The philosophical one is. Having not resolved anything hehe. — AmadeusD

It's pretty rare for someone who is deeply committed to some position to reverse themselves in a short time, such as the lifespan of a thread. In this thread I'd say we see a large number of failed attempts to establish moral anti-realism, and a large number of failed attempts to overthrow moral realism. Just consider the number of times the OP was revised, or the number of times arguments backtracked. Again, what inevitably happens in these threads is that a naive epistemology derides moral realism; the complex and non-empirical nature of epistemology is demonstrated; and then the naive epistemology recognizes that it is naive, and begins to back off.

In the intractable world of argument, I would call this a success. I wouldn't aim for more in a thread like this. The doubling-down on something which is commonly accepted to be absurd (that tastes are a proper subject of dispute) is a bonus, and is a strong sign of the weakness of the position. It seems like a successful thread to me.

In this thread I'd say we see a large number of failed attempts to establish moral anti-realism, and a large number of failed attempts to overthrow moral realism. — Leontiskos

From Bob and I's perspective, the exact opposite is true.

That's kind of the entire point of our lines of questioning. Nothing, whatsoever, has been presented to support moral realism. The closest anyone has got is Banno's weirdo move of just claiming 'brute fact' without anything whatsoever to establish that claim.

You've not done anything more. Sorry to say. But this is the nature or differing perspectives. I just can't grasp why anyone is being a dick about it (Banno's obtuseness mainly, but you've devolved a couple of times too).

From Bob and I's perspective, the exact opposite is true. — AmadeusD

Oh, really?

With regards to my previous positive argument for moral anti-realism, I no longer accept it (thanks to the useful critiques by fellow moral realist members). — Bob Ross

Your quote/s from Bob don't touch what i've said.

adjust one's position for new objections isn't a failure, nor is refining ones position or language. Neither of us have ceded the ground of anti-realism. We've just come up against the same problem with new words or objections every time - but the problem amounts to just saying 'It's true, give up'.

Your quote/s from Bob don't touch what i've said. — AmadeusD

If you don't think moral anti-realism lost the day in this thread, then you simply don't understand the OP or the purpose of this thread.

If you don't think moral anti-realism lost the day in this thread, then you simply don't understand the OP or the purpose of this thread. — Leontiskos

Or, and forgive me for this, you're wrong.

In either case, it appears you've made your conclusions and that's fine :)

I got the feeling this wasn't on the menu, for this interlocutor. I have a feeling moral realists are necessarily unable to bridge the gap we're genuinely looking to traverse.

Although I don’t want to overgeneralize moral realists, I would say my conversation with Leontiskos is an example of a moral realist that cannot step outside of their moral realism to understand their opposition on their opposition’s own terms. I don’t expect them to agree with me, but it is sad (to me) when the conversation isn’t as fruitful as it could have been.

I think your toes are much stickier than you realize.

Then please respond adequately to my previous responses, and demonstrate any incoherencies or inconsistencies with my position.

f someone thinks imposing tastes is justifiable, then in my estimation the conversation is at an end, and they have reduced their own position to absurdity.

I see. So, for you, anyone who isn’t a moral realism is thereby absurd, irrational, and stupid...this seems like you have straw manned your opponent’s position(s) with a false dilemma.

Likewise, you ignored my questions about axiology. It seems as though you either reduce axiology to morality (which I think is flawed) or you are internally incoherent with this critique.

You think imposing tastes is justifiable (when "[You] care about it enough to impose it on other people"). Hence, the conversation is at an end.

So be it.

I largely agree with Amadeus' analysis here. @Bannos moral realism seems like it is really just moral cognitivism, and I think they actually agree with me on that (but I could be mistaken).

Although I gave up on my original Humean argument for moral realism, this does not entail that I am convinced that moral realism is true nor that it should be the default position: quite the contrary; and I am sure Leontiskos didn't provide a positive argument for moral realism in here because they are expected me to give a positive argument for moral anti-realism in this thread (which is fair enough) but I've moved on and am now, in the other thread, asking moral realists to give me reasons to believe their view. With that being said, I am working on an argument for moral anti-realism that I have run by Leontiskos before; but here's the fully fleshed out version:

My argument provides a positive case against prong-2 of the moral realist thesis, so let me recap what I think that thesis is:

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].

Here's the argument:

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.

P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.

C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist.

