No, I don't. And i have explicitly covered why not multiple times, so i'm refrain from repeating my very much coherent answer to this charge again. — AmadeusD

Maybe your answer is not as clear as you think.

But keep working on it.

edit:

It sits on it's own, while completely failing to rise to the status of truth. — AmadeusD

The T-sentence is exactly about truth. It does not address belief.

Again, keep thinking.

Same I think could be claimed for most everything. — javra

We;re getting somewhere... :P

Maybe your answer is not as clear as you think.

But keep working on it. — Banno

Or... so strange, i know... maybe... You're not supporting your point in such a great way? That's my conclusion. So, as i say. I think we're probably done :)

It's been a very interesting and entertaining exchange. I don't require you to change your mind, and i've not seen anything that would push me in that direction either so... I simply tip my hat to another on the path.

Ok, so here is my point:

One ought not keep slaves. It is therefore true that "One ought not keep slaves". — Banno

Now we have been through this discussion, set out where this goes astray.

Interesting how much angst this simply issue causes folk. It shows how deeply logical empiricism has seeped into the thinking of our engineers.

Perhaps philosophy is not as simple as folk might suppose.

Interesting how much angst this simply issue causes folk. I supose it shows how deeply logical empiricism has seeped into the thinking of our engineers. — Banno

It sounds like you have an inferiority complex about engineering.

Yep. It wasn't something I considered studying, and perhaps I should have. it's such clever stuff.

It's pleasing that folk take an interest in philosophy. Engineering is not necessarily good preparation for such conceptual work.

Engineering is not necessarily good preparation for such conceptual work. — Banno

I think the philosophy bug is something you're born with anyway. There are a number of philosophical problems in the realm of engineering. If engineers were prone to becoming stumped by them they wouldn't be able to work.

At an AAP event last week, I was stuck by how much of the work, and especially the best work, was being done in collaborations, across multiple fields. It seems to be quickly becoming the most fecund habitat for professional philosophers.

I supose if the philosophers are being paid, their efforts are seen as worthwhile.

That sounds really interesting. It'll be cool to see what they come up with.

I don’t see it: can you elaborate? That’s just a hypothetical imperative being used to with modus ponens to derive the consequent. Or are you saying it is world-to-word direction of fit because it is hypothetical, since it is subjective? I could get on board with that, but I don’t see how there’s such a thing as a fact which has a world-to-word direction of fit. ‘You ought to bring an umbrella’ (P2) is non-factual (to me). — Bob Ross

Hrmm, not sure. Sometimes I use the boards to think out loud and sometimes it's more piffle than substance. I'm going with that now. I was thinking how the verb shouldn't matter when translating sentences into a logic, and so it would also go with facts. But in that spirit I was just using silly examples that follow the form, in the same way that we use silly examples to demonstrate validity (like "if the moon was made of green cheese" etc.)

In another logic, though, you would track the predicates. So... meh. Just some fluff in trying to lay out a way of thinking.

But isn't your claim tautological at that point? Obviously moral claims must be situated somewhere within "the totality of existence."

It is not tautological, because P1 is not “the totality of existence is reality”: it is “the way reality is does not entail how it ought to be”. The point is that the moral realist (presumably) needs to deny this claim in order to save moral facts, and I find P1 very plausible (so I am inclined to disagree with them.

No, I don't think that makes any sense. If it is not objectively wrong for others to torture babies then you should not get angry at them when they do. You get angry and intervene because you believe it is wrong for them to torture babies. Moral anti-realism is too often

You are importing the metaphysical framework of moral realism and trying to force-fit it into moral anti-realism, such that you end up committing a straw man fallacy.

I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you. Where’s the inconsistency or incoherence with that?

Let me offer another story. One fellow responded to my moral anger argument as follows. "Anger presupposes justice, but because moral realism is false justice does not exist. Therefore anger is irrational. Nevertheless, I myself do get angry with other people. This is only because I am irrational. If I ever succeed in becoming perfectly rational I will no longer get angry."

I won’t speak towards that person, but I completely disagree with them. I think moral realism sometimes paints the false narrative that, even under that metaethical theory, we cannot impose tastes on one another; but I can provide a parody argument, which equally applies to moral realism and anti-realism, which illustrates how false this notion really is.

