:wink: Kierkegaard would disagree.

I think I might have already mentioned once or twice that my interest here was no more than to show that there are moral truths. — Banno

And as I have already mentioned, the rest of us are interested in further considerations. We want to know if moral truths are expressions of individual attitudes, or if they describe conventions of social behaviour, or if they report on facts about the world that obtain even if everyone were to believe otherwise. We want to know whether or not moral truths are reducible to natural phenomena.

If you're not interested in these further considerations then you don't need to engage with the rest of us who are.

I find myself constantly lowering my expectation of what you understand of philosophy.

There is no sense of asking if something is moral independently of this system any more than asking about chess rules independently of the rules of chess. — hypericin

:ok:

We want to know if moral truths are expressions of individual attitudes, or if they describe conventions of social behaviour, or if they report on facts about the world that obtain even if everyone were to believe otherwise. — Michael

How odd. These are not mutually exclusive.

We want to know whether or not moral truths are reducible to natural phenomena. — Michael

The discussion of the open question and direction of fit shows that they are not natural phenomena.

I find myself constantly lowering my expectation of what you understand of philosophy. — Banno

:rofl: :rofl:

All moral truths are true. — Banno

You've already hit rock bottom buddy.

When others argue against moral realism they are arguing against their (3b), not your (3). Your (3) also allows for their (3a).

So you're just talking past each other. — Michael

You are assuming that (3a) is coherent, but when presented with the incoherencies of (3a) you only said, "Well it's like chess." Instead of addressing the morality question you sought to address a chess question, and I don't think it was persuasive. ()

All moral truths are true.
— Banno

You've already hit rock bottom buddy. — hypericin

I love this. A case in point for my ever-lowering expectations.

Can you give us an example of a moral truth that is not a truth?

Of course. Are you expecting mere philosophical considerations will decide what you ought to do? They might help you phrase the issues, but they will no more solve all your moral quandaries than they will tell you the value of the gravitational constant. — Banno

There is a great quote to this effect in the Magna Moralia by Aristotle (or whoever wrote it). I couldn't find it. :nerd:

---

In any case, meta-ethics has an effect on ethics. In fact we often argue about ethics via meta-ethics nowadays.

Are you expecting honesty? — unenlightened

From someone who thinks dishonesty will lead to the collapse of society? Yes, in fact. :grin:

(I agree, by the way.)

In any case, meta-ethics has an effect on ethics. In fact we often argue about ethics via meta-ethics nowadays. — Leontiskos

The distinction is only problematic when someone takes it to be hard-and-fast.

You are assuming that (3a) is coherent, but when presented with the incoherencies of (3a) — Leontiskos

I don't think you have presented any incoherencies.

I don't think you have presented any incoherencies. — Michael

See:

The notion that the consensus has moral weight and the votes have none is incoherent. — Leontiskos

Are you committed to the proposition that, on the version of moral subjectivism you are examining, the consensus has moral weight and the votes have none?

Can you give us an example of a moral truth that is not a truth? — Banno

Oops, I somehow misread that as "all moral claims are true".

Anyway, instead of being an asshole, why don't you tell me what was wrong with my previous post? Or not.

I've no strong opinion. Or at least not one I care to express here, where it will go on my file.

:wink:

It's arsehole.

Are you committed to the proposition that, on the version of moral subjectivism you are examining, the consensus has moral weight but the votes have none? — Leontiskos

What I am saying is that there are certain behaviours that society has deemed acceptable and certain behaviours that society has deemed unacceptable. According to some moral subjectivists when we talk about morality we are talking about these socially acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The sentence "murder is immoral" is true iff society deems murder unacceptable because "murder is immoral" just means "murder is deemed socially unacceptable."

This may be factually incorrect (e.g. if Moore's open argument is sound), but that doesn't make it incoherent. It's an internally consistent theory even if it mistakes the meaning of moral sentences.

And on a similar vein, the same is true for the subjectivists who claim that "murder is immoral" is true (for me) if I disapprove of murder because "murder is immoral" just means "I disapprove of murder". It's internally consistent even if factually incorrect.

