- Eep, this thread is getting away from me. In truth it will probably be best to save this conversation for another day, but let me say one or two things.

And I suppose this is why I find statements like ""One ought not kick puppies for fun" is true" as unpersuasive. Sure, but It's the hard questions that give me pause, not the points of agreement. And our love of puppies does nothing to speak to our, what appears to me, thirst for violence. — Moliere

I think it's the easy questions that are important. If you accept a moral truth then you are a moral realist, even if that truth is "easy." I don't think hard questions disprove moral realism; they only prove that there are places where moral truths come into practical conflict and create scenarios which are difficult to judge. ..But I am skating over the question of disagreement that you are thinking about.

"If morals were real then we would agree to such and such a standard. We do not agree to that standard, therefore morals are not real" — Moliere

As I said elsewhere:

Somewhat relatedly, a lot of people seem to think, “Because they can be ignored or argued against, therefore duties do not exist.” I would respond, “If duties could not be ignored or argued against, then they would not exist.” — Leontiskos

Whether I look to Christ or Aristotle, I find that most people are not moral, and a fortiori, most people care nothing for moral philosophy. So I don't take the state of affairs to be as odd as you do. That said, while the conclusion of your view may not be absurd, it is quite odd. It is something like, <In a world where morality manifestly existed, everyone would act morally and acknowledge morality, or at the very least the wrongdoers would admit that they are wrong and accept their punishment graciously>. It's hard to present such a view without a grin on my face! :grin: Incidentally, this is related to your claim that ethical homogeneity would produce societal harmony (), which I also tend to disagree with. A Judeo-Christian view would say that oftentimes evil and a disregard for the moral law is the best piece of evidence for the moral law, insofar as it pricks one's conscience and leads them to consider and acknowledge the moral law.

Now, there may be people who earnestly profess to fail to comprehend morality. But I would say that if it is observable in their actions then they understand it just fine, it's just that their theory is at odds with their actions. Interestingly, it's not clear whether Aristotle and Aquinas were "moral cognitivists," even anachronistic as the question might be. They thought that morality was more a matter of acting than thinking; that one could not usually think their way into morality or a moral life; and that theoretical moral discourse is quite limited.

(Thomas Pink has a paper on academia.edu about the force of, "Moral Obligation." This thread makes me want to read it, but it will be awhile before I have time.)

could you provide some examples (so I can research them)? — Bob Ross

I was thinking of religious moralities, Kantian moralities, and conscience-based moralities. It seems to me that very many of these are not arguing from "how the world is," as if one could infer morality from the natural world.

Edit: Incidentally, I don't know of any knock-down treatments for moral realism. It turns out to be rather difficult to bridge the gulf between moral realism and moral anti-realism. As an example, some years ago I was engaged in a rather superficial argument with an atheist who professed that there are no moral truths. As we conversed it became very obvious that she held the prohibition on slavery as an objective moral truth, and I was able to tease this out in a dozen different ways. Nevertheless, she never admitted it, and continued to hold to her position, construing, for example, the necessary freeing of slaves as an act of violence rather than justice. As far as I'm concerned, that's a reliable interaction. Folks who profess moral anti-realism tend to be engaged in a rhetorical tack, and it is primarily their actions that betray them. For instance, creatures who don't believe in morality would never perceive injustice and never get angry. We get angry all the time. :grin:

I was thinking of religious moralities, Kantian moralities, and conscience-based moralities. It seems to me that very many of these are not arguing from "how the world is," as if one could infer morality from the natural world.

By world, I was meaning it more generically than ‘natural world’: I meant ‘the totality of existence’. So when a religious person says, for example, ‘the moral facts come from God’s nature’, I think this falls prey to violating P1.

As an example, some years ago I was engaged in a rather superficial argument with an atheist who professed that there are no moral truths. As we conversed it became very obvious that she held the prohibition on slavery as an objective moral truth, and I was able to tease this out in a dozen different ways. Nevertheless, she never admitted it, and continued to hold to her position, construing, for example, the necessary freeing of slaves as an act of violence rather than justice

Interesting.

