A Case for Moral Anti-realism

AmadeusD

Sure, fair enough. :up: — Leontiskos

Nice, thank you mate. Really appreciate the grace. It's been a really cool thread.

Leontiskos

Which of these don't you agree with:
(By "Doctrine", I mean any doctrine, system of thought or belief, ideology, etc. ) — hypericin

Okay:

Claims can be about doctrine, or about reality, or both. ( $\checkmark$ )
Doctrinal truth is independent of truth in reality. ( $\unicode{x2718}$ )
Claims can therefore be:
Doctrinally true, but false in reality. ( $\checkmark$ )
Doctrinally false, but true in reality. ( $\checkmark$ )
Doctrinally true or false, but have no truth value at all in reality. ( $\unicode{x2718}$ /?)
Doctrinally empty, and true or false in reality. ( $\unicode{x2718}$ ) — hypericin

The form in English of doctrinal and reality claims is identical.
Therefore, people are apt to get all this wrong. They may confuse doctrinal claims with claims about reality, or mistake doctrinal truth with truth in reality. — hypericin

I tend to think you are digging around in the grave of Logical Positivism. I don't think people are often confused about this matter. It is only very seldom that we speak about doctrinal claims qua doctrinal. Do you have any examples:?

"One cannot move pawns backwards" — hypericin

For me the problem with this Logical Positivist-esque approach is that it reifies judgments and propositions. You are trying to read that as a material, intent-independent sentence, when in fact it is not. The material sense creates an ambiguity, but in the context of organic intent the meaning is, "According to the rules of chess, one cannot move pawns backwards." This is about the "doctrine" of chess, which is itself a part of reality; and it is true.

Edit: Changed comma to semicolon in last sentence.

Leontiskos

Nice, thank you mate. Really appreciate the grace. It's been a really cool thread. — AmadeusD

I don't mind if you retract statements or mistakes, but it is worth noting that the point at hand was not insubstantial. You tried to affirm a moral claim while denying that it involves a norm. I pointed out that, in effect, moral claims involve norms. After that you saw that the norm was attached and backed away from the claim, due to the norm. The more fundamental point here is that moral claims and moral norms are all around us. Avoiding them would be like avoiding CO2 and only breathing oxygen. "We should not torture babies," is a moral claim, but so is, "He should not have cut me off in traffic." We are social creatures, and as such we are constantly judging actions.

AmadeusD

After that you saw that the norm was attached and backed away from the claim, due to the norm. — Leontiskos

*sigh*

I have no idea how to get this through to you lol - I misspoke. I walked nothing back. Given that I entirely overlooked where I misspoke you took my claim for something it wasn’t. I have no issue with this… I’m just being very clear to you that I fucked up in our exchange, but hold my position with no qualms.

There is a norm attached to making a moral claim about anyone but me. I never intended to intimate the claim was about anyone but me - which is where I fucked ip and have now multiple times apologies for that because it was my fault this was such an anal exchange. We weren’t talking about the same claim - because I messed up. Unsure what’s not clear about this

hypericin

↪Leontiskos

What does it mean for the rules of chess to be "true"? Can a games rules be "false"?

The rules exist. The may be followed, broken, or ignored. But how exactly are they "true"?

Leontiskos

What does it mean for the rules of chess to be "true"? Can a games rules be "false"?

The rules exist. The may be followed, broken, or ignored. But how exactly are they "true"? — hypericin

The truth in question was the claim, not the doctrine. "According to the rules of chess, one cannot move pawns backwards." Sorry - sloppy writing, I admit!

Leontiskos

I have no idea how to get this through to you lol - I misspoke. I walked nothing back. Given that I entirely overlooked where I misspoke you took my claim for something it wasn’t. — AmadeusD

Well, if it was purely accidental then my point remains instructive. But we have been talking about the torture of babies for days now, and I would be surprised if you have consistently misunderstood that claim to be about only oneself, and not also about others.

