Thanks for taking the time. — Tom Storm

:wink:

I asked this question myself several years ago. — Michael

I don't think I posted to that thread. It seemed to me to be asking why we ought to do what we ought to do.

If Banno's view is realism, it is an extremely thin, watered down realism where "truth" is nothing more than how we use the word, regardless of what "truth" actually means. — Apustimelogist

The meaning of a word is its use in an utterance.

You might learn something from my thread on the logic of truth. There's another on the relation between belief and truth, which you might find useful. I've also set out some more general comments about Realism.

Can any realist name any nonmoral proposition, that is neither logically derivable nor in principle empirically verifiable, that you nonetheless are certain is true? — hypericin

Bishops move diagonally. Sydney is in Australia. You stop on the red light. Any fact determined by convention.

But his persistence in pretending his proclamations amount to 'truth-making statements' is absurd, — AmadeusD

I don't think you have understood the phrase "truth-maker". Nor is it a phrase I would use.

I wonder if Banno is actually a secret theist. — AmadeusD

Oh, yes. I'm well-known hereabouts for my defence of theism.

The cool thing about the position i hold is, is that nothing you or Leontiskos have asserted has any affect on the premise that 'There are no objective moral standards'. — AmadeusD

That's more about your inability to understand an unexpected point of view than about ethics.

One can hold values, tastes, preferences, without being obligated that any of these is "true" in an objective sense — hypericin

So you think you can have a preference for foolishness without it being true that "hypericin has a preference for foolishness". Very clever.

So to be clear, the Nazis were also enacting moral truths? — hypericin

What do you think? You are responsible for your beliefs.

is that it may not be the case that there is no explanation — AmadeusD

There are three possible options:

1. There are no moral facts (error theory)
2. There are moral facts that can be explained by non-moral facts (ethical naturalism)
3. There are moral facts that cannot be explained by non-moral facts (ethical non-naturalism)

If ethical non-naturalism is correct then moral facts cannot be explained by physics or mathematics or anything non-moral. So what sort of explanation do you expect from then?

Then I will just end the conversation with an analogy. — Leontiskos

An inapt analogy. Moral non-realists hold the same moral values, feel the same moral feelings. We just don't assign to them the meaningless honorifics "fact of the world", "objectively true". Which you can't account for, you can't deduce, you can't explain, you can't verify, not just to us, but even among yourselves. But you nonetheless insist on.

That's more about your inability to understand an unexpected point of view than about ethics. — Banno

No. It's about exactly what i said it was about - further proclamations without support don't help. Hope this helps :)

further proclamations without support don't help — AmadeusD

On this we agree.

So what sort of explanation do you expect from then? — Michael

You've not at all understood what i actually said - which is that there are further explanations that they choose not to engage.

"One ought not kick puppies for fun"

Why?

"Because it hurts the puppy"

And then there's a further conversation. The old mates making moral claims around here seem to think that after the claim, nothing comes.

Nice.. that's a good place to start! Even if we never go further lol

It seemed to me to be asking why we ought to do what we ought to do. — Banno

The question is one about motivation. Knowing that I ought to do something isn't always enough to convince me to do it. Sometimes I do things I know I ought not do.

If it could be proved that I ought eat babies I still wouldn't.

So you think you can have a preference for foolishness without it being true that "hypericin has a preference for foolishness". Very clever. — Banno

As I pointed out.

One is only obligated to the trivial claim that "That I hold this value/taste/preference is true". — hypericin

Can you even read two sentences?

What do you think? You are responsible for your beliefs. — Banno

Yawn. You don't strike me as very clever at all.

You've not at all understood what i actually said - which is that there are further explanations that they choose not to engage.

"One ought not kick puppies for fun"

Why?

"Because it hurts the puppy"

And then there's a further conversation. — AmadeusD

That's ethical naturalism. Ethical non-naturalism, by definition, cannot offer this kind of explanation.

If ethical non-naturalism is correct then either:

1) "one ought not X" is a brute fact, or
2) "one ought not X" is true because "one ought not Y" is true, and "one ought not Y" is a brute fact.