Values are not morals: they are our subjective tastes of what we hold as worth something. I can value vanilla ice cream, and you not so much—irregardless of what the moral facts say. Now, imagine there’s a moral fact such that ‘one shouldn’t torture babies’ and you catch me in the act of torturing a baby: you cannot impose the moral fact without simultaneously imposing your taste that I should value moral facts. If you say “hey! You shouldn’t be doing that because it violates this moral fact!”, and I just say “why should I care about moral facts?”. What moral fact would you possibly try to cite to justify the value of moral facts themselves? None, of course! You would cite your valuing of them. But...wait a second...according to your moral realist view you shouldn’t ever impose tastes on another, which would include your taste about moral facts. Are you just going to stand there and let me continue torturing the baby because you can’t enforce the moral fact without shoving your values down my throat? Of course not! So why would it be any different with respect to morals under a moral anti-realist view? It wouldn’t.

Now we have been through this discussion, set out where this goes astray. — Banno

If this is for me, I have. Multiple times, and have now decided to refrain from repeating myself.

It's an opinion, and nothing more. I reject that it's a fact, or state of affairs and you've not adequately defending either stance. So, again, I think we're done. I'm trying my absolute best to end this exchange respectfully. But I am getting the distinct feeling you're under the impression you have an empirically verifiable position - something to which this claim is not amenable, in my mind.

So there we go. Tip my hat once more.

It wouldn’t. — Bob Ross

:ok:

:up:

I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you. Where’s the inconsistency or incoherence with that? — Bob Ross

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>. So if you think that, "Thou shalt not torture babies," is a prescriptive statement that is objectively binding on all, then you are surely not a moral anti-realist. Now we usually speak about objectively binding statements as true statements, but I'm not especially interested in the moral cognitivism debate, which I think is misguided. I'll leave that debate to the side.

Values are not morals: they are our subjective tastes of what we hold as worth something. I can value vanilla ice cream, and you not so much—irregardless of what the moral facts say. Now, imagine there’s a moral fact such that ‘one shouldn’t torture babies’ and you catch me in the act of torturing a baby: you cannot impose the moral fact without simultaneously imposing your taste that I should value moral facts. — Bob Ross

Answered here:

"Chocolate ice cream is the best," is a preference. Perhaps you construe, "Do not torture babies," as a preference as well. The difference is that when we see someone torturing a baby, we prevent them; whereas when we see someone eating vanilla ice cream, we do not prevent them. — Leontiskos

-

If you say “hey! You shouldn’t be doing that because it violates this moral fact!”, and I just say “why should I care about moral facts?” — Bob Ross

But I am not the one saying anything; you are. That's the whole point. You are the one enforcing a prohibition on the torture of babies. Why must we all obey your so-called "taste"? What makes it special? You are the one on the bench, here. You are the one engaged in moral realism. Whether you can square this with your rhetorical utterances remains to be seen.

Edit:

I think moral realism sometimes paints the false narrative that, even under that metaethical theory, we cannot impose tastes on one another; but I can provide a parody argument, which equally applies to moral realism and anti-realism, which illustrates how false this notion really is. — Bob Ross

You are presumably saying, "The moral realist imposes his tastes, so why can't I impose mine!?" First, the notion that the moral realist is imposing tastes begs the question at hand. Second, tastes are not imposable by their very nature. When we talk about a taste that's part of what we mean. Third, just because your opponent engages in a practice you believe to be arbitrary does not give you license to engage in arbitrary practices, and this is particularly true when you are in the process of criticizing the supposed arbitrariness. Fourth, if you are imposing a moral standard of any kind then I would say you aren't a moral anti-realist. The moral anti-realist eschews objective moral values just as much as they eschew objective moral "facts".

The T-sentence is exactly about truth. It does not address belief. — Banno

It is a statement of belief. If you don't have something of more substance than to just repeat the statement, in the face of this objection, we have no further ground to cover. As i've noted multiple times.

But I am not the one saying anything; you are. That's the whole point. You are the one enforcing a prohibition on the torture of babies. — Leontiskos

Hmmm. this comes across entirely a non sequitur in the face of what Bob Ross has outlined.

He is, from what i can make out, making an emotionalist argument against moral realism. So far, it's not been addressed very well. Moral statements are instances of a subject expressing their taste as a universal rule. What makes this not true? In the case of the babies vs the ice cream, the only move that needs to be made is moving from your taste, that babies ought not be tortured, to a statement that no one should do it. Nothing of substance changes there, just a delivery method apt for a wider audience than merely one's self.

If you've got the inverse of this as an overview of hte exchange, I think you may be misreading.