Note that you had already staked out the same position earlier (

↪AmadeusD

). There you claimed that it was justifiable to get angry at others who behave in a way you deem incorrect. In that case it was also obvious that we were talking about the behavior of other people.

AmadeusD

Well, if it was purely accidental then my point remains instructive. — Leontiskos

This is absolutely the case. And i've certainly learnt to be far more careful. I've cleaned a fair bit of egg from my face.

There you claimed that it was justifiable to get angry at others who behave in a way you deem incorrect — Leontiskos

Not really. I queried why it would be senseless. I can see where you've gone with that, though.

In that case it was also obvious that we were talking about the behavior of other people. — Leontiskos

In that case, yes, but for the above (in regard to your take on my position).

Leontiskos

This is absolutely the case. And i've certainly learned to be far more careful. I've cleaned a fair bit of egg from my face. — AmadeusD

No, the point is that it is not about you. It's not personal. <This post> was meant to convey something other than personal culpability. I don't count it an error to claim that we should not torture babies. At worst it is an understandable mistake from a moral non-realist. But if it was a purely accidental utterance/agreement, then so be it.

Not really. I queried why it would be senseless. I can see where you've gone with that, though.

In that case, yes, but for the above (in regard to your take on my position). — AmadeusD

:up:

AmadeusD

No, the point is that it is not about you. It's not personal. <This post> was meant to convey something other than personal culpability. I don't count it an error to claim that we should not torture babies. At worst it is an understandable mistake from a moral non-realist. — Leontiskos

I have no idea why you're saying this.

I made an error of laziness by not reading adequately closely, the statement you made. Therefore, my response was incoherent in light of my actual position. There was no mistake in my claim(position, that is - I never intended for the claim you're talking about to be made from my mouth(to use metaphor)), there was a mistake in my words. Which is absolutely a personal mistake on my part for not reading adequately and responding hurriedly without considering the actual words used.

Like, dude, what's not getting over the line here?

Leontiskos

↪AmadeusD

- Ye doth protest too much, methinks.

AmadeusD

Ye doth protest too much, methinks. — Leontiskos

Yet, the case is that i made a mistake in replying to fast. My position hasn't changed one iota. I'm really not understanding what you're not getting here... *shrug*.

IF nothing else, you're being wrong here is unhelpful to me because i now do not know if you intended the lesson that i've actually learned (to read more closely to ensure i don't represent a view i don't hold) or that you think I actually held a different view between the start and end of the substantive exchange?

Leontiskos

My position hasn't changed one iota. — AmadeusD

Swell. Your zealous defense of your honor hath succeeded. I concede all points. I surrender. You win.

Now go do some actual philosophy.

AmadeusD

Swell. Your zealous defense of your honor hath succeeded. I concede all points. I surrender. You win.

Now go do some actual philosophy. — Leontiskos

I'm sorry, why are you being a dick?

I'm trying, very politely, to assist you to understand that I did not ever hold the view you're saying I had to walk back. That is the case. Why has this descended into you making insulting quips?

hypericin

↪Leontiskos

This is about the "doctrine" of chess, which is itself a part of reality, and it is true.

So then you agree, the rules of chess themselves cannot be "true".

What would it mean for the claim "You cannot move a pawn backward" to be true "in reality"?

Either, the claim would be true without the rules of chess. This is false.
Or, the rules of chess themselves would have to be true. This is nonsensical. (this is the case where you X'ed/?. How do you make the check/X icon, btw?).

The claim, therefore, "You cannot move a pawn backward", in reality, outside the rules of chess, is false or nonsensical.

Precisely the same holds of moral claims.

A moral claim C is true, or false, in virtue of moral rules, R. (doctrines, axioms, etc.)
What would it take for C to be true in reality?
Either, it is true without R. But we just said, C is true in virtue of R. This is therefore false.
Or, R itself is true. I contend, R can no more be true than the rules of chess. You can follow R, or not, like R, or not, find R useful, and virtuous, or not. But R by its nature, cannot be true, it is not truth-apt.