Here's an elaboration:

P1 affirms a subtle and fairly intuitive notion that whatever the state-of-affairs are in reality (i.e., in the totality of existence) it simply does not inform us how they should be—what should be the case is despite what is the case. However, if moral facts exist, then they are exactly that: states-of-affairs that inform us of how reality should be—which entails that what should be the case is not despite what is the case. Therefore, P1 precludes the existence of moral facts as defined in P2. If moral facts cannot exist, then it is impossible for any true moral judgments, if they exist, to be expressing something objective and, thusly, prong-2 of the moral realist’s thesis is denied if the above argument is affirmed. It seems as though the moral realist must deny P1 to salvage moral facticity (from this argument), but this seems like an incredibly expensive maneuver: if states-of-affairs about reality can inform us how it ought to be, then it appears as though the question “it is the case, but should it be the case?” is not a universally valid question (which seems very implausible). Likewise, when one is presented with such a state-of-affairs that ground, objectively, a moral fact-of-the-matter called, let’s say, M, they cannot, if P1 is false, validly ask “it is the case that M, but should it be the case that M?”. However, this seems like a legitimate question: just because it is the case that there is such a state-of-affairs that (allegedly) grounds a moral fact, it does not seem to follow that it should be that way or that another state-of-affairs would not have been better. Nevertheless, this is the bullet a moral realist must bite: some state-of-affairs are simply what should be, and they cannot be questioned further about what they should be themselves.

Here's anticipated objections and responses:

There are various objections a moral realist can make that are worth noting. One could, as mentioned before, bite the bullet and deny P1; one could deny the underlying theory of truth required for P2 and adopt an alternative theory (e.g., pragmatist account, coherentism, deflationary account, etc.); or one could deny what is sometimes called the ‘direction-of-fit’ with respect to the statement and reality such that it is reversed: if, in P2, a moral fact has a ‘world-to-statement’ ‘direction-of-fit’, then, at least in principle, they are not statements about reality but rather exist as informants of reality. The first objection has already been addressed and the second is out of the scope of this, but the third is worth addressing further. By ‘direction-of-fit’ of a fact, it is meant as a specifier of the direction by which one should correspond the statement and reality. There are two options: a ‘reality-to-statement’ or ‘statement-to-reality’ direction-of-fit: the former implies that one attempts, in order to decipher the truth, to ‘fit’ (or correspond) reality with the statement (such that a state-of-affairs in reality makes the statement true) and the latter implies an attempt at ‘fitting’ the statement with reality (such that the statement is true if it agrees with a state-of-affairs in reality but isn’t immediately made true by a state-of-affairs). An example of the former is a human desire: if one desires X, then it is true that they desire X and this is made true solely because of the state-of-affairs responsible for generating a desire for X—there is no matching of the statement ‘I desire X’ with reality but, rather it is just true in virtue of its own creation; whereas an example of the latter is ‘I ran today 5 miles’: that statement is true iff there was a state-of-affairs in the past (today) which contained one running 5 miles—there is a matching of the statement with reality, and the statement is not true in virtue of some process(es). The moral realist, who takes this route, will say that moral judgments are like the former and not the latter, and P2 is assuming the latter. To this, I deny the validity of a ‘reality-to-statement’ direction-of-fit for anything: every proposition is true iff that statement corresponds to a state-of-affairs in reality and, as such, is made true only by matching with reality and never by some virtue of its own creation. Consequently, ‘I desire X’ is true iff I actually desire X: it is not true in virtue of me stating or thinking it. There is simply no such thing as a fact of which its truthity is sui generis.
Another worthy objection, albeit a misapprehension, is that this is an argument from Hume’s is-ought gap and, consequently, objections are directed towards this argument by proxy of objections raised to Hume’s, or some neo-Humian’s, is-ought gap argument. It is imperative that the reader understands that Hume’s Guillotine is an epistemic argument which does not negate the possibility of moral facts but, rather, notes that one cannot validly, in logical form, derive an prescriptive statement from an indicative statement; whereas the argument set out hereon is far bolder, being a ontological argument, that contends with the notion of a moral facts being impossible in virtue of normativity and objectivity being two different ontological categories.
The last noteworthy objection is a misunderstanding stemming from the term ‘reality’ and ‘states-of-affairs’: some moral non-naturalists will agree with my argument and merely add that it does not contend with their moral realist theories because they identify moral properties with supersensible, supernatural, or non-natural properties—thusly, they have no problem admitting that the way reality is never entails how it should be. However, this misunderstands the deployment of the terms ‘reality’ and ‘states-of-affairs’ in this argument: it is not referencing nature, the universe, or the world but, rather, the ‘totality of existence’—and ‘states-of-affairs’ is not referencing mere temporal nor spatiotemporal ‘states’ within reality but, rather, is any ‘arrangement’ of existent entities within reality. Consequently, for example, theistic and platonistic moral realist positions are not exempt from this argument.