Folks who profess moral anti-realism tend to be engaged in a rhetorical tack, and it is primarily their actions that betray them.

I don’t think this is the case, but I will stick to myself: I don’t mean that there are no moral facts because of a rhetorical or sophistical tack.

Also, it common in my life that moral realists think that my actions betray my words; but I think most of the time they are importing their own moral framework instead of dealing with mine on its own terms. More on that in a minute...

For instance, creatures who don't believe in morality would never perceive injustice and never get angry. We get angry all the time.

This is something I get from moral realists all the time: if I truly care that someone is being immoral, then I am not a moral anti-realist. But this just presupposes that if something isn’t objectively immmoral, that it doesn’t matter. Obviously, I am going to deny that. So I can get as furious as I want about people torturing babies for fun and never once concede that it is a factually wrong thing to do.

By world, I was meaning it more generically than ‘natural world’: I meant ‘the totality of existence’. — Bob Ross

But isn't your claim tautological at that point? Obviously moral claims must be situated somewhere within "the totality of existence."

This is something I get from moral realists all the time: if I truly care that someone is being immoral, then I am not a moral anti-realist. But this just presupposes that if something isn’t objectively immmoral, that it doesn’t matter. Obviously, I am going to deny that. So I can get as furious as I want about people torturing babies for fun and never once concede that it is a factually wrong thing to do. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think that makes any sense. If it is not objectively wrong for others to torture babies then you should not get angry at them when they do. You get angry and intervene because you believe it is wrong for them to torture babies. Moral anti-realism is too often <affectation>.

Can you explain your thinking? — Banno

HI mate, sorry for the delay here. Weekend with the kids :)

I came into this thread simply to point out that there are moral truths. — Banno

So, i'm taking this as an at-base position. One with which I disagree, in so far I consider truth to be corresponding to states of affairs, and I don't understand morals to be states of affairs. In that position in a baked-in need for individuals to understand their own moral compass as theirs and not aligning with some antecedent (though, i recognize that within this position is also a incredible wealth of guiding lights in previous writing and other people's conceptions of their own morals. They just are all relative to those individuals) theory that claims truth. Not an odd position, i don't think, but just laying some ground work for the response.

Indeed, in questions of ethics, you have no choice but to work it out for yourself. — Banno

This seems to suppose that ethics are the correct basis/es for considering morals. I reject that wholly as ethics basically assume either 1. A worthwhile external benchmark (you could think revelation or law here); or 2. Some way to ascertain certainty around a moral claim via some ethical consideration.

If you're concluding that for ethics, individuals must 'work it out for themselves' you're (to my mind) precluding an external mitigating authority (or force) which would be required as a source of 'ethical truth' which would be required to ground a moral truth.

I certainly think you can make claims like 'Generally, suffering is bad'. That could be an ethical consideration informing a moral position to not cause suffering. However, I just don't understand how that's an objective or 'true' statement. It is patently relative. So accepting that ethics must be relative, each individual who must necessarily (by this light) work out their own ethical code as such, are being informed by a identically relative moral code as informed by that antecedent ethical consideration (notwithstanding hypocrisy lol).

If you're decoupling ethics from morals and essentially considering ethics teleological and morals some how truth-apt, I'm not really understanding how that works

If it is not objectively wrong for others to torture babies then you should not get angry at them when they do. — Leontiskos

I'm unsure this makes too much sense. If i'm happy with (in light of potential objections in practical day-to-day life) understanding my position is subjective, but that it is the 'best' position by my lights, given the information I believe I can rely on, how would that necessarily mean it was senseless to get angry about a behaviour that I have, by those previous subjective position/s, understood to be 'wrong'?

Making moral decisions, acting out their conclusions, and then adjusting for resulting data input seems to be a totally coherent and workable way to go about moral consideration. I suppose if you take morals to be objective (or that there are some objective morals) this might not work, but i'm more trying to make the 'other' position cohere in the face of this critique.