- Sorry, I've read enough of your exchange with Banno. I don't think your position makes a lick of sense, and I think you are only engaging in hand-waving when met with the contradictions in your thought. It looks to be an exercise in evasion. If that's how you treat contradictions, then there's really no reason for me to try to lead you to another one. So yeah, "Keep working on it," I suppose.

↪AmadeusD - Sorry, I've read enough of your exchange with Banno. I don't think your position makes a lick of sense, and I think you are only engaging in hand-waving when met with the contradictions in your thought. It looks to be an exercise in evasion. If that's how you treat contradictions, then there's really no reason for me to try to lead you to another one. So yeah, "Keep working on it," I suppose. — Leontiskos

Given that i take both of you to have avoided the problem you face entirely (including in this comment - which is condescending and bizarre in many ways), suffice to say this is no skin off my nose.

I hope to remain in good faith going forward :) Take care mate.

- Take care

Okay, let me say something to your point...

So far, it's not been addressed very well. Moral statements are instances of a subject expressing their taste as a universal rule. What makes this not true? — AmadeusD

Because it's not binding and therefore provides no defense for the imposition of moral claims. Unless Ross was trying to resurrect the bogey of Hare's universal prescriptivism, which he was almost certainly not attempting to do. Those who hold the type of emotivism you are describing do not generally also hold that moral statements are binding. Taste does not bind, and is not the stuff of argument. To say that the moralist is expressing a taste is to make an excuse to ignore them.

Those who hold the type of emotivism you are describing do not generally also hold that moral statements are binding. Taste does not bind, and is not the stuff of argument. To say that the moralist is expressing a taste is to make an excuse to ignore them. — Leontiskos

Thank you for this. That is, happily, not what I was saying. I, in fact, whether wrong or right, indicated my understanding was exactly that what you say is true, abs therefore statements of the kind “one ought not kick puppies” is a statement of taste only and so is emotiovism I’m action.

I am not seeing either you or Banno making statements that aren’t emotivist. They are just statements that express your opinion as a command. I assumed I was wrong at every turn and sought anything at all which would traverse the taste-truth gap but I saw nought to that effect. That is why I cannot even conceive of the positions you two have taken. They are just fingers in ears

Edit; I am typing on a phone on a bus. Forgive the inevitable typing errors

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>.

Correct.

So if you think that, "Thou shalt not torture babies," is a prescriptive statement that is objectively binding on all, then you are surely not a moral anti-realist.

Correct. I never claimed that, I said:

I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you.

Now we usually speak about objectively binding statements as true statements, but I'm not especially interested in the moral cognitivism debate, which I think is misguided. I'll leave that debate to the side.

I am a moral cognitivist, just not a moral realist. For moral subjectivism, technically, moral judgments are rewritten as indexical or specifically referencing a particular judgment (e.g., ‘one ought not torture babies’ → ‘I think/believe one ought not torture babies’ or ‘Bob Ross thinks/believes ...’).

I think you may be under the impression that a moral cognitivist anti-realism is impossible, since all true propositions are objectively binding; but when rewritten it is clear that the belief is what is enveloped in the proposition, which, in turn, envelopes the moral judgment.

Values are not morals: they are our subjective tastes of what we hold as worth something. I can value vanilla ice cream, and you not so much—irregardless of what the moral facts say. Now, imagine there’s a moral fact such that ‘one shouldn’t torture babies’ and you catch me in the act of torturing a baby: you cannot impose the moral fact without simultaneously imposing your taste that I should value moral facts. — Bob Ross

Answered here:
"Chocolate ice cream is the best," is a preference. Perhaps you construe, "Do not torture babies," as a preference as well. The difference is that when we see someone torturing a baby, we prevent them; whereas when we see someone eating vanilla ice cream, we do not prevent them. — Leontiskos

This completely missed my point: you sidestepped/derailed it with your response. I pointed out that you cannot impose a moral fact without imposing a taste, and you responded essentially with ‘preferences, by definition, are not imposable’. I just gave you an example of how they are necessarily imposed (in order to impose facts): what say you?

Obviously, as a side note, I disagree that preferences are, by definition, not imposable; and, just to clarify, I was not saying that the vanilla ice cream is equivocal to the torturing babies example: they are analogious insofar as tastes exist in both irregardless (and validly irregardless) of the moral facts. I agree that we normally wouldn’t care about someone’s favorite ice cream vs. we would about torturing babies: I am just noting that even in a moral realist’s framework they are imposing their taste that one should value the moral fact (that one ought not torture babies) when stopping that person from torturing the baby (even though it is a moral fact that one shouldn’t be doing that). You haven’t really addressed this point as of yet.