Banno

I'm going to repeat the two objections to the idea that value statements do not have truth value.

First, it seems that they do have truth value. So "one ought not kick puppies for fun" is a valuation. And it gives every appearance of being true. Therefore there are true valuations.

Second, if valuations are not the sort of thing that can be true, then they cannot be used in deductions or explanation. If "Banno likes Vanilla" is not true, then it cannot be used to explain why Banno usually buys vanilla ice cream and vanilla milkshakes. If "One ought not keep slaves" is neither true nor false, then it cannot be used to reach conclusions such as

One ought not keep slaves
Alice keeps slaves
Alice does what one ought not do.

And so on.

Leontiskos

So then you agree, the rules of chess themselves cannot be "true". — hypericin

Even if the rules of chess cannot be true, it would not thereby follow that no rules or systems can be true. We are apt to speak about the truth of an artifact according to the goal of the artist. So if there is a horse drawing competition, the drawing that most resembles a real horse will be the winner, and will be deemed truest. Or a carpenter's square is true when it achieves an exact 90° angle. We could apply the same rule to games, and perhaps claim that the true game is chess and not checkers, because it better achieves the end that games are meant to achieve.

How do you make the check icon, btw? — hypericin

[math]\checkmark[/math]
[math]\unicode{x2718}[/math]

(There might be a shortcut for the 'x'. I don't know.)

A moral claim C is true, or false, in virtue of moral rules, R. (doctrines, axioms, etc.) — hypericin

This is really the whole of your argument, and it is nothing more than an assertion. Moreover, it is an assertion I have already addressed (

↪Leontiskos

). Feel free to engage that post.

Or, R itself is true. I contend, R can no more be true than the rules of chess. You can follow R, or not, like R, or not, find R useful, and virtuous, or not. But R by its nature, cannot be true, it is not truth-apt. — hypericin

I think at bottom your claim is rather simpler. You are saying that all truth is formal, deriving from axioms, and where axioms are not truth-apt so conclusions are not truth-apt (in the strong sense). But the moral axioms you have in mind are qualitatively identical to the conclusions. For example, the Utilitarian begins by saying that one should achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and ends by saying that Bob should ride his bike to work instead of driving. At the end of the day you just think prescriptions cannot be true or false, no? It is not that R is systematic/doctrinal/axiomatic, but rather that it is prescriptive. If all you are saying is that prescriptions are not truth-apt, then all that talk about systems and axioms led me to misunderstand your position.

Do you think mundane claims are also true in virtue of systems, such as the claim, "Frogs can jump"?

AmadeusD

First, it seems that they do have truth value. So "one ought not kick puppies for fun" is a valuation. And it gives every appearance of being true. Therefore there are true valuations. — Banno

Is the point here that you are perceiving truth in it, therefore it is a truth-evaluative statement? As my previous question, im not objecting, just want to clarify what you're saying.

Banno

...you are perceiving truth in it... — AmadeusD

I've no idea what that might mean.

Banno

Even if the rules of chess cannot be true... — Leontiskos

...and what I said above applies here too. If the rules of chess are neither true nor false, then they cannot be used in deductions such as:

One wins if one places one's opponents King is checkmate
Leontiskos placed his opponents king in checkmate.
Therefore Leontiskos wins.

Is this what is being suggested? If the major premise is neither true nor false, no one can win.

AmadeusD

I've no idea what that might mean. — Banno

You've claimed it 'gives every appearance' to have truth in it.

I disagree (but that's probably already known, and isn't too relevant here - it just explains why im asking).

You must be perceiving that status of 'being true' viz. it 'appears' to be true to you. I am asking whether your point is that your perception of it's truth is what grants its truth-evaluative power or whether you're trying to suggest you are merely making observation of it, grounded in something other than your perception.

Leontiskos

↪Banno

- Thanks for that.