If i'm happy with (in light of potential objections in practical day-to-day life) understanding my position is subjective, but that it is the 'best' position by my lights, given the information I believe I can rely on, how would that necessarily mean it was senseless to get angry about a behaviour that I have, by those previous subjective position/s, understood to be 'wrong'? — AmadeusD

Because if one is going to hold others to a standard then they either have to admit that a standard exists or else accept the fact that they are performatively self-contradicting themselves. This is quite basic.

...in so far I consider truth to be corresponding to states of affairs, and I don't understand morals to be states of affairs. — AmadeusD

This has come up a few times.

And yet, one ought not keep slaves. It is therefore true that "One ought not keep slaves".

And hence, if truth is corresponding to states of affairs, then that one ought not keep slaves is a state of affairs.

Or there is more to truth than mere correspondence.

This seems to suppose that ethics are the correct basis/es for considering morals. . — AmadeusD

I can't make sense of how you are distinguishing morals and ethics here. Ethics is the field of study that has as its subject, morals. What you have said is analogous to "thjis seems to suppose that botany is the correct basis for considering plants". Well, yes.

...ethics basically assume either 1. A worthwhile external benchmark (you could think revelation or law here); or 2. Some way to ascertain certainty around a moral claim via some ethical consideration. — AmadeusD

You have not set out why these follow, and indeed, there are ethical proposals that do not propose an external benchmark (subjectivism) nor ethical certainty (nihilism).

If you're concluding that for ethics, individuals must 'work it out for themselves' you're (to my mind) precluding an external mitigating authority (or force) which would be required as a source of 'ethical truth' which would be required to ground a moral truth. — AmadeusD

Here again is the ubiquitous confusion of belief and truth. Here's another analogy. The Earth is not flat. It is true that the Earth is not flat. Even given that truth, each individual can choose whether to believe that the Earth is flat, or not. They must work it out for themselves.

The exact same applies to ethical truths. Folk choose to believe, or not. They must work it out for themselves. Their believe does not determine the truth of the proposal.

Notice that you do understand that ethical truths "ground" moral truths, something you seem to deny, above.

I just don't understand how that's an objective or 'true' statement. I — AmadeusD

Have a read of @Leontiskos posts, above. They offer some novel contraries to this proposal.

In addition, there is a confusion here about "subjective" statements, such that you seem to suppose that hey cannot be true. That would be very odd. But then, the subjective/objective distinction is fraught with conceptual puzzles.

If you're decoupling ethics from morals and essentially considering ethics teleological and morals some how truth-apt, I'm not really understanding how that works — AmadeusD

That much is apparent. That's not at all what I am proposing. I'm just pointing out that there are moral truths. The inability of your theorising to deal with this simple observation perhaps tells us, not to reject moral truths, but your theorising.

Because if one is going to hold others to a standard then they either have to admit that a standard exists or else accept the fact that they are performatively self-contradicting themselves. This is quite bas — Leontiskos

Where did i indicate my standard applied to others?

No, I don't think that makes any sense. If it is not objectively wrong for others to torture babies then you should not get angry at them when they do. You get angry and intervene because you believe it is wrong for them to torture babies. Moral anti-realism is too often — Leontiskos

The fact you have an opinion or preference does not mean you are expressing a belief about something being objectively correct. Saying ice cream is delicious doesn't mean that it is objectively correct. Saying you want your local sports team to play a certain way doesn'y mean it is objectively correct. Wishing people were more interested in art doesn't mean it is objectively correct to like art.

When I first heard someone say they were a moral anti-realist I also had the reaction of sonething like: "what... how can you not think certain things are wrong" but its not that they dont believe things are wrong. Every antirealist has ethical opinions. They just don't think their opinions have an objective basis.

The fact you have an opinion or preference does not mean you are expressing a belief about something being objectively correct. — Apustimelogist

No one has claimed such a thing.

And yet, one ought not keep slaves. It is therefore true that "One ought not keep slaves". — Banno

I reject your position. You haven't defended it adequately, and so i remain unconvinced. Im not asking you to make any psychological moves - But i am pointing out that your descriptions and expositions are very much wanting to my mind. If you're to reject my 'theorizing', so be it. That doesn't actual say anything about the truth of your position. I may agree with that position, but that doesn't make it true.

