom about what worked best for our forebears. Since cultures evolve, what works changes over time. In one era, greed is destructive, in another, it's constructive. In this way, you could have a kind of moral realism, it's just that the rules are in flux. The basis for the rules is always the same, though: cultural evolution. — frank

In this case, the basis itself might change; if cultural evolution was the basis for most of history, there comes a modern time when it is no longer wise to ignore the environmental consequences of 'cultural evolution'. Again, it is a practical matter, and something that has only recently become a dominant moral issue. Anyway, the correct morals are the ones that lead to flourishing, aka 'the good'.

There was a science fiction story - forget whose but I think by a woman writer, about an intelligent species that procreated by a mass spawning in the sea. The juveniles spent their time in the sea and were prey to all sorts including adults of their own species those few that survived to emerge onto land as adults were only then considered to be moral subjects, rather as we (or some of us) treat birth as the beginning of moral subject-hood, or for others it is conception, or implantation, or rarely "every sperm is sacred." The Romans considered children to be property, I believe, and thus killing children was a personal matter, or killing other folks children a matter of infringement of parental rights. (I might be making that up, but it's a possible moral position. The Spartans had some fairly harsh ideas anyway.

Anyway, human cultures have moral beliefs that modify the culture in many ways, and not least in the effect on the psyche. Shaker beliefs, for example were that to procreate at all was wrong, which meant that without a plentiful supply of sinners, they could not survive. And they didn't. I am getting a bit Dawkins here for my own taste, but anti-natalism generally does undeniably suffer from short-term-ism unless its failure is guaranteed. A society that relies on immorality to survive is arguably merely indulging in double-think, a very common human trait, aka hypocrisy, that enables immoral moralities to survive at the cost of psychological misery.

For example if we all believe it is wrong to kill babies, but we are wrong about that, then there will be more living babies than there ought to be, and hence population overshoot environmental catastrophe, and eventual population crash. — unenlightened

What is the connection between a moral obligation to kill babies and environmental catastrophe?

1. One ought not kill babies, we (truthfully) believe that we ought not kill babies, and if we don't then there will be an environmental catastrophe

2. One ought kill babies, we (falsely) believe that we ought not kill babies, and if we don't then there will be an environmental catastrophe

Whether our belief that we ought not kill babies is true or false has no practical consequences. Either way we believe that we ought not kill babies and if we don't kill babies then there will be an environmental catastrophe.

"Unlike other kinds of beliefs, our moral beliefs being right or wrong has no practical consequences." — Michael

Is the belief that homosexuality is sinful a moral belief?

Is the belief that homosexuality is sinful a moral belief? — Joshs

Yes.

Is the belief that homosexuality is sinful a moral belief?
— Joshs

Yes. — Michael

And there are no practical consequences to changing one’s view from ‘it is true that homosexuality is sinful’ to ‘it is false that homosexuality is sinful’? Let’s say the person who has a change of heart is a legislator or a parent of a homosexual child.

And there are no practical consequences to changing one’s view from ‘it is true that homosexuality is sinful’ to ‘it is false that homosexuality is sinful’? Let’s say the person who has a change of heart is a legislator or a parent of a homosexual child. — Joshs

There are practical consequences to moral beliefs. There appear to be no practical consequences to moral facts.

Imagine two worlds:

1. Homosexuality is immoral but everyone falsely believes that homosexuality is moral
2. Homosexuality is moral and everyone truthfully believes that homosexuality is moral

In both worlds everyone believes that homosexuality is moral. This has practical consequences (e.g. the legality of same-sex marriage). But in one world everyone's belief is correct and in the other everyone's belief is incorrect.

What are the practical consequences of having a true belief? What are the practical consequences of having a false belief? I can't see that there are – or could be – any.

It seems to be a necessary consequence of any ethical non-naturalism that moral facts are irrelevant.

Whether our belief that we ought not kill babies is true or false has no practical consequences. — Michael

Yes. Our belief is efficacious., whether it is true or false. the question is though what is its effect if it is true, and what is its effect if it is false. On the face of it, believing false things is likely to be deleterious and believing true things is advantageous. Immediately, if we believe we ought to kill babies, we will probably kill babies. The question of the truth or falsehood of our belief is borne out on a larger frame than the immediate. Later, we notice that our numbers are dwindling, and there is no one left to change our nappies when we become incontinent.

Later, we notice that our numbers are dwindling, and there is no one left to change our nappies when we become incontinent. — unenlightened

What does this have to do with the truth or falsity of "one ought not kill babies"?

By my reckoning we could replace moral facts with empirical facts and end up in the same quandary.

Imagine two worlds:

1. The earth is round but everyone falsely believes that the earth is flat.
2. The earth is flat and everyone truthfully believes that the earth is flat.

Not only does the belief that the world is flat have practical consequences but the belief itself comes down to a pattern of shared practices. It is only when these practices change that, from the vantage of the changed form of life, the former belief in a flat earth appears false. Thus there cannot be a change in truth value without an accompanying change in the practical landscape of social behavior.

On the other hand, given the significant consequences of a shift in attitude toward the moral and empirical facts cited above, these examples might better be conceived as theoretic presuppositions rather than facts. But then there are trivial and consequential facts, so maybe we could say that the more significant the practical consequences of a fact , the more akin to a theoretical
presupposition we should treat it as being. Trivial facts don’t disturb the practical landscape when they are falsified. But falsifying the belief that bisexuality is sinful has all kinds of consequences, since to arrive
at this change in attitude already presupposes a significant change in world orientation.

By my reckoning we could replace moral facts with empirical facts and end up in the same quandary. — Joshs

They’re not equivalent. The world being round or the world being flat has practical consequences. There hasn’t been explained what the practical consequences are of homosexuality being moral or homosexuality being immoral.

They’re not equivalent. The world being round or the world being flat has practical consequences.
There hasn’t been explained what the practical consequences are of homosexuality being moral or homosexuality being immoral — Michael

You’re ignoring what kinds of significant practical
reorientations of thinking are required in order to arrive at such a changed view. This isn’t a game of computer logic, it’s about how people arrive at and transform their thinking on important issues which are rooted in deeply entrenched social practices. Our attaching the labels of truth and falsity is alway ad hoc and comes late to the party.

What does this have to do with the truth or falsity of "one ought not kill babies"? — Michael

Something. Or nothing. I cannot help you beyond pointing out that moral beliefs are efficacious, and some are life affirming and others life denying. At some point one has to choose what side one is on. And from there one can judge rightly or wrongly.

I cannot help you beyond pointing out that moral beliefs are efficacious, and some are life affirming and others life denying. — unenlightened

I agree. Moral beliefs are efficacious. But I'm asking about the efficacy of moral facts.

Given your comments, I have a more tailored question: what is the practical difference between a world in which we have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash and a world in which we don't have a moral obligation to prevent environmental catastrophe and population crash, assuming that in both worlds we believe that we have such a moral obligation and so act accordingly.

I don't understand what you're saying.