There you go @Leontiskos: this (^) is a fully fleshed-out positive argument for moral anti-realism (irregardless of whether you agree with it).

Your argument seems to be, "Moral realism is false, therefore I can do whatever the heck I want! If moral realism is false, then I'll impose my tastes whenever I please!" So sure, on that account you can impose your tastes, or contradict yourself with impunity, or send millions of Jews to the gas chambers. Everything is fair game! I admit I wasn't prepared for the doubling-down on sociopathy. I was sort of hoping for more than that.

But the notion that your view is in some way rational is surely problematic, and you did admit this in your own way (). In this post () you attempt to give four steps that would precede coercion in matters of taste. Regarding those, I would invite you to ask yourself whether <one ought not have false beliefs>, <one ought to have consistent beliefs>, etc. Logic and reasoning is inherently moral, and the things that we reason about have an inherently objective quality. Your rebuke about "charity" and "hate" is a moral rebuke (). The ideas that we ought to seek truth, or be consistent, or mean what we say, are all moral claims ().

If someone thinks imposing tastes is justifiable, then in my estimation the conversation is at an end, and they have reduced their own position to absurdity. — Leontiskos

I see. So, for you, anyone who isn’t a moral realism is thereby absurd, irrational, and stupid...this seems like you have straw manned your opponent’s position(s) with a false dilemma. — Bob Ross

Actually, as I already noted, I have never encountered someone who believes it is rationally justifiable to impose tastes. "I have never heard anyone, on this forum or elsewhere, argue for this stupid position" (). Your claim that all moral non-realists hold your same position is false. "Moral subjectivism" is likely the most unendorsed form of anti-realism, and the variety of subjectivism that you endorse is virtually unheard of.

Your argument seems to be, "Moral realism is false, therefore I can do whatever the heck I want! If moral realism is false, then I'll impose my tastes whenever I please!"

It depends on what you mean. I cannot do whatever I want in any meaningful, colloquial sense of the term because I must abide by my own moral law--viz., my 'ego', as the tip of the ice berg, can say 'I find this to be morally permissible', but if my true self does not then I am going to be in a world of hurt when I violate my own moral law; but, sure, that stems from my psychology too!

But this is true of yourself as well (so some extent), and is not absurd nor abnormal, just like everyone else: why do you enforce and care about the moral facts?. Because you simply like it—not because there is a fact of the matter (because there can’t be in this case, even if moral realism is true). So, let’s be consistent and apply your own reasoning to your own position:

Your axiology boils down to “I can do whatever the heck I want! I will, then, impose whatever values I please!” And you simply can't 'do whatever you want' in the sense that you will not allow yourself to violate the moral facts. See how this is analogous to the above?

You keep avoiding this because, at this point, I think you know it undermines your point here. This isn’t a gotcha moment, I would much rather you actually genuinely attempt at answering the hypothetical.

So sure, on that account you can impose your tastes, or contradict yourself with impunity, or send millions of Jews to the gas chambers.

I will not allow myself to contradict myself (if I know it) nor send millions of jews to the gas chambers; but, yes, none of it is objectively wrong...that’s why moral subjectivism is a form of moral anti-realism.

Have you read Nietzsche? Based off of your responses, I bet you hate that man (; – but I could be wrong.

Everything is fair game! I admit I wasn't prepared for the doubling-down on sociopathy. I was sort of hoping for more than that.

If by ‘sociopathy’ and ‘everything is fair game’ you are loaded the terms with objectivity, thusly presupposing your own view and consequently begging the question, then sure. I don’t use those terms that way, because I am not a moral realist.

But the notion that your view is in some way rational is surely problematic, and you did admit this in your own way

I don’t think it is irrational to be a moral anti-realist, I’ve outlined what I mean by ‘rationality’, and you never once will answer my inquiries about what you mean by ‘rationality’. It seems like, for you, being rational requires one to be a moral realist...that’s kind of convenient, isn’t it?