If you say “hey! You shouldn’t be doing that because it violates this moral fact!”, and I just say “why should I care about moral facts?” — Bob Ross

But I am not the one saying anything; you are. That's the whole point. You are the one enforcing a prohibition on the torture of babies. Why must we all obey your so-called "taste"? What makes it special? You are the one on the bench, here. You are the one engaged in moral realism. Whether you can square this with your rhetorical utterances remains to be seen.

Come on, Leontiskos! This is clearly a derailment and straw man! I gave you a hypothetical to prove a point: that your moral realist principle that “tastes cannot be imposed” is incoherent with your position. Instead of dealing with that hypothetical scenario and demonstrating why it isn’t, you shifted the burden of proof (for some reason) on me. Now, to answer your question (which has nothing to do with my scenario I gave you):

Why must we all obey your so-called "taste"?

I am not saying that you should be convinced that you shouldn’t be doing X because I think you shouldn’t be doing X: I am saying that I am going to try and stop you. First, I will try to intellectually and rationally convince you otherwise. In moral subjectivism, this is going to look different than moral realism, since my objective is not to convince you that it is factually true that you ought not do X. Instead, there are some other avenues to explore:

1. Tease out false beliefs you have about yourself. You may say “I don’t believe that I ought not do X” but, under moral subjectivism (being that moral judgments are cognitive beliefs which are the upshot of one’s conative psyche), that doesn’t thereby make it true (relative to you). Most people are really bad at psycho-analysis, and if I can tease out to you that you actually do believe you ought not do X, then I have succeeded in my own goal.

2. Latch onto higher prioritized moral beliefs you have, and show that accepting that hypothetical imperative logically or plausibly entails that you ought not do X. You may initially be against being obligated not to do X, but if I can get you to agree to another hypothetical imperative and show you that it is logically inconsistent with your denial of the hypothetical imperative [that one ought not do X], then you are forced to choose one or the other. Most likely, since the former is higher prioritized, you will flip your position on the latter and I have succeed in my own goal.

3. Disputing the supplemental non-moral facts. It could be that you and I agree about the underlying moral judgments that I am using to commit myself to ‘I ought not do X’ but that the supplementing non-moral fact is disputed. This aspect of the conversation follows the normal realist discussion that a moral realist wants for moral judgments (but I deny), since there is a fact-of-the-matter about the non-moral facts.

4. If 1-3 don’t work, then I may try other nuanced tactics, but, for brevity, I will not include them here.
5. The last resort, for moral realist and anti-realist alike, is violence.

You are the one on the bench, here. You are the one engaged in moral realism. Whether you can square this with your rhetorical utterances remains to be seen.

I have no clue what you are talking about. I think I have made it clear that I am not engaging in any affirmation of moral facts, and I have shown how my theory deals with this (as shown above quite explicitly).

Perhaps the issue is similar to one I had with Banno: they said that if someone proclaims something which they apply to everyone, then it is categorically not a taste. This is just so incredibly false (by my lights) and perhaps this kind of thinking is your motivation for saying I am engaging in moral realism. In order for Banno to be right here, they have to deny that I can have a subjective taste that everyone should abide by my taste [about something]: which seems blatantly false to me.

You are presumably saying, "The moral realist imposes his tastes, so why can't I impose mine!?”

No. I am saying that it is incoherent, as a moral realist, for you to say that tastes are not imposable on other people since you do it to impose the moral facts (necessarily). You still haven’t demonstrated how this is false.

First, the notion that the moral realist is imposing tastes begs the question at hand.

Not at all. I am not claiming, in that hypothetical, that moral realists are imposing tastes that are moral judgments, which would clearly beg the question, but rather that their values are being imposed on other people (which are subjective tastes). That is why I explicitly put at the beginning of it that “Values are not morals: they are our subjective tastes of what we hold as worth something”.

Second, tastes are not imposable by their very nature. When we talk about a taste that's part of what we mean

Exactly, this is what I am contending with as an internal critique of moral realism. You can’t coherently claim, or as the story goes, that tastes are not imposable and turn around and impose your value of the moral fact on me in order to stop me from torturing the baby. You still haven’t addressed this.