And hence, if truth is corresponding to states of affairs, then that one ought not keep slaves is a state of affairs. — Banno

Trying my best to remain credulous, no. But that is given my above position, i suppose. It just plum has nothing to support it as a conclusion running from your opinion about slavery.

I can't make sense of how you are distinguishing morals and ethics here. Ethics is the field of study that has as its subject, morals. What you have said is analogous to "thjis seems to suppose that botany is the correct basis for considering plants". Well, yes. — Banno

Ethics is the study and discussion of the benchmarks that inform morals( to my understanding, and from what i can tell, the general population including philosophers). They seem adequately different to be potentially decoupled, or conjoined by context.

Further, no, it isn't anything like that. Ethics is how to get your framework in place. Morals is how to apply that framework to your behaviour (in answering what i take to be your query here viz. what do i actually mean by these terms).

They must work it out for themselves. Their believe does not determine the truth of the proposal. — Banno

Apply this to what you've proposed, at any point in these collected exchanges. I smell a lot of fish.
Your belief that moral truths exist doesn't entail that they actually do. It entails that you believe them. Which is the totality of my point, highlighted in a specific instance. And as best i can tell, your beliefs rest upon your beliefs. And at this stage, I am getting the distinct impression your position jhust boils down to "Well, I believe these moral statements are true. You can reject that, and that's fine, but they're still true". I just don't buy that line.

Notice that you do understand that ethical truths "ground" moral truths, something you seem to deny, above. — Banno

If this has been the impression, I have misspoken. I am acutely aware that ethical positions inform moral decisions. I am just under the impression that barely anyway has a clue what their ethical positions are and operate from (what i read to be) similar brute statements are you're employing to support teh abstract position that moral truth exists. So, as mentioned many, many times, i accept that for you some ethical statements may be true because you cannot conceive otherwise. I'm just not in that position. Seems a fairly simple divergence that we should be able to just recognized and see for what it is.

In addition, there is a confusion here about "subjective" statements, such that you seem to suppose that hey cannot be true. That would be very odd. But then, the subjective/objective distinction is fraught with conceptual puzzles. — Banno

This I'm certainly picking up. Subjective statements can be 'true'. Like Jones is in Barcelona :snicker:

I'm just pointing out that there are moral truths. — Banno

*claiming. You've yet to say anything that indicates to me that statement is anything but a over-wrought subjective claim. But i have no issue with this, because that's my ground position anyway LOL

And yet, one ought not keep slaves. It is therefore true that "One ought not keep slaves".
— Banno

I reject your position. — AmadeusD

So, where does my deduction, given above, go astray?

Set it out.

It seems to me to be no more than a T-sentence. If one accepts that one ought not keep slaves, then one accepts that "One ought not keep slaves" is true. Where does this go wrong?

So, where does my deduction, given above, go astray? — Banno

That it doesn't establish it's truth. It establishes any given S's belief in it's truth. I note a very subtle, but incredibly important difference between "..therefore X is true" and "..Therefore S believes X is true".

That it doesn't establish it's truth. — AmadeusD

Sure - you can believe it or not. The example is chosen because it is so commonly believed. Like the puppies or eating babies.

So do you think it is true? Should folk keep slaves? Kick puppies for fun?

But moreover, if you think folk ought not keep slaves, how could you not be committed to concluding that "One ought not keep slaves" is true?

I note a very subtle, but incredibly important difference between "..therefore X is true" and "..Therefore S believes X is true". — AmadeusD

My suspicion, from what you have written, is that you are only now becoming aware of the implications of this.

You're welcome.

But moreover, if you think folk ought not keep slaves, how could you not be committed to concluding that "One ought not keep slaves" is true? — Banno

No. It think its the best option given te information I have, when input to the values i hold.

I would need to be confident in my own ideas to such a degree (one i can't fathom) that my beliefs entail teh truth of them. I just don't make that move. And i can't really see how anyone could, and be entirely comfortable with it (that is, without some supervening source of ethics like revelation. Then you just believe what you're told and it's air tight).

My suspicion, from what you have written, is that you are only now becoming aware of the implications of this.