Bishops move diagonally. Sydney is in Australia. You stop on the red light. Any fact determined by convention. — Banno

Great. I agree then, morals are determined by convention.

That's ethical naturalism. Ethical non-naturalism, by definition, cannot offer this kind of explanation. — Michael

Yes. I am pointing out the flaw in that notion. I'm not disagreeing with your possible view points at all. I'm merely pointing out that that position is an ignorant one.

Yes. I am pointing out the flaw in that notion. — AmadeusD

Why is it a flaw? If infinitism is incorrect then there are, necessarily, brute physical facts. If there are brute physical facts then why can't there be brute moral facts?

why can't there be brute moral facts? — Michael

Because that position is ignorant of the deeper facts related to any moral claim.

Edit: my current position, above. Not a be-all-end-all. But, in these recent conversations this seems true of all moral claims made. The ethical naturalist may not want to explore those deeper bits of data, but they exist, so, it's a flaw.

Because that position is ignorant of the deeper facts related to any moral claim. — AmadeusD

All you seem to be saying here is that moral realism is incorrect.

Obviously this is begging the question.

All you seem to be saying here is that moral realism is incorrect, and so moral realists are ignorant (in the literal sense). — Michael

Luckily for me, you've actually quoted my saying more than that. And giving a reason why that's the case - because the deep facts in regard to any claim are necessarily left untouched to support the view that there aren't any - which is obviously the claim of a moral realist if they believe their moral statements are brute. It begs no question.

What "deep facts"?

What "deep facts"? — Michael

I've given you an example, which you've quoted. To be noted, though, is that this concept can apply to any claim.

Do you recall the below?

"One ought not kick puppies for fun"

Why?

"Because it hurts the puppy"

And then there's a further conversation.

The bold and underlined, and italicised is a deeper fact about why kicking puppies for fun is wrong. The moral realists I've encountered (particularly here) don't seem to think either that A. those facts exists; or B. are relevant to supporting the statement itself.

I think both are mistaken. Therefore, my position is that the moral realist has work to do. They may not believe those explanations are required, but they are available - and so their position can be reduced to deeper facts. Why aren't they engaging them? This is my issue.

And as I said, that's ethical naturalism. Those kinds of explanations are impossible for ethical non-naturalism.

According to ethical non-naturalism, moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms, so arguing that ethical non-naturalism is false because it cannot explain moral facts in non-moral terms is begging the question.

And as I said, that's ethical naturalism. Those kinds of explanations are impossible for ethical non-naturalism. — Michael

I understand. I'm not quite sure where we're getting wires crossed.

I'm aware that is the naturalist position - but my position is that: that is factually wrong. There are further explanations available and to just ignore them doesn't constitute it being impossible. Unsure if i can clarify that further.

I'm aware that is the naturalist position - but my position is that: that is factually wrong. There are further explanations available and to just ignore them doesn't constitute it being impossible. Unsure if i can clarify that further. — AmadeusD

Then you're simply stating your disagreement with ethical non-naturalism (and moral realism). That's fine, but it doesn't constitute a rebuttal of their position.

That's fine, but it doesn't constitute a rebuttal of their position. — Michael

Sorry, I don't understand how pointing out a fatal flaw in a claim isn't a rebuttal? Deny facts that exist is surely a fatal flaw in a position?

Like, i could certainly wrong but if what i've said is the case, then **discreet** (edited in)ethical naturalist claims fail at the first hurdle.

Sorry, I don't understand how pointing out a fatal flaw in a claim isn't a rebuttal? Deny facts that exist is surely a fatal flaw in a posiiton? — AmadeusD

John says that God exists.
Jane says that John's claim is fatally flawed because God doesn't exist.

Jane says that God doesn't exist.
John says that Jane's claim is fatally flawed because God does exist.

Michael says that moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms.
AmadeusD says that Michael's claim is fatally flawed because moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms.

AmadeusD says that moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms.
Michael says that AmadeusD's claim is fatally flawed because moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms.

