If you act as if one ought not keep slaves, then you act as if it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
Your point is pointless. — Banno

HI Banno... Hmm..This is likely to be my last reply in this exchange and so f'ing help me i will stick to that, unless something fruitful comes of it.

I act in accordance with my thought. My thought is not that it's true, but that its best practice. It is a sentiment i hold. Not a claim i make about hte world. I don't make that claim. I just behave in accordance with the claim, accepting it could never be 'true'. Reject that? I don't care. That's how it is.
You've elsewhere admitted that these claims can only rise to the level of heuristics anyway, so i literally don't understand what's going on.. Can't for the life of me figure out how your mind works mate, but its fascinating.

If you believe that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you believe that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you doubt that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you doubt that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you understand that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you understand that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you suspect that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you suspect that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you are 98% certain that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you are 98% certain that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you act as if the tree is a Eucalypt, then you act as if it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If the one ought not keep slaves, then it is true that "One ought not keep slaves" — Banno

That/if you do not see a significant linguistic and philosophically important difference between statement 1. about "It is " or not and 2. about "One ought..." or not, I'm unsure this can be helped. I anticipate "It is the case that it is a Eucalypt" vs "It is the case that one ought..." as an objection. It isn't one. That sentence is the same with extra words. They contain the exact same distinction between them. Is/ought.

One is about a state of affairs that actually exists (As you point out, if it's a Eucalypt, then its true to claim it is) and one is your claim about what want to exist (the state of it being wrong to own slaves) and does not reference anything in the world (it references something in your head) - coupled with your claim that is is a state of affairs, rather than your belief in one. It is a claim. Not a fact. This is the exact is/ought distinction.

You've nothing to add to your claim, but to further claim that it's also true, rather than a mere claim.
Have you just plum forgotten to provide anything more than the claim? Or are you saying that acting in accordance with it rises it to the level of truth? So far, no mechanism between the claim and it's truth have come forward (see below for the 'brute fact' issue).

The bold is the exact non sequitur I've been trying to tease out of you. Thank you. What in the world does it refer to?? What would confirm or defeat this claim?? IF it were true, then that would make the claim true. But, you've not established that it's true. Your opinion is the single piece of data in support of the claim (or, perhaps an aggregate of other opinions appended) couple with a claim that its a brute fact. Except that amounts only to the claim it could be a brute fact, if ever shown to be true. If you concede, without qualification that it's a 'brute fact' that you can't prove, then what the heck has this exchange even been (refer also here to your concession that its heuristics all the way down).

So, "Your claim is true for you" (my position) cannot be addressed by your use of 'truth' here. Its entirely self-referential and is patently, inarguably and inescapably merely your subjective assessment of hte world. Which is fine. We don't even need to deal with what would make it objective here.

If you reject that, please stop wasting my time as i've respectfully noted we have nothing more to discuss. This is literally an is/ought distinction and that you're not getting it is just tedious to me. I would posit if you're going to repeat yourself in more words, this is a waste of both our times and i request you not bother.

There are "non-stance-independent facts"? And these are not true? — Banno

Not necessarily. I am just implying that people may be able to use such sentences such as "you ought to do this" without necessarily meaning it in a way of expressing beliefs about stance independent *facts*.

Expressions such as *you ought to do this* may have other meanings or uses that do not have to be related to stance independent facts. I am skeptical that there are always determinate meanings behind the way that people use certain words in everyday life, let alone meanings that coincide with how philosophers might interpret those words in an academic setting. After all, people can use *words like truth* and concepts of right and wrong without any kind of formal training or education. I think people can plausibly use sentences like "you ought to do this" or even use the word "true" in ways that are not as strict as what is being talked about with more rigorous philosophical frameworks.

I therefore don't think that just because someone can say "you ought to do this" or "it's true that you ought to do this" has to imply the kind of T-sentence framework you are using *because people are not necessarily expressing a fact*.

Edit: some mistakes and added clarity **

I don't understand any of that. What's a "stance-independent act"?

I mean't stance-independent moral fact. If moral statements aren't about facts in the first place then they may not be amenable to the T-sentence thing. If they then think that "you ought to do this" it may not be obliged that they are saying that "you ought to do this is true". They may even find perhaps that "it is a stance independent fact that you ought to do this" is false of they want to.

It is clear you have not followed the argument. You are under no obligation to participate.