You're welcome. — Banno

No. It was my entire point. One which i took extreme pains to try to very carefully map out over your responses. Apparently, i failed. But i thank you not :snicker: This appears to some thing necessarily ignored by your responses to mine. So, I don't think either of us could have done a great job here :lol:

Uhh yes, I think you are implying exactly this when you say...

No, I don't think that makes any sense. If it is not objectively wrong for others to torture babies then you should not get angry at them when they do. You get angry and intervene because you believe it is wrong for them to torture babies. Moral anti-realism is too often — Leontiskos

You are implying that someone saying that torturing babies is not a stance independent moral fact also believes that torturing babies is not wrong.

So I can get as furious as I want about people torturing babies for fun and never once concede that it is a factually wrong thing to do. — Bob Ross

Let me offer another story. One fellow responded to my moral anger argument as follows. "Anger presupposes justice, but because moral realism is false justice does not exist. Therefore anger is irrational. Nevertheless, I myself do get angry with other people. This is only because I am irrational. If I ever succeed in becoming perfectly rational I will no longer get angry."

Well, fair enough! That is an example of thoroughgoing moral anti-realism. Still, I don't find such a position cogent or appealing.

You are implying that someone saying that torturing babies is not a stance independent moral fact also believes that torturing babies is not wrong. — Apustimelogist

How does your previous claim about preferences follow from this? In any case, I will just quote Banno:

But moreover, if you think folk ought not keep slaves, how could you not be committed to concluding that "One ought not keep slaves" is true? — Banno

I would need to be confident in my own ideas to such a degree (one i can't fathom) that my beliefs entail teh truth of them. I just don't make that move. — AmadeusD

So you are not confident in your conviction that folk ought not keep slaves. Ok.

You are not being asked to be certain beyond any doubt. You are being asked if you think folk ought be allowed to keep slaves. And if you think folk ought not be allowed to keep slaves, then can you explain how it does not follow that you think "folk ought not be allowed to keep slaves" is true?

But moreover, if you think folk ought not keep slaves, how could you not be committed to concluding that "One ought not keep slaves" is true? — Banno

I'll take this one: You can act without believing your act to comport with truth. Im unsure why that's difficult. I outline to Banno that a direct answer is that to act in accordance with what i think is the best judgement of the information/data available to me doesnt entail that judgement's truth, or that i must necessarily take it to be true. It only need be the best among the options I see ahead of me, for any given decision to act.

Additionally, I could believe a course of action is 'right', despite not relying on a truth to inform the action.

I personally think Israel is probably wrong in it's current actions. But that's amenable to immediate update if new data is available to me. If i believed they were wrong, i would necesasrily have to also believe, with certainty, some data which informed that belief. I don't. I don't even think that's available to me. So, I hold belief (such as a belief is a strongly-held, lively impression of a judgement) that Israel is likely wrong (disproportionate, at least) in it's current actions.
That doesn't require me to think it's true. It is just the best explanation I can rely on to inform any kind of moral decision. Luckily, i'm not involved lol.

Parenting has thousands of these situations - you have to believe what you're doing is 'right', without ever having to believe the data is true on which you've based the decision to do that thing.

And if you think folk ought not be allowed to keep slaves, then can you explain how it does not follow that you think "folk ought not be allowed to keep slaves" is true? — Banno

I just did. I don't mean this to be rude - but it appears you might just plum not have read my response to this same question in the post you're quoting:

"It think its the best option given te information I have, when input to the values i hold."

That doesn't require me to believe it's true. It requires me to believe it's the best option.

So you ar enot confident in your conviction that folk ought not keep slaves. Ok. — Banno

Bit underhanded. I'm confident that its the best option, and so my conviction to it is sound. I just don't claim it's true, in any sense that isn't entirely predicated on my disposition in light of the data available to me personally (i.e that which i'm aware of, rather than could (lets say easily) become aware of).

How does your previous claim about preferences follow from this? — Leontiskos

Because you can talk about someones ethical beliefs as opinions or preferences like that.

