Well, the way we think about stuff has a background in our myths.

But the consequence, and the take away from Anscombe, is that the only workable option is to improve where on can. I'm working on being kind to fools. It's not easy.

:up:

has learned a new term: "Metaethical". And of course, a few hours after learning it, he is an expert.

meanwhile still hasn't grasped the concept. Which is odd, given his very extensive readings of the literature. He must have encountered it dozens of times by now!

:wink:

I think we're primarily considering the notion of moral obligation in this discussion. Are there moral obligations and if so then what is their ontological status?

Assuming that a moral sentence is a sentence of the form "one ought (not) X":

a) no moral sentence is truth-apt
b) some moral sentence is truth-apt

Either (a) or (b) is true.

c) no moral sentence is true
d) some moral sentence is true

If (b) is true then either (c) or (d) is true.

e) no moral sentence is true if nobody believes so
f) some moral sentence is true even if nobody believes so

If (d) is true then either (e) or (f) is true.

Therefore, one of these is true:

a) no moral sentence is truth-apt (non-cognitivism)
c) no moral sentence is true (error theory)
e) no moral sentence is true if nobody believes so (non-objectivism)
f) some moral sentence is true even if nobody believes so (robust realism)

So given that a moral sentence is a sentence of the form "one ought (not) X", which of (a), (c), (e), or (f) is true?

One would treat this as a reductio, that shows the supposed argument to have gone astray. That one ought not eat babies takes precedence over the argument. — Banno

I think it's worth looking at this

Use of this Latin terminology traces back to the Greek expression hê eis to adunaton apagôgê, reduction to the impossible, found repeatedly in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. In its most general construal, reductio ad absurdum – reductio for short – is a process of refutation on grounds that absurd – and patently untenable consequences would ensue from accepting the item at issue. This takes three principal forms according as that untenable consequence is:

1) a self-contradiction (ad absurdum)
2) a falsehood (ad falsum or even ad impossible)
3) an implausibility or anomaly (ad ridiculum or ad incommodum)

The first of these is reductio ad absurdum in its strictest construction and the other two cases involve a rather wider and looser sense of the term.

It would be wrong to assert (1) and begging the question to assert (2) in this case. So I take it that you are asserting (3)?

Even if (3) were true it doesn't then follow that one ought not eat babies. Something can be true and implausible.

That one ought not eat babies takes precedence over the argument. — Banno

So if Neanderthals engaged in cannibalism, you would say that was immoral? I'm just asking for the sake of understanding your position.

This is a very clear layout of the possibilities (though it must seem quite "convolute" to our poor @Banno).

But why is it a response to my post? Was it just the term "moral reasoning"? If I replace it with "moral obligation" I don't know that anything would change otherwise.

Most moral realists throughout history didn't have to consider morality for animals because they didn't realize that we emerged from an evolutionary chain. We evolved from an animal that looked like a squirrel, and it evolved ultimately from archaic cells that developed a relationship with mitochondria.

So if it's a continuum, and the archeological record shows that it is, how does moral realism work? Is it immoral for black widow spiders to eat their mates? I think the obvious answer is: no. It's not.

That means we're stuck with this: X is immoral for us. The challenge to moral realism is in asking about what's moral for homo habilis, or homo erectus. They're human. Are they us? Or not? The answer is going to be somewhat artificial, which means morality is artificial.

But why is it a response to my post? — hypericin

Because your post was saying that Banno and Leontiskos are making a mistake in asking about obligations, whereas I think obligations are the very thing we're discussing.

Are sentences like "one ought not X" true and if so are they true even if we all believe otherwise?

This discussion is on meta-ethics, not descriptive ethics, and your post seems to be discussing the latter.

The challenge to moral realism is in asking about what's moral for homo habilis, or homo erectus. — frank

That's a challenge for some theory on normative ethics (e.g. utilitarianism, hedonism, etc.). Moral realism is a theory on meta-ethics and so it doesn't need to answer this question.

That's a challenge for some theory on normative ethics (e.g. utilitarianism, hedonism, etc.). Moral realism is a theory on meta-ethics and so it doesn't need to answer this question. — Michael

Cannibalism was just an example. The question is: is morality only for humans? The idea is that if morality is only for homo sapiens, then morality is artificial because there's an ancestral continuum between humans and their forebears.

If morality is artificial, then moral realism fails.

This discussion is on meta-ethics, not descriptive ethics, and your post seems to be discussing the latter. — Michael

Certainly not descriptive ethics. If you don't like my instinct example, go with your version of moral subjectivism:

"One ought do X" is true when everyone believes it's true.

It is not a valid objection to say "Why ought I do something just because everyone believes I should?".
Because it is not an ethical theory that says "You ought to do what everyone believes you should".
It is a metaethical theory that says "The truth of ethical propositions arises from everyone's belief in them".