In this post (
↪Bob Ross
) you attempt to give four steps that would precede coercion in matters of taste. Regarding those, I would invite you to ask yourself whether <one ought not have false beliefs>, <one ought to have consistent beliefs>, etc. Logic and reasoning is inherently moral, and the things that we reason about have an inherent objective quality. Your rebuke about "charity" and "hate" is a moral rebuke (
↪Bob Ross
). The ideas that we ought to seek truth, or be consistent, or mean what we say, are all moral claims

This is correct (for the most part) and equally can be said of axiology. If the person doesn’t even agree with me on being logically consistent, for example, then I will deploy the same tactics I told you about plus some others to try and convince them otherwise; and at the end of the day if they are doing something really bad then I will use violence to stop them. this is no different than enforcing laws, axiological evaluations, and enforcing moral realism. You keep bringing up things that equally apply to your own position (as far as I can tell).

I have never encountered someone who believes it is rationally justifiable to impose tastes. — Leontiskos

This question isn't a piggy-back, its totally askance from the thread - Are you using the word 'impose' here to include 'encourage', or is it more definite?

The vast majority I have ever talk to or heard of have held that preferences can be imposed on other people. The only moral anti-realism view that in principle doesn't allow it is nihilism...but I've heard some of them also allow for impositions of preferences.

Moral non-cognitivist positions, like emotivism, absolutely agree with me on this point.
Moral subjectivists absolutely agree with me on this point.

You are thinking of moral nihilism or amoralism and conflating it with moral anti-realism.

The vast majority I have ever talk to or heard of have held that preferences can be imposed on other people. — Bob Ross

They do not hold that tastes can be imposed on other people, and that is what you have consistently held.

why do you enforce and care about the moral facts?. Because you simply like it—not because there is a fact of the matter — Bob Ross

You're obviously begging the question.

But this is true of yourself as well — Bob Ross

No, because what I "want" flows from my "subjectivity," and what I am bound by (morality) flows from something that is objective. To say that I can do whatever I want would require abandoning moral realism, hence my point. I cannot do whatever I want, for I am bound by what is objectively moral and right.

If there is a speed limit of 55 mph that I am bound to obey, then I cannot do whatever I want. Suppose you repudiate the speed law. I conclude, "You can drive as fast as you want!" You respond that you have certain subjective inclinations that tend to limit your speed to 55 mph, and that, after all, we are both in the same boat with regard to a speed limit. But this is patently false, for we are not in the same situation at all. I can expand if you disagree.

Your point is presumably that either I could also choose to repudiate the speed limit, or else that I am lying about my belief that the speed limit binds me. If I am lying then we are in the same boat, but of course I am not lying. I could choose to repudiate the speed limit, but I have not done so, and therefore we are not in the same boat.

Then, positively, if I saw someone imposing his ice cream taste, I would deem him irrational. It wouldn't matter at all if he really cares about that ice cream flavor. I would still deem him irrational. And if I saw someone else imposing a taste, that would also be irrational. Namely, if I saw someone imposing something like an ice cream taste, that would be irrational. You say that you are willing to impose things that are like ice cream tastes, and therefore I deem you irrational. You say, "Ah, but the difference is that I really care about it." It makes no difference. You are still irrational. Tastes don't become imposable when someone cares about them a lot. Imposition requires more than that. I suspect that you know this. You know it is irrational to impose ice cream tastes, even if one cares about them a great deal. And you know that if X is not imposable, and Y is like X, then Y is also not imposable.

This question isn't a piggy-back, its totally askance from the thread - Are you using the word 'impose' here to include 'encourage', or is it more definite? — AmadeusD

It is more definite. It is my ice cream case ().

- I do appreciate these long and detailed posts of yours, but if I tried to engage them in detail I would soon run short on time. I cannot responsibly enter into such long-form discussions at this point. This seems to have been a difficulty throughout: you have much more time than I do, and that discrepancy becomes problematic.

I will say, though, that the central problem is that you mistake states of affairs with physical reality, and Michael has addressed this in detail in the other thread. Of course if you assert an ontological position which denies the possibility of normative realities then normative realities will be excluded from your ontology. But as I have noted, beginning with totalizing, abstract, categorical systems is just a poor way to do philosophy, or to think in general. If you are not able to consider individual propositions independently of your a priori system, then you have walled yourself off from new data, information, and insight.

