It's a complex issue. It cannot simply be addressed with aphorisms. — Michael

Nor by algorithms. Again, if a moral theory were to advocate some horror, it is open for us to reject that moral theory on that basis. So, to take on a biblical example, the Binding of Isaac can be seen as child abuse, sufficient to rule out Abraham as a moral authority. (, hence "faith", especially in some authority, is morally questionable.)

This is about the ontology of chess, and ontological questions are not settled by authorities. — Leontiskos

They are if the ontology of chess is such that the rules are dictated by some relevant authority, which they are. Cavemen didn't just discover the rules of chess one day.

How can it be simultaneously true that, "It is morally wrong because we agreed on it," and, "We agreed on it because it is morally wrong"? You have to pick one or the other. — Leontiskos

I did. Moral subjectivists say it's the former.

Again, if a moral theory were to advocate some horror, it is open for us to reject that moral theory on that basis. — Banno

On what grounds do you justify this assertion? It seems to beg the question.

And what happens when two people disagree over whether or not something is a "horror" (e.g. with abortion or the death penalty for murderers)?

They are if the ontology of chess is such that the rules are dictated by some relevant authority, which they are. Cavemen didn't just discover the rules of chess one day. — Michael

If the nature of chess is dictated by an authority, then it is not the result of a general consensus. A vote and an appeal to an authority are two different things. Thus your chess case, as presented, is not a matter of consensus.

I did. Moral subjectivists say it's the former. — Michael

Then the votes that constitute the consensus are themselves non-moral, and this is absurd. If a consensus of votes have moral weight, then the individual votes also have moral weight. The notion that the consensus has moral weight and the votes have none is incoherent. Your contractualism article actually admits this and tries to wrestle with it.

Our beliefs may be wrong. — Michael

On this account, our moral beliefs and intuitions are an expression of this cooperative system. To ask, "but what if they are *wrong*?", independently of the system, is to reintroduce moral realism, which this account leaves no room for.

Simply on the grounds of logic. If the consequence of an argument is unacceptable, it is open to us to reject the argument. That's how reductio works.

If the nature of chess is dictated by an authority, then it is not the result of a consensus. A vote and an appeal to an authority are two different things. Thus your chess case, as presented, is not a matter of consensus. — Leontiskos

I think you're being overly pedantic here. In the case of chess there was a majority consensus amongst the group authorized to decide the laws. In the case of laws there is a majority consensus amongst the legislature. In the case of morality it may be that there is a majority consensus amongst the general population.

There's nothing inherently contradictory about these positions.

If the consequence of an argument is unacceptable, it is open to us to reject the argument. That's how reductio works. — Banno

Unacceptable to who? You and I might disagree over whether or not abortion, eating meat, and the death penalty are unacceptable.

I think you're being overly pedantic here. In the case of chess there was a majority consensus amongst the group authorized to decide the laws. In the case of laws there is a majority consensus amongst the legislature. In the case of morality it may be that there is a majority consensus amongst the general population. — Michael

Right, I edited to say "general consensus." The consensus of a non-elected or non-representative body is an authority in a way that excludes the sort of general consensus we are considering.

On this account, our moral beliefs and intuitions are an expression of this cooperative system. To ask, "but what if they are *wrong*?", independently of the system, is to reintroduce moral realism, which this account leaves no room for. — hypericin

If moral realism is correct then it is perfectly appropriate to ask "what if they're wrong?"

So to simply use this example of socially advantageous behaviour as a refutation of realism is to beg the question.

This to me is a good example of an anti-realist account. Morality is a conventionalized system devised to punishes uncooperative behavior and reinforce cooperative behavior. If moral claims are to be considered "true", they are only true in terms of this system. — hypericin

This shows, yet again, that what you are calling "antirealism" is not what the rest of us are calling antirealism. Nothing in the story here is incompatible with realism. We may well have "conventionalized system devised to punishes uncooperative behavior and reinforce cooperative behavior", and yet it is still open to us to ask if such a system is indeed moral.

This is from Moore, it's called the Open Question Argument, and it leads to one of the central discussions of Ethics, the Naturalistic Fallacy.

Unacceptable to who? You and I might disagree over whether or not abortion, eating meat, and the death penalty are unacceptable. — Michael

So what.

Agreement is not a criteria here. The open question argument shows that.

I am not following whatever it is you are doing.

"Society ought not collapse" — Leontiskos

Cool! Fuck off and die, then.

Again, if a moral theory were to advocate some horror, it is open for us to reject that moral theory on that basis. — Banno

I agree. This is a point that I have <pounded> before, and I think it's actually one of the most widespread problems on this forum.

So, to take on a biblical example, the Binding of Isaac can be seen as child abuse, sufficient to rule out Abraham as a moral authority. — Banno

So even if I were to disagree with Banno on this, he would not be begging the question or committing any logical faux pas. Reductio's can act on systems, including moral systems.

So what.

Agreement is not a criteria here. The open question argument shows that.