Do you just fling insults when you've got nothing better to say?

Do you just fling insults when you've got nothing better to say? — hypericin

No - I also fling insults when I have something to say.

why don't you tell me what was wrong with my previous post? — hypericin

Which previous post? There are so many.

So for you subjectivism is coherent but wrong.

For others it is incoherent because in being a response to moral issues it pretends to tell us what we ought to do, and yet it only tells us what most people do.

Looks like it was the one where I said that @unenlightened claim was metaethical.

Absurd, right? Do tell.

The distinction which right here you seem to have no clue about:

For others it is incoherent because in being a response to moral issues it pretends to tell us what we ought to do, and yet it only tells us what most people do. — Banno

Moral subjectivism isn't a "response to moral issues", it is a metaethical theory.
It doesn't "pretend to tell us what we ought to do", nor does it "tell us what most people do", it is a statement on the nature of moral claims.

This?

Yes, it is a metaethical claim, not an ethical one. — hypericin

where "It" is

The virtue of this account is that it fully explains our moral notions, without need of some ontological category. — hypericin

the account claiming

On this account, our moral beliefs and intuitions are an expression of this cooperative system. To ask, "but what if they are *wrong*?", independently of the system, is to reintroduce moral realism, which this account leaves no room for. — hypericin

and the story of the monkey.

the point that both @Michael and I have made is that the account is an example of the naturalistic fallacy, as shown by the open question argument. I used the line that it's not a winning move because it's not even in the game.

But it seems you didn't notice this critique for what it is. I put that down to your probably not being familiar with the background.

So here it is again, in small words: that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate.

"Yes, it is a metaethical claim, not an ethical one."

Was a response to

"And it's poverty is that it fails completely to tell us what we ought to do."

Which is a nonsensical requirement of a metaethical claim. All your obfuscation to the side.

The naturalistic fallacy is a response to ethical naturalism, how does it even apply to moral anti-realism, or subjective realism?

I think you're a rude troll that isn't a fraction as clever or knowledgeable as you pretend. Kindly "piss off".

The naturalistic fallacy is a response to ethical naturalism, how does it even apply to moral anti-realism, or subjective realism? — hypericin

I didn't introduce naturalism in to the conversation - you did in the example you borrowed. So if it's irrelevant, that's down to you.

I think you're a rude troll that isn't a fraction as clever or knowledgeable as you pretend. Kindly "piss off". — hypericin

Cheers. You'll be sending me the hemlock, then?

You are under no obligation to post here.

What I am saying is that there are certain behaviours that society has deemed acceptable and certain behaviours that society has deemed unacceptable. According to some moral subjectivists when we talk about morality we are talking about these socially acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The sentence "murder is immoral" is true iff society deems murder unacceptable because "murder is immoral" just means "murder is deemed socially unacceptable."

This may be factually incorrect (e.g. if Moore's open argument is sound), but that doesn't make it incoherent. It's an internally consistent theory even if it mistakes the meaning of moral sentences.

And on a similar vein, the same is true for the subjectivists who claim that "murder is immoral" is true (for me) if I disapprove of murder because "murder is immoral" just means "I disapprove of murder". It's internally consistent even if factually incorrect. — Michael

Okay, thanks. My problem with this is that morality is a normative affair. If someone is making purely descriptive claims, then they are not engaged in, or committing themselves to, any kind of morality. If someone claims that morality is reducible to descriptive facts, then they are explaining away morality.* Either way, there is a significant equivocation on the term 'morality.' If someone mistakes the meaning of a moral sentence by failing to understand that, for example, "murder is immoral" involves a claim about whether one ought murder, then they are substituting an equivocal sense of "immoral."

There is a common confusion and category error between theories about "morality", and moral theories. Only the latter involves true normativity. There is moral subjectivism as a theory about "morality," and then there is moral subjectivism as a moral theory. I have argued against the latter; you are proposing the former. I don't think it is incoherent to say that every moral claim is about societal expectations (but I do think it is wrong). Similarly, I wouldn't think it incoherent to say that every moral claim is really about the lengths of different giraffes' necks. Neither one is incoherent in the sense of self-defeating. But I do think it is incoherent to appeal to these sort of claims while at the same time espousing a moral theory (i.e. a normative theory).