I don't see an inherent difference between a preference such as " I don't think my favourite sports team should play in such a manner " and an ethical statement like " people should be nice ". Both are framed normatively in terms of what should be done but I don't necessarily think the idea that my favourite sports team should play in a particular way is an objective fact. In the same way, just because someone thinks torturing babies is wrong, doesn't mean they think it is an objective stance independent fact.

But moreover, if you think folk ought not keep slaves, how could you not be committed to concluding that "One ought not keep slaves" is true? — Banno

I mean, there are lots of moral anti-realists across the world who would disagree with this sentiment. This rhetoric is not really more than question begging moral facts.

It only need be the best among the options I see ahead of me, for any given decision to act. — AmadeusD

Wouldn’t it then be true that you believe it to be the best option? “Best” means “most good”. Hence, you’d be affirming that you judge “one not owning slaves is the best (most good) option” to be true. In other words, you are affirming that the stated proposition conforms to the objective reality of what is good by being most proximate to it, this given the other options available. But this, then, would be realism, since it presupposes an objective, else impartially real, good by which standard you are judging not owning slaves to be a best option.

I don't see an inherent difference between a preference such as " I don't think my favourite sports team should play in such a manner " and an ethical statement like " people should be nice ". Both are framed normatively in terms of what should be done but I don't necessarily think the idea that my favourite sports team should play in a particular way is an objective fact. In the same way, just because someone thinks torturing babies is wrong, doesn't mean they think it is an objective stance independent fact. — Apustimelogist

"Chocolate ice cream is the best," is a preference. Perhaps you construe, "Do not torture babies," as a preference as well. The difference is that when we see someone torturing a baby, we prevent them; whereas when we see someone eating vanilla ice cream, we do not prevent them.

You can act without believing your act to comport with truth. — AmadeusD

Now you are confusing truth with certainty. Sure, you can act without being certain. So you are not certain that folk ought not keep slaves - perhaps a lack of moral fortitude leads you here - but you act on the basis that folk ought not keep slaves. That is, you act on the basis that "Folk ought not keep slaves" is true.

it doesn't matter which propositional attitude you frame it with; the T-sentence sits on its own.

So your reply doesn't help you avoid ascribing truth values to moral statements.

Same reply to

objective reality of what is good by being most proximate to it, — javra

No. I did cover this. It is explicitly not entailed by acting on what is thought to be the best option. My own fallibility precludes me from concluding that my best intuitions correlate with 'truth'. I don't even think my deductive reasoning could be truth-apt in that sense. If you reduce the claim to it being true, that it is the best option among those in front of me, that's the case. But that doesn't touch the truth of the statement itself.

That is, you act on the basis that "Folk ought not keep slaves" is true. — Banno

No, I don't. And i have explicitly covered why not multiple times, so i'm refrain from repeating my very much coherent answer to this charge again.

it doesn't matter which propositional attitude you frame it with; the T-sentence sits on its own. — Banno

It sits on it's own, while completely failing to rise to the status of truth. Because its self-referential and tautological. So, yeah. I reject your position and your reasoning on the basis that is not good lol. It's just a way of sophistically remaining convinced your opinions represent truths.

So your reply doesn't help you avoid ascribing truth values to moral statements. — Banno

yes it does. A repeat of the first response in this comment.

I think we may be done. But i pointed that out a long time ago.

Same I think could be claimed for most everything. But this conflates epistemic appraisals of what is true, which are fallible, with the ontic reality of what is true. At any rate, I find that one cannot have the former in the ontological absence of the latter.

But I'll let others continue the debate.

I mean, there are lots of moral anti-realists across the world who would disagree with this sentiment. This rhetoric is not really more than question begging moral facts. — Apustimelogist

Rhetoric?

It's not a sentiment; it's an observation about English. "The sky is blue" is true if and only if the sky is blue. Acceleration due to gravity is 9.8m/s/s if and only if "Acceleration due to gravity is 9.8m/s/" is true.

But for some reason, folk refuse to apply this to statements counting "ought". Special pleading.

Those who deny this usually claim either that moral statements are not truth-apt; or that they are, but are all false. Which path will you choose?