Raising an ethical objection to a metaethical theory is a mistake. Because it is an is theory, not an ought theory, even though its subject is ought statements.

I'm working on being kind to fools. It's not easy. — Banno

Please be kind to yourself.

I'm working on being kind to fools. It's not easy.
— Banno

Please be kind to yourself. — hypericin

Now, now, boys....

Your article continues "The usual explanations of reductio fail to acknowledge the full extent of its range of application.'

You said

If it could be proved that I ought eat babies I still wouldn't. — Michael

with which I was agreeing.

So we apparently take as true that one ought not eat babies. And we suppose there is some theory T such that T⊢ (one ought eat babies). The we are entitles to conclude ~T.

Seems pretty straight forward.

So if Neanderthals engaged in cannibalism, you would say that was immoral? — frank

:smile: You are asking for a friend?

So we apparently take as true that one ought not eat babies. — Banno

I was saying that I wouldn't eat babies even if I ought to. I am not (only) motivated by moral considerations. I am (more) motivated by self-interest and my "passions" (as Hume would put it).

Human psychology isn't a slave to some supposed duty.

Certainly not descriptive ethics. If you don't like my instinct example, go with your version of moral subjectivism:

"One ought do X" is true when everyone believes it's true.

It is not a valid objection to say "Why ought I do something just because everyone believes I should?".
Because it is not an ethical theory that says "You ought to do what everyone believes you should".
It is a metaethical theory that says "The truth of ethical propositions arises from everyone's belief in them".

Raising an ethical objection to a metaethical theory is a mistake. Because it is an is theory, not an ought theory, even though its subject is ought statements.
an hour ago — hypericin

I misunderstood you then. I agree with this.

The question is: is morality only for humans? The idea is that if morality is only for homo sapiens, then morality is artificial because there's an ancestral continuum between humans and their forebears.

If morality is artificial, then moral realism fails. — frank

Even if it were only for humans it doesn't then follow that it's artificial. Humans are biologically distinct from non-humans yet human biology isn't artificial; it's an objective and natural fact. It may be that humans are morally distinct from non-humans even though morality isn't artificial; it may be an objective fact (whether natural or non-natural) that only obtains for a species that reaches a sufficient level of intelligence, e.g. intelligent enough to conceive of morality.

X is immoral for us. The challenge to moral realism is in asking about what's moral for homo habilis, or homo erectus. They're human. Are they us? Or not? The answer is going to be somewhat artificial, which means morality is artificial. — frank

Oh, I see. You're asking about the scope of moral statements. Interesting.

Ok, so let's suppose that moral statements are "artificial". Does it follow that they are not true? Because moral realism is the contention that there are true moral statements.

Trace Neanderthal DNA remains in modern humans, so there seems no reason not to include them in our moral discourse. Eventually one might ask how worthwhile it is to consider a behaviour immoral. While it isn't a pressing issue, there has been some recent work on the moral culpability of animals.

Human psychology isn't a slave to some supposed duty. — Michael

I entirely agree.

Again, for the third or fourth time, your purpose here is obscure. It's not clear where your reasoning leads, or where it comes from. What's your point? Are you supporting subjectivism, or just positing it for the sake of discussion?

You seem to have some very particular use of "ought" in mind, perhaps relating to deontology.

Humans are biologically distinct from non-humans yet human biology isn't artificial; — Michael

Yes, my argument hinges on that. Scientists of human origins don't agree with that, but that would take my argument into the weeds.

I can still argue this: there's an ancestral continuum from Homo Sapiens backward. Even if you want to pick a certain point where there was a mutation, this choice for where we draw the moral line is going to be arbitrary. For instance, we know that Homo Sapiens and all our close relatives have a mutation that makes our jaw muscles weak. That would be an objective separating line between us and the other animals. But why would having a weak jaw make us subject to moral rules?

Plus that demarcation will have us holding member of Homo Erectus accountable for all their bullshit.

Because moral realism is the contention that there are true moral statements. — Banno

I don't think so.

Again, for the third or fourth time, your purpose here is obscure. It's not clear where your reasoning leads, or where it comes from. What's your point? Are you supporting subjectivism, or just positing it for the sake of discussion? — Banno

It was a discussion from several years ago that I mentioned in passing. I didn't mean to bring it into this discussion.

You are asking for a friend? — Banno

My neighbor has really prominent brow ridges, so maybe.

Even if you want to pick a certain point where there was a mutation, this choice for where we draw the moral line is going to be arbitrary. For instance, we know that Homo Sapiens and all our close relatives have a mutation that makes our jaw muscles weak. That would be an objective separating line between us and the other animals. But why would having a weak jaw make us subject to moral rules? — frank

I mentioned an example. Morality applies to any species (or rather, person) with the intelligence to understand morality. I certainly don't think this arbitrary.

Odd, again.

You have
"One ought do X" is true when everyone believes it's true.
And yet you seem to deny
"You ought to do what everyone believes you should"

As if these were not contrary.

This thread has been largely polemical, but some recent developments in a different direction have led me to draw up this post. I am thinking of and 's consideration of a central thesis of Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy," and to a lesser extent, 's more serious posts on ethical dilemmas. Taking Anscombe as my point of departure, everything in this post will tend toward the "analytic" spectrum.

When someone coming from an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework (A-T) encounters the characteristic categories and problematics of modern moral philosophy, they seem strange and far-removed, almost like Zeno's Paradox. It is very hard to know how to begin to bridge the gap, and in large part these two traditions have simply ignored one another. When Anscombe speaks about modern moral philosophy needing to develop a robust "psychology" or "theory of action," I think she has this gulf in mind, at least in part.

(My entry point is usually the idea that all acts are moral, or that the moral/practical and moral/psychological distinctions do not hold (which I have alluded to a few times in this thread). Interestingly, Anscombe takes an almost identical tack in her, "Medalist's Address," albeit only in passing.)

Introducing someone coming from the modern tradition to Aristotelian-Thomistic moral philosophy would be a bit like setting someone on a motorcycle who has never driven a manual transmission or even ridden a bicycle. "'Clutch', 'front brake', 'accelerator', 'shift', 'rear brake'. Good luck, and remember to balance!" Thus, not too many have tried to bridge that gap, and many of these have done a poor job of it. Still I wanted to draw up a list of articles that would be helpful to anyone who is interested. Almost all of these essays only attempt to bite off a small chunk of the task, for obvious reasons.

As far as I know, the best philosopher who attempts to respond to questions of modern moral philosophy with an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework is Peter L. P. Simpson (website; academia.edu). He is a very strong Aristotelian and he knows the modern tradition well. For a longer treatment, see his book, Goodness and Nature and its supplement. Here are three related essays, each also available in his book, Vices, Virtues, and Consequences: Essays in Moral and Political Philosophy:

1. "A Century of Anglo-American Moral Theory," by Peter L. P. Simpson
   
   • (A historical look at the genealogy of Anglo-American moral theory along with some of its biases)
   • Related: Alasdair MacIntyre's informal piece, "On Having Survived the Academic Moral Philosophy of the 20th Century."
2. "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble," by Peter L. P. Simpson
   
   • (A historical framing of the widespread Kantian idea that morality is a sphere all of its own)
3. "On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas," by Peter L. P. Simpson
   
   • (Answering the naturalistic fallacy with Aquinas)

The next three essays are a step removed, topically, from the first three, but they are still related. Kevin Flannery wrote the first, and he is also very good.

• "Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds," by Kevin Flannery, S.J.
  
  • (Explaining what Anscombe meant by a "corrupt mind" and why that corruption is culpable)
  • Jennifer Frey's work on practical truth, following Anscombe, may also be of interest to some.
• "Justice, Scheffler and Cicero," by Peter L. P. Simpson
  
  • (Defending Cicero's absolute moral prohibition on murder against consequentialists)
• "On Practical Thinking and St. Thomas," by Peter L. P. Simpson
  
  • (With respect to Aquinas on theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge, and ethical truth)

Another step removed:

• "On Virtue Ethics and Aristotle," by Peter L. P. Simpson
  
  • (That contemporary virtue ethics is non-Aristotelian in significant ways)
  • This paper also helps underscore the fact that the A-T tradition, following Aristotle, sees only a thin line between morality and politics. Simpson also has a large body of work that is more "political" than "moral," addressing these same questions in the political sphere. See also: "The Revolt Against Prudential Truth," by Charles de Koninck. Jacques Maritain is also worth mentioning in this regard.

Finally, three essays by William Matthew Diem. I appreciate his work greatly, but it is more specialized and less accessible to folks coming from the modern philosophy tradition. Diem is speaking to Thomists and using Thomistic language, although I think he will still be understandable to those coming from a secular perspective:

• "Obligation, Justice, and Law: A Thomistic Reply to Anscombe," by William M. Diem
• "On Value and Obligation in Practical Reason: Toward a Resolution of the Is–Ought Problem in the Thomistic Moral Tradition," by William M. Diem
• "Reasons for Acting and the End of Man as Naturally Known: Reconceiving Thomistic Axiology," by William M. Diem

Other relevant essays that I have not yet vetted include, "The Two Kinds of Error in Action," by G.E.M. Anscombe and Sidney Morgenbesser; "Moral Obligation," by Thomas Pink; "Normativity and Reason," by Thomas Pink; "Promising and Obligation," by Thomas Pink; "Reason and Agency," by Thomas Pink; "Law and the Normativity of Obligation", by Thomas Pink; "Natural Law and the Theory of Moral Obligation," by Thomas Pink; and "St. Thomas on Prudence and the Moral Virtues," by Alfred Freddoso.


(CC: @J, @Bob Ross, @AmadeusD, @Apustimelogist, @hypericin)