...and what I said above applies here too. If the rules of chess are neither true nor false, then they cannot be used in deductions such as: — Banno

Yes, this is interesting. I was just pulling an example that hypericin gave in the other thread (

↪hypericin

). I want to say that the case depends on a kind of material imprecision which prescinds from the intent/context of the statement. Your response to him in that thread was presumably to the effect that context is always at play, and that "context-independent" is a fiction. His point here, though, is that the rules taken as a whole, or the game taken as a whole, are apparently not truth-apt:

The rules exist. The may be followed, broken, or ignored. But how exactly are they "true"? — hypericin

It's moving towards conceiving of morality as a set of hypothetical imperatives.

Banno

↪AmadeusD

:rofl: Oh, I see - taking the turn of phrase literally.

So you think "One ought not kick puppies for fun" is neither true nor false? Or do you think it false?

Apustimelogist

↪Banno

So "one ought not kick puppies for fun" is a valuation. And it gives every appearance of being true. — Banno

What makes it true?

Second, if valuations are not the sort of thing that can be true, then they cannot be used in deductions or explanation — Banno

Its very easy to reason about normativity in terms of some kind of means-ends analysis.

Banno

His point, though, is that the rules taken as a whole, or the game taken as a whole, are apparently not truth-apt: — Leontiskos

Yes, I saw that. I can't see how one could play chess if he were right.

AmadeusD

Oh, I see - taking the turn of phrase literally. — Banno

No. Asking you to clarify yourself
I see you’ve answered a question with a question. Neato

Banno

What makes it true? — Apustimelogist

Well, "one ought not kick puppies for fun" will be true if and only if one ought not kick puppies for fun.

That's about all one can say, but I suspect you will not be happy with it. You probably want to ask how we know it is true, and my own answer is that it's a consequence of the hinge proposition that one ought so far as one can avoid causing suffering. And we "know" that to be true. With all the usual considerations invovled in hinge propositions.

Its very easy to reason about normativity in terms of some kind of means-ends analysis. — Apustimelogist

Can you show how one does that if normative statements have no truth value?

Leontiskos

↪Banno

I think he might say that a game like chess involves voluntarily abiding by stipulated rules, and that deductions can be formed in light of these stipulated rules, but the truth of the deductions is only derivative, deriving from an artificial reality (namely, the stipulated rules). It's the idea that there is chess-truth and there is real-truth, where the first depends on stipulated rules and the second does not. Thus claims about the rules of chess are truth-apt in light of the rules of chess, but the rules of chess taken as a whole are not truth-apt. He would say that, "Chess is true," and, "Chess is false," are nonsensical statements.

Apustimelogist

↪Banno

Well, "one ought not kick puppies for fun" will be true if and only if one ought not kick puppies for fun. — Banno

Again, that describes how people talk about truth but it doesn't in and of itself tell you if something is true or truthapt.

it's a consequence of the hinge proposition that one ought so far as one can avoid causing suffering. — Banno

So what stops someone from starting from a different assumption about whether one ought to cause suffering? Presumably there is nothing that makes this true either if you have to add in that its a hinge proposition.

Can you show how one does that if normative statements have no truth value? — Banno

Its very easy, you can talk about it in terms of things like goals, actions, their consequences and reason using them instead. People do it every day concerning the things they want to do and the ends they want to realize to decide what behaviors they want to do.

Apustimelogist

↪Leontiskos

This kind of stuff is difficult without being very precise but I think there is a good point in the idea of chess not being true or false due to how it is a construction. Its truth totally depends on people to the extent that it seems difficult for there to be truths that are not about things like people playing chess or their intentions regarding chess and things like that. Its difficult to say the rules of chess pick out anything independently of such things which makes it similar to morality in that regard. And there comes a triviality to it too because if you can talk about the rules of chess being true then it is trivial to talk about any game being true. Talking about this is interesting because it unveils that a lot of our truth talk is actually idealizations and when you try to specify what you mean, the original sentences seem at best vague, usually faulty and can arguably even not be true under the standards you would have wanted for them.

A Case for Moral Anti-realism

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