If moral statements aren't about facts in the first place then they may not be amenable to the T-sentence thing. — Apustimelogist

That just takes us back to the first few pages, about whether facts are just true statements or if the term is to be restricted to only physical states.

It remains that we can and do commonly assign truth values to normative statements. We also use these truth values to perform deductions. The oddity here is the denial of all this because of philosophical ideology. — Banno

If that's what you need to think, far be it from me.

:wink:
I simply repeated what you had already said, adding an observation about forum etiquette.

I simply repeated what you had already said, adding an observation about forum etiquette. — Banno

Listen mate, I understand that obtuseness comes natural; but I’m here to have fun.

Far be it from me ;)

Far be it from me — AmadeusD

So it seems. :wink:

So it seems. :wink: — Banno

Hehe.
“We ought to get on well”.

Are we now playing posts-last-wins?

usD Are we now playing posts-last-wins? — Banno

I’m just trying to get back to a place of good faith, whether we think the other has missed a specific point in a specific thread being irrelevant :) that’s all.

It remains that we can and do commonly assign truth values to normative statements. We also use these truth values to perform deductions. The oddity here is the denial of all this because of philosophical ideology. — Banno

Well I would say that just because people seem to assign truth values doesn't mean that that is necessarily what they mean; I don't think there is even necessarily determinate what people mean when they use the word "true" in everyday scenarios. It may not even be determinate in philosophical conversations and people clearly have different explicit philosophical notions of what truth means.

I think maybe the central issue is that regardless of whether one has the prior belief that there is such a thing as moral facts or not, I don't see how the use of T-sentences can be a strong argument since people can just deny they use language in a certain way. Its difficult to see how what people say about their own language use can be rebutted just through this existence of this scheme. If people use language one way, and others use it another way, then how can language use in itself tell you anything about whether something is actually truth-apt in an objective sense? I think it's a framework for how people talk about truth but I fail to see how it can be an argument for truth.

…just because people seem to assign truth values doesn't mean that that is necessarily what they mean; I — Apustimelogist

Fucksake. Yea, people may not mean what they say nor say what they mean, so we might as well just give away the whole thing hey?

Well I think its less about saying "we might as well kust give away the whole thing" and more that some people just genuinely don't believe in the "whole thing" in the firsr place.

Correct. I never claimed that, I said, "I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you." — Bob Ross

Then you think people should do what they are in no way bound to do, which is a contradiction. Your statement is a perfect example of a moral judgment, and you are even introducing the notion of truth.

I am not saying that you should be convinced that you shouldn’t be doing X because I think you shouldn’t be doing X: I am saying that I am going to try and stop you. — Bob Ross

Why would you try to stop someone from doing something which is not objectively wrong (i.e. something that is not wrong for them or for all)? (Of course it makes no difference how you try to stop them.)

This is patently false. Moral anti-realism is the denial of one of three things:

1. Moral judgments are propositional (moral cognitivism).

2. Moral judgments express something objective (moral objectivism).

3. There are at least some true moral judgments.

Denying any of these lands you in moral anti-realist territory. Denying just 1 lands you in moral non-cognitivism; denying just 2 in moral subjectivism; and just 3 in moral nihilism.

You have attempted to define moral realism such that it is ‘anyone who imposes a moral standard’, which includes subjective and objective standards, and this is just not what moral realism is at all. Perhaps you are presupposing that standards are always objective, then clearly I am not a moral realist since I impose subjective ‘standards’. — Bob Ross

Your beliefs and your actions with regard to torturing babies constitute a moral judgment (3). Your claims are "subject-referencing prescriptive statements," for you are prescribing how other subjects ought to act. This isn't rocket science. You enforce your belief that no one should torture babies, and therefore you are a moral realist. This is the contradiction I have been pointing to: you are a moral realist while simultaneously claiming that moral realism is false. You can't just run around encouraging/arguing/forcing others to act in certain ways and claim you are not a moral realist.

More concisely, "Thou shalt not torture babies," is a moral judgment, and one that you affirm to be true.

- I'm just saying that if you treat both "preferences" in a significantly different way, then you must hold that there is something significantly different about them. I'm leaving it up to you to do the math.