Thank you; appreciate that and the link-to-post.

I'll repeat the simple point that I am not here attempting anything like a coherent, complete theory of ethics, but simply pointing out that there are true moral statements.

Those who have disagreed have either claimed that it is false that one ought not kick puppies for fun, or engaged in the special pleading that despite common usage it is neither true nor false.

Neither reply is tenable.

↪AmadeusD I'll repeat the simple point that I am not here attempting anything like a coherent, complete theory of ethics, but simply pointing out that there are true moral statements.

Those who have disagreed have either claimed that it is false that one ought not kick puppies for fun, or engaged in the special pleading that despite common usage it is neither true nor false.

Neither reply is tenable. — Banno

It's not true. You've done nothing other than basically saying you believe it and it should be true (ding ding bloody ding lol).
Your point, is exactly as i outlined it, and fails just as spectacularly.

Your claim of 'untenable' is supported by what?? Your imagination that no one is capable of making that claim?

it isn't true. It's normative. Go ahead and beat hte argument, instead of just making a claim.

:smile: :wink:

I don't think I have ever heard an argument for moral realism that is overly convincing. I know where I stand on some moral questions, but I have no idea why I hold the views I do other than I am a member of a species with empathy and am part of a collaborative (if flawed) culture. This, plus an eternity of ingrained religious moralism, plays out as it must.

In the Philpapers survey, 2020, just under 70% accepted or leaned towards moral cognitivism.

62% leaned toward moral realism.

Not as high as for external word realism, but perhaps enough to show our anti-realist and non-cognitivist friends hereabouts that they might have missed something.

I know where I stand on some moral questions — Tom Storm

So you know where you stand on moral questions, but you do not consider those statements that set out that stance to be true?

How can that be made coherent? You know things that are not true?

Again, moral realism is simply the view that there are true moral statements. Are you sure you reject this?

How can that be made coherent? — Banno

I guess the same way I justify aesthetic taste. Plus I generally assume there’s broad intersubjective agreement about many matters based on shared human experience. I don’t spend much time worrying about coherence as a rule but maybe I should.

Again, moral realism is simply the view that there are true moral statements. Are you sure you reject this? — Banno

It’s not that I reject it, I just see no clear way to believe it. When you say there are true moral statements my intuition is to ask, based on what criteria?

I am happy with a foundational principle such as, we should not cause suffering, but that foundation rests on what exactly? Codified behaviour based upon the habits of culture?

I guess the same way I justify aesthetic taste. — Tom Storm

I'm not asking you to justify your moral stance, but to explain how it can be not true. In aesthetic terms, you claim would have to be that despite, say, liking sugar in your morning coffee, you do not think it true that "Tom likes sugar in his morning coffee".

...there’s broad intersubjective agreement about many matters based on a shared human experience — Tom Storm

Yep. Another way to say this is that there is broad intersubjective agreement as to what is true.

I am happy with a foundational principle such as, we should not cause suffering... — Tom Storm

Good. Now if you are a moral realist, you would say that "we should not cause suffering" is true. If you reject moral realism, you somehow have to maintain that we should not cause suffering, and yet deny that "we should not cause suffering" is true.

Gets complex, doesn't it. It's hard to have a foundational principle that is not true.

What you have brought ought here is that the justification is a seperate issue to the truth of the proposal. The point has been made several times throughout this thread, by a few of the more well-versed folk, but some are deaf to it.

Gets complex, doesn't it. It's hard to have a foundational principle that is not true. — Banno

Well, I would put it this way, I would like people to share my foundational principle - but I have nothing to point to its truth other than I choose it, the way I might choose a preferred art work. And I know that many would share my choices. I can’t find my way to truth in this.

What you have brought ought here is that the justification is a seperate issue to the truth of the proposal. The point has been made several times throughout this thread, by a few of the more well-versed folk, but some are deaf to it. — Banno

I’m deaf to this too, I’m afraid.

I can’t find my way to truth in this. — Tom Storm

But you have your foundational principles - that is, you take them to be true. Hence you are a moral realist.

How you justify that belief is over to you, and irrelevant to whether you are a moral realist or not.

How you justify that belief is over to you, and irrelevant to whether you are a moral realist or not. — Banno

Ok, I see that. In that case a moral realist can say anything. I was assuming that to be a realist you had to have some sort of foundational guarantee for the belief, like Platonism or some other magical thinking.