None of these are rebuttals. They're just two people stating their conflicting beliefs.

Michael says that moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms.
AmadeusD says that Michael's claim is fatally flawed because moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms.

AmadeusD says that moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms.
Michael says that AmadeusD's claim is fatally flawed because moral facts cannot be explained in non-moral terms. — Michael

Ahh, Ok I think I see where we're crossing wires. That's not at all how the rebuttal actual is. See below:

Michael claims (fictionally) that the claim 'one ought not kick puppies for fun' is true, and brute (i.e admits of no deeper facts to whcih it can be reduced)

Amadeus says (in contracted form) That's wrong - here are the deeper facts on which your claim rests (add in suffering, arbitrariness or whatever).

Michael says No. "

But those deeper facts remain in existence, and do, in fact, support the claim.

This is quite different from your version of the hypothetical exchange. In yours, I offer no explanation of my claim. In my version, I offer a precise and specifically relevant rebuttal to the claim that there are no deeper facts.

So yeah, it's a rebuttal. I guess you could say the rebuttal is "there are always deeper facts" Which is not my opinion, but something i claim to actually be the case. That's a rebuttal, whether its strong or not.

But those deeper facts remain in existence, and do, in fact, support the claim.

This is quite different from your version of the hypothetical exchange. In yours, I offer no explanation of my claim. In my version, I offer a precise and specifically relevant rebuttal to the claim that there are no deeper facts.

So yeah, it's a rebuttal. — AmadeusD

You have claimed that one ought not kick the puppy because it hurts the puppy. The ethical non-naturalist, being a non-naturalist, rejects this connection. You are begging the question and assuming ethical naturalism.

The ethical non-naturalist might refer to Hume: one cannot derive an ought from an is.

You have claimed that one ought not kick the puppy because it hurts the puppy. The ethical non-naturalist, being a non-naturalist, rejects this connection. You are begging the question and assuming ethical naturalism. — Michael

No, I haven't. I have presented a deeper fact about the claim - whether i believe that's the case is somewhat by the by. The rebuttal is there are deep facts about moral claims. If an ethical naturalist rejects that, so be it. That's the rebuttal they actually have to grapple with instead of just jettisoning and pretending those facts arren't pertinent to their claim.

Again, whether i'm correct or not, this is a rebuttal to ethical naturalism. Their denial doesn't do anything for their position other than expound it in some sense.

In a more involved circumstance, I may indeed refer to Hume to support the contention and I think our flow is similar on that. But it's unneeded here as the mere existence of those facts, and their patent connection to the moral claim, is enough to defeat the position that ... there are no deeper facts for the statement to be reduced to. Because.. there they are. And simply denying a connection to them isn't an adequate response.

Again, whether i'm correct or not, this is a rebuttal to ethical naturalism. — AmadeusD

For it to be a rebuttal you must prove that moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms. You must prove that "one ought not kick puppies for fun because it hurts the puppy" is true.

As you haven't proven it, only asserted it, it begs the question.

Moral non-realists hold the same moral values — hypericin

Hold them how? For they cannot hold them to be true!

One is only obligated to the trivial claim that "That I hold this value/taste/preference is true". — hypericin

...and that is realism.

For it to be a rebuttal you must prove that moral facts can be explained in non-moral terms. You must prove that "one ought not kick puppies for fun because it hurts the puppy" is true. — Michael

Ahh, ok I'm groking you now. I still don't think that's right, though.

To my mind, and my understanding, what you're asking me to do is prove another ethical framework is true (something which would amount to those deeper facts establishing the 'correct' (to the view-holder's mind) ethical reason for the statement to be true))... I'm not trying to do that. Merely, that the claim of a ethical naturalist isn't tenable.

If it could be proved that I ought eat babies I still wouldn't. — Michael

One would treat this as a reductio, that shows the supposed argument to have gone astray. That one ought not eat babies takes precedence over the argument.

Davidson offered an account that tried to account for weakness of the will in an otherwise rational mind, with I think some success. Have you read ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’