As an aside, this thread has become sophistry-ville. :confused:

You can't just run around encouraging/arguing/forcing others to act in certain ways and claim you are not a moral realist. — Leontiskos

(please keep in mind I am not defending, particularly, anything here - I am nutting out ideas and approaching tehse things as a pretty green amateur philosopher)

I just cannot see in your exchange where that's established but i run into the huge problem that i don't engage other people's morals for the (imo subjective) reason that i don't feel adequately omniscient to perceive my moral standards as applicable to others. So, i act-out exactly what you're saying in practice (i.e, i take morals to be subjective, and therefore do not attempt to enforce my morals on others), but I don't actually see why i couldn't without a contradiction getting in the middle (treatment of 'enforce' below - whcih i think is relevant).

Can it be the case that, at the apex of my considerations(judgement), a certain behaviour appears moral/immoral, and so I enforce that judgement to the degree that I am acting on it toward other people, and yet am open to their response motivating or informing an adjustment in my judgement?

I think this allows for "running around encouraging/arguing.." but not forcing. But then, do you consider my behaving in line with my (subjective) moral considerations, forcing them on those I interact with, or does 'enforcement' only apply to aattempt to change their behaviour?

Can it be the case that, at the apex of my considerations(judgement), a certain behaviour appears moral/immoral, and so I enforce that judgement to the degree that I am acting on it toward other people, and yet am open to their response motivating or informing an adjustment in my judgement? — AmadeusD

To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting. It doesn't matter whether we "think," "suggest," "opine," "suppose," "admonish," "argue," "force," et al. In each case the judgment of action is occurring (moral judgment). Tentative judgments are still judgments. Abductive judgments are still judgments (judgments to the best possibility, or judgments from significantly limited information). Judgments which are open to correction or revision are still judgments.

The posts of yours that I have read always contain something like, "Well, the judgment is abductive so it isn't really a moral judgment." That's not right. It's still a moral judgment, it's just a moral judgment formed or acted upon with less certitude.

does the same thing when he says that he only thinks that others should not torture babies (and he thinks this independently of others' beliefs, and he will act to prevent them by force if necessary). His claim here is something like, "I only think, I don't know, therefore I am not a moral realist." This is incorrect for the same reason outlined above. A tentative moral judgment is still a moral judgment, and I would further argue that a moral judgment that one is prepared to act upon decisively is not a particularly tentative judgment.

The posts of yours that I have read always contain something like, "Well, the judgment is abductive so it isn't really a moral judgment." That's not right. It's still a moral judgment, it's just a moral judgment formed or acted upon with less certitude. — Leontiskos

Hmm. I imagine i'm being linguistically imprecise then (or i've been unnecessarily reactionary to challenges), as this is not what i think. I'm happy to call it a judgement. I just think that entails that i believe the truth of the judgement. I do think a tentative judgement precludes me from assigning 'truth' to it, personally but again, I'm not at the stage that i could enunciate this well. I take an internal sense of 'true' to entail a certitude that I don't apply to my moral judgements.

I think I have pinpointed the crux of our disagreement (and let me know what you think): it is twofold. Firstly, you believe that someone is a moral realist if they accept #3 (i.e., “There are at least some true moral judgments.”), whereas I believe one needs to accept all three prongs of the thesis (that I outlined before). Secondly, you believe that there is it is illegitimate to impose a taste on another person.

With respect to the first point, I think this is just wrong, in the sense that this is not a standard definition of moral realism. The contemporary view holds those three prongs, which makeup of the moral realist thesis in its most generic form, and rejecting even one of them entails anti-realism. If you think that #3 (and I would presume #1 as well) are all that are required to be a realist, then, by your definition, I am a realist. I simply do not agree with the semantics.

So, to clarify:

Your statement is a perfect example of a moral judgment, and you are even introducing the notion of truth.
…
Your beliefs and your actions with regard to torturing babies constitute a moral judgment (3).

I wholly agree: moral subjectivism agrees with moral anti-realism insofar as it also affirms there are true moral judgments—they just don’t express anything objective (hence the denial of #2). Again, because I don’t care about semantics, if all you mean by moral realism is #1 and #3 (thereby omitting #2), then, if I were to use your terms, I would be a moral realist: I just don’t, at the end of the day, accept that schema.

And on more clarification (on point 1):

More concisely, "Thou shalt not torture babies," is a moral judgment, and one that you affirm to be true.

Nope. I affirm that “I believe thou shalt not torture babies”. Unless you think those are equivalent propositions, then we should be able to agree that moral judgments, under moral subjectivism, clearly violate prong #2 of the moral realist thesis (as I have outlined it at least).