Third, just because your opponent engages in a practice you believe to be arbitrary does not give you license to engage in arbitrary practices, and this is particularly true when you are in the process of criticizing the supposed arbitrariness.

Two things:

1. I don’t consider the vast majority of subjective tastes to be arbitrary.

2. I do think that if it is inevitable that we impose tastes on each other, then most reasonable people would find that to be a license to impose them on each other. If you can’t impose moral facts without imposing your valueing of the moral facts, then you cannot have one over the other. Honestly, if you deny that tastes can be imposed on other people, then you will have to lie down and starve to death. There’s nothing you can do in this world which will not impose, to some degree, your tastes on other people: irregardless if moral realism is true.

Fourth, if you are imposing a moral standard of any kind then I would say you aren't a moral anti-realist.

This is patently false. Moral anti-realism is the denial of one of three things:

1. Moral judgments are propositional (moral cognitivism).

2. Moral judgments express something objective (moral objectivism).

3. There are at least some true moral judgments.

Denying any of these lands you in moral anti-realist territory. Denying just 1 lands you in moral non-cognitivism; denying just 2 in moral subjectivism; and just 3 in moral nihilism.

You have attempted to define moral realism such that it is ‘anyone who imposes a moral standard’, which includes subjective and objective standards, and this is just not what moral realism is at all. Perhaps you are presupposing that standards are always objective, then clearly I am not a moral realist since I impose subjective ‘standards’.

Seems arbitrary. I don't see what going out of your way to prevent something entails about dtance independent moral facts. At the same time, many bad things happen which you do not or would not necessarily go out of your way to prevent. I'm sure there are examples too of people imposing their preferences on others if they feel strongly about it.

it is clear that the belief is what is enveloped in the proposition, which, in turn, envelopes the moral judgment — Bob Ross

:ok:

But for some reason, folk refuse to apply this to statements counting "ought". Special pleading. — Banno

If saying that *a moral statement* is true means that they are saying *that such a statement* is a stance-independent fact then why should they *apply T-sentences* if they don't think *that the moral statement* is a stance-independent fact? Doesn't seem to follow. To apply the T-sentence is to assume the phrases make sense in the first place, which some might *not* believe *to be the case for moral statements*, if they have a reason to.

Those who deny this usually claim either that moral statements are not truth-apt; or that they are, but are all false. Which path will you choose? — Banno

I don't think I really have a strong opinion on that particularly right now.


Edit: Some housekeeping on comment just for better clarity (hopefully); additions marked within * ... *.

I am not saying that you should be convinced that you shouldn’t be doing X because I think you shouldn’t be doing X: I am saying that I am going to try and stop you. First, I will try to intellectually and rationally convince you otherwise. — Bob Ross

Such a good way of setting this out - and I think what i would reference here is the ethical considerations around vegetarianism.
You get quotes from folk like Parfit and Singer to the effect that it is inarguable that we, objectively, should all be vegetarian.

That's merely a strong preference - but these people spent/spend decades trying to convince people of their point of view. They believe it's 'true'. Yet, fail entirely to actually establish that that is the case. Many take that further and become violent because of this conviction. I've been physically attacked (not in any way that put me in real danger) for refusing a (really bad) argument for vegetarianism in public. So, this taste can absolutely be imposed on others - its just that those imposing it don't consider it a taste. They are wrong.

The T-sentence is exactly about truth. It does not address belief.
— Banno

It is a statement of belief. — AmadeusD

T-sentences are about true, not belief.

You can act without believing your act to comport with truth. — AmadeusD

Was that your argument?

If the tree is a Eucalypt, then it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"

If you believe that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you believe that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you doubt that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you doubt that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you understand that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you understand that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you suspect that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you suspect that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you are 98% certain that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you are 98% certain that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you act as if the tree is a Eucalypt, then you act as if it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"



If one ought not keep slaves, then it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"

If you believe that one ought not keep slaves, then you believe that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
If you doubt that one ought not keep slaves, then you doubt that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
If you understand that one ought not keep slaves, then you understand that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
If you suspect that one ought not keep slaves, then you suspect that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
If you are 98% certain that one ought not keep slaves, then you are 98% certain that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
If you act as if one ought not keep slaves, then you act as if it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
Your point is pointless.

If saying that it is true means that they are saying it is a stance-independent fact... — Apustimelogist

"stance-independent fact"?

There are "non-stance-independent facts"? And these are not true?

I don't see any meat in your posts. I'm not at all sure of your point.