I am not following whatever it is you are doing. — Banno

You said that "if the consequence of an argument is unacceptable, it is open to us to reject the argument."

So you offer an argument for some morality with a consequence that I find unacceptable, so I reject it.

I offer an argument for some morality with a consequence that you find unacceptable, so you reject it.

We've gotten nowhere. How do we determine which of us is, if either, is right? Is moral philosophy simply a futile endeavour?

Cool! Fuck off and die, then. — unenlightened

I'll take your moral indignation as a sign that there is an implicit 'ought' in your account. :wink:

Ah, I see already mentioned the Open Question.

Despite Banno's comments there is more to the issue than simply whether or not some moral sentences are true. There are further considerations to be had. — Michael

Banno's point is that the common element in moral realism is that there are true moral statements. It turns out to be important that the SEP article on moral realism stops there, noting that "...some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments", while the SEP article on Moral Antirealism - the one you repeatedly refer to - needs these "additional commitments' in order to implement a critique of "moral realism".

Could it be that without these "additional commitments" moral realism stands firm? I think so.

I'll take your moral indignation as a sign that there is an implicit 'ought' in your account. — Leontiskos

There is no moral indignation. Just the end of communication.

There is no moral indignation. Just the end of communication. — unenlightened

And I suppose "fuck off" is not a normative utterance? :roll:

If moral realism is correct then it is perfectly appropriate to ask "what if they're wrong?"

So to simply use this example of socially advantageous behaviour as a refutation of realism is to beg the question. — Michael

The virtue of this account is that it fully explains our moral notions, without need of some separate ontological category. Introducing it anyway is simply gratuitous. It does not explain anything additional that is not already explained without it.

We've gotten nowhere. — Michael

Of course. Are you expecting mere philosophical considerations will decide what you ought to do? They might help you phrase the issues, but they will no more solve all your moral quandaries than they will tell you the value of the gravitational constant.

So even if I were to disagree with Banno on this, he would not be begging the question or committing any logical faux pas. Reductio's can act on systems, including moral systems. — Leontiskos

I suspected this would finally provide a divergence in our opinions...

Banno's point is that the common element in moral realism is that there are true moral statements. It turns out to be important that the SEP article on moral realism stops there, noting that "...some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments", while the SEP article on Moral Antirealism - the one you repeatedly refer to - needs these "additional commitments' in order to implement a critique of "moral realism".

Could it be that without these "additional commitments" moral realism stands firm? I think so. — Banno

You seem to view the distinction as:

1. Moral non-cognitivism
2. Error theory
3. Moral realism

Others view the distinction as:

1. Moral non-cognitivism
2. Error theory
3a. Moral subjectivism
3b. Moral realism

When others argue against moral realism they are arguing against their (3b), not your (3). Your (3) also allows for their (3a).

So you're just talking past each other.

The virtue of this account is that it fully explains our moral notions, without need of some separate ontological category. Introducing it anyway is simply gratuitous. — hypericin

And it's poverty is that it fails completely to tell us what we ought to do.

It's not even in the game, let alone a winning move.

Of course. Are you expecting mere philosophical considerations will decide what you ought to do? They might help you phrase the issues, but they will no more solve all your moral quandaries than they will tell you the value of the gravitational constant. — Banno

I'm expecting philosophical considerations to help me determine what "one ought not" means and whether or not moral truths are determined to any extent by human attitudes and decisions.

You seem to be confusing metaethics and normative ethics. I have no questions for normative ethics. I already know what I ought to (not) do. Don't eat babies, for example.

I suspected this would finally provide a divergence in our opinions... — Banno

I am glad the positions have now scrambled a bit. The thread was becoming dull before that.

But a common interpretation of Akedah (The Binding) is that Abraham was morally problematic, inclined to child sacrifice as was common at the time, and that God was acting as pedagogue, pulling out the weed by exposing the deepest rot. So I don't mind your claim that Abraham is no moral exemplar. :razz:

, : You are obsessed with "isms".

I think I might have already mentioned once or twice that my interest here was no more than to show that there are moral truths.

And "fuck off" is not a normative utterance, I suppose — Leontiskos

A mere pleasantry. Are you expecting honesty, rationality, or good sense? Reject my argument, but don't then complain when you see the consequences.

Nothing in the story here is incompatible with realism. We may well have "conventionalized system devised to punishes uncooperative behavior and reinforce cooperative behavior", and yet it is still open to us to ask if such a system is indeed moral. — Banno

The idea is that all of our notions of morality, of what is and isn't moral, are themselves are a part of this system. There is no sense of asking if something is moral independently of this system any more than asking about chess rules independently of the rules of chess.

This shows, yet again, that what you are calling "antirealism" is not what the rest of us are calling antirealism. — Banno

And I thought it turned out that what you were calling "realism" was not what the rest of us were calling realism.

nd it's poverty is that it fails completely to tell us what we ought to do. — Banno

Yes, it is a metaethical claim, not an ethical one.