In short: you are confusing moral judgments with what they express; and that can be either subjectivity or objectivity.

With respect to the second point, here’s why I reject any notion of prohibiting the impositions of tastes is because it is impossible not to (re:, revisit my scenario I gave of you shoving your values down my throat to stop me from torturing babies). Beyond rejecting that principle, I also reject that moral realists (like yourself) can coherently affirm it (because if you were to take it seriously you would not be able to impose facts either, as mentioned before). What do you disagree about this?

And, finally, let me address:

he says that he only thinks that others should not torture babies (and he thinks this independently of others' beliefs, and he will act to prevent them by force if necessary). His claim here is something like, "I only think, I don't know, therefore I am not a moral realist."

I never once said this. I never once even implied this. I completely agree that there are true moral judgments: I affirm prong #3 [and #1 by the way] of the 3-pronged moral realist thesis and this is why I am a moral subjectivist, which is a form of moral anti-realism. You have to accept all three to be a moral realist: it makes no difference if morals are truth-apt and there are true moral judgments if those judgments express something non-objective.

It is also worth mentioning that my belief in the moral judgments is, under moral subjectivism, an upshot of my psychology and not a fact about the stance-independent world (which is what a moral realist is going to hold).

They may be different but I don't think that difference entails anything to do with truth. Nothing has been presented to suggest that imo.

I take an internal sense of 'true' to entail a certitude that I don't apply to my moral judgements. — AmadeusD

I think my same point applies to the question of truth, as judgments always relate to truth. But if you want to say that "true" means "true with a high degree of certitude," then you are of course able to say that one or more of your moral judgments are not "true" in that sense. In any case, this seems to go right back to my point about tentativeness.

I think my same point applies to the question of truth, as judgments always relate to truth. But if you want to say that "true" means "true with a high degree of certitude," then you are of course able to say that one or more of your moral judgments are not "true" in that sense — Leontiskos

What would you think about a visceral uneasiness is calling it 'true'? I don't know whether my behaviour is correct. It's the best i can envisage. I feels awful to claim that as truth. Any comments there?

I think I have pinpointed the crux of our disagreement (and let me know what you think): it is twofold. Firstly, you believe that someone is a moral realist if they accept #3 (i.e., “There are at least some true moral judgments.”), whereas I believe one needs to accept all three prongs of the thesis (that I outlined before). Secondly, you believe that there is it is illegitimate to impose a taste on another person. — Bob Ross

It seems that I did somewhat misread your three conditions, but you already agreed to my own definition:

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>. — Leontiskos

With respect to the first point, I think this is just wrong, in the sense that this is not a standard definition of moral realism. The contemporary view holds those three prongs, which makeup of the moral realist thesis in its most generic form, and rejecting even one of them entails anti-realism. If you think that #3 (and I would presume #1 as well) are all that are required to be a realist, then, by your definition, I am a realist. I simply do not agree with the semantics. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. According to the standard view, someone who accepts objective moral values is a moral realist. What source are you using?

Again, my definition pertains to the bindingness of a moral prescription, and you agreed to that definition. Are you withdrawing your agreement?

I wholly agree: moral subjectivism agrees with moral anti-realism insofar as it also affirms there are true moral judgments — Bob Ross

I assume this is a typo and you meant to say "moral realism."

Nope. I affirm that “I believe thou shalt not torture babies”. — Bob Ross

"I believe the proposition, but that doesn't mean I think it's true." This is the sort of sophistry that has led me to avoid your threads on these topics. Anyway, let's just go back to the definition that I already gave and you already agreed to, because that was constructed so as to avoid these sophistic responses.

it makes no difference if morals are truth-apt and there are true moral judgments if those judgments express something non-objective. — Bob Ross

This all goes back to the bindingness I have already brought up. Your moral judgment depends on a moral norm. If others are not bound by that moral norm, then what in the world gives you the right to force them to obey it? If the moral norm does not objectively apply to their actions, then why are you applying it to their actions? This claim of "subjectivism" is ad hoc, and that is what I disagree with. Enforcing moral norms that you claim are not binding is irrational, even if it is called "subjectivism."