The relevance here is that folks in this thread either are, or else are flirting with, espousing normative theories. That sort of "subjectivism" is incoherent. The other sort just fails to understand that morality pertains to oughtness.

* Ethical naturalism aside

You'll be sending me the hemlock, then? — Banno

No, you're no Socrates, I'm afraid.

(↪Moliere, hence "faith", especially in some authority, is morally questionable.) — Banno

I agree that faith in an authority is questionable. The Euthyphro demonstrates the difficulty there -- faith in an authority can serve as a kind of way of passing the moral buck to someone else when you're always responsible for how you act regardless of the faith you place: faith soothes, but does it justify?

The Binding of Isaac is such a good moral story to me because I grew up with it. Johannes de silentio's doubt doesn't end in aporia for me but it's still a very popular story with enough valances of meaning to keep it alive and contemplate. I suppose it comes to mind because I'd say that the commitment to non-violence strikes me as something of a heavenly belief, whereas the acceptance of violence in this world, when necessary, strikes me as an earthly belief. In metaphor The Binding of Isaac can be read as this tension between heavenly and earthly commitments: the first born son inherits the wealth and guarantees that you have a legacy, so to sacrifice your first-born is to put faith back in God that your legacy is greater because of him and that he will keep his promise to you -- that is, the ethics of today, which Kierkegaard clearly felt, were so alien then that killing your son wasn't even something morally worth considering. Instead: There are the goods of this world and then the goods of the higher world that God knows, and only he knows, and it's only through faith that you can reach them even when you do not understand him.

I reach for faith because it seems right, and rhetorically at least it seems to imply anti-realism. So it fits how I feel, at least. Further I wonder if there may be points of consonance here between what are usually competing worldviews or ethical considerations -- if it's all faith then perhaps this is a path to talking.

These are the considerations that lead to virtue ethics, to working on oneself rather than grand moral schemes. — Banno

That makes sense -- it's a sort of literature for this purpose of working on myself, and surely all this is real.

My problem with this is that morality is a normative affair. If someone is making purely descriptive claims, then they are not engaged in, or committing themselves to, any kind of morality. — Leontiskos

1. X is wrong
2. One ought not X

Do these mean the same thing?

If someone claims that morality is reducible to descriptive facts, then they are explaining away morality. — Leontiskos

I don't think that this is necessarily the case. There is a normative component to the rules of chess and to laws even though these are manufactured. I don't see a problem with claiming that society has manufactured (organically over time) a set of rules that each member must abide by, and that these are the rules we talk about when we talk about morality.

For others it is incoherent because in being a response to moral issues it pretends to tell us what we ought to do, and yet it only tells us what most people do. — Banno

See my second paragraph above.

:gasp:

There are many apologies for Abraham's behaviour. Seen at face value, he was morally culpable.

See my second paragraph above. — Michael

Sure. We do cooperate. Yet it remains open as to whether we ought cooperate. There are moral issues unaddressed by naturalism.

Kindly "piss off". — hypericin

hypericin, you're just out of line. No one here is being as escalating or trollish as you are. You continually misread posts in order to take offense, and then sound off like a loose canon. See:

Oops, I somehow misread that as "all moral claims are true". — hypericin

See also:

Great. You think it's "chimerical". Wow. Everyone take note, Leontiskos thinks moral subjectivism is chimerical. — hypericin

That was in response to a post where I agreed with your position with respect to Michael's consensus-based subjectivism, and then noted that Michael's attempt is not altogether bad, along with AmadeusD's. You seem to have taken umbrage as if I were calling you out, but I don't even consider your theory moral subjectivism. I consider it non-cognitivism. You think system-based moral claims are truth-apt and supra-systematic claims (or axiom claims) are not truth-apt. Given that the foundations of the system are the most important issue, this is non-cognitivism in my eyes.

(The "chimerical" comment was a reference to the arguments in my previous post to Michael)