What would you think about a visceral uneasiness is calling it 'true'? I don't know whether my behaviour is correct. It's the best i can envisage. I feels awful to claim that as truth. Any comments there? — AmadeusD

I think it's a cultural problem. In the West we are culturally (and morally) conditioned "not to judge others," and therefore we are uneasy with moral judgments. But it seems to me that this is unhelpful because moral judgments are unavoidable. Then there is the additional philosophical problem of grounding moral judgments, which is also particularly Western.

There are some people who try to obey this conditioning, and try to at least never act on the basis of their moral judgments (of others). That may be possible (and it may not be), but I think it's unhealthy either way. The way forward seems to be the virtue of humility. Embrace moral realism while simultaneously embracing humility. Form and enact moral judgments in a way that is neither brash nor shortsighted. Like truth, morality is best accepted willingly and arrived at via persuasion. Once it is admitted that moral propositions are truth-apt, persuasion becomes a possibility. Morality is largely social, so it is in everyone's best interest to know moral truth and to move forward in unison, with argument and dialogue to the fore.

You are a legal professional. Law is the most practical form of morality, and it is a social reality. As a society we agree that certain actions are impermissible and we lock people up for decades in prisons for carrying out these actions (things like murder, rape, pedophilia, etc.). I hope there is some certitude that these actions are actually wrong! (I don't mean to open up the law-morality debate. Again, I am defining a moral judgment as a judgment of a person's action.)

Anyway, sorry for the snippy post earlier. These morality threads drive me a little crazy, and therefore I try to limit the number of my interlocutors.

(Awhile back I drafted a thread on why all acts are moral acts, or at least all interpersonal acts. It seems there might be some interest if I ever get around to finishing it.)

Thank you! Really appreciate the considered reply! Even a polite rejection is fine by my lights :nerd:

I am doing my best to try not to annoy people so, snippiness is a good indicator (as long it's not gratuitous!). I understand why, too. You'll have seen from several exchanges that I just do not see what moral realists see. I cannot make the connection they make either semantically or conceptually between an act and its rightness or wrongness per se, rather than apropos of a chosen framework. So it is very frustrating, I think, from any perspective to be discussing these things as though we could convince someone of the POV (see below for why your notion of persuasion isn't part of my moral framework, really, other than incidentally - although, i would just note for my own peace of mind here, there is no consensus).

Unfortunately, as I (currently) reject the notion of moral truth in the sense of objectivity, this extrapolation is fairly much unintelligible as a 'way forward' for me but I (think) I grok what's being said regardless, from the realist perspective and it's consistent and helpful.

I have, elsewhere, today, had to alter my formulation of truth, though, and so I could, imagine, with quite little force be convinced of moral 'truth' as long as it's a relative truth.

You are a legal professional. Law is the most practical form of morality, and it is a social reality. As a society we agree that certain actions are impermissible and we lock people up for decades in prisons for carrying out these actions (things like murder, rape, pedophilia, etc.). — Leontiskos

Tricky. Unless you're a legal positivist (Leiter, anyone?) this is not very clear. Things have evolved over time, but drug laws are a very front-and-center example of why your conception probably isn't actually the way things are. I don't really see the law as moral. It's pragmatic and usually, really bad.

I think there are some widely-held views that make their way into law, and that's fine. I don't really think much beyond that. This is why i think activism is great, but faulty. You probably should speak up if you think a law/regulation is wrong. But it's faulty because activism necessarily requires a moral certitude that i don't think is warranted (ever).

There is a core confusion which I think is making progress on this topic impossible.

The question is not whether moral statements are truth-apt. They clearly are.

The problem is, are the moral systems against which moral statements are true or false themselves truth-apt? Here I think not.

In real world propositions, there are generally two levels of truth: truth against the operating framework, and the truth of the framework itself.

For example:

"The Triune God is one being which is simultaneously three: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit"

Is a true statement within the framework of Catholic doctrine. This is entirely independent of the truth of the framework itself.

You can see this with the proposition:

"The Triune God is one being which is simultaneously three: Frogger, Sonic, and Holy Spyro"

Doubter of Catholic orthodoxy or not, you must concede that the second statement is doctrinally false in a way that the first is not.

Moral statements are just as truth apt as the two above. Moral Antirealsm doesn't really challenge this. What it challenges are the truth-aptness of the moral frameworks under which moral claims may be true or false.

I think moral frameworks can be many things:

Useful, or useless.
Virtuous, or vicious.
Agreeable, or disagreeable.
Desirable, or undesirable.

But true or false? I don't think so. I just can't see how they are the sort